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ABSTRACT 
The main aim of this study is to shed light on the major factors affecting the performance 
of the Muslim military in five important battles fought during the first two decades of 
Islam (2/624-16/638). The study comprises an introduction, seven central chapters, and a 
conclusion (an Arabic-English glossary is placed at the end of the study). 
The first chapter includes a general introduction which incorporates an explanation of the 
method to be followed in the study. It provides a review of the study's primary and 
secondary sources and of the Arabic literature on the subject of warfare and military 
activities. It also explains the nature and scope of the study and closes with an outline of 
the organisation of the chapters. 
The second chapter provides a brief background account of the region prior to Islam and 
considers in particular the region of al-Ilijäz. In addition it illustrates some of the main 
features of the neighbouring powers in the north and south of Arabia, and of the two 
great empires that still dominated the region. 
The third chapter narrates the significant events of the battles under discussion, i. e. Badr, 
Uhud, al-Khandaq, al-Yarmiik, and al-Qädisiyyah, thus providing a reference for the 
subsequent chapters. 
The fourth chapter investigates the factor of Islamic military doctrine, its role in the 
performance of the Muslim armies, and its importance for the conduct of the five battles. 
The fifth chapter examines the factor of Islamic military leadership, its impact upon the 
performance of the Muslim armies, and how it was exercised during the battles under 
study. 
The sixth chapter discusses the factor of Islamic military intelligence, its task in relation to 
the performance of the Muslim armies, and how it was conducted in the battles in 
question. 
The seventh chapter considers the factor of the adversaries' strengths and weaknesses 
using both narrative and analysis. This chapter provides a necessary examination of the 
nature of the forces confronting the Muslim armies. 
The eighth chapter focuses on the factor of Islamic military strategy, its importance for 
the performance of the Muslim armies, and its implementation in the five battles. 
The ninth chapter summarises and discusses the study's most important findings and 
draws conclusions from them, indicates to what extent the study's principal aims have 
been achieved, and makes suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
Military activities are an important part of any nation's culture. Focusing on its respected 
past will enlighten its present, as an understanding of the past will guide future action. 
This is as true of warfare as it is of politics or social affairs. However, Islamic warfare is a 
very broad subject. Many books and articles have been written on Islamic warfare, which 
tend to deal with battles, locations, equipment, and matters of organisation. However, such 
studies inevitably neglect some of the complexities that are crucial to victory or defeat. In 
any battle, success depends on a range of factors, which will vary in importance according 
to circumstances. With this in mind, Islamic military doctrine, military leadership, Islamic 
military intelligence, the strengths and weaknesses of the adversary, and Islamic military 
strategy have been chosen as major factors to be considered in this study. This 
concentration on an Islamic perspective has been prompted by the fact that, as far as the 
researcher is aware, no military study referring primarily to Islamic sources has discussed 
or analysed all these factors in relation to the decisive battles of the early period of Islam 
i. e. Badr (2/624), Uhud (3/625), al-Khandaq (5/627), al-Yarmük (13/634), and al- 
Qädisiyyah (15/636). It must be acknowledged that these factors are not Islamic in 
themselves; they have been the subject of theoretical discussion and practical application 
for many centuries, from long before Islam to our own time. Nevertheless Islam has given 
them a special character, guiding, controlling, and directing them to follow a clearly 
defined path. The study's concentration on the Islamic characteristics of the factors under 
discussion is the basis of its uniqueness and interest. During the course of the analysis 
these major factors will be carefully examined to find out to what degree they are in 
conformity with Islam, that is, whether their basis is to be found in human thought and 
practice or in the sharical originating in the will of Alläh. A related question raised by the 
study is whether these battles would have proved so decisive had the Muslim army not 
been inspired by a transcendent doctrine. Thus these factors, each of which could itself be 
the subject of a thesis, will be examined from an Islamic military perspective in order to 
narrow the focus in accordance with the purposes of the study. 
' For Muslims, the shari°a is not a manmade law; it is the holy law of Islam, governing all aspects of life 
as the Quran (ETMC), 4: 18, states: "Then We put thee on the (right) Way of Religion". The study's 
use of'Shari`a' rather than 'law' is intended to prevent the misconception that the law under discussion 
is to be considered in the same way as secular or manmade legislation. See al-Khudrawi, Qamfs al- 
A16z, p. 216 and Netton, A Popular Dictionary oflslam, p. 230. 
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Put another way, this study is concerned with the social transformation of a people 
through religion and its effects on the conduct of military affairs. Its interest could be said 
to lie in its complexity: although the events of the battles are relatively straightforward, 
they will be shown to be the locus of interaction of many different dimensions, some of 
which will be discussed in great detail. It is the interdependence and interaction of these 
factors, rather than their separate influence, which is the study's focus of attention. 
To look for sources of data may be considered a relatively easy matter nowadays due to 
the unprecedented developments in electronic communications. It is also not difficult to 
find works of scholarship devoted to specific subjects; but the sources relevant to this 
study are many and varied, and investigating them all has involved a lengthy process of 
discovery. Relying largely on Islamic sources has made the task easier. Thus, the 
information necessary to the study is contained in a great many historical, religious, and 
narrative works, all of which have been examined from a number of perspectives. In 
addition, on those occasions where consultation with Islamic scholars was impracticable, 
the researcher had to form an opinion on the basis of his own knowledge and 
understanding. 
If we consider the few works of recent times which are pertinent to our discussion, we find 
that they rarely use the Qur'an as a main source, and thus their applicability is limited. In 
addition, the method followed by the classical writers such as al-Tabari, al-Waqidi, and 
others was largely to collect information without assuring its reliability. For example al- 
Tabari includes small number of narrations that appear dubious or stretch credulity, 
admitting in his introduction that the reader might reject or disbelieve them, in which 
case the burden of proof lies with the narrator, not with al-Tabari. Z Moreover, there 
appears to be no consensus among the modern works that might be referred to, many of 
which flatly contradict one another, chiefly due to their being affected by the views of 
opposing sects and by their widely differing aims. 3 Therefore it has been considered fitting 
to rely on the Qur'an as the main source, which provides our basic ground, and the books 
of the Ihadith. It is also fitting for any Islamic study to use the two references that all 
Muslims acknowledge as pre-eminent. Hence, these sources will guide our discussion of 
the factors in question as well as the narration of the battles. 
'See al-Funaysän, Ghazwat al Ahzäb, p. 14. 
See Newby, "Muhammad: Bibliographies", in Esposito and others (eds), The Oxford Encyclopedia of 
the Modern Islamic World, v. 3, p. 162. 
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This study therefore aims to analyse these factors and determine their effect on the 
outcomes of the five battles mentioned above in the light of Qur'anic and other Islamic 
teachings. 
The lack of useful works specialising in military affairs necessitated a thorough 
exploration of the Qur'an, hadith, al-shah (biography), al-maghäzi (battles), a1-futub 
(conquests), and of general histories in order to fulfil the requirements of the study. Al- 
cAsaf has remarked that: "No study concerning human beings can be perfect due to the 
nature of the case study. "4 Given that our study is an exploration of a particular form of 
human behaviour and an analysis of some of the factors influencing that behaviour, we 
accept his judgment, while striving to minimise any defects that might compromise the 
validity of our conclusions. Thus, it is hoped that the footnotes will demonstrate that the 
researcher has been concerned to find the most comprehensive references, without 
compromising the purposes of the study. Further, the period covered by the study has 
been strictly limited to that of the five battles in question, i. e. c. 2/624 to the 15/637. A 
great number of documents covering this period have been compared and analysed. 
Further, the study will make use of the Islamic sources according to their seniority and 
status. Thus the Qur'an, as the word of Allah, is the first to be consulted. The hadith is 
next in importance. Then follow the exegeses of the Qur'an, and the books of the 
biography of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). 5 Finally, the works of selected Islamic 
scholars will be investigated according to the expected priority of usage including some 
western works as needed. 
1.1: Sources of the Study 
It is useful at this point to provide the reader with some information on the primary and 
secondary sources used in this research. As we have noted, these are almost exclusively 
Islamic in nature. The sources are divided into primary sources, medieval sources, and 
modern sources. They mostly consist of. 
Primary: The Qur'an, hadith and historical works. 
Medieval: Religious and historical works. 
Modern and Contemporary: Religious and historical works, theses, periodicals, internet 
sites, and the like. 
4 Al `Assäf, al-Madkhal, p. 57. 
1 The phrase (Peace Be Upon Him) will be used at the beginning of each section only. 
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1.2: Primary Sources 
No studies on the military arts have survived from the early period of Islam. It is thought 
that the earliest texts were mainly either religious treatises or historical narrations, and 
even later writings are fragmentary and of limited usefulness. Therefore, the Qur'an and 
its exegesis, the hadith and works dealing with biography and the battles in question will 
be consulted as the most important sources. In addition some modern works will be 
considered whenever necessary. 
The Qur'an mentions and comments upon several battles, among which are three of 
interest to the study: Badr, Uliud, and al-Khandaq. References to the battles of al-Yarmük 
and al-Qadisiyyah are in the Sira and Maghäzr literatures. 
The Qur'an is the Word of Allah, which was revealed to Prophet Muhammad. It is 
indispensable for Muslims as a book of guidance. It is of great importance for our purpose, 
as it contains information and guidance, especially relating to the first three battles, since 
the Prophet Muhammad took part in them. To indicate the view of this scripture adopted 
by the study, the researcher would like to refer to the preface of a recent English 
translation of the meanings and commentary of the holy Qur'an, from which the following 
quotation is taken: 
"Before the reader begins to study the Qur'an, he must realise that unlike all other 
writings, this is a unique book with a supreme author, an eternal message and universal 
relevance. Its contents are not confined to a particular theme or style, but contain the 
foundations for an entire system of life, covering a whole spectrum of issues, which range 
from specific articles of faith and commandments to general moral teachings, rights and 
obligations, crime and punishment, personal and public law, and a host of other private 
and social concerns. These issues are discussed in a variety of ways, such as direct 
stipulations, reminders of Allah's favours to His creation, admonitions and rebukes. Stories 
of past communities are narrated, followed by the lessons to be learned from their actions 
and subsequent fates. i6 
The preface also argues that, given the depth, as well as the sublimity, of the Qur'anic text, 
a faithful translation of it into another language is virtually impossible. ' The various 
translations that exist today, however accurate they may be, cannot be designated as the 
6 The Holy Qur'än ETMC p. iii. It should be noted that the edition used by this study is the large 
(2082 pages) translation issued by King Fahad Holy Qurän Printing Complex, in Medina, (the 1990's 
Print) and titled "THE HOLY QUR'AN; English Translation of the Meanings and Commentary". It will 
be referred to as The Holy Qurän ETMC 
' See The Holy Qurän ETMC, p. vi. 
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Qur'an, since they can never hope to imitate the diction or the style of the Book of Allah. 
Nevertheless translation is one of the few ways to export the knowledge among the 
nations, and so it is the duty of those in a position to do so to fulfil this task. 8 This 
linguistic limitation should be noted by readers of the translated passages quoted in this 
study. 
Second only to the Noble Qur'an, the most important text for Muslims is the hadith. The 
term hadith denotes `what was transmitted on the authority of Muhammad, his deeds, 
sayings, tacit approval, or description of his physical appearance. '9 The hadiths are 
collected into many books, '0 whose veracity depends on their isnad 1 to the Prophet. 
However, there are six main books, known as the Kutub al-Sihäh al-Sittah (The six 
authentic Books of hadith). 12 These six books will be used extensively; the other books of 
hadith will be used as the study requires. It should be noted that every hadith consists of 
two parts, the isnad (the chain of authorities) and the matn (the main text of the hadith), 
but the study will be concerned only with the main text due to the limitation of space. 13 
An exhaustive exegesis that will be much referred to is the exegesis of al-Tabari, 
Muhammad b. Jarir [224/839-310/923] known as Tafsir al-Tabari: Jami' al-Bayän can 
Ta'wr7 al-Qur'an, which is collected in thirty volumes. It contains both the Ylm of al- 
Riwayah and al-Dirayah (the Sciences of Transmission and Cognizance) and as such it 
remains a much-used work of reference. Al-Tabari illustrates each verse in full detail and 
usually without repetition. At the end of his discussion he often makes a sound and 
reasonable judgment. Al-Qurtubi not only depended on this exegesis in order to complete 
his own, but he also generally followed the same style. It should be noted, however, that 
each exegesis used in this study has a distinctive character due to the influence of time 
'See The Holy Qur'än ETMC p. iv. 
9 The sunna, often used as a synonym for the hadith, is more properly the mode of life of the Prophet. 
There is a slight difference between them, for a hadith may not contain any sunna or a single hadith 
may contain more than one sunna. Similarly see al-Khudrawi, Qämris al-A//4 ä p. 204 and Netton, A 
Popular Dictionary of Islam, p. 238. Also see I; Iusayn, al-Aqidah al-Askariyyah, p. 38 and al-Funaysän, 
Ghazwat al Ahzäb, p. 55. 
10 They were collected and written by the order of the Caliph Umar b. 'Abd al- Aziz [61/681-101-720]. 
11 Isnäd means the chain of authorities given at the beginning of a hadith. See Netton, A Popular 
Dictionary oflslam, p. 128. 
12 They are Sa$ih al-Bukhari [194/810-256/870], Sahih Muslim [206/822-261/875], Sunan Abü 
Dd'üd [202/818-275/889], Sunan al-Tirmidhi [209/824-279/892], Sunan al-Nasa i [215/831- 
303/916], and Sunan Ibn Majah [207/822-275/255]. See al-Suyü i [849/1446-911/1505], Tadrib al- 
Rä wi, v. 1, pp. 100-103 and al-Khudrawi, Qämils al A11ä p. 234. 
13 It should be noted that the text of a hadith is sometimes differently narrated in the different Books 
of the hadith. These differences will not be considered due to the limitation of space. However, any 
book used as a reference will be acknowledged. In addition, it should be noted that this study will use 
mostly the translation of the Sahib al-Bukhari by Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan, The Translation of 
the Meanings ofSahrh al-Bukhäri, Dar al-Saläm, al-Riyadh, 1997, v. 9. 
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and place. For example, al-Qurtubi excludes the fabricated and weak hadiths mentioned 
in al-Tabari. 
One of the most interesting historical works used in this study is also by al-Tabari. This 
book, Tänkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulük, contains a great deal of military information, much of 
it covering the period of the study. It is considered one of the most extensive of the extant 
early works of Islamic scholarship, and the richest and one of the most detailed sources 
for the beginning of Islamic history. In this particular respect the Tänkh al-Tabari is more 
valuable than any other historical work, and has proved especially useful to the study in 
its discussions of leadership, tactics and strategy, and the strengths and weaknesses of the 
adversary. On the negative side, the information is not well organised and needs to be 
teased out of the historical and narrative material. This work consists of ten volumes. It is 
organised chronologically, beginning with the creation of Adam and continuing up until 
the time of the author. Al-Tabari's information is generally trustworthy, and he places 
particular emphasis on the isnäd of his sources. His book contains much unique matter 
that cannot be obtained from any other source, especially with respect to the battle of al- 
Qädisiyyah. His chief source of information was Sayf b. Umar al-Tamimi, although the 
narrations of Shucayb b. Ibrahim and Yacgüb b. Ibrahim, al-Wägidi, 'Awänah b. al-Ilakam, 
and al-Madä'ini were particularly valuable when it came to dealing with the regions of 
Syria and al-Hijäz. la 
Another important book is the al-Sirah, compiled by Ibn Hishäm [d. c. 213/833] in six 
volumes. It is customarily designated as the leading narration of the biography of the 
Prophet, and has become the cornerstone for all later studies of his life. It should be 
noted, however, that Ibn Hishäm is said to have relied on the work of Ibn Ishäq in 
composing his narration, while omitting poems included by Ibn Ishäq but not found in any 
other source. Ibn Hishäm's al-Sirah narrates the events of the life of the Prophet, but first 
deals with the life of the Arabs before Islam. His history continues with an account of the 
life of the Muslims in Mecca during the first decade of Islam before the Hi rah. He then 
relates in detail the life of the Prophet, including in his discussion some of the military 
activities of the Companions nominated by the Prophet. He ends his work with the 
election of Abü Bakr as the first Caliph. 
Another important and wide-ranging work of Islamic history is that of al-Balädhuri [d. c. 
279/892] entitled Futüh al-Buldän. It deals with the Islamic conquests, futclh, of the early 
This study will use Netton, A Popular Dictionary of Islam, and al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari; the 
English Version, as the main sources for transliteration. 
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Islamic period, beginning with the emigration, Hijrah, of the Prophet Muhammad from 
Mecca to Medina and continuing up to the third/ninth century. Its broad scope 
encompasses a great deal of information about the Islamic art of war and the Muslims' 
military activities. Even though al-Balädhuri does not discuss the battles of Badr, Uhud, 
and al-Khandaq from the tactical viewpoint, his Fut h al-Buldan contains much valuable 
information of a military nature, especially with regard to al-Qädisiyyah. It discusses 
military tactics, equipment, and leadership, relying in this respect on the narrations of al- 
Wägidi and al-Haytham b. cAdi al-Tä'i. 'S 
Al-Wägidi [130/748-207/823] wrote another book besides his famous al-Maghazl, which 
he called Futüli al-Sham. Compiled in two volumes, it covers the period from the end of 
the Riddah wars to the middle of the first Islamic century. As the title indicates, al- 
Yarmük is the only battle to receive detailed attention. None of the factors to interest of 
this study are discussed separately, but they are mentioned indirectly. 
1.3: Medieval Sources 
Islamic literature has been developed over many centuries. This applies to works on 
military subjects as much as to those on any other topic, and many Muslim books or parts 
of books have been devoted to the arts of war. Jihad has perhaps been the main subject of 
Islamic military literature, being examined from the perspective of jurisprudence in the 
first centuries of Islam. " 
Al-Qurtubi completed a huge work (in twenty volumes) of exegesis of the Qur'an, which is 
known as Tafsir al-Qurtubi: al-Jämc li Ahkäm al-Qur'an. Abü cAbdullah Muhammad b. 
Ahmad al-Qurtubi [d. 761/1273] was influenced by Ibn 'Atiyyah, Abü Jacfar al-Nahas, al- 
Mawardi, al-Tabari, and Abü Bakr b. al-Arabi. Other eminent scholars learnt from him, 
including Abü Hiyyan al-Andalusi, Ibn Kathir, and al-Shawkani. Al-Qurtubi's exegesis 
provides much valuable information in many areas of Qur'anic studies. It also furnishes 
documentation concerning the chain of isnad for each hadith. Al-Qurtubi explains the five 
pillars of Islam and illustrates the various Islamic principles as the need arises. It must be 
admitted, however, that in spite of his care in discovering and exposing forged hadith his 
exegesis is not free of them. " In addition, as one of the main exegetical works, it deals 
with the analysis of the construction of words and sentences, since it is known that the 
Qur'an is of supreme importance not only legislatively but also lexically. It is therefore 
'S See D5ri, The Rise ofHistorical Writing, p. 53. 
16 Awsi, Tafrij al-Kurz7b, p. 4. 
See al-Qurtubi, Tafsiral-Qurtubi, v. 1, p. 9. 
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necessary to have sufficient knowledge of the etymology of the words of the Qur'an since 
this study sometimes needs to make judgements based on linguistic evidence. 
Abü al-Fida' Ismacil Ibn Kathir [701/1302-774/1373] compiled another valuable 
exegesis, entitled Tafsir Ibn Kathir: Tafsir al-Qur'an al-Azim. He learnt from many 
scholars, among whom were Ibn °Asakir, Ibn Taymiyyah, and Ibn al-Zaki. He was 
recognised as the most knowledgeable scholar of his time, expert in exegesis, hadith, and 
history. His exegesis deals with most of the Qur'anic sciences. He discusses the reasons for 
revelations, the pillars of faith, and many other subjects. In the first volume he discusses 
and comments upon the meaning of the verses. In the later volumes the commentaries are 
omitted in order to avoid repetition, but reference is made to those in the first volume. He 
does not draw on al-Qurtubi s work since al-Qurtubi was raised and mainly studied in al- 
Andalus (Spain) and the northernmost part of Africa. Ibn Kathir also differs from al- 
Qurtubi in that he extensively discusses almost every point in his first and second chapters 
before reaching a decision, unlike al-Qurtubi, who briefly considers some strongly related 
points and then states his judgement. 
Ibn Kathir also compiled an enormous historical work entitled al-Bidayah wa al-Nihayah. 
The unique significance of this book is that it considers in detail not only the events of the 
past but also those which are to come. He uses a chronological method, starting from the 
moment of creation and continuing to his own lifetime. He also writes about the Day of 
Judgment and what might happen in the life after death. More pertinently, he proves a 
great deal of military information regarding the battles under discussion. He is indebted to 
his eminent predecessors, notably Ibn Ishaq, Ibn Hisham, and al-Wagidi. His work will be 
relied on mainly for the events of the battle of al-Yarmilk. 
Ibn Taymiyyah Abü cAbdullah Ahmad [661/1263-728/1328], who is considered to be 
one of the greatest Muslim scholars of his time, wrote several books that are used in 
various ways in this study. He earned the cognomen Shaykh al-Islam due to the huge 
store of his Islamic knowledge. His works deal with Islamic warfare, though indirectly, 
and always from a figh point of view. However there is a good deal of military information 
to be discovered between the lines in his discussions. His works include Majm171'a1-Fatawa, 
al-Särim al-Mash7, a]-Ja wäb al-Sah h1721 and Minhäj al-Sunnah. 
Ibn al-Qayyim, Abü cAbdullah Muhammad [691/1292-751/1350] was a brilliant 
student of Ibn Taymiyyah. He composed many books on Islamic matters, and in one of 
them, al-Furisiyyah, he discusses in detail means of riding, weapons, and military courage. 
Again his viewpoint is mainly that of jurisprudence, and it should be noted that he was 
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writing during a period of peace. He particularly discusses and compares types of 
horsemanship and weapons. He illustrates each weapon in detail and makes a final 
judgement. A few of his other books containing discussions of some aspects of warfare are 
Zäd a1-Ma ad, Badä'c al-Fa wä'd, and Hidäyat al-Hayärä. 
The celebrated Muqaddimat Ibn Khaldün18 contains a section devoted to a discussion of 
warfare and the different methods of fighting of different nations. Here Ibn Khaldün, cAbd 
al-Rahmän [732/1332-808/1406] investigates the causes of war and the methods of 
mobilisation. " However, these discussions form only a small part of this richly varied 
work by a great philosopher of history. 
Al-Malabi, `Ali b. Burhän al-Din [975/1568-1044/1635] is the other important writer of 
the Sim of the Prophet. He relies on two works: al-Sirah al-Shämiyyah and cuyfn al- 
Athar, and follows in the footsteps of Ibn Hishäm in his narration, but with greater depth 
of detail and more discussion of different views. However, he adopts a judgmental style in 
concluding most of his discussions of each point. His outlook and style could be said to be 
almost modern, and because of this his work has been particularly useful to the study, 
especially as his comprehensive account of the first three battles is generally more 
valuable than that of Ibn Hishäm. 
In addition, most of the early Islamic writers on military conflict did not mention their 
sources and depended mainly on their own experience. 
I. 4: Modem and Contemporary Sources 
The modem sources consulted by the study are more specialised than their medieval 
forerunners, which are known to be general and comprehensive. They usually rely on the 
traditional sources but are better organised, particularly al-Zuhayli. In addition some of 
them limit themselves to either discussing one factor or investigating one battle. 
Al-Zuhayli, Wahbah Mustafa composed a modem work of Qur'änic exegesis, al-Tafsfr al- 
Munir. His thirty-two volume work covers most aspects of what is now known as `i/din 
al-Qur'an (the Qur'änic Sciences) such as asbäb al-nuzUl (reasons of revelation), al-'agida 
(Islamic doctrine), al-sharica (Islamic legislation), figh (jurisprudence), lexicography and 
semantics. It is useful since it goes straight to the point but without omitting to discuss 
briefly other points of view. It is also valuable due to its well-designed appearance and 
18 It should be noted that the full title of this book is Kitäb al-Mbar wa Diwan al-Mubbtada' wa al- 
Khabar fi Ayäm a1-°Amb wa al- Ajam wa al-Barbar wa min Ärarah um min Dha wi al-Sultan al Akbar. 
See Ibn Khaldün, Mugaddimatlbn Khaldin, p. 7. 
19 Ibn Khaldnn, Mugaddimatlbn Khaldrin, pp. 271-279. 
9 
Ch. 1: Introduction 
clear organisation and the great amount of information it contains. Thus sometimes it is 
used to confirm a particular point. 
Alimad Iiusayn, al-Agidah al-Askariyyah al-Islämiyyah, is a relatively concentrated work 
concerning Islamic military doctrine and its aspects, for instance its importance and 
sources. In addition Husayn also briefly compares the Islamic military doctrine with its 
Western equivalent. 
Another writer on military doctrine was Ahmad Basbüs, whose book on the role of Islamic 
doctrine in warfare, al-Agidah a1-Qitäliyyah fi al-Isläm, concentrates on the concept of 
`doctrinal fighting' in Islam and the way it is instilled in the troops. He also draws 
comparison with other schools of doctrinal fighting, and compares the principles of Islam 
with those of international law. 
Muhammad al-Rashid's large volume, al-Qiyädah al-Askariyah fi Ahd al-Rasril, is the one 
of the first purely military works to be considered by this study. It discusses some general 
aspects of leadership, and the leadership of the Prophet in detail. This work illustrates the 
role of the Prophet's leadership in some of his more important battles, among them the 
three covered by this study: Badr, Uhud, and al-Khandaq. The book also deals briefly with 
intelligence and doctrine. 
Afzalur Rahman composed an extensive work entitled Muhammad as a Military Leader. 
Writing in English, he concentrates on the leadership of the Prophet, examining the 
different aspects of military activities from this specific point of view. 
Another specialist work is cAbdullah Manäsarah's Al-Istikhbärät al-Askariyyah R al-Islam, 
in which the author is concerned with jurisprudence rather than history, specifically in 
section two. In the third section, counter-intelligence is also examined systematically and 
methods of collecting intelligence data are discussed. 
c& . jf cAbd al-Ghani's Nuzm a1-Istikhbärät Cind al-Arab wa al-Muslimin covers an extensive 
period: from the beginning of Islam, through the age of the first four Caliphs, up until the 
middle of the fifth century [c. 550/1155]. Spying operations are also judged from a figh 
point of view. Unlike Manäsarah, he discusses the system and means of intelligence data 
transference and the organisation of what was called the Shurat (Police) of that time. On 
the other hand, like Manäsarah, he covers a long period of time in a limited number of 
pages, and this does not allow him to devote much detail to the points he raises for 
discussion, which it must be admitted is a defect of both authors. 
Ali Naseers interesting doctoral thesis, entitled Military Organization in Early Islam, is 
concerned with the first forty years of Islam [1/622-40/661]. The study is a general 
discussion of early Islamic military affairs, drawing on the main Islamic historical sources 
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such as al-Tabari, al-Baladhuri, al-Wagidi, and Ibn Hisham. Naseef also makes use of 
some Western works as secondary sources. His discussions are brief but cover a wide 
range of issues, including administration, tactics, equipment, means of riding and 
transportation, and the army's financial affairs, all of which are well described, although 
their specific roles in the battles of the period are not investigated thoroughly. Thus the 
study could be considered as a basis for further research. 
Among the Western works consulted for use in this study are two comprehensive volumes 
edited by John Kelsay and James Johnson and entitled Just War and Jrhäd and Cross, 
Crescent, and Sword. They comprise a number of articles written by several authors. 
Adopting a generally juridical approach, they mostly deal with their subjects from a 
secular viewpoint, employing historical and philosophical analysis to discuss and indicate 
the links between the Islamic conceptions (both Sunni and Shia) of the just (or 
justifiable) war and their Western equivalents. In other words, they are generally 
concerned with comparing and contrasting the Islamic and Christian traditions and 
discourses with regard to the notion of justified warfare and trace their historical 
development. The historical and theoretical essays explore a wide range of information, 
dealing with the subject analytically and comparatively. They follow the deviation of the 
religious and secular concepts of war and peace over a long period, from the earliest 
Christian formulations to the arguments of the present day. Despite their many virtues, 
however, as they are written from a secular perspective and include many matters 
unrelated to this study their usefulness is limited, and some contain opinions which 
contradict Muslim belief. To cite only one example, Donner argues that the Qur'an is 
"ambivalent" in its attitude to violence, drawing attention to the apparent inconsistencies 
to be found on comparing certain verses. 20 These seeming contradictions will be clarified 
and resolved in the eighth chapter of the study. 
Nevertheless, Donner's summary of the background of the juridical tradition may serve to 
indicate the study's scope: 
"The attitudes of the first generations of Muslims toward questions of war and peace were 
shaped by several factors. Paramount among them were (a) the cultural norms of the pre- 
Islamic societies to which they had belonged, (b) the attitudes toward war contained, 
implicitly or explicitly, in the Qur'an, and (c) the dramatic events of their own lifetimes. 
ZÖ Donner, "The Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War", in Kelsay and Johnson, Just WarandJihäd, p. 
47. 
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All of these factors contributed to the formation of the "classical" Islamic conception of 
war, that is, the juridical notion, as well as to popular attitudes. "2i 
As we will see, the cultural norms of the pre-Islamic Arab society were of great importance 
in providing the structure within which Islam was revealed. So without a knowledge of 
the cultural norms that preexisted Islam it is impossible to understand the transformation 
that took place through Islam. Thus Donner's first point applies to the Muslims' 
adversaries in the first three battles and to the background to the study's argument. His 
second point indicates the main focus of the thesis: "the attitudes toward war contained, 
implicitly or explicitly, in the Qur'an", since the Qur'an is used as its main source and 
substantive basis. Donner's third point can be said to concern the events referred to in the 
study, not only the drama of the battles themselves, but also the transformative power of 
revealed religion, which first made the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) speak out against 
what he saw as the degenerate and corrupt society of Mecca and so eventually drove his 
fellow-citizens to react against his message, to persecute his followers and later to attempt 
to destroy the faith in its newly established base in Medina. These `dramatic events' were 
commented on in the Qur'an, whose revelation was a continuing phenomenon in the lives 
of the Prophet's Companions, helpers and followers. 
What this suggests is that for the leader and the ordinary soldier alike, the concept of the 
just war from the Islamic point of view was of the greatest importance, and so the study 
has taken the Qur'an as its main source chiefly because of the unimpeachable nature of its 
judgements and pronouncements for Muslims. The study is therefore not concerned to 
describe the external practices of warfare, which can be done from a secular perspective, 
but rather to explore its moral basis, which, we will argue, is inseparable from religious 
doctrine for the committed Muslim. An important aspect of the study's discussion is the 
attempt to discover why the Muslims acted as they did, why their behaviour conformed to 
strict limits, and why they did not return to the barbarous practices of their warrior kin 
(such as the intimidating custom of dismemberment) after the Prophet's death. 
Thus the study cannot be categorised as being concerned with juridical matters only, since 
it is a synthetic study which ranges across a number of aspects. It is unified by its focus on 
the Qur'anic text and hadith and by its scope, which is limited to these five important 
battles. It also deals with one particular dimension of the vast subject of Islam, which is 
all-embracing and none of whose aspects can be isolated from the others. So its subject is 
not only jurisprudence, or military history, or the psychology of the early Muslims, or a 
21 Donner, "The Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War", p. 33. 
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historical analysis of the change from pre-Islamic Arab tribal culture to Islam, but it is an 
attempt to elucidate a relatively brief period of history by examining it through the lens of 
military affairs and in the light of Islam. Its intention is, through a concentration on 
military affairs, to illuminate the whole process of transformation of a group of relatively 
ordinary Arabs into Muslim warriors capable of toppling empires. Further, although it 
uses a theological approach this does not mean that it is a theological study where, for 
example, doctrine is examined and judged; it is rather an examination of a phenomenon of 
history using a theological framework and evaluating the matters under study accordingly. 
Therefore in one sense the study is a work of military history, but only in the sense that it 
seeks to explain `the cause of the people' and how they managed to defeat two empires 
and begin to spread their faith so rapidly. So it can be argued that this is an exploratory 
study, which moves beyond the boundaries of military history proper in the attempt to 
discover the most likely reasons for the extraordinary military achievements of the early 
Muslims. 
The study is divided into nine chapters: an introduction, seven main chapters and a 
conclusion. It will be noticed that some of the chapters have certain distinctive 
characteristics due to the nature of the topic under discussion. The first chapter contains a 
general introduction which reviews the method and plan followed in the study. It also 
discusses the primary and secondary sources of the study and of the Arabic literature of 
war, and closes with an outline of the organisation of the study. 
The second chapter presents a brief background account of the region prior to Islam. It 
discusses the general atmosphere of the region of al-IIijäz. It also illustrates some of the 
main features of the neighbouring powers in the north and south of the Arabian 
Peninsula and of the two great empires of that time. Hence it is closely connected to the 
matter of the seventh chapter. It is a `bridge' chapter, describing the environment of the 
peninsula both before and after Islam. 
The third chapter narrates, in chronological order, the events of the battles under 
discussion: Badr, Uhud, al-Khandaq, al-Yarmnk, and al-Qädisiyyah. It is thus an essential 
preface to the discussion and analysis contained in the succeeding chapters, and is 
intended to be used as a reference by those following the argument presented in the 
fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth chapters in particular. 
The fourth chapter investigates the factor of the Islamic military doctrine, its role in the 
performance of the Muslim army, and its function and implementation in the five battles 
in question. Islamic military doctrine, as the first major factor, can be considered the most 
important influence on the Muslim soldier, as it is not imposed from without, nor is it a 
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matter of mere external obedience or of intellectual conviction. It is a matter of faith, of 
internal certainty, which, it can be argued, has been essential to the successful conduct of 
military activities throughout history. 22 The chapter attempts to distinguish between 
doctrine, Islamic doctrine, and Islamic military doctrine. It also discusses the sources of the 
Islamic military doctrine (its validity) in the sharica, its significance, virtue, principles, and 
warfare management guidelines. Within the discussion of each point a proof of its 
application and degree of involvement will be provided. 
Lastly, the insufficient effect of this factor on its own will be briefly discussed. 
The fifth chapter deals with the factor of Islamic military leadership, its role in the 
performance of the Muslim troops, and how it was exercised in the five battles. Extensive 
use will be made of the references to leadership found in the Qur'än and hadith. Its 
concept and principles, according to the Islamic view, will also be discussed. The chapter 
is divided into two main parts: theoretical and practical. The theoretical part will cover 
several issues of Islamic military leadership based on the shari`a as to definition, validity, 
necessity, unity of command, and types and qualities of leaders. From a practical point of 
view, the reader will be provided with the method of applying the theoretical concepts to 
each battle, first separately and then as a related group. 
The sixth chapter investigates the factor of Islamic military intelligence in the same way 
as the previous chapters discussed their topics. It is also divided into two separate parts, 
theoretical and practical. The theoretical part furnishes the reader with a definition of 
Islamic military intelligence, as well as its validity in the sharifa. It also discusses the 
various types of intelligence; the role of manpower; leadership and its degree of response; 
the importance and value of intelligence to soldiers; the role of divine information, and 
the element of al-tawriyah `dissimulation' from the point of view of the sharifa. On the 
practical side we show how these theoretical considerations were implemented in the 
battles considered separately, after which a comparison is made between the battles and 
conclusions are drawn. 
The seventh chapter stands alone to a certain extent in that it analyses the adversaries' 
strengths and weaknesses. Here the focus is on the Muslims' enemies and their conduct in 
the five battles. At the same time it examines this conduct in the light of the other factors 
considered by the study. This chapter provides an essential counterbalance to the 
discussion of the Muslim army's strengths and weaknesses as explored in the other central 
chapters. 
22 For example the Middle-East case i. e. Jerusalem. 
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The eighth chapter examines the factor of Islamic military strategy. The plan and method 
of the chapter are similar to those used in chapters five and six. The theoretical part 
constructs a definition of Islamic military strategy, considers its validity, formulates the 
concept of the `two pillars', explores the relationship between military and religious 
decisions and between strategy, operations, and tactics, and analyses its principles by 
reference to the shan'a. The chapter then illustrates the practical application of these 
theoretical aspects to the battles, first separately and then through a comparison. 
The ninth chapter summarises and discusses the findings of the study and draws 
conclusions from them, indicates to what extent the study's principal aims have been 
accomplished, and makes some suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Brief Background of the Region Prior to Islam 
This chapter aims to furnish the necessary background to the study's subject matters, and 
to briefly describe the environment - geographical, cultural, and political - of the region 
prior to the period of the battles under study. It is hoped that the following discussion will 
shed some light on the great changes wrought on those within the Arabian Peninsula 
whose lives were transformed by the message of Islam, bearing in mind that these people 
had long resisted any comprehensive changes to their way of life. First of all, the terrain of 
the Arabian Peninsula will be described, providing a geographical overview. In addition its 
position in relation to the empires that surrounded it during the period in question will be 
briefly explored. The characteristics and structure of the Arabs' social life and other 
matters pertinent to the study will be briefly considered. 
The location of a city - that is, its cultural and political, as well as its geographical, position 
and climate - is known to have a very important bearing on the lives of its inhabitants, and 
it is therefore difficult to discuss any nation without discussing its location, which would 
surely "affect its way of living". ' 
I1.1: The Arabian Peninsula before Islam 
Much of the Peninsula2 was subject to the influence of the two great neighbouring 
empires of that time. ' In the north, the Byzantines occupied northeast Africa and al- 
Shäm4 while the Persians' occupied Iraq and Yemen. ' Also there were two Arabian 
kingdoms: al-Manädhirah', which was subject to the Säsänians, and al-Ghas5sinah8, 
' Furayhät and Yäsin, Madkhal ilä M kh al-Hadärah, p. 44. 
s See Weiss and Green, A Survey ofArab History, pp. 41-89. 
See al 'Arif, al-Jaysh al-Arabi al-Islämi, p. 9. Also see the section "The Adversary at the Battle of al- 
Yarmük" in the chapter "Me Adversaries' Strengths and Weaknesses" (Ch. 7). 
4 Al-Shäm refers to the region comprising Syria, Jordan, Palestine, and Lebanon. 
5 For the origins of the Säsdnian Empire see al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari; the English Version, v. XII, p. 
43, fn: 178. 
6 See al cArif, al-Jaysh, p. 9. 
They were from the tribe of Tanükh and had migrated from Yemen to the land of al-Hirah on the 
west bank of the Euphrates River in Iraq after the destruction of the Ma'rib Dam. They were Lakhmids 
and were known as al-Manädhirah. Having built a powerful ruling state in the region, they entered 
into a reciprocal agreement with the Säsänians whereby they accepted subject status in return for 
protection. See Ibn Hishäm, al-SLrah, v. 1, p. 182 Ibn al-Athir [d. 630/1233], al-Kämil, v. 1, p. 316, and 
Furayhät and Yäsin, 7ärikh al-Haclärah, pp. 43-44. Further see Sälim, "Siyäsat Dawlat al-Rasill", in al- 
Ansäri (ed), a -Jazirah al-Arabiyyah, No. 3, v. 1, p. 135. 8 The Ghasäsinah were originally from Yemen, from the tribe of Jifnah; after the destruction of the 
Ma'rib Dam they took up residence in the land of Hurrän and al-Balgä'. They were the Byzantines' 
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which was subject to the Byzantines. 9 The centre of the Peninsula was under the control 
of the free-living Arabs. However, there was interference from the surrounding cultures, 
causing political, religious, social, and cultural laxity in both kingdoms and to some extent 
in the rest of Arabia. 10 This laxity and disunity increased what is known as a1-casabiyyah 
al-gabaliyyah, `tribal solidarity', as we shall presently see. Relationships in Arabia as a 
consequence became infected by deception, cruelty and treachery, which kept the Arabs in 
an inferior position vis-ä-vis the surrounding powers. " 
The region of al-Hijäz, where three out of the five battles in question occurred, was 
important to the Arabs for several reasons. The central position of the region, its 
accessibility and its location on the main caravan routes running north and south, offered 
an unexcelled opportunity for both religious and commercial activities. 12 In addition, there 
were several merchandise routes to the south; some of these began in Yemen and ran 
eastwards along the coast of the Arabian Sea as far as Oman, 13 where they turned to the 
north, towards Bahrain. The main cities of al-Hijäz were Mecca and Medina. 14 The 
western route ran through Mecca, which grew prosperous, being half-way between South 
Arabia and Palestine. Therefore, the great Arab fair of °Ukäz flourished there because of 
these conditions. 
The area surrounding Mecca was poor in resources, 15 but due to its location on the main 
caravan routes between Yemen and al-Sham it developed quickly. 16 Its citizens were for 
the most part involved in mercantile activities. Also it was the main centre of pilgrimage, 
subjects, charged with maintaining order and peace among the Bedouin and assisted them in their 
wars against the Sasanians and the Manädhirah. See Furayhat and Yasin, Tärikh al-Hadärah, p. 43. 
9 See Mu'nis, Atlas, pp. 48-49 and al `Arif, al-Jaysh, p. 9. 
'o See the sections "Tribal Life and Feuding" and "The Byzantines and Sasanians" in this chapter. Also 
see al °Arif, al-Jaysh, p. 9. 
" See al 'Arif, al-Jaysh, p. 10. 
12 These routes were known and used by both caravans and individual travellers since they passed 
through the locations of water wells, including the well of Badr. Further see al CAli, Muhädarat, v. 1, p. 
78. 
13 See Hitti, History oftheArabs, p. 50. 
14 Him, History of the Arabs, p. 102. Also the Qur'an (EI'MC), 106: 2, mentions journeys through 
these important routes: "For the familiarity of the Quraysh, their familiarity with the journeys by 
winter and summer. " 
15 See al-Fakihi [217/832-275/889], Akhbär Mecca, v. 2, p. 9. Further see al-I; lasan al-Basri [21/642- 
110/729], Fadäfl Mecca, v. 1, p. 14. 
16 In the book of The Holy Quran ETMC p. 2014, the following sentence is found: "If the Quraysh 
were fond of Mecca and proud of it, if they profited, by its central position and its guaranteed security, 
from their caravans of trade and commerce, let them be grateful, adore the One True God, and accept 
His Message. " 
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visited by all Arabs and, later, by all Muslims capable of making the journey. 17 The various 
Arab tribes were drawn to the city by the many idols the Quraysh made for them there. "' 
It should also be noted that the practice of usury had increased the wealth of the people 
of Mecca and especially of the nobility, who were determined to maintain their power and 
prestige. 19 The tribes of the Quraysh had taken control of Mecca after gaining ascendancy 
over the Khuzacah; the latter had previously taken the leadership from the tribe of 
Jurhum, the first builders of the city. 20 Later on and prior to Islam, the duty of serving the 
Pilgrimage, which was considered to be the most honourable obligation in the region, 
devolved upon the tribes of the Quraysh. 21 
In contrast, the land surrounding Medina, 22 which lay about 450 kilometres north of 
Mecca, was much richer than that of Mecca. Medina also lay on the main caravan route, 
which connected Mecca with al-Sh5m. 23 Unlike Mecca, it was not a religious centre, but it 
had the advantage of being a fertile oasis, especially adapted for the cultivation of date- 
palms, which provided nourishment to most of the main tribes. These tribes were the Aws 
and al-Khazraj and their neighbours, the Jewish tribes of Banü al-Na4ir, Banü Qurayzah, 
and Banü Qaynugdl, and their interest in the town made it a leading agricultural centre, 24 
with an economy that guaranteed independence. Like Mecca, Medina did not have a 
supreme leader. In fact, the town witnessed several wars which sometimes lasted for 
decades. 
On the other hand, by the time of the Prophet's birth, said to be in 571 AD, the 
inhabitants of South Arabia had occupied the land for a millennium or more. Their 
country was very different from northern Arabia, consisting mostly of civilised settlements, 
although the two parts of the peninsula were linked by caravans. There were various 
different tribes, among whom were the Ijimyer, Khawlän, Ilamdän, Muräd, and the 
" The Qur'an mentions its important position in: Qur'an, 2: 125,127,144,158,159,197, & 200,3: 96, 
5: 97,16: 112,17: 1,9: 19,22: 26,27, & 29,27: 91,28: 57 & 126,34: 15, and 106: 3, 
18 See Furayhät and YYsin, T rikh al-Hadärah, p. 54. 
19 Due to the great negative effect of usury on society, as Muslims believe, the Qur'an discusses the 
practise in several places, including Qur'an, 2: 275,276, & 278,3: 130,4: 161, and 30: 39. Also see the 
rest of the Books of hadith. 
20 See Furayhät and rsin, 7ärikh al- -Iadärah, p. 46. 
21 This would explain why Mecca did not have one supreme leader. See the section "The Adversary at 
the Battle of Badr" in the chapter "The Adversaries' Strengths and Weaknesses" (Ch. 7). For the 
virtues of Mecca see The Holy Qur' n ETMC p. 2015 and al-I iasan al-Basri, Fadä'l Mecca, pp. 11-25. 
Zz For the virtues of Medina see al-Jundi [d. 308/921], Fadä'il al-Madinah, pp. 18-27. 
See Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 104. 
2' See ibid. 
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kingdom of °Abdu Jayifar in Oman. ' The land was rich, watered by regular rainfall, and 
agriculture was well developed. Irrigated, terraced fields produced a variety of foods and 
aromatics. The people of the major states - Saba, Main, Oatabän, Awsän, and the 
Hadramawt - were skilled architects and visual artists and the region had grown wealthy 
through trade. 
11.2: The Hijaz on the Eve of the Rise of Islam 
During the period before the coming of Islam the Arabs lived in a condition which was 
later to be called the jähiliyyah. In fact, the period is generally referred to by this term, 
which is usually translated as the "time of ignorance". 26 The jähiliyyah is thus the period 
in which Arabia had no dispensation, no inspired Prophet, and no revealed book. 27 
"Jähiliyyah" occurs in the Qur'än in its original form28 and in various different forms 
several times and has been discussed in these contexts by many scholars. 29 
During the jähiliyyah the Arab tribes tended to resort to violence in order to solve their 
problems, although killing was regarded as a very serious matter and was usually avoided. 
How their feuds, vendettas, and wars were regulated will be considered in the following 
sections. 
II. 3: Tribal Life and Feuding 
In pre-Islamic Arabia Arab society was based upon families, kinship, clans, and tribes, and 
religious belief was of relatively little importance. 30 Tribal solidarity (`acabiyyah) was the 
main characteristic of social life. 31 Even in matters of belief they usually preferred to 
follow their leaders and their tribal customs even when they suspected they were 
See Mu'nis, Atlas, p. 61. 
26 Ibn Manziir [630/1233-711/1312], Lisän al-Arab, v. 11, p. 129. 
27 The Qur'an (ETMC), 5: 104, states: "When it is said to them: "Come to what Allah Hath revealed; 
come to the Messenger": They say: "Enough for us are the ways we found our fathers following. " 
What! Even though their fathers were void of knowledge and guidance? " Also see Ibn Manzür, Lisän 
al-°Arab, v. 11, p. 129. 
28 The Qur'an (ETMC), 5: 50, states: "Do they then seek after a judgment of (the Days of) Ignorance? 
But who, for a people whose faith is assured, can give better judgment than Allah? " Also see the 
Qui'an, 3: 154,33: 33, and 48: 26. Hitti, HistoryoftheArabs, p. 87, mentioned other two verses which 
are in fact not relevant; these verses are 3: 148 and 5: 55. 
29 Bashier, in his book The Makkan Crucible, p. 25, mentions that the Qur'an describes the jähiliyyah 
as the age of darkness and described the mission of the Prophet Muhammad as bringing people from 
darkness into light. See the Qur'an, 2: 257,6: 35. The Qur'an also discusses other aspects of jähiliyyah; 
see for example 6: 136-140. 
3° See Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests, p. 20. 
31 See the chapter "The Importance of Islamic Military Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
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misguided. 32 The Qur'än confirms this by saying: "While the Unbelievers got up in their 
hearts Heat and cant-the heat and cant of Ignorance. 03 Asabryyah was also the basic 
element in all matters concerning human relations and the rule of law in the Arabian 
Peninsula and the two small northern kingdoms of al-Manädhirah and al-Ghasäsinah. 
This was also the case in the settled communities of Mecca and Medina. 
The nomads (Bedouin) of Arabia traveled in groups due to the harsh climate and the 
need for security during their constant search of water and grazing. These conditions led 
to alliances between tribes and reinforced their unity, as we will see in the next section. 
Although there were no fixed borders between the tribal territories, each tribe had its own 
lands, which no one could pass through or use without the permission of the owner. Each 
tribe had its own shaykh (ruler). He was a permanent leader who was rarely supplanted 
and who obtained his power from his tribe through kinship, alliance or loyalty. The 
shaykh s leadership was called for on many occasions such as in warfare, in making 
alliances (ahlälj, and in settling blood feuds. 34 Wars often occurred between tribes or 
clans for various reasons several times within a single year. Each tribe's small and close- 
knit society also led to the development of individual dialects. 
II. 4: Tribal Alliances 
Despite being strongly connected by tradition and commercial factors, the Arab tribes in 
the region of al-Hijäz were not united by one central or ruling party which could play an 
important part in keeping order and peace. 35 It is surprising that these tribes, which 
resolved most of their disagreements by resorting to war in an apparently hostile climate, 
managed to survive, let alone flourish. 36 However, if we make the effort to understand the 
system by which they tried to overcome these difficulties, our astonishment might abate. 
One means of survival was the tribal alliances (ahläfsing. hi1i, where two or more tribes 
would agree to support each other against other tribes in case of clashes or movement 
3z See Ibn Kathir, Tafsir Ibn Kathir, v. 2, p. 131, al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 277, and Ibn Kathir, 
al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 6, p. 327. 
33 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 48: 26. Further see The Holy Qur-'än ETMC, p. 1584, fn: 4907. 
3a This phenomenon was used by Islam later to the benefit of the Muslim army in all five battles but 
especially the last two, al-Yarmnk and al-Qädisiyyah. See the sections "The Battle of al-Yarmiik" and 
"°I'he Battle of al-Qädisiyyah" in the chapter "The Importance of Islamic Military Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
3s See Furayhät and Yäsin, 79rikh al-Hadärah, pp. 44-45. 
It should be noted that for a long period the harsh climate had the effect of keeping the Arabian 
Peninsula from being conquered or undergoing change, although there were, of course, other reasons. 
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outside of the sacred months (these months are discussed later in this chapter). 37 A few of 
the strongest tribes, however, did not seek alliances with other tribes; these were called 
the Jamarät a1-Arab, `the `life-coals' [tribes] of the Arabs'. 38 However, two out of the four 
Jamarät al-Arab tribes could not sustain their independence and, as the Arabs said, 
became tufi'at, `extinguished'. 39 An alliance could be agreed between individuals, clans, or 
tribes. 40 In addition there was no restriction on the size or power of the two parties to the 
alliance, which meant that a small tribe could ally itself with a much bigger one. There 
were, however, certain rules and regulations which the smaller tribe was expected to abide 
by. Within certain limits, the smaller tribe had to go along with the wishes of the bigger 
tribe in exchange for protection and the guaranteeing of its members' rights, which it 
could not have secured without such an alliance. 41 When the tribes were equally 
powerful, however, one could not subjugate the other and each would keep its 
independence and control of its lands. 42 The purposes of ahläf were to end fighting 
between the tribes, to unite them for purposes of common defence and offence, for raiding 
operations (ghazwah), for acts of revenge, for mutual aid in the payment of settlements to 
third parties, and for the common use of grazing land. If one or more of these interests 
ceased to obtain, khal° (annulment) would be the fate of the alliance until a new one was 
entered into. 43 After agreeing on the plan of the alliance it was customary to swear to a 
3' Ibn Manzür, Lisän al-Arab, v. 9, p. 55, al-Fayriizabädi, al-Qämis al-Muhit, p. 1035, al-Räzi [d. 
721/1321], Mukhtäral-Sihäh, p. 63, and al-Farahidi, al-Ayn, v. 3, p. 231. 
38 The Jamar-ät al-Arab tribes were the Banii °Abs b. Dhübyän, Banii Numayr b. cM ir, Banü al-Härith 
b. Ka°b, and Banii Dabbah b. Ad. For example, Banü cAbs fought against the tribes of Qays. See Ibn 
Manzür, Lisän al-Arab, v. 4, p. 145, al-Fayrüzabädi, al-Qämi s al-Muh{t, p. 469, al-Farahidi, al-Ayn, v. 6, 
p. 122, and al-Fayyümi [d. 770/1369], al-Misbäh al-Munir, v. 1, p. 108. 
39 They were Banü °Abs b. Dhübyän and Banii al-Härith b. Ka°b, which formed alliances with the tribes 
of °Amr b. Sa`sacah and Nahden respectively. See Ibn Manzür, Lisän al-Arab, v. 4, p. 145. 
4o Such alliances were used and bore fruit in the battles of Uhud and al-Khandaq. See the sections 
"The battle of Uliud" and "The Battle of al-Khandaq" in the chapter "nie Task of Islamic Military 
Intelligence" (Ch. 6). 
41 See Naseef, Islamic Military, p. 38. 
42 Among the thirty-five alliances mentioned by al-Baghdädi in his book, al-Munammiq, p. 55, two of 
these equal alliances were attended by the Prophet and the Companions: firstly, the hilfal-Mutayyabin 
(the Perfumed Alliance) between the tribes of Usd, Taym, and Zuhrah, was attended by the Prophet 
and Abü Bakr. Secondly, the alliance of al-ahläf, which was between the tribes of °Abd al-Där, Jumah, 
Sahm, Mukhzüm, and cAdy b. Kalb was attended by, among others, cUmar b. al-Khattäb. The first 
alliance was called hilfal-Mutayyabin because the parties dipped their hands in perfume and rubbed it 
on the wall of al-Ka`bah. Their aim was to spread justice and to help aggrieved people from the 
Quraysh and other tribes. See Ibn Manzür, Lisän al-Arab, v. 1, p. 565, & v. 9, p. 53 and al-IIarbi 
[198/814-285/898], Ghanä al-Hadith, v. 3, p. 1053. 
Also it should be mentioned that the hilfal-Mutayyibin was also called the hilfal-Fu4l171. See al-Azhari, 
al-Azhär, p. 288. 
43 Ibn Manziir, Lisän al-Arab, v. 8, p. 76 and al-Harbi, Ghanh al-Iladith, v. 3, p. 1053. 
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binding pact. All parties swore on some sort of subjectively significant but tangible 
substance or object, for example blood, perfume, salt, ash, water, or even the place where 
the alliance was concluded. ` 
Also it should be added that there was a special form of alliance called al-Nasf. 45 This was 
sometimes entered into by tribes which were intent upon revenge although the period of 
the sacred months was about to begin. 46 Therefore, they made payment to the people 
whose responsibility it was to count and trace the months, so that the order of the months 
could be changed, allowing them to pursue their vendetta. 47 
11.5: The Reasons for Conflict and the Mounts of the Arabs 
Clashes often occurred over access to water and grazing land, especially in summer as it 
was enormously important for any tribe to gain control of these vital resources, which 
would strengthen it and promote its position among the other tribes. If for any reason a 
tribe was not able to secure such resources it would raid the lands of other tribes to 
capture them. It was a matter of life or death; if the tribe succeeded it increased its stock 
of food, camels, and horses. The Quraysh, the Prophet's tribe, had to fight in order to take 
control of the trade route in western Arabia for economic reasons. 8 
Another important reason, which was often connected with the previous one, was the 
vendetta (tha'r). This institution forged strong bonds among the tribe's members since any 
member of a tribe responsible for the death of a member of another tribe was vulnerable 
to a revenge attack. 49 In this way victims became killers and killers victims, the lethal 
pattern being sustained for generations-50 Sometimes the relatives of the victims would 
give up women, wine, and perfume until they had fulfilled their promise to destroy their 
The question arises here of the attitude of Islam towards these practices among the Arabs. This is 
discussed in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
4° There was another important alliance, the hilf al Ah, bish, which was named after the mountain 
called Hubshf It was made between the tribes of 
Quraysh, Bang al-Muslaliq, and Bang cUdi b. 
Khuzaymah. See Ibn Manzgr, Lisan al-Arab, v. 6, p. 278, al-Fayrgzabädi, al-Qämüs al-Muhit, p. 759, 
and Yaggt al-II Iamawi [d. 626/1229], Mu jam al-Buldän, v. 2, p. 214. 
4s Al-Nasi'means to transpose one of the sacred months; for example, to exchange the position of the 
last of the sacred months with the one after. Further see Ibn Manzgr, Lisän al-°Arab, v. 1, p. 167. 
' See Sunan al-Bayhaqi al-Kubrä [384/994-458/1066], (Bäh: al-Nast min Amr a1-ä hiliyyah, No. 
9553, v. 5, p. 165) and al-Nawawi [631/1234-676/1278], Sharh Sahrh Muslim, v. 8, p. 225. 
See Qur'an, 9: 36 & 37, al-Tabari, Tafsir al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 275, and Mahfgz, Fann alHarb, p. 17. 
48 See Naseef, Islamic Military, p. 37. 
49 See Mahfgz, Fann al-Harb, p. 9. 
so This was one of the main reasons why the Quraysh made the final decision to fight the Muslims at 
Badr. See the section "The Adversary at the Battle of Badr" in the chapter "The Adversaries' Strengths 
and Weaknesses" (Ch. 7). 
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enemy. These promises might not be fulfilled in many years of war between the tribes. For 
a small tribe the only escape was to subject itself and pay tribute taxes - or protection 
money - to a bigger and more powerful tribe 
sr 
Attacks on caravans also provoked conflict among the tribes. In order to protect 
themselves some of the caravans made agreements with particular tribes, which permitted 
them to travel unmolested through those tribes' lands. The winter and summer caravans 
traveling through Mecca brought their security in this way. In addition, the problems 
associated with social activities such as marriage and divorce also gave rise to tribal 
conflicts. 
The Arabs depended on two mounts when engaged in war: the horse and the camel. The 
favoured mount in combat, however, was the horse. But to buy and maintain such a 
prestigious animal was beyond the means of many men of the desert. 52 The camel, though 
less prized, was much more useful to the Arabs and had many advantages over the horse. 
It was able to endure both heat and cold, and was perfectly suited to the harsh climate 
and the desert terrain. Yet, in war the camel was usually used for carrying supplies or for 
the long journey to the battlefield and was rarely involved in the actual combat. 53 
Nevertheless Muslims have considered it as the gift of Allah and the Qur'an praises it in 
several verses. 4 
The infantry played a crucial role in the period prior to Islam as well as in the first battles 
of Islam during both the Prophet's lifetime and the Caliphate of Abü Bakr. However, its 
importance as a major resource of the Muslim army began to decrease as the importance 
of the cavalry grew due to the nature of the later battles and the extensive areas they 
covered. Also the bigger the armies became the major they cavalry was needed. Its duty 
was to make close contact with the adversary and particularly to halt or repel the first 
assault. In addition they are used as mounted archers against the cavalry of the 
adversary. 55 
So the cavalry came to be the main force of the Arabs. In the battles in question horses 
were expensive, and even after the revelation of Islam the Muslims at first had few horses. 
5i See Ibn al-Athir, al-Kämil, v. 1, p. 150 and Naseef, Islamic Military, p. 35. 
52 The horse had been imported into the Arabian Peninsula. See Hitti, History ofthe Arabs, p. 20. 
ss See the statement of the Prophet toward the end of the section "The Battle of Badr" in the chapter 
"The Battles and their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
S4 See the Qur'an, 16: 5-8 and 88: 17. According to Hitti: "The dowry of the bride, the price of blood, 
the profit of maysir (gambling), the wealth of a sheikh, are all computed in terms of camels. " Hitti, 
History of the Arabs, p. 21. 
55 See al cArif, al-Jaysh al-Arabi a1-Isläml, p. 67. 
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They the cavalry was not used as the main attacking force, especially in the first three 
battles in question. Later, in the era of the second Caliph, and after the state's income 
increased, it became the backbone of the Muslim armies. Cavalry were used for 
reconnaissance, protection of the front and wings, close contact, raids deep into the 
adversary's territories, and chasing the fleeing enemy. "' 
Of the adversary's mounts, the elephant was scarcely known and was certainly not used in 
the Arabian Peninsula since it was totally unsuited to the climate, unlike the horse or the 
camel. The Arabs had some experience of fighting against elephants but this happened 
rarely. One of these rare occasions occurred when Abraha [d. 543 AD], an Abyssinian 
leader, sought to destroy the Kacbah. 57 
The Arabs' weapons were mainly limited to the sword, the javelin, the bow, the knife, and 
their own battle-gear, 58 in other words only what an individual could carry; and of these 
the sword was the Arab warrior's inseparable companion 59 In addition, among the large 
siege weapons were the manjaniq (mangonel) and dabbäbah (siege tower) 60 Battles 
usually began with a number of single combats or duels: one warrior would step forward 
between the two armies and make a general challenge or call upon someone by name. 
This opponent would usually be his equal in nobility and rank, and the duel would be a 
test of skill and strength. The aim was to kill the adversary's best warriors and thus to 
strengthen and encourage one's own tribe and to weaken and dishearten the enemy. 61 
The battle would then continue, but again the warriors fought as individuals, not in 
organised and disciplined groups, and the tactic employed was that of `hit and run' (al- 
karr wa al-farr) . 
62 
Since the conduct and outcome of the battles considered by the study cannot be discussed 
without reference to the nature of the Arabs, the next section will examine some of their 
characteristics. 
56 See al -ýArif, al-Jaysh a1-Arabi al-Islami, p. 68-69. S' The Qur'an, 105: 1-5, refers to this confrontation. Also al-Tabari, Tafsir al-Tabari, v. 30, pp. 298-304, 
al-Qurtubi, Tafsir al-Qurtubi, v. 20, pp. 199-201, al-Mustadrak cala al-Sahihayn [321/933-405/1014], 
(Bib: Tafsir Surah a1-F17, No. 3974, v. 2, p. 583), and al-I-ialabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 1, p. 95. In 
this study the books of hadith will be referred to by their titles only. The word Kacbah is referred to in 
the Qur'an in several places. See the Qur'an, 2: 152,3: 96 & 97,5: 95 & 97, and 22: 26. 
S8 See Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Furisiyyah, p. 81 and Mahfnz, Fann al--Iarb, pp. 10-14. 
59 See the Qur'an, 9: 37, al-Tabari, Tafsir al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 275, Mahfüz, Fann al-Narb, p. 17, and 
Swayyid, al-Fann al-°Askari, p. 18. 
60 These were often used in the conquests period as well as in the late battles of the Prophet. See °Abd 
al-Raof, al-Handasah a/-Askariyyah, p. 6 and al-Zardakash, al Aniq Ra/-Manjaniq, p. 16. 
61 See Mahf- , Fann al-Narb, p. 
8. 
62 See Mahfüz, Fann al-Harb, p. 9. 
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11.6: The Special Characteristics of the Arabs 
The moral system of the pre-Islamic Arabia was not entirely condemned by Islam: some 
aspects and practices were accepted while others were rejected. The Arab's morality was 
practical rather than religious. Particularly valued were the virtues of honour, hospitality, 
truthfulness, pride, and loyalty to his group. His social life called upon him to be brave 
and capable of great endurance in the harsh conditions of the Arabian Peninsula. 63 These 
noble ideals, however, were not always realised, and the pre-Islamic Arab's defects were 
enumerated by Jacfar b. Abi Tälib, who summarised them for the enlightenment of 
Asbamah Negus, King of Abyssinia. He told him that before Islam the Arabs were sunk in 
an abyss of ignorance and barbarism, adored idols, lived unchastely, ate carrion, spoke 
abominations, and disregarded every human feeling. They neglected the duties of 
hospitality and neighbourliness, and no law was known but the triumph of the strong over 
the weak. The revelation of Islam eliminated these vices. 64 
Other important features of Arab life need to be briefly explained; among these is their 
great love of poetry and the prestige earned by those skilled in the use of language. The 
Arabs were much concerned with language and greatly admired eloquence, that of the 
poet above all. 65 It is known that the poet, especially in his capacity as propagandist, or 
even as journalist, had a strong effect on their daily life and daily activities. 66 A tribe's poet 
could attack and humiliate an opponent's whole tribe and exalt his own. 67 
The Arabs had little devotion to any religion; in fact their religious practice usually 
involved no more than following tribal custom and respecting tradition. 68 The Qur'än 
states in several places that the Arabs were mainly content to follow their fathers and 
grandfathers in matters of religion. 69 Even when a conception of deity existed, "natural 
objects such as trees, wells, caves, stones, remained sacred objectss70 to the Arab 
'See Ibn Khaldiin, Mugdimatlbn Khaldr7n, p. 125 and Nicole, The Military Technology, v. 1, p. 269. 
64 See Musnad Ahmad [164/780-241/855], (No. 1740, v. 1, pp. 201-202), Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 
238, and al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 145. It should be noted that Musnad Ahmad was the editor 
of the works of Ahmad b. 
Hanbal, 
and that his son Sälih contributed more than one third to the 
edition after his father's death. Some of the references, however, contain neither an indication of the 
Kitäb or Bab, nor even sometimes the number of the hadith. 
6 Among the variety of poetic forms were the lament, the satire, and the panegyric. 
66 See al-Bakri [d. 487/1094], Muym ma Istujm, v. 3, p. 960. 
67 Similarly see Ibn Manziir, Lisän al-Arab, v. 1, p. 389. Further see al-Rushood, The Poet, pp. 89-90. 
The Qur'an discusses this phenomenon without condemning it. Instead it limits the poet's power. See 
the Qur'än, 26: 224-227. 
68 See Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 96. 
69 See the Qur'an, 5: 104,7: 28,10: 78,21: 35,16: 74,31: 21, and 43: 22 & 23. 
70 Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 97. 
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worshippers. 71 This lack of interest in religion gave rise to a variety of different beliefs 72 
In the south, many gods and goddesses were worshipped. 73 Also, Judaism had been 
brought to the Yemen, it was said, by two Jewish scholars from Medina74, and Christianity 
had also flourished due to the involvement of the Abyssinians. Further, there were 
sanctuaries in the South Arabia, among which was a building called Dhü al-Khalsah, also 
known as al-Ka°bah al-Yamäniyyah, built by the people of Yemen in imitation of the 
original Ka'bah in Mecca, which they visited regularly. 75 
It may be useful at his point to consider in some detail the system of dating events known 
as ayyäm al-: Arab. 
The term ayyam al-Arab (the days of the Arabs) is used to refer to the battles of the 
Arabs prior to the rise of Islam. 76 It is known that one of the means by which the Arabs 
recorded a particular event was its relationship to the date of a battle. An important event 
was referred to by its `day' (yawm, pl. ayyäm), and this was (and still is) used to place 
other events in time. 77 They still say that this event happened before, during or after the 
day of such-and-such. 78 They called a battle lasting a single day `yawm', 79 whereas longer 
conflicts were called barb `war' (pl. hurvb); these might continue for several days, months, 
or even years. 80 These days or battles were named after events, places, individuals, or even 
animals. Some of them were given more than one name since they lasted more than one 
day or were conducted in different places. 81 
" For example, Ibn Hishäm and al-Tabari speak of a sacred palm tree in Najrän known as Dhätu 
Anwät. Gifts were offered in the form of weapons, garments, and rags, which were suspended from it. 
See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 5, p. 110 and Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 325. Similarly 
see Sunan al-Tirmidhi (Kitäb al-Fitan, No. 2180, v. 4, p. 475). 
72 See Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 26. 
73 These included 'Athtar, the god personifying the planet Venus, and the lunar gods, who included 
Almaqah. See Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests, pp. 13-14 and Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 61. 
There was some regional variation; Ri'äm and °Imyänis were venerated in the Yemen, Marhab and 
Dhiirayikh in the Hadramawt, and Dhii Allba in the Bahrain region. See Mu'nis, Atlas, p. 61. 
74 See Yagiit al-I Iamawi, Mu jam al-Buldän, v. 3, p. 110. 
n See Sahih al-Bukhäri (Bab: Harq al-Dar wa al-Nakhil, No. 2857, v. 3, p. 1100) and Ibn Kathir, al- 
Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 5, p. 
75. 
76 See Ibn al-Athir, alKämil, v. 1, p. 391. 
n The researcher relied on this way of recording events to give his final judgement regarding the battle 
of al-Yarmük. See the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
78 Naseef, Islamic Military, p. 35. 
79 This idea will be used later to clarify the duration of the battle of al-Yarmiik in the next chapter. 
Harb al-Basüs lasted for about forty years. See Yaqüt al-Hamawi, Mu jam al-Buldän, v. 1, p. 113. 
81 This point is especially pertinent to the battle of al-Qadisiyyah. See Naseef, Islamic Military, p. 36. 
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Several tribes could be involved in a battle, and fighting could also break out within the 
tribe itself or even within clans. 82 These conflicts could also involve non-Arabs, as in the 
day of Dhü Qär. 83 It was necessary, however, that long conflicts should cease for a time in 
order that the people might look to their social affairs. Wars, therefore, were restricted by 
the system of the sacred months. 
The Arabs' annual calendar included four holy months, whose significance was recognised 
throughout the Arabian Peninsula. These months were called the sacred months `al- 
ashhur al-burum'. 84 Three of them followed one another at the turn of the year; the 
fourth was in the middle of the Arabic year. 85 The three consecutive months were Dhü al- 
Qicdah (the eleventh month), Dhü al-Hf/ah (the twelfth month), and Muharram (the 
first month), while the isolated month was Rajab (the seventh month). 86 How these 
months came to be designated as sacred is not known to the researcher, but it is likely that 
they were organised to serve the customs and practices of the early Arabs. For example, 
pilgrims would have needed many days to perform their pilgrimage and return safely to 
their homelands. These months also allowed the people to venerate their idols around the 
Kacbah, to flock to their annual fairs (aswäq sing. süq) to buy and sell goods, especially 
animals and food, and to be certain of traveling unmolested and in peace; and usually 
peace prevailed. However, sometimes these sacred months were interrupted by fighting 
among the tribes, for example the `sacrilegious war', barb al-F#, är. 87 It was reported that 
the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) had taken part in such a war prior to Islam along with 
his tribe. 88 In addition, it is worth mentioning in connection with the tha'r (vendetta) that 
the Arabs could use the aswäq to identify the killer of a father or other relatives. 
It occurred between the Arabs and the Säsänians. See al-Tabari, Tarikh al-Tabari v. 1, p. 472 and 
Yägnt al-Hamawi, Mu jam al-Buldän, v. 4, p. 249. Also the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 103, states: "And 
remember with gratitude A115h's Favour on you; for ye were enemies and he joined your hearts in love, 
so that His Grace, ye became brethren. " 
This battle occurred between the Arabs and the Säsänians. See al-Muyam al-Kabir (No. 1238, v. 2, p. 
46), Ibn Hajar [773/1372-852/1448], Fath al-Bari, v. 6, p. 262, al-Tabari, 7ärikh al-Tabari, v. 1, p. 472, 
and Yägnt al-I lamawi, Mu jam al-Buldän, v. 4, p. 249. 
80. See Ibn Manziir, Lisan al-Arab, v. 3, p. 211, Mahfiiz, Fann al-Narb, p. 17. Also see the Qut'än, 2: 194 
& 217,6: 2, and9: 5. 
The Qur'an (ETMC), 9: 36, mentions such months and assures their position in Islam: "The number 
of months in the sight of Allah is twelve (in a year)- So ordained by Him the day He created the 
Heavens and the earth; Of them four are sacred. " 
86 Five wars had occurred in the sacred months according to Ibn al-Athir, al-Kämil, v. 1, pp. 467,534, 
537, & 572. Also see Ibn Manzür, Lisän al-Arab, v. 3, p. 211 and al-Räzi, Mukhtaral-Sihäh, p. 124. 
87 °Abd al-Karim, Quraysh, p. 
55, reports that four main wars occurred in the sacred months. 
It was reported to be around the years 585-591 AD. See al-Suhayli, al-Rawl v. 2, p. 233 and al- 
Mubarakpuri, al-Rahiq, p. 73. 
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Since this study is essentially a religious one it is necessary to discuss briefly the great 
powers in the wider region which are directly involved in our study. 
11.7: The Byzantines and Säsänians 
Islam came into existence on the margins of two great Empires, those of the Byzantines 
and Säsänians. The Byzantines ruled over a Christian empire of enormous extent, 
covering the lands north and northwest of the Arabian Peninsula to B5diyat al-Sham, and 
beyond. The climate was mostly dry from mid-April to mid-November; then the rains 
came, lasting until the end of March. Snow also fell in winter, especially on the 
mountains. Summers were dry and the wind carried the dust of the desert from the east 
and south-east. 89 The Empire's citizens were of mixed origins and it seems that every 
region of al-Shäm was occupied by a different sect. Its leaders - religious, political, and 
military - were motivated by the desire to maintain and increase the power and influence 
of Christianity. They had lately defeated the Säsänian army and managed to reoccupy al- 
Sh5m. 90 Its religion had spread throughout Europe and some Arabian lands, as in the city 
of Najarän in the south and the kingdom of Ghassän in the north. 91 Its strategy in the 
region was to achieve dominance and make use of its natural resources, as well as to 
consolidate its power in the Holy Land, and especially Jerusalem, and to spread 
Christianity. 92 
The Säsänian Empire began just beyond the eastern border of the Arabian Desert, 
occupying Badryat al-Iraq or al-Simawah, where the wind blew mainly northwest most of 
the year, providing alternately cold and hot seasons; further north the climate changed, 
growing increasingly colder due to the effects of the uplands. 93 There were many grassy 
areas fed by the rivers running from the north, where the battle of al-Qädisiyyah 
ß9 See Kamäl, al-Tariq i1ä Dimashq, pp. 19-20. 
This climatic phenomenon was used to the advantage of the Muslim army at the battle of al-Yarmük. 
Further see the section "The Battle of al-Yarmiik" in the chapter "The Importance of Islamic Military 
Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
9° See Kamäl, al-Tariq i1ä al-Madä in, p. 124. 
91 See Sahib al-Bukhäri (Bäb: QucatAhli Najrän, No. 4119, v. 4, p. 1592) and Sahib Muslim (Kitab al- 
Adäb, No. 2135, v. 3, p. 1685). 
92 It appears that some of the Arabs in the Kingdom of al-Manädhirah were not prohibited by the 
Sdsänians from embracing Christianity, while it is not recorded that the subjects of the other Arab 
kingdom, that of al-Ghasäsinah, which owed allegiance to the Byzantines, were permitted to embrace 
Mazdaism. This disparity in toleration was likely to affect the cooperation and support they might have 
provided to defend their religions against Islam. The S5sänians' tolerance of Christianity, however, was 
probably practised for essentially political reasons. 
93 The word Säsänian denotes a dynasty and refers to the rulers of the Persian lands. Therefore the 
study will use both 'Säsänians' and 'Persians' interchangeably. See Netton, A Popular Dictionary of 
Islam, p. 226 and Kamäl, al-Tariq i17 al-Madä in, p. 103. 
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occurred. This powerful empire also encompassed the region of Yemen. 4 Similarly to the 
Byzantines, the S5sänians had an official religion, Zoroastrianism, in honour of which a 
Holy Fire was kept burning in their capital, al-Madä'in, or `the towns', the chief of which 
was Ctesiphon. 95 They were rich, with access to bountiful natural resources and having a 
strong military capability, and they added to their wealth by collecting taxes from the 
lands they occupied. 96 They were not respected by the Muslims, since they could not be 
numbered among the people possessing a divine Book, as the Qur'än mentions. 97 
It must be emphasised that what follows is taken from the works of Western scholars, and 
their conclusion that both empires were exhausted by the 630s does not tally with the 
view of Muslim historians. 
In the fourth century the centre of Roman imperial power moved eastwards from the old 
capital to Constantinople, where the emperor was the symbol of cohesion and the focus of 
loyalty. The majority of the population was Christian, although pagan philosophers 
taught at the school of Athens until the sixth century, and Jewish communities lived in 
the cities. 98 
In 328 AD Constantine made Byzantium his capital mainly because it was a good position 
from which to direct the defence of the Danubian frontier, the most vulnerable stretch of 
the Roman border. Rome had no proper communication with the sea and was cut off from 
the main body of the Empire by the Alps. By 328 Rome had little or no commercial 
importance, while Byzantium was `a strategic centre of the first order'. 99 
The greatest emperor of the sixth century was Justinian (527-565), who reconquered 
North Africa from the Vandals, Italy from the Ostrogoths and parts of Spain from the 
Visigoths. The unified Roman world empire, which had stretched from Scotland to the 
Sahara and from Gibraltar to the Euphrates, had been replaced by a polycentric system of 
barbarian states, whereas in the East Roman empire there was cultural and political unity. 
94 See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 1, p. 191, al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 134, and al-Näsir and 
Dirwish, al-5ayäh al-Diniyyah, p. 80. 
They were viewed by the Muslims as "Fire-Worshippers". See Ibn Manzür, Lisän al-Arab, v. 13, p. 16 
and al-Näsir and Dirwish, al-Hayäh al-Diniyyah, pp. 78-81. 
See Ibn al-Athir, al-Kämil, v. 1, p. 353. 
97 As the Qur'an, 30: 4, records, the reaction of the Muslims when the Byzantine army defeated the 
Persian army indicates that they considered that the Persians did not follow a divine religion. Further 
see al-Qurtubi, Tafsiral-Qurtubi, v. 1, pp. 75-76 and Ibn Kathir, Tafsirlbn Kathir, v. 3, pp. 423-427. See 
the section "The Adversary at the Battle of al-Qadisiyyah" in the chapter "The Adversaries' Strengths 
and Weaknesses" (Ch. 7). 
98 Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, p. 7. 
99 Foord, The Byzantine Empire, p. 5. 
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Justinian's programme of reconquest was based on this unity. He desired to restore the 
world empire but was less than completely successful. 10° 
A catastrophic decline in manpower took place during Justinian's wars. This was 
exacerbated by a severe outbreak of bubonic plague in 542. Both had lasting effects. In 
addition the wars produced chronically undermanned and underpaid armed forces and an 
empty treasury. Last but not least, religious (Christological) feuds in Egypt and Syria 
threatened the Empire's stability. 101 Though it is possible to overemphasise the 
importance of these religious disputes, which continued to plague the Empire until the 
Muslim wars of conquest, they centred around a burning issue - how could they 
Incarnation of God in a human body be explained? These matters exercised almost 
everyone in the Empire, not just the theologians of the Church. 102 
The Byzantines were skilled in the military arts; indeed war was studied as an art in the 
East, although there is no evidence that the Muslims studied the Byzantine books on the 
subject. The army in the seventh century owed its form to the reorganisation carried out 
by Maurice (582-602). His Strategikon is one of the most important works of the period. 
It was probably written in 579, when Maurice was a general of Tiberius II. His reforms lay 
behind the later successes of Heraclius. Maurice reorganized the army on the basis of the 
regiment or numeros, which were combined into what we would call brigades and 
divisions, but there was no fixed corps. Since the foreign auxiliaries who had been a 
feature of Justinian's armies were no longer available, Maurice decided to make the 
Empire self-supporting in military affairs and to recruit the army entirely from within. 
This was only partially achieved. 103 
It is important to note that Byzantine strategy from 600-800 was less considered than 
tactics and organisation and was essentially defensive rather than offensive, since the 
rulers were engaged in a strenuous fight for survival. They tended to be careful to avoid 
great battles and thought it absurd to expend resources and the valuable lives of 
experienced soldiers unnecessarily. They had a strong predilection for stratagems, 
ambushes and simulated retreats and boasted of their cunning and skill in deception, but 
in all these they were to be bested by the Muslims. 104 
100 Haldon, Byzantium, p. 15. 
101 See Jenkins, Byzantium, p. 9. 
102 See ibid, p. 25. 
1°3 Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, pp. 172-177. 
1°4 See ibid, pp. 200-202. 
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Before turning to the decades preceding the Muslim victory at al-Yarmük it is important to 
consider the Byzantines' main enemy, the Säsänian Empire, which at its height was the 
second greatest power in the ancient world, ruled all the lands between the Euphrates and 
the Indus, and was the master of vast wealth. Its capital was a group of seven cities on the 
Tigris, not far from modern Baghd5d. '05 
The Empire consisted of two distinct geographical areas: the very fertile lowlands of 
Mesopotamia and the Iranian uplands, separated by the Zagros chain. Mesopotamia 
supported a network of major cities including Ctesiphon, while the Iranian plateau was 
sparsely settled. There were few passes through the Zagros. The Säsänian heartland lay 
in Fars, the fertile region at the south-western end of the Iranian plateau. From the first, 
conflict with the Romans was a defining feature of the dynasty's regional policy, and until 
the late fourth century this centred on contested frontier lands. Then came a long period 
of relative peace, after which hostilities resumed in the sixth century, during which the 
Persians generally took the offensive, and ended in the "Endless Peace" of 532, which 
turned out to be far from endless. 106 
Khusro I (531-579) was suspicious of Justinian's ambition and attacked in 540. Peace was 
concluded in 562 and lasted for a decade. It was broken by the Byzantines, who objected 
to paying large sums to preserve the peace. In 590 this war ended and Khusro II (590- 
628) was deposed by Vahram, a successful general. Khusro appealed to Maurice for aid 
and was reinstated by a Byzantine army in 591. When Maurice was murdered in 602 
Khusro look advantage of the situation and initiated an exhausting conflict that was to 
last for twenty-five years. 107 
It will be useful at this point to consider briefly Säsänian military organisation. The 
Säsänian dynasty had overthrown the Parthians in 226, and one constant of the society of 
the first Säsänian Shahanshah (King of Kings), Ardashir I (226-224) and of the last 
Zoroastrian ruler, Yazdagird III (633-651) was the hegemony of a small number of noble 
families, several of which had been eminent in Parthian times. Their role was to provide 
candidates for top military and administrative positions in the Empire. Maurice's 
Strategikon notes that the Persians "stress an orderly approach", "join battle with 
calmness and determination" and "do not attack in a disorderly fashion". Persian military 
references from the same period (c. 580) contain instruction on many points such as 
'OS Rodinson, Muhammad, pp. 4-5. 
i06 Rubin, "The Säsänid Monarchy", in Cameron, Ward-Perkins, and Whitby (eds), Cambridge Ancient 
History, v. XIV, pp. 638-641. 
107 See ibid, p. 644. 
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tactics and ambushes. Standard deployment for large armies was usually in five parts: a 
main battle line, a reinforcing line, a small reserve of elite cavalry and two cavalry wings. 
The cavalry was certainly the most effective component of the Säsänian military, and 
occasionally no infantry at all was used, but generally the cavalry constituted about one 
third of the army. Elephants were usually accompanied by large infantry contingents, and 
were often used in conjunction with cavalry to terrify the horses of the enemy, as at al- 
Qädisiyyah. 108 
Although Zoroastrianism or Mazdaism was the dominant religion of the Säsänian Empire, 
it did not enjoy the status that Christianity was given by the Byzantine rulers. Since the 
early Muslims looked down on Zoroastrianism as mere fire-worship and treated its 
adherents as polytheists, it is necessary to consider briefly some aspects of this religion. 109 
The Säsäninans' original power lay among the Persian-speaking peoples of southern Iran. 
The family ruled their state through a hierarchy of officials, and in the fifth century they 
tried to provide a solid basis of unity and loyalty by reviving the ancient religion of Iran, 
traditionally associated with the teacher Zoroaster. 110 He is believed to have lived in the 
Iranian Bronze Age, when his people were one of numerous Iranian tribes inhabiting the 
south Russian steppes; that is, sometime before 1200 BC. The temple cult of fire, however, 
was not established until the fourth century BC. 111 
There is a debate among the jurisprudents concerning how the Persians should be 
regarded. The Muslims did not consider them a people of a divinely revealed Book. 
However, they were not treated as atheists because the Prophet had taken the jrzyah"Z as 
`Umar also did with the people of al-Sawäd. 13 It seems that they fell between being a 
People of the Book and being atheists; and like Jews and Christians they were not forced 
to convert, but suffered from restrictions. For example, they could not marry Muslims, 
108 Cornuelle, "An Overview of the Sassanian Persian Military", pp. 11-12. 
109 See Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, p. 9. 
10 See ibid, p. 9. 
111 See Boyce, A History of Zoroastrianism, pp. 1-3, and 222. 
112 A tax levied upon adult non-Muslims living in an Islamic state. See al-Balädhuri, Futüh al-Buldän, 
v. 1, p. 157. Further see the section "The Concept of the Just War" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic 
Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
113 The region of al-Sawäd (darkness) may have been so called because of. 1) the great number of palm 
trees, 2) the heterogeneous mixture of people and sects, or 3) the large population of that area. 
Respectively see Yaqüt al-Hamawi, Mujam al-Buldän, v. 3, p. 201, v. 1, p. 309, and v. 2, p. 290. Further 
see al-Bakri, Mujam ma Istujm, v. 1, p. 286, al-Manäwi, al-Ta ärif, p. 393, and al-Nawawi, Tabrir al-Fäz 
al-Tanbih, v. 1, p. 82. 
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their meals could not be shared by Muslims, and they were excluded from positions of 
power. 114 
For this religion the universe was a battleground, beneath the supreme God, between 
good and evil spirits. The good would eventually triumph but men and women of virtue 
and purity could hasten the victory. Zoroaster's teachings were revived in a philosophical 
form by the Säsänians in order to provide divine sanction for royal legitimation, but with 
greater emphasis on the dualism of good and evil, and with a priesthood and formal 
worship. 115 But although Mazdaism was the dominant religion, generally variety was 
encouraged. Manichaeism and the cult of Anahita were accommodated, Nestorian 
Christians found a refuge in the Empire, and central Iraq was the main locus of Jewish 
religious learning and a refuge for pagan philosophers and medical scientists from the 
Greek cities of the Mediterranean world. 116 
Great changes took place in the fortunes of the two Empires in the sixth and early seventh 
centuries, gravely weakening both. They engaged in a series of long wars, which lasted 
with intervals from 540 to 629. These were mainly fought in Syria and Iraq. The Säsänian 
armies reached the Mediterranean, occupying Antioch, Alexandria and Jerusalem, and 
were not driven out until the 620s. For a while Säsänian rule extended to Yemen. 117 This 
was possible because of the contradictions and weaknesses of the Byzantine Empire, 
which became apparent during the last years of Justinian's reign and during the reigns of 
his successors, especially the incompetent and brutal Phocas (602-610), a former 
centurion and the murderer of Maurice. The threats to the Empire now came from the 
Avars in the north and the Persians in the east. The Avars destroyed much of the 
Byzantines' political authority in the Balkans. In the west, by the time of Mubammad's 
birth, northern Italy had been lost, and soon afterwards the Persians took a number of 
cities. It was obvious that the territories were too widely dispersed to be defended. 118 
The war in the east continued to drain the treasury until 591, when civil war in Persia 
enabled Maurice to aid Khusro II and conclude a favourable peace agreement. After 
Maurice's death Phocas abandoned the Balkans and was faced with the renewed threat 
from the east - the war with Khusro II. The next twenty-five years saw the Byzantines 
deprived of huge areas including all of Egypt and Syria. It can be said that Phocas 
"a See Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, p. 47. 
15 Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, p. 10. 
16 See ibid, p. 11. 
See ibid, p. 11. 
"g Haldon, Byzantium, p. 35. 
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presided over a military and economic disaster. 119 The Justinian expansion of the sixth 
century had overextended the resources of the state, and Phocas had neither the ability 
nor the experience to rectify the situation or to deal with the acrimonious divisions within 
the Church. He was deposed and executed in 610 by Heraclius (610-641). Heracius is 
justifiably regarded as one of the Empire's greatest rulers, but the first years of his reign 
were not successful and in 618 he even considered abandoning Constantinople for his 
home city of Carthage. In 613 the Persians took the Anatolian provinces and occupied 
Jerusalem in 614. They overran Armenia - the main source of Byzantine gold and the 
homeland of Heraclius' family - and reached the Bosphorus in 616. The fact is that 
Heraclius' overthrow of Phocas did not stabilise the Empire. The armies virtually 
collapsed between 610 and 615.120 Heraclius' great achievement was to reverse this trend, 
and the 620s saw some notable successes. Building upon the system initiated by Maurice, 
Heraclius defused the danger the Avars posed to the Empire in the Balkans. From 622 to 
628 he outmanoeuvred the Persian forces in Anatolia and Armenia and took the war to 
the heart of the Säsänian Empire. The Persians and Avars tried unsuccessfully to take 
Constantinople in 626, and in the 630s the Bulgars rebelled against and defeated the 
weakened Avars. Thus the decade witnessed the partial resurgence of the Empire. 
Heraclius had been able to restore its eastern territories and stabilize its position in the 
Balkans. 121 
The last decade of the Säsänian dynasty saw a series of violent upheavals which exposed 
the inherent weaknesses of the huge empire. The reforms of Khusro I (531-579) had 
attempted to cope with these weaknesses and strengthen the Emperor's position, but the 
Empire proved resistant to centralization: the political and military organisation was too 
inefficient to remain stable. In addition, the hundred years of almost continuous war with 
the Byzantines from 527 to Heraclius' victory in 628 weakened the social structure. The 
Säsänians were, like the Byzantines, involved in wars on several fronts, notably against the 
Turkish federation in the 570s and 580s, which proved hugely expensive. 122 In spite of 
Khusro's reforms the Säsänian state remained a fairly simple structure in which economic 
and military power rested with the feudal nobility. The wars against the Byzantines 
provided short-term gains and their peace payments were useful, but much of this revenue 
was expended in defending the Empire against other dangers. Even the most successful 
' Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, p. 11. 
120 See Kaegi, Byzantium, p. 33. 
121 Haldon, Byzantium, p. 48. 
Rubin, "The Sasanid Monachy", v. XIV, p. 659. 
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conqueror, Khusro II, expanded the Empire too far to the west. 123 Heraclius' successes 
against the Empire gave rise to the most severe bout of dynastic instability the state had 
ever experienced. In 628 Heraclius prompted the Persian nobility to overthrow Khusro 
and the humiliated Säsänian Empire degenerated into civil war and chaos. In 629 the 
Persians abandoned Egypt and Byzantine western Asia. 124 Thus the last Säsänian ruler, 
Yasdagird III (633-651) found himself confronted by the Muslim forces at a point when 
the return of booty to the Byzantines combined with the destruction caused by the 
Mesopotamian campaigns had left the monarchy gravely weakened. 125 
As for the Byzantines, Heraclius' achievement was remarkable, but the restored Empire 
was no longer a great power. All the resources of Church and state had been expended on 
the war effort. Heraclius owed the Church a vast sum, a substantial army still needed to 
be maintained, and taxes were slow in coming from Asia Minor. Economically the Empire 
was in a precarious condition. 126 The hold of the Byzantines on Syria remained 
tenuous. ' 27 In addition theological disputation continued to undermine the affairs of the 
Church. After Mu'ta (629) Heraclius taxed the provinces in order to liquidate the loan 
made by the Church and this exacerbated the sectarian tensions within the Empire. 128 
The Muslim invasions followed Heraclius' victory over the Persians too swiftly to allow 
imperial restabilisation. The rapid succession of internal and external crises kept Heraclius 
and his government perpetually off balance. 129 But it is difficult to measure how 
exhausted the Empire was after 628. It was certainly not in a state of collapse at the 
moment of the first Islamic raids and invasions, yet it was fiscally, psychologically and 
militarily unstable. "° Nevertheless the Muslims were justified in regarding the restored 
Empire as a formidable foe against whom victory was by no means certain in the short 
term. Nor was the Säsänian Empire to be considered a spent force militarily. But the 
Muslims were an unknown quantity. Heraclius had good intelligence on the topography, 
roads and communications, climate and other factors in Syria. On the eve of al-Yarmiik he 
was very experienced in war, but as a result his military repertory was well known to the 
Muslims, who by contrast were far less well known to Heraclius and his advisors, except in 
See ibid, p. 661. 
12` Kaegi, Byzantium, p. 26. 
Rubin, "The Sasanid Monachy", v. XIV, p. 661. 
126 Haldon, Byzantium, p. 50 
127 Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, p. 23. 
11 See Foord, The Byzantine Empire, p. 113. 
129 See Kaegi, Byzantium, p. 33. 
130 See ibid, p. 46. 
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so far as they conformed to earlier Arab patterns of conducting war. 131 Oman's verdict on 
the Muslims' success against the Byzantines applies equally well to their campaign against 
the Säsänians: "The Muslims who conquered Syria and Egypt were not superior in arms 
or organisation to the Byzantines but their fanatical courage enabled them to face and 
defeat better-armed and better-disciplined troops. "132 
11.8: Conclusion 
This chapter has covered some important aspects of the political, religious, and social life 
of the Arabian Peninsula in the era prior to the rise of Islam. It first explained the Arabs' 
critical location in relation to the two giant empires and their Arabian subject kingdoms. 
Then, it focused on the particular nature of al-Hijäz and of its two cities of Mecca and 
Medina. After that, the social life of the tribes, their feuds and their alliances were 
examined. Next, the causes of inter-tribal conflict and the mounts of the Bedouins were 
considered. The special characteristics of the Arabs which were to have an effect on the 
five battles in question were briefly discussed, and this was followed by an explanation of 
ayyäm al-Arab, including the sacred months. Finally a brief history of the Byzantine and 
Säsänian empires was given. 
This chapter has made clear that the Arabs had no notion of strategy, no centralised 
leadership, no one single religion, and were far from being a united military power. Their 
loyalty was to their own belligerent tribe, and they were continually at war with each 
other. How these aggressive and unruly warriors were disciplined and inspired to win 
decisive victories against apparently superior forces will be considered in the next chapter. 
13' See ibid, p. 63. 
132 Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, p. 208. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Battles and their Significance 
Islam was revealed in Mecca in about 609 AD. The Prophet then remained in the city for 
thirteen years, calling the people to Islam. In the beginning it was a secret call but three 
years after the revelation he declared it openly. Mecca at that time was considered an 
important religious city, since it sheltered the Kacbah, to which people had been making 
pilgrimage for many centuries. ' During the sixth century AD the tribe of Quraysh had 
come to occupy positions of power within the religious and commercial hierarchy. 2 The 
Quraysh's wealth was mainly derived from the organisation and financing of caravans; 
journeys took place twice a year, to Yemen in winter and to Syria in summer. 3 The 
Prophet's message was directed against the ideas and practices of polytheism and slavery. 
These two elements among others formed the backbone of trade for the Quraysh. 4 During 
the pilgrimage season, the Prophet and his Companions started to call the Quraysh and 
other tribes to Islam. The reaction quickly grew violent: they were tortured, disgraced, and 
humiliated increasingly day after day. Consequently, they had to seek a place of refuge 
and look for shelter elsewhere. ' Some - though not the Prophet himself - were forced to 
migrate to Abyssinia (a Christian land); and finally to escape to Medina. Many did so 
under cover of darkness, leaving behind their wealth and their families. 6 After most of the 
Muslims had migrated to Medina, the Quraysh were concerned that the Prophet himself 
would travel to Medina and establish a power base which could be used to strike against 
their interests. As a result they laid plans to assassinate him, but he was aware of the 
'The Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 9-97, refers to this: "The first House (of worship) appointed for men was that 
at Becca (another name for Mecca): full blessing and guidance for all the worlds. In it are Signs 
Manifest; the station of Abraham; whoever enters it attains security; pilgrimage thereto is a duty men 
owe to Allah". 
2 See al-I Ialabi, al-Sirah a1-Halabiyyah, v. 1, p. 156. 
3 See the Qurän, 106: 2. 
See Musnad Ahmad (No. 4258, v. 1, p. 446) and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 1, p. 438. 
Al-llahhäk [d. 774/1373], al-Ahäd, v. 2, p. 179, claimed that there were two kinds of migration: first, 
one went to Medina and stayed there in order to serve Islam; second, one migrated to Medina, then 
returned home and stood by, awaiting the call of the Prophet in Medina. Of these, the first was 
considered the better course of action, and is called Herat al-Battah. 
6 In the Qur'an (ETMC), 22: 39, it is found: 'To those against whom war is made, permission is given 
(to fight), because they are wronged; - and verily, Allah is Most Powerful for their aid; - (they are) those 
who have been expelled from their homes in defiance of right, - (for no cause- except that they say: 
"Our Lord is Allah. " 
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danger and left the city with his closest Companion, Abn Bakr. ' The Quraysh then offered 
a substantial reward for the capture of Muhammad. ' Upon the Prophet's (PBUH) arrival 
in Medina, the Islamic community, the Muslim Umma (nation), was born. ' Most of the 
emigrants had to start from scratch. 10 Three groups basically formed the society of 
Medina; firstly, the two tribes newly converted to Islam, al Aws and al-Khazraj, known as 
the Helpers (al Ansär); secondly, the Emigrants (al-Muhäjirün); and lastly, the three 
Jewish tribes of Bann Qurayzah, Bann al-Nadir, and Banü Qaynugä The Prophet was 
received as the unchallenged leader of Medina. The location of Medina provided the 
newly Islamic community with a strategic position on the mercantile route from Mecca to 
Syria. The migration of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina took place in 622 
AD. " The Prophet immediately built a mosque, which was to become the headquarters of 
the fledgling Islamic state. One of the first acts of the Prophet in Medina was to create 
bonds of Ikhä' (brotherhood) 12 between the Emigrants and the Helpers. " In addition, 
treaties were concluded with the Jewish tribes. Now that they were settled in their new 
home, one of the main tasks of the Prophet and his Companions was to spread Islam by 
' Abd Bakr [c. AD 573-13/634] was the first Caliph to rule the Islamic community after the death of 
the Prophet. He was also the first man to embrace Islam and later fought at the battle of Badr. Further 
see Sahib al-Bukhäri (Bib: Manigib al Muhijrin, v. 3, p. 1336) and Sunan al-Tirmidhi (Bib: Manägib 
Abii Bakr, v. 5, pp. 606-616). 
' The reward was about 100 camels, which was considered at that time a huge amount. See Sähih al- 
Bukhdri (Bib: H#ratal-Nabi, No. 3692, v. 3, p. 1417) and Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 12. 
9 Umma oftem translated "Muslim community". See Dallal, "Ummah", in Esposito and others (eds), 
The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, v. 4, p. 267. 
1° The Qur'an (ETMC), 59: 8, states: "(Some part is due) to the indigent Muhäjirs, those who were 
expelled from their homes and their property, while seeking Grace from Allah and (His) Good 
Pleasure, and aiding Allah and His Messenger: such are indeed the truthful". 
11 See Kennedy, The Prophet, p. xii. Further see Sahib Muslim (Bib: Fi Ihfadith al-Hý(rah, v. 4, pp. 
2309-2311). 
12 Brotherhood was initiated between individuals of different tribes, who were encouraged to share 
their wealth and property with one another. For example, Sacd b. al-Rabic, who was one of the Helpers, 
offered cAbd al-Rahmän b. cAuf, who was an emigrant, half of his wealth and property and even offered 
to divorce one of his wives. CAbd al-Rahmän, however, simply thanked him and asked for directions to 
the market. See Sähih al-Bukhäri (Kitib al-Buyii; No. 1944, v. 2, p. 722), al-Sunan al-Kubrä [215/831- 
303/916], (Bib: al-Hadiyyat li man Arras, No. 5580, v. 3, p. 336), and Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa a! - Nihiyah, v. 1, p. 228. 
The Qur'än (ETMC), 59: 9, states: "And those who before them, had homes (in Medina) and had 
adopted the Faith, show their affection to such as came to them for refuge and entertain no desire in 
their hearts for things given to the (latter), but give them preference over themselves even though 
poverty was their (own lot). And those saved from the covetousness of their own souls, - they are the 
ones that achieve prosperity. " 
13 It should be noted here that this was another state of alliance, but between individuals not tribes, 
and based upon different norms of formation than the ones that had been known in Arab society. 
Similarly see the section "Tribal Alliances" in the chapter "Brief Background of the Region Prior to 
Islam" (Ch. 2). 
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word and deed. 14 Naturally, this resulted in conflict with many of the neighbouring tribes 
and nations. As we shall see, however, these conflicts became decisive turning points for 
the Muslims and it can be argued that their importance for the very survival of the 
community led the Muslim army to change its method of warfare to one in which "It 
moves swiftly and attacks quickly in every battle. "" 
This chapter proposes to survey the five major battles considered by this study with the 
intention of furnishing the reader with a general background and a source of references 
for the succeeding chapters. In addition, at the end of the account of each battle its 
specific characteristics will be highlighted. What makes these battles (Badr, Uliud, al- 
Khandaq, al-Yarmük, and al-Qädisiyyah) significant is that they took place in the early 
stages of Islam, between the second year and the fifteenth year AH (in the seventh 
century AD, about 624-636). It is important to note that the revelation of the Qur'än had 
begun before, and continued until after, the first three battles. The last two battles were 
fought against the two huge empires which dominated the region. Some Companions 
fought in both periods, at first to ensure the survival of the Islamic state, and then during 
the period of conquests. It should be emphasised that in these battles the Muslim army 
fought only with non-Muslim armies. Historians have long regarded these battles as 
turning points for the Muslim Umma. 
14 For more detail see the section "Definition of Islamic Strategy and the Two 'Pillars"' in the chapter 
'The Importance of Islamic Military Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
'S Al-Turkumäni, al-Madhähib, p. 183. 
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111.1: The Battle of Badr 
The battle of Badr16 took place on the 17`h of Ramadan, 2 AH (March 15`h 624 AD). " It 
was the first major conflict between the Muslim army and the non-believers of Quraysh. '8 
It is considered by the Qur'an to be a turning point for humanity. The Prophet heard that 
a great caravan carrying a large amount of money and valuable merchandise was on its 
way back from al-Sham. 19 Militarily, it seemed a soft target since only forty men were 
guarding the caravan; it was considered an easy prize. A state of belligerency already 
existed between the Muslims and the Quraysh and so, hoping to capture the caravan and 
seizing the opportunity, the Prophet (according to some accounts) requested those 
Companions who had their mounts ready to proceed with him. 20 Approximately three 
hundred and fourteen of his Companions rode rapidly with him, carrying a minimum 
amount of weapons and (according to other accounts) taking turns to ride on the seventy 
camels they had at their disposal . 
2' At the well of Aba cUtbah he ordered some 
inexperienced youths to go back to Medina 22 The Prophet's information was that the 
caravan would pass through Badr. 23 Nevertheless, Abü Sufyan, who was in command of 
the caravan, was somehow made aware of the danger and sent a message to the Meccans 
urging them to come to the rescue, as almost everyone in the city had invested in the 
16 Badr is the site of a number of wells, and is located between Mecca (c. 300km) and Medina (c. 
153km). It was named after Badr b. Yakhlid b. Kinänah [d. c. 300 AD]. Badr was not an inhabited 
area, but a fair was held there every year at the beginning of Dha al-Qicdah for eight days. Badr 
became renowned after the battle. The battle was given several names such as GhazwatBadr, Ghazwat 
Badr al-Kubrä, and GhazwatBadr al-Thäniyah. See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 2, p. 202, 
al-Bakri, Mujam ma Istujim, v. 1, p. 231, Yägiit al-Hamawi, Mujm al-Buldan, v. 1, p. 357, al-Halabi, al- 
Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 390, Yamäni, Badr al-Kubrä, pp. 19-23, and al-Sha°räwi [d. 2001], 
Ghazawaral-Rasril, p. 25. 
17 For the main references to the battle see the Qur'an, 8: 5-19,41-45,49-50, & 67, Sahib al-Bukhäri 
(Bab: GhazwatBadr, v. 4, pp. 1435-1458), Sahib Muslim (Bib: GhazwatBadr, v. 3, pp. 1403-1404), and 
the rest of the books of hadith and biography. 
18 The major tribe in Mecca at the time of the Prophet Muhammad, who was himself a member of the 
Qurayshite clan of Banü Häshim. See Sahb} Muslim (Bäb: Fadil Nasab al-Nabi, Nos. 2276,2277, & 
2278, v. 4, p. 1782), Ibn I; lajar, Fath al Bari, v. 6, pp. 529 & 530, and Firestone, Jihäd, p. 174. 
19 See al-I; Ialabi, al-Sirah al-5alabiyyah, v. 2, p. 375. 
20 Further see the section "The Battle of Badr" in the chapter "The Task of Islamic Military 
Intelligence" (Ch. 6). Also see Sabah Muslim (Bib: 7hubüt a/-Jannah It al-Shahid, No. 1901, v. 3, p. 
1510), Sunan al-Bayhagi al-Kubrä (Bib: Jawäz Infräd al-Rajul wa al-Rajulän B al-Ghazü, v. 9, p. 99), 
and al-Nawawi, Sharh Sahü1 Muslim, v. 13, p. 45. 
21 This account is not consistent with others holding that two-thirds of the army did not have their 
camels with them and that each camel was ridden by three men alternately. Even the Prophet himself 
is said to have shared his camel with Marthd and `Ali b. Abi 'I alib. See Sahib Muslim (Bäb: ThubUt al- 
Jannah li al-Shahid, No. 1901, v. 3, p. 1510), Sunan al-Bayhaqi al-Kubrä (Bib: Jawäz Infiräd al-Rajul 
wa al-Rajulän B al-Ghazü, v. 9, p. 99), and al-Nawawi, Sharh Sahib Muslim, v. 13, p. 45. 
22 See al-II Ialabi, al-Sirah alljalabiyyah, v. 2, p. 380. 
23 The section "The Battle of Badr" in the chapter "The Task of Islamic Military Intelligence" (Ch. 6). 
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caravan. 24 Remembering the story of Ibn al-Hadrami, the men of Mecca reacted angrily 
and with no time to spare one thousand warriors including 100 cavalrymen marched to 
defend their caravan. Abii Sufyän, however, did not wait for the Quraysh; he avoided 
Badr and the caravan escaped. Although many of the Quraysh, having been informed of 
the escape, wanted to turn back - and some did - the great majority continued to march 
towards Badr, and the Muslims realised that an encounter with the Quraysh army was 
inevitable. " At this point, after evaluating the loss of the caravan and the potential threat 
posed by the Quraysh army, the Muslims needed to prove three things: firstly, that they 
were not afraid of the Quraysh, and were determined to protect their dignity and uphold 
their position in the region; ` secondly, that they would stand for Islam even if it meant 
fighting against their relatives, many of whom were with the Quraysh army - in other 
words, their decision to stand and fight can be considered a forward defensive plan against 
the Quraysh; thirdly, that they would at all costs prevent the Jews in Medina gaining 
dominance over the fledging Islamic state. 27 In addition, the Prophet was promised one of 
two alternatives by A115h: either the caravan, or the Quraysh army. 28 As for the Quraysh, 
their intention, after being informed that the caravan had escaped, was either to celebrate 
in Badr for three nights or to punish the Muslims so severely that they would not dare to 
intercept any more caravans, as their inevitable victory would impress on the Arabs that 
the Quraysh were still supreme in the region. 29 After the Prophet had called upon his 
forces to prepare for the expected confrontation, the Muslim army moved towards Badr. 3o 
That night it rained, hindering the progress of the Quraysh to Badr by impeding their 
mounts, but proving a blessing for the Muslim army as it hardened the ground and made 
24 For the incident of Ibn al-Hadrami see the Qur'an, 2: 217 and Sunan al-Bayhaqi al-Kubra (Bib: 
Qismat al-Ghanimah, v. 9, p. 58). 
25 See the Qur'an, 8: 6. Also see the section "The Battle of Badr" in the chapter "The Task of Islamic 
Military Intelligence" (Ch. 6). In addition, it should be noted that the Qur'an makes it clear that the 
two armies were brought into conflict by the will of Allah. See the Qur'an, 8: 42. 
26 Firestone, Jihid, p. 131 and al-Rashid, al-Qiyidah a1-Askariyah, pp. 49-50. 
27 In the Qur'an (ETMC), 22: 39, it is mentioned: "To those against whom war is made, permission is 
given (to fight), because they are wronged; and verily, Allah is Most Powerful for their aid". 
28 Al-Mubarakpuri, al-Rahiq, p. 208, states: "The Muslims were afraid that the pagan Meccans would 
march on and initiate the war within the headquarters of Islam, Medina. " This judgment seems to be 
weak since they had been promised they would meet the Quraysh or take the caravan. The Qur'an 
(ETMC), 8: 7, states: "Behold! Allah promised you one of the two parties, that it should be yours: Ye 
wished that the one unarmed should be yours, but Allah willed to establish the Truth according to His 
words and to cut off the roots of the Unbelievers. " 
29 See al-Mubarakpuri, al-Rahiq, pp. 212-213. 
30 Before continuing the march he consulted with his Companions and asked them whether the army 
should proceed to Badr. See Ibn Hisham, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 162, al-Tabari, Tirikh al-Taban; v. 2, p. 26, 
Ibn Kathir, al Bidiyah wa al-Nihiyah, v. 3, p. 262, and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 385. 
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it easier for them to march. 31 The next day the Muslims proceeded with caution to Badr, 
camping on the further bank of the valley. A squad of guards from the Helpers was 
assigned to defend the Prophet at his headquarters. A trellis-like structure was built in a 
dominant position, from which the Prophet, acting as commander, could observe and 
supervise the confrontation32 Al-Hubab b. al-Mundhir, an experienced warrior, evaluated 
the battlefield and advised the Prophet that the Muslims should go to the nearest well, 
construct and fill a large water container (pool), and fill in the remaining wells. Such an 
action, he explained, would deprive the Quraysh army of water, which was rightly 
considered a vital natural resource. This suggestion was accepted and executed at 
midnight. Meanwhile, the Quraysh drew closer and camped on the nearer bank of the 
valley. On the morning of the conflict, they marched into the valley and took up a fighting 
position designed to disadvantage the Quraysh army. 33 Before their advance the Prophet 
had called his men together, performed the Fajr (dawn) prayer and urged them to fight 
bravely. As the sun rose, he ordered them into ranks. 34 From an Islamic perspective, as the 
two armies became clearly visible to each other, it is recorded in the Qur'nn that the Devil, 
who had been with the Quraysh army, fled as he caught sight of the Angels sent by Allah 
to assist the Muslims. Satan had accompanied the Quraysh in the shape of Suragah b. 
Malik, one of the leaders of the Banii Kinnnah, and had promised to help the Quraysh 
achieve victory. 35 
The battle was started by al-Aswad b. cAbd al-Asad, who challenged the Quraysh to drink 
from the pool protected by the Muslims; he was later killed. An arrow was then fired into 
the Muslim army, fatally wounding Muhji Muslims consider him to be the first martyr of 
31 In the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 11, it is mentioned: "Remember He covered you with drowsiness, to give 
you calm as from Himself, and He caused rain to descend on you from heaven, to clean you therewith, 
to remove from you the stain of Satan, to strengthen your hearts, and to plant your feet firmly 
therewith. " 
32 See Ibn Hajar, Fath al-Bari, v. 7, p. 289 and Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 168. 
33 See the exegesis of Ibn Kathir, Tafsirlbn Kathir, v. 2, p. 319, regarding verse, 8: 49. 
See Musnad Ahmad (No. 948, v. 1, p. 117) and al-I Talabi, al-Sirah al-1jalabiyyah, v. 2, p. 393. 
3s In the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 48, it is found: "Remember Satan made their (sinful) acts seem alluring to. 
them, and said: "No one among men can overcome you this day, while I am near to you. " But when the 
two forces came in sight of each other, he turned on his heels, and said: "Lo! I am clear of you; Lo! I 
see what ye see not; Lo! I fear Allah; for Allah is strict in punishment. " AI-Tabari, Tafsir al-Tabari, v. 10, 
pp. 18-20, al-Qurtubi, Tafsir al-Quriubi, v. 8, p. 27, and Ibn Kathir, Tafsir Ibn Kathir, v. 2, p. 318-319, 
maintain that it is indeed Satan who is referred to in this verse. Also, al-Mubarakpuri, al-Rahiq, the 
English Version, p. 220, refers to this event when he cited the exhortation of Abü Jahl, the Prophet's 
sworn enemy, to the Quraysh army: "Do not fear the betrayal of Suragah" (Satan, it seems, appeared in 
the form of Suragah). " Also see Grunebaum, Classicallslam, p. 36. 
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the battle. 36 cUtbah b. Rabicah stepped out from the ranks of the Quraysh accompanied by 
his brother and son, and called for single combat. 37 `Ubaydah b. al-I: Iarith, Hamzah b. 
cAbd al-Muttalib38, and cAli b. Abi Talib39, the closest relatives of the Prophet, represented 
the Muslim force. Ilamzah and °Ali killed their opponents, and then helped the injured 
°Ubaydah to kill his. At first, the Muslim army followed a defensive plan devised by the 
Prophet: first, to rain arrows on the enemy as they marched closer, as a temporary 
disruption; second, not to break ranks and fight as individuals, but to maintain discipline 
and protect one another's lives with their swords as the Quraysh closed in on them. This 
unique method of fighting, quite unfamiliar among the Arabs, was to prove a highly 
successful tactic. The Muslim army, unlike the Quraysh, were thus a united force, and this 
was a more important factor than the greater numbers of the Quraysh army. 40 It can be 
argued that if they had not been united they might have been easily defeated. 41 
As the armies drew closer together, the Prophet went to his shelter and prayed fervently 
to Allah to support the Muslim troops. Nadawi writes: "Putting his head (PBUH) on the 
dust..., he knew full well that if the victory in the battle was to go by the numbers and 
strength, prowess and weapons of the two forces, the result was a foregone conclusion. ""Z 
Then the Prophet dozed a little and waking, said: "0 Abil Bakr, glad tidings are there for 
you: Allah's victory has approached; by Allah, I can see Gabriel on his mare in the thick of 
36 See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 175, al-Tabari, 7ärikh al-Tabari, v. 3, p. 33, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah 
wa al-Nihäyah, v. 3, p. 274, and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 404. 37 cUtbah b. Rabicah called for a duel in order to defend his honour against Abii Jahl's accusation of 
cowardice. What had happened was this: after the escape of the caravan the Quraysh army were about 
to return to Mecca, following the advice of cUtbah, since they now had no pressing reason to fight the 
Muslims. Abii Jahl accused °Utbah of cowardice, and cUtbah replied: "Tomorrow he will know who the 
coward is. " See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 171 and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 398. 
38 He was the uncle of the Prophet, and his brother, through what is called min al-Radä"ah (through 
breast-feeding). He became a Muslim in the sixth year of the first revelation. He was one of the great 
fighters of Islam and was called AsadAllah (the lion of Allah). He was killed on the seventh day of the 
tenth month of the third year of AH at the battle of Uhud. See al-Mustadrak Gala al-Sahihayn (Bib: 
Manägib Hamzah b. Abd al-Muttalib, No. 4874, v. 3, p. 211). 
39 cAli b. Abi Tälib [c. AD 598-40/661] was the cousin of the Prophet. He was the first boy to become a 
Muslim. After the assassination of cUthmän he became the fourth Caliph. He was known for his of 
knowledge jurisprudence. See $al}ih, al-Bukhäri (Bab: Manigib Ali b. Abi Tälib, No. 3498, v. 3, p. 
1357) and al-Mustadrak `ala al-Sahihayn (Bä6: Manägib 5411 b. Ab! 7ä1i6, No. 4572, v. 3, p. 116). 
4° See Ibn Khaldün, Mugaddimatlbn Khaldün, p. 272 and Henderson, The Science of War, p. 40. 
41 This view, however, is open to question since Muslims believe that at Badr the angels participated in 
the fighting; and although the study does not doubt the importance of the Prophet's plan or wish to 
argue that the victory of the small Muslim army was not deserved, nevertheless, it is a fact according to 
the Qur'än that the angels' participation, along with other divine assistance, was very effective both 
materially and spiritually. The Qur an (ETMC), 8: 12, states: "Remember thy Lord inspired the Angels 
(with the message): "I am with you: give firmness to the Believers: I will instil terror into the hearts of 
the Unbelievers. " Also see the Qur'an, 54: 45 & 46. 
42 Nadawi, Muhammad, p. 205. 
44 
Ch. 3: The Battles and their Significance 
a sand storm . "43 The Prophet then stepped 
forward and recited the verse: "Their 
multitude will be put to flight, and they will show their backs. s44 Following the request of 
Gabriel, the Prophet took a handful of pebbles, flung it at the enemy and ordered his field 
commanders to sweep the enemy positions. Within a short time the Quraysh army 
panicked and fled. It should be noted that according to the various historical biographies 
of the Prophet, he did not take part physically in the battle. 45 The Muslims had won the 
day; prisoners of war were captured and a considerable booty was collected. Among the 
seventy Meccans killed in the field were some of their most influential leaders. They were 
all thrown into a well, except Umayyah b. Khalaf, who was buried where he had fallen. 
Other well-known chiefs of the Quraysh were killed after being made prisoner 46 In three 
days, the Muslim army returned to Medina. The battle of Badr did not last long. In fact, it 
was one of the shortest of the battles under discussion. 47 
From the Muslim point of view this battle has specific features, some of which did not 
occur in the other battles. First, it is considered by all Muslims, on the authority of A115h, 
to be the most important battle in Muslim history; the Qur'än praises it and calls it Yawm 
al Furq n. 48 The main reason for the confrontation was religious. However, it can be 
argued that, contrary to what can be found in most biography of the Prophet, he had to 
go into the fight not only to take revenge on the Quraysh for the loss of the caravan, but 
also because the Quraysh had threatened the non-Muslims of Medina with invasion and 
death if they refused to expel the Prophet and his Companions. 49 Badr was the first 
43 See Sabi al-Bukhäri (Bib: Shuhüd al-Mali'ikah Badr, No. 3773, v. 4, p. 1468), al-Mu'jam al-Kabir 
(No. 11952, v. 11, p. 342), al-Mustadrak Gala al-Sahihayn (Kitib Ma`rifat al-Sahibah, No. 4431, v. 3, p. 
72), and Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 172. Translated by al-Mubarakpuri, al Ralhiq, p. 221. 
44 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 54: 45. Also see Grunebaum, Classical Islam, p. 36. 
4s Further see al-Halabi, al-Shah al Halabiyyah, v. 2, pp. 344 and 412. 
46 See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 180 and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 440. 
47 The extraordinary ease of the victory can be understood from the remark of Salamah b. Waqsh, who 
scornfully observed that the Muslims had only been slaughtering bald old people as if they were 
sacrified camels. See al-Mustadrak Gala al-Sahihayn (DhikrManigib Salamah b. Waqsh, No. 5765, v. 3, 
p. 472), Ibn Hishäm, al-Shah, v. 3, p. 193, Ibn Kathir, al Bidiyah wa al-Nihiyah, v. 3, p. 305, and al- 
Halabi, al-Shah al Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 443. 
48 This word is used in different places in the Qur'an in different forms; however, it generally means a 
distinction between two things. It is used in the Qur'an to indicate the difference between right and 
wrong. The Qur'an is described as al-Furq n, which means that its revelation is a distinction between 
the right and the wrong, as in surah al-Furgan. This phrase has several meanings such as The Day of 
Discrimination, Testing, Criterion between right and wrong, and Decision between right and wrong. In 
The Holy Qur'in ETMC, p. 503, it is stated that the battle of Badr is called Furgin in Muslim theology, 
because it was the first trial of strength by battle, in Islam, between the powers of good and evil. Evil 
was defeated, and those who had real faith were tested and separated out from those who had not 
faith enough to follow the banner of faith. Also see the Qur'an, 9: 37 and 41. 
49 See Sunan Abii Da'iid (Kitib alKharij wa al-Imirah wa al-Fay; No. 3004, v. 3, p. 156) and al- 
Ghadban, al-Manhaj; v. 1, p. 219. 
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confrontation between the new Muslim community and the Quraysh, and it was a 
necessary one because the Prophet had to make sure of the loyalty of his new allies, the 
Helpers5° Second, non-human actors participated in this battle, i. e. the Angels and Satan. 
According to al-Bukhäri and Muslim the Angels actually took part in the fighting. " Third, 
it was the first time the new Islamic community was involved in a major confrontation 
with their main enemy, the Quraysh. Fourth, the battle occurred at a well-known 
gathering place (an annual fair) and was witnessed by the people who were waiting for 
the caravan. As a result, the news of the Muslims' victory spread quickly throughout the 
Arabian Peninsula. Fifth, the casualty report of the Quraysh stated that many of their 
leaders were killed or captured: 70 were killed and the Muslim army captured almost one 
quarter of their total numbers. "Z Sixth, there was, on the part of the Muslims, a huge 
change in the usual Arab attitude to kinship ties: relatives were killed not for leadership, 
wealth, or any other mundane motive, but according to the new criteria of Islam. Also the 
Prophet helped to assuage the psychological effects of slaying a kinsman. Seventh, the 
men who took part were praised and named after the battle: each one of them was called 
Badri by subsequent historians, especially when discussing those who took part in the 
ensuing battles53 In addition, it was reported that the best among the Emigrants and the 
Helpers of Medina were those who fought at the battle of Badr54 Eighth, the Muslim 
troops went into the confrontation without sufficient preparation. In addition they were 
distant from their main supply area, i. e. Medina. Their main objective had been to capture 
the caravan, but this was changed in accordance with the new prevailing circumstances. 
Ninth, it was the first time the Muslim army processed prisoners of war. Tenth, it is 
50 This judgement is supported by the nature of the consultation meeting he held with the Helpers; he 
asked the Helpers to verify their position. See Sähih Muslim (Bä& Ghazwat Badr, No. 1779, v. 3, p. 
1404), al-Sunan al-Kubrä (Kitäb al-Manägib, No. 8348, v. 5, p. 92), Ibn Hishäm, al-Shah, v. 3, p. 162, al- 
Tabari, Tarkh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 26, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihiyah, v. 1, p. 279, and al-Halabi, al- 
Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 386. 
5' See Sahib al-Bukhäri (Bib: Shuhi d al-Malä'ikah Badr, v. 4, p. 1467). Also see the section 'The Role 
of Divine Assistance" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
52 See Sahib al-Bukhäri (Bäb: Ghazwat Badr, No. 3764, v. 4, p. 1464) and Sahib Muslim (Bäh: al- 
Imdäd fi al-Malä ikah fi Ghazwat Badr, v. 3, p. 1385). 
Ss Ibn Kathir wrote that 100 Badr (the Companions who attended the battle of Badr) also fought at 
the battle of al-Yarmnk. See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, p. 9. Similarly see Sahib al- 
Bukhäri (Bib: Ghazwat Badr, No. 3762, v. 4, p. 1463) and Sahib Muslim (Bäb: Fadä'il Ahlu Badr, No. 
2494, v. 4, p. 1491). 
54 A1-Halabi, al-Sirah a1 flalabiyyah, v. 2, p. 467 and Williams, Themes of Islamic Civilization, pp. 30- 
31. 
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discussed in several verses in the Qur'an and in the hadith. ss Eleventh, it was the direct 
cause of the following battle, i. e. Uhud, since the Quraysh were honour-bound to take 
revenge for their defeat. Twelfth, it had been a spiritual torch for Muslims throughout 
history. It had been noted that despite the prevailing circumstances, i. e. a deficiency of 
men and equipment, the Muslim army accomplished a resounding victory over a 
seemingly invincible army and also succeeded in striking a powerful blow at the Quraysh 
economy 56 Muslims believe that the battle of Badr is a great landmark in the culture of 
Islam and contains many lessons in the military fields' 
ss For example see the Qur'an, surah al-Anffal, Sahib al-Bukhari (Bib: Ghazwat Badr, v. 4, p. 1454), 
Sahib Muslim (Bib: Ghazwat Badr, v. 3, p. 1403), al-Mustadrak'ala al-Sahihayn (Kitib al lihid wa al- SiyarNo. 4307, v. 3, p. 25), and Sunan Ibn Majah (Kitib al-Jihad, No. 2828, v. 2, p. 944). 
sb See Ismail, al-Ta°bi'ah al-Askariyyah, pp. 52-55. 
See al-Jubbüri, Tadibir al Amn, p. 31. 
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111.2: The Battle of Uhud 
In 3 AH (625 AD), 58 the year after the disgraceful defeat at Badr, Abu Sufyän, now the 
outstanding leader of the Quraysh, launched another attack on Medina 59 This battle 
followed an earlier raid (ghärah), which many Islamic works mistakenly call hajmah (an 
attack); this might mislead the reader into thinking that it was more significant than was 
actually the case. 60 Such small revenge was hardly enough, and the Quraysh utilised their 
time after Badr in preparing for another conflict with the Muslims, this time designed to 
crush them utterly. " In the third year of the Hijra the Quraysh marched towards Medina 
with an army three times the size of the one that had fought at Badr. It had to be large 
enough to ensure success; the military defeat at Badr and the capture of their caravans in 
al-Qirdah had resulted in a substantial economic loss for the Quraysh. 62 Upon hearing the 
news of the Quraysh's movements from his uncle al-`Abbäs, 63 the Prophet held a military 
council with both the Companions and the hypocrites (munäiqün). b4 The Prophet 
(PBUH) and the well-known Companions, as well as cAbdullah b. Ubayy b. Salül, 
preferred to stay in Medina, which contained a number of forts, and thus to secure the 
tactical advantage. The Prophet explained: "If they try to enter the city, we can fight them 
I Some historians have reported that it occurred in the month of Shawwäl. See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah 
wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 94. 
19 See the Qur'an, 3: 121-128 & 152-171, Saliih al-Bukhäri (Bäb: GhazwatBadr, v. 4, pp. 1485-1498), 
Sahih Muslim (Bäb: Ghazwat Ilhud, v. 3, pp. 1415-1417), Ibn Hajr, Fatly al-Bari, v. 7, pp. 346-348, Ibn Hishäm, 
al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 14, al-Tabari, Tarikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 59, al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, 
v. 2, pp. 489-490, and Grunebaum, Classical Islam, p. 39. 
60 Abü Sufyän carried out a surprise attack on a farm in the suburbs of Medina after hiding nearby 
waiting for an opportune moment. He killed the farmer and ran off with some dates, which he soon 
dropped in order to flee more quickly to Mecca, as he was being chased by the Muslims, who named 
the incident 'the Raid of the Dates' (Ghazwat al-Swayq). See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 310 and al- 
Malabi, al-Shah al-Flalabiyyah, v. 2, p. 479. See the meaning of the word Ghärah in Ibn Manzur, Lisan 
al-Arab, v. 1, p. 678, Ibn Qutaybah [213/829-276/890], Ghana al-Hadith, v. 2, p. 530, and 
Chambers, 
large Print Dictionary, pp. 464-465. 
61 This can be concluded from the fact that °Abdulläh b. Abi Rabic, cIkrimah b. Abi Jahl and Safwän b. 
Umayyah and others asked Aba Sufyän not to distribute the proceeds of the caravan which he had led 
to safety but to keep them in preparation for the next conflict with the Muslims. See Ibn Hishäm, al- 
Sirah, v. 4, p. 5 and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 502. 
62 See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 317 and al-Khattäb, al-Rasül, pp. 98-101. 
63 He had ordered a man from the Banil Ghifär to ride as fast as possible to warn the Prophet about 
the impending attack of the huge Meccans army on Medina; he asked him to make the journey in 
three days and nights. See al-Halabi, al-Sirah a1 Jalabiyyah, v. 2, p. 489. 
6A One of them was a man considered by Muslims to be an arch-hypocrite: °Abdullah b. Ubayy b. Salill. 
It is not known why he was at the council, as prior to this the Prophet had never asked his advice; 
nevertheless he sent for him to attend the meeting. See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, pp. 59-60, al-Tabari, 
Tänkh al-Tabat , v. 2, p. 
60, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 157, and al-I; Ialabi, al-Sirah 
al Halabiyyah, v. 2, pp. 492-493. Also see the section "Consultation" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic 
Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
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therein. "' However, the majority, among them I; Iamzah b. cAbd al-Muttalib, preferred to 
fight outside Medina despite the wishes of the Prophet and in defiance of his dream. 66 
When the Prophet finished the Friday prayer, he put on his war-gear to demonstrate his 
final decision to step outside Medina for the inevitable confrontation. Thus attired, he 
marched out with a thousand of his Companions; but when they reached al-Shaut, 
between Medina and Uhud, at this most critical juncture, cAbdullah b. Ubayy withdrew 
with a third of the army, saying: "He (the Prophet) has obeyed them (i. e. those 
Companions that chose to fight outside Medina, whereas °Abdullah b. Ubayy wanted to 
fight in Medina) and disobeyed me. We do not know why we should lose our lives here, 0 
men. "6' Nevertheless, that was not the reason according to the Qur'än: "They were that 
day nearer to Unbelief than to Faith, saying with their lips what was not in their hearts. 
But Alläh hath full knowledge of all they conceal. s66 So he returned to Medina 
accompanied by about three hundred men. In the assembly area, some untested 
youngsters, less than fifteen years old, were ordered to return to Medina; only two were 
allowed to stay. 69 In addition, on the way to the battlefield the Prophet refused the offer 
of a well-armed company from the Banii Qurayzah. 70 Despite these setbacks, the Muslim 
forces proceeded to meet their enemy. The Quraysh took up their position first; however, 
the Prophet slipped around their army and secured a position superior both tactically and 
in terms of terrain, facing Medina and commanding the slopes of Mount Ul1ud. 7' He 
divided the army into centre, right flank, and left flank. 72 He stationed some archers above 
65 See Ibn Hishäm, The Life of Muhammad; the English Version, p. 371. Also see the original source in 
Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 9. 
" The Prophet had dreamed that he thrust his hand into a strong coat of mail. See the rest of the 
dream in the following sources: al-Tabari, Tafsir al-Taban, v. 23, p. 78, Qurtubi, Tafsir al-Qur ubi, v. 15, 
p. 102, Ibn Kathir, Tafsir Ibn Kathir, v. 4, p. 16, al-Nawawi, Shari Sahli 
Muslim, v. 15, p. 32, and Ibn 
Hishäm, The Life of Muhammad; the English Version, p. 371. 
67 See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 10 and Ibn al-Qayyim, Zäd al-Ma'äd, v. 3, p. 194. 
68 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 167. 
69 These two were Samurah b. Jundub al-Fizäri and Räfic b. Khadij. They were allowed to remain with 
the army since one of them was a brilliant archer and the other was able to knock him down. See Ibn 
Hishäm, al Sirah, v. 4, p. 12 and al-I; Ialabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 493. 
70 See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 9, p. 99, al-Tabari, 7ärikh al-Taban, v. 2, p. 383, al-Mubarakpuri, al- 
Rahiq; the English Version, p. 249, and Grunebaum, Classical Islam, p. 39. 
Further, according to Faraj, al-Madrasah, p. 250, one of the reasons the Prophet did not accept their 
offer was because if he had accepted it this would have broken the unity of the goal. Also, one of the 
tenets of the Islamic military doctrine, discussed in this study, would also have been broken. See the 
sections on "The Well-Defined Goal" and "The Assistance of Non-Muslims" in the chapter "The Role 
of Islamic Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
71 The Quraysh were initially at a tactical disadvantage because of the Prophet's mobilised defensive 
plan (see footnote 101, p. 55). Since Uhud was close to Medina the Muslims were able to make good 
use of their superior knowledge of the terrain. 
72 See Ibn al-Qayyim, Zid al-Ma'äd, v. 3, p. 194. 
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the flanks on the strongpoint, a small hill, to keep the Quraysh cavalry at bay. 73 The 
Prophet strongly commanded the archers not to leave their position, no matter what 
direction the battle took, until he sent for them. The Quraysh numbered about three 
thousand men with two hundred horses, 74 whereas the Muslim army had at most two 
horses. Once again the balance of power was to the advantage of the Quraysh by three to 
one or more. 75 At the beginning of the battle a duel took place between Talbah b. Abi 
Talbah and cAli b. Abi Tälib and `All managed to kill the Quraysh champion. The Prophet 
once again conducted a defensive plan and ordered his soldiers not to march forward 
unless he so commanded. The Quraysh cavalry tried to join the combat but al-Zubayr b. 
aI °Awwäm and his group pushed them back. Therefore, Khälid b. al-Walid, 76 the leader of 
the Quraysh cavalry (who later became a Muslim), tried three times to make a tactical 
manoeuvre in order to attack the Muslim army from the rear, but was prevented by the 
Muslim archers from reaching his goal. In the Arabs' tribal battles the most important 
targets were the armies' standards. Consequently, the most intense fighting occurred 
around the standards, specially the standard of the Quraysh, which was the priority of 
engagement for the Muslim army. As a result, twelve standard bearers of the Banil cAbd 
al-Dar of Quraysh were killed one after another, and the last, an Abyssinian slave named 
$u'äb, held on to it, even after his hands had been cut off, until he was killed. 7' After that, 
the Quraysh army was "obliged to take to their heels, s78 according to the Qur'an . 
79 Al- 
Zubayr b. al 'Awwäm reported that he saw the Quraysh women running away and if he 
had wanted to capture them he could have. It appeared that the Muslim troops had the 
upper hand. Yet at this point a vital military rule was broken, leading to a massive and 
73 See Sahib al-Bukhäri (Bib: Ghazwat Badr, No. 3817, v. 4, p. 1486) and al-I; -Ialabi, al-Sirah al- 
Halabiyyah, v. 2, pp. 496. Also see Naseef, Military Organization, p. 104. 74 However some historical works state without certainty that the Quraysh army numbered about five 
thousand. See Mansoorpuri, Mercy of Mankind, p. 121. 
's Ibn Hishiim, al-Sirah, v. 4, pp. 10-13, al-Tabari, Tinkh al-Taban; v. 2, pp. 60-62, Ibn Kathir, al- 
Bidiyah wa al-Nihiyah, v. 4, pp. 14-16, and al-llalabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 496. 
7' Khälid b. al-Walid [d. 21-641] belonged to the clan of Quraysh, and was the cousin of cUmar b. al- 
Khattäb. He had fought as commander against Islamic forces on several occasions before he became a 
Muslim in the seventh year of the Hijra. The Prophet honoured him with the title 'Sword of God' 
(Sayfu Allih). 
" See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 84. Also see Mansoorpuri, Mercy ofMankind, p. 121. 
7e Naumani, Sirat un-Nabi, v. 2, p. 58. 
In the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 152, we find: "Allah did indeed fulfil His promise to you when we with 
His permission were about to annihilate your enemy. " 
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destructive turning point in the battle. The archers vacated their defensive position 
without the permission of their leader. 80 
Khälid b. al-Walid, an experienced and cunning warrior, took advantage of this window of 
opportunity; he drove through the Muslims' left flanks, killing the remaining archers and 
then attacking the Muslim army from the rear. The fleeing Quraysh army started to come 
back on to the field as their standard was raised again by a woman called al-l; lärithiyyah. 8' 
At that moment, the Muslim army was trapped; confusion took hold among them and 
they started to strike out in all directions. This, and the difficulty of distinguishing 
between friend and foe, led to the death of one of the Muslim soldiers, Hudhayfah b. al- 
Yamän's father. 82 At this critical moment, someone shouted: "Muhammad has been 
killed. " Some of the Muslim army, among them `Umar b. al-Kh5tt5b, 83 believed this 
rumour and sat down. 84 The Prophet and some of the remaining Companions, with 
difficulty and sacrifice, cleaved their way back to the slopes of Uhud. The Quraysh 
pressed the attack, and fell upon others of the Companions who were seeking the shelter 
of Mount Ubud. Some Companions were put to flight and many were slain. Quraysh 
warriors managed to reach the Prophet and injured him in several places, though not 
seriously. However, the Quraysh army could not sustain the attack on the Prophet, as 
many of them were being picked off by Sacd b. Abi Waggäs, a skilful archer who rarely 
missed his target. During these moments of chaos, the Prophet himself killed one of the 
Quraysh leaders, Ubayy b. Khalaf, with a javelin. "' When the Quraysh army was about to 
retreat, Abü Sufyän called out, enquiring if the Prophet, Abü Bakr, and cUmar were still 
alive 86 When `Umar replied in the affirmative, Abü Sufyän proclaimed that next year the 
confrontation would be at Badr, and the Prophet agreed. The Prophet then ordered `Ali b. 
80 The archers' disobedience was a serious sin according to the Islamic military doctrine; however, 
Muslims believe that since it was a first offence Allah forgave them. See the Qur'an, 3: 152. Also see 
Sahib al-Bukhari (Bib: Ghazwat Uhud, No. 3817, v. 4, p. 14486). 
81 Her name was °Amrah d. (daughter) Alqamah. See al-Halabi, al-Sarah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 503 and 
Naumani, Sirat un-Nabi, v. 2, p. 58. 
82 Ibn Hisham, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 36 and al-Ilalabi, al-Sirah al-5alabiyyah, v. 2, p. 529. In addition, it 
seems that Hudhayfah's father did not know the password for this battle. For such passwords see Ibn 
Hisham v. 4, p. 15, Ibn al-Qayyim, Zid al-Ma`äd, v. 3, p. 99, and al-I; Ialabi, al-Shah al Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 
426. 
83 Umar b. al-Khattab [c. AD 591-23/644] was the second Caliph to rule the Mulsim community, 
taking over the office after the death of Abü Bakr. He fought at the battle of Badr. He continued Abü 
Bakr's plan of conquest and expanded it. Further see Sahib al-Bukhari (Bib: Manägib Umar b. a! - 
Khattib, v. 3, pp. 1346-1350) and Sunan al-Tirmidhi (Bib: Manigib °Umarb. al-Khattäb, v. 5, pp. 617). 
8a See al-I Talabi, al-Sirah al-5alabiyyah, v. 2, p. 496. 
as See Sahib al-Bukhari (Kitäb al, Thid, No. 2874, v. 3, p. 1105), Musnad Abmad (No. 2609, v. 1, p. 
287), al-IIalabi, al-Sirah al-hialabiyyah, v. 2, p. 387, and al-Mubarakpuri, al-Rab q, p. 253. 
86 See Ibn Kathir, al Bidiyah wa al-Nihiyah, v. 4, p. 38. 
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Abi Taub to follow the Quraysh and find out whether they were heading to Medina or 
not. 87 He promised that if they were going to attack Medina he would follow them and 
fight them, but the Quraysh had decided to return to Mecca. On the way back, the 
Quraysh discussed the result of the battle and discovered that they had not accomplished 
any of their goals, i. e. to kill Muhammad, to destroy Islam, or to take booty or prisoners. 88 
According to the Qur'an, the Muslim army did not lose the battle of Ubud even though 
many of its soldiers were killed 89 Some historians, including Endress, 90 have called it a 
defeat, while others have described it as a victory for the Muslim army. 91 Al-Sha`rawi 
draws a suitable conclusion, in the light of the Qur'an, in his discussion of Uhud. 92 He 
explains that the Islamic army was not defeated in most of the important military aspects, 
supporting his argument with the following points: 1) the Muslim army killed many noted 
leaders of the Quraysh, 2) they remained on the battlefield whilst their enemy left, 3) 
none of the Muslim army were captured, 4) the Quraysh did not gain any booty, 5) the 
Muslim headquarters was not attacked. Also, it can be added that from an Islamic 
perspective many of the Muslim army were martyrs. In addition, the Prophet took 
advantage of the prevailing circumstances as he regrouped the following day, chased the 
Quraysh army, and camped for three nights, waiting for them in l; Iamra' al-Asad. 93 
Rodinson's opinion of the later stages of the battle is representative of the views of most 
historians. He writes that the critical point arrived when the Muslims allowed themselves 
to be drawn away from the slopes, encouraged by their early success, which historical 
tradition has probably exaggerated. Some of the archers, believing the battle already won, 
moved on to the plain and the fighting became confused. Khalid was the main cause of 
" He asked him to discover what mounts the Quraysh were using. If they were riding camels they 
would be returning to Mecca; but if horses, they would definitely be riding to attack Medina. See Ibn 
Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 43. 
68 Militarily speaking, prior to any battle every army command will lay down a series of objectives that 
it wishes to achieve e. g. to kill the enemy commander, occupy territory, or gain valuable spoils. The 
Quraysh did not achieve any one of these. See al-Sha°räwi, Ghazawit al-Rasril, pp. 155-156. Further 
see Sahib al-Bukhäri (Bab: Alladhina Istajäbü Liläh wa al-Rasul, No. 4287, v. 4, p. 1662), Ibn Hishäm, 
al-Sirah, v. 4, pp. 52-53, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihiyah, v. 4, p. 49, and al-I Talabi, al-Sirah al- 
hfalabiyyah, v. 2, p. 12. 
99 See the Qur'an, 3: 139. 
9o See Endress, An Introduction to Islam, p. 30 and al-Zuhayli, al-Tafsiral-Munir, v. 3, p. 102. 
91 See al-Khalfät and Asd, al-Askariyyah, p. 150. 
92 See al-Sha`räwi, Ghazawital-RasiJ, pp. 155-156. 
93 The Prophet insisted on being accompanied by the same men who had fought with him at Uhud 
with the exception of Jabir b. °Abdullah. About 700 had taken part, of whom about 100 had been 
killed; so there would have been about 600 pursuers. See the Qur'än, 3: 172-175, Sahih al-Bukhäri 
(Bib: Alladhina Istajäbri Lilih wa al-Rasal, No. 4287, v. 4, p. 1662), Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, pp. 52- 
53, Ibn Kathir, al Bidäyah wa a/-Nihiyah, v. 4, p. 49, al-lIalabi, al Shah al Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 12, and 
al-Sha°räwi, Ghazawital-Rasril, pp. 156-159. 
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the reversal. Rodinson calls the outcome "a triumph" for the Quraysh and writes "they 
had won a great victory. Y)94 Some scholars have dissented from this opinion, however. 
Kennedy, for example, considers the outcome "indecisive". 95 Moreover, although Peters 
notes that the Muslim forces suffered a "severe setback", 96 and Watt remarks that "the 
defeat of the Muslims at Uliud was a severe blow to the confidence of the Muslims", 97 it 
should be remembered that the Quraysh did not consolidate their victory by killing or 
capturing the Prophet, nor did they feel themselves capable of taking Medina. Islam lived 
to fight another day. It should also be emphasised that the Muslims' pursuit of the 
Quraysh was no mere afterthought. This strategic manoeuvre `turned the tables' to the 
advantage of the Muslim community. The surrounding tribes of the Arabian Peninsula 
heard that Muhammad had pursued the fleeing Quraysh army. Thus the Muslims 
strengthened their position within the region. 98 
Again, this battle had significant features, which differentiate it from the other battles. 
First, it occurred in the homeland of Medina, which the Quraysh invaded with the 
objective of seeking revenge for their defeat at Badr. Second, the mosque had an 
important role, particularly since it was used as a military headquarters, where the Muslim 
army regularly held their consultation meetings. Third, both armies were well prepared. 
Fourth, the common goal of the Muslim army was to exalt the word of Allah despite the 
action of the hypocrites, which did not affect the Muslim army's willingness to fight. Fifth, 
the course of operations changed fundamentally according to the course of events. Sixth, 
the archers did not understand the importance of obeying the commander's strict orders, 
and so enthusiasm detached from obedience proved destructive. Seventh, the result of 
fleeing from the battlefield and the importance of steadfastness in the confrontation were 
revealed in the Qur'an. Eighth, despite the difficulties of the battle the Prophet did not 
hesitate to respond to the challenge to fight the following year. Ninth, unlike at the battle 
of Badr, it seems that divine assistance did not come in the form of angelic support. 
Nonetheless, Muslims believe that prior to the battle divine assistance put the Muslim 
Rodinson, Muhammad, pp. 177-181. 
Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, p. 38. 
Peters, Mecca, p. 72. 
97 Watt, Bell's Introduction to the Qur'än, p. 100. 
98 There has been a debate regarding the Ghazwa of IHamrä' al-Asad; whether it was a separate 
Ghazwa from Uhud or was connected with it. Further see Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, pp. 52-53, Ibn 
Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 49, al-Halabi, al-Sirah al Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 12, and AI- 
Sha°räwi, Ghazawät al-Rasül, pp. 156-159. 
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soldiers to sleep. " Tenth, it revealed the ability of the Muslim army's leadership in 
regrouping the army and chasing the Quraysh. Eleventh, it can be argued that many 
historical works have not been based on a military perspective, since most of them agree 
that Ubud was a defeat for the Muslim army, while we contend that although the Muslim 
forces suffered a tactical defeat, operationally the outcome was indecisive, and the 
Quraysh's decision not to sacrifice more lives in order to make sure the Prophet was killed 
or captured was a strategic error, obvious in hindsight. Moreover, according to the Qur'an 
the money the Quraysh spent was no help to them as they had not been able to 
accomplish their goals. 1Ö° Twelfth, in this battle the Prophet carried out what is called a 
"mobilised defensive plan". 101 Thirteenth, this battle demonstrated beyond doubt that the 
Prophet was a human being, as he was injured. Fourteenth, this battle also resulted in the 
revelation of new elements of the shari'a. Part of Surah al-Nisä' (The Women) was 
revealed to clarify the way in which to deal with social problems related to widows, 
orphans, inheritance, remarriage and family rights. "' It also clarifies dealing with the 
"recalcitrant in the larger family, the community at Medina, viz., the Hypocrites and their 
accomplices. " 103 It also resulted in a strategic advantage for the Muslim army, in that they 
were now aware that there were many hypocrites among them who could not be 
trusted. 104 
See al-Halabi, al-Shah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, pp. 544 & 505. 
100 The Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 167, states: "And the Hypocrites also. These were told: "Come, fight in the 
way of Allah, or (at least) drive (the foe from your city). " They said: "Had we known there would be a 
fight, we should certainly have followed you. " They were that day nearer to Unbelief than to Faith, 
saying with their lips what was not in their hearts. But Allah hath full knowledge of all they conceal. " 
Also see Ibn Hajar, Fath al-Bari, v. 7, p. 347. 
101 A mobilised defence: defence of an area or position in which manoeuvre is used with organisation of 
fire and utilisation of terrain to seize the initiative from the enemy. See US Department of Defense, 
Dictionary of Military Terms, p. 213. 
Operationally, a mobile defence is "a defensive operational method in which no serious attempt is 
made to hold territory, to leave mobile forces free to attack the flanks of the enemy advance. " Lutwak 
and Koehl, The Dictionary of Modem War, p. 404. 
Wright notes that an offensive manoeuvre combines four elements with regard to weaponry: mobility, 
protection, striking power and holding power. Thus a mobilised as opposed to a static defence includes 
all four elements rather than just the last three. When the defence of a small area is impracticable for 
whatever reason, the fight is taken to the enemy by a force small enough to be easily moved; supply 
lines may be easily maintained; the stronghold is close enough to be used as a refuge in ease of defeat; 
and the chosen terrain is well known to the defending force, bringing an initial tactical advantage. See 
Wright, A Study of War, pp. 150-152. 
102 See al-Zuhayli, al-Tafsir al-Munir, v. 4, p. 220. For the outline of this sürah see Abdul-Raof, The 
Qur'an Outlined, pp. 15-19. 
103 The Holy Qur'an ETMC p. 204. 
104 Ibid. 
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111.3: The Battle of al-Khandaq 
The third battle discussed in this study, that of al-Khandaq, (the trench)"' occurred on 
Dhü al-Qicdah, the 51h year AH (February 627 AD). 106 Al-Khandaq is marked by various 
elements that distinguish it from Badr and Ubud. For example, despite the length of the 
siege, there was no real military confrontation and few casualties occurred. The chief 
cause of this battle is to be found in developments that had taken place since Uhud: the 
Banü al-Nadir, who had been expelled from Medina and settled at Khaybar, started 
hatching a widespread conspiracy against Islam. 107 Their plan succeeded as the Quraysh108 
and their formidable cavalry under the command of Abü Sufyän, together with their allied 
forces, 109 attacked Medina. 
The confederate army, composed of ten thousand men, attacked Medina from the frontal 
line, i. e. from the northern side, and their goal once again was to eliminate Islam. » The 
'OS It is sometimes called the battle of al-Khandaq (the Trench) which is its popular name; at other 
times it is called the battle of al Ahzib (The Confederates), as in the Qur'än. See the whole surah al- 
Ahzäb, Sahih al-Bukhäri (Bib: Ghazwat al-)Gandaq, v. 4, pp. 1505-1510), and Sahib Muslim (Bäb. - 
Ghazwat al Khandaq v. 3, pp. 1430-1430). 
106 Nonetheless, some historians report that it occurred in the month of Shawwäl, while others prefer 
the date 4/636. See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 94 and al-Funaysän, Ghazwat al- 
Ahzib, p. 30. 
1Ö7 In addition, in the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 51, we find: "Hast thou not turned thy thought to those who 
were given a portion of the book? They believe in jibt (sorcery) and tighlitand say to the Unbelievers 
that they are better guided in the (right) way than the Believers. " Al-Tabari, al-Qurtubi, and Ibn Kathir 
relate that Abn Sufyän, upon meeting with the Jewish chiefs asked them, since they knew the 
scriptures, to tell him whose religion was better, Muhammad's or his. They told him that his religion 
was better. Therefore this verse was revealed. See al-Tabari, Tafsiral-Tabari v. 5, pp. 133-134, Qurtubi, 
Tafsir al-Qurtubi, v. 5, p. 249, and Ibn Kathir, Tafsir Ibn Kathir, v. 1, p. 514. It can be argued that Abil 
Sufyän asked this question on behalf of the Quraysh not because he was sincerely interested in 
theological matters - otherwise the Quraysh would have debated with the Prophet and his followers 
instead of persecuting them - but because he sought confirmation from representatives of the 'People 
of the Book' that the Prophet was a dangerous impostor. 
108 The coalition of forces will be called the confederate army or confederacy, as the Bann Qurayzah 
were also involved, as we shall see later. 
109 The commanders and forces were: Abii Sufyän and those who followed him from the tribe of 
Kinänah; `Uyaynah b. Hisn b. Hudhayfah and those who followed him from the Ghatafän tribe; al- 
Härith b. °Auf al-Murri and his followers from the Banii Murrah; Tulayhah and his followers from the 
Asad tribe; and Sufyän b. °Abd Shams and his followers from the Salim tribe; and others. Later on all 
of these leaders became Muslims except Sufyän b. °Abd Shams, who led the Banü Salim tribe and 
whose end is unknown. See al-Halabi, al-Sirah al--Ialabiyyah, v. 2, p. 631, al-Funaysän, Ghazwat al- 
Ahzäb, p. 44, and Ibn Hishäm, The Life of Muhammad; the English Version, p. 450. In addition, since 
the Qur'än calls the battle al Ahzäb, which means the Confederates, it can be argued that the meaning 
of this word can cover even the non-Arabs involved in this battle. Further see Ibn Taymiyyah, Majrnu 
al-Fatiwi, v. 28, p. 444, Ibn Qudämah [541/1147-620/1223], al-°Uqüd, p. 162, and al-Funaysän, 
Ghazwat al Ahzäb, p. 245. 
110 See Ibn Kathir, Tafsir lbn Kathir, v. 3, p. 477. Al-Mubarakpuri, al Rahiq, p. 311, argues that if this 
army had carried out a surprise attack on Medina it would definitely have exterminated all the 
Muslims. 
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Qur'an speaks of this battle in surah al-Alizäb. Upon hearing the news of this dangerous 
alliance, the Prophet straight away consulted his Companions, asking them whether they 
should fight their enemy inside or outside Medina. After analyzing the terrain, Salmän al- 
Färisi` suggested that they should dig a trench in the northern frontal line of Medina, 
since the oasis was well protected by both natural and man-made obstacles on three 
sides. 112 These obstacles consisted of a continuous line of buildings and palm groves, and 
to the south, west and east the volcanic stone (Harrat Wägim and flarrat Wabarah) and 
hills served well as a defensive line. This plan was received with general approval. The 
Prophet divided the trench into forty sections. To each section he (PBUH) allotted ten of 
the Companions and allowed anyone, even those less than fifteen years of age, to 
participate in the work. Later on, when the battle was about to begin, he ordered those 
under fifteen to go back to Medina. "' Since the Muslims had a treaty with the Banü 
Qurayzah, the Muslim army borrowed some digging tools from them. 14 It took the 
Muslims about fifteen days to complete the trench. "' Due to the continuous work, during 
these fifteen days the Muslim army suffered from extreme hunger and tiredness. The 
Prophet joined in the work with such vigour that his body was covered with dust. ' 16 Rocks 
were put next to the trench so that they could be used to stone any attempt to cross it. "' 
During the building of the trench, the confederate army killed two Muslim soldiers who 
were on a scouting mission. "' When the army arrived at Medina, they were surprised to 
be faced with such a defensive plan, and one of them exclaimed: "This is a device which 
"' Salmän aI-Färisi was originally a Persian who had been raised in the city of al-Madd'in in Persia. As 
a young man he determined to search for the truth. At first he converted to Christianity, but on 
hearing the Prophet converted to Islam. He was a leading figure among the Muslims and narrated 
more than sixty hadiths, four of them are narrated in Sahib al-Bukhäri and three in Sahib Muslim. His 
greatest effect on Islam and the Muslims was at the battle of al-Khandaq, when he advised the Prophet 
to dig the trench around Medina's vulnerable northern boundary, a method of warfare which the 
Arabs were not familiar with. See al-Dhahabi [673/1275-748/1348], SiyarA°läm a1-Nubalä; v. 1, pp. 
506-507. 
"Z See the map al-Khandaq. 
13 See al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 636. 
See al-Funaysän, Ghazwat al-Ahzäb, p. 49. For a similar case see al-Sunan al-Kubrä (Kitäb Ta, ýmin 
al-Ariyah, No. 5776, v. 3, p. 409) and Sunan al-Bayhagi al-Kubrä (Bäb. " al-Ariyah Mu'däh, No. 11255, 
v. 6, p. 88). 
"s See al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 636. 
The trench was about 5 yards (c. 4.75 meters) in depth and ten yards (c. 9.5 meters) wide, and in 
length thirty times the space taken up by ten men standing side by side. See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa 
al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 99 and Naumani, Sirat un-Nabi v. 2, p. 97. 
116 Regarding this subject, in the Qur'an (ETMC), 33: 21, we find: "Ye have indeed in the Messenger of 
Allah an excellent example. " 
117 See Naumani, Sir-at un-Nabs, v. 2, p. 97. 
"e See Ibn Kathir, Tafsirlbn Kathir, v. 3, p. 477 and al-Funaysän, Ghazwatal-Ahzäb, p. 242. 
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the Arabs have never employed. ""' The Muslim army, numbering three thousand men, 
camped facing the trench, with Mount Sal' at their back; the trench, as was intended, 
provided an effective line of defence. The women and children were sent to a well- 
guarded fort in Medina. As an attack was feared from the Banü Qurayzah, Salama b. 
Aslam and a detachment of 200 men was stationed outside the fort to protect the women 
and children. 120 The confederate army was now in a difficult situation since they had 
come prepared to fight for a few days at most, win an easy victory, and then return home. 
Facing a well-conceived and executed defensive plan they had no choice but to camp on 
the other side of the trench and wait for any sign of inattentiveness on the part of the 
Muslim army. The Muslim troops had to be spread along the trench in order to protect 
every section; they could not be drawn up into a fighting formation. The two armies were 
in stalemate and, as we have mentioned, no real combat took place. This can be 
understood from the Qur'an: "And A115h turned back the non-believers for (all) their fury: 
no advantage did they gain; and enough is Allah for the believers in their fight . i121 Almost 
a month went by without any actual fighting except for a few individual duels and the 
firing of arrows. 122 As a result there were remarkably few casualties, but Sacd b. Mu°ath, 
who is considered in Islam as one of the great Companions, was badly injured by an 
arrow. The forces on the other side of the trench, however, were not the only danger. 
Shortly after the beginning of the siege, the Banü Qurayzah broke their treaty with the 
Prophet and were in a position to threaten the Muslim army from behind, thus - in theory 
at least- increasing the number of fighters available to the confederacy. In addition to 
"extreme weather, lack of supplies, continuous starvation, sleepless nights and a swarm of 
armies arrayed against them", '23 within Medina the hypocrites started to spread 
propaganda with the objective of reducing the spirit of the Muslim army. The difficult 
conditions at the trench coupled with the ongoing propaganda gave the hypocrites the 
excuse they needed to go back to their homes, although their desertion deprived the 
Prophet of essential manpower, as he needed all his men to be in position. '24 In danger of 
attack from the Banü Qurayzah, facing a huge - albeit fairly inactive - confederate army, 
"' Ibn Hishäm, The Life of Muhammad; the English Version, p. 454. Also see al-Shacräwi, Ghazawät 
al-Rasi 1, p. 217. 
'2o See al-Malabi, al-Shah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 636 and Naumani, Sirat un-Nabi, v. 2, p. 98. However, 
al-Halabi reports that another group, led by Zayd b. I; lärithah, became involved when the Banii 
Qurayzah broke their treaty with the Prophet. 
12' See the Qur'an (ETMC), 33: 25. Also see Ibn Kathir, Tafsirlbn Kathir, v. 3, pp. 477-478. 
122 See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 181 and Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 104. 
123 Naumani, Sirat un-Nabi, v. 2, p. 99. 
'24 The Qur'an discusses their shameful behaviour and intentions in detail. See Qur'än, 33: 12-19. 
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and with its women and children insufficiently protected, the Muslim army found itself in 
a very critical situation. '2' At this point the Prophet devised a plan to break the alliance. 
He made a verbal agreement with cUyaynah b. I; Iisn and al-I. lärith b. cAuf al-Murri, the 
leaders of the Ghatafän, offering them a third of the dates of Medina on condition that 
they agreed to retreat with their followers, leaving behind the rest of the confederate 
army. While the matter was still undecided, he sought the advice of the two Sa°ds, who 
inquired whether this was a divine order and when they were told it was not, they advised 
against the plan. 126 The siege continued, but day by day the Muslim defensive plan 
weakened the confederate forces, who were growing tired of waiting. They had been 
facing the Muslims for almost a month, and according to al-Sha`räwi, it went against the 
nature of the Arabs to stay in one place for long. i2' Also it was the cold season and the 
huge army required a great many supplies, and those sent from Khaybar must have been 
insufficient. As a result of the lack of preparation for a long siege and far from their main 
supply lines, the confederate army suffered shortages of direct support. '28 In addition, the 
Muslim army captured a caravan composed of twenty camels loaded with food on its way 
to the confederate army at the front line, which had been sent by the Banat Qurayzah. '29 It 
was clear that the confederate army had to attack or retreat, and so they sought a quick 
end to the siege. They attempted to tighten their grip on the Muslim army. They tried by 
day and night to find a critical weak point through which a successful attack could be 
made, but the Muslim army stood firm and struggled with grim determination to protect 
their position. They succeeded in limiting the freedom of action of the confederate army. 
Nothing the confederates attempted brought any result, and although some horsemen 
broke through the trench they were quickly defeated in single combat by Muslim warriors, 
among whom was cAli b. Abi Tälib, who killed one of the greatest warriors of the Quraysh 
named `Amr b. cAbdu Wudd; the survivors fled. '30 Of all the days of the battle, this was 
'25 In the Qur'an (ETMC), 33: 10 & 11, it is found: "Behold! They came on you from above you and 
from below you, and behold, the eyes swerved and the hearts gaped up to the throats, and ye imagined 
various (Vain) thoughts about Allah! In that situation were the Believers tried: They were shaken as 
by a tremendous shaking. " Also see Ibn Hisham, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 170, al-Tabari, Tiikh al-Taban; v. 2, p. 
91, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Niyhäyah, v. 4, p. 93, and al-Malabi, al Shah al Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 508. 
'26 They were Sad b. Mu`ädh, Sa°d b. Ub5dah, 'Abdullah b. Rawähah, and Khawät b. Jubair. See Ibn 
Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 178, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 104, and al-Malabi, al-Sirah 
al-Ilalabiyyah, v. 2, p. 640 
127 Al-Sha°räwi, Ghazwat al-Rasr11, p. 216. 
128 Except the Bann Qurayzah, since they were in their fort and had sufficient resources. 
See al-Halabi, al-Shah al-Ilalabiyyah, v. 2, p. 647. 
130 Al-Sha°räwi described °Amr b. cAbdu Wudd as the cavalryman of the Quraysh. See al-Sha°räwi, 
Ghazwat al-Rasril, p. 218. Further see Ibn Hisham, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 181, al-Tabari, Tän7ch al-Tabari, v. 2, 
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the severest, as the attacks were launched continuously, accompanied by showers of 
arrows. As a result, it is reported that some of the Muslim army, including the Prophet 
himself, were not able to perform any of their prayers. 131 Additionally, one scout of the 
adversary was able to from the rear and approach the fort which sheltered the women 
and children. He was killed. At this critical moment, described in the Qur'an: "They came 
from above and below"132, one of the confederate notables, Nadim b. Mascüd, embraced 
Islam. He proved to be of great help to the Muslims by making an important contribution 
to lifting the siege. 133 The long siege was nearly over; the besiegers, having made little 
impression on the Muslims, became more and more disheartened. Maintaining supplies 
for a huge army was not an easy task. In addition, the cold winter season of Medina, and 
its strong winds, which turned their tents and cooking pots over, "did more than a whole 
army could do. "134 The Qur'an reports it as divine assistance: "But We sent against them a 
hurricane and forces that you saw not: But Allah sees clearly all that ye do. "135 At last the 
surrounding circumstances of the inclemency of the weather, the prolongation of the 
siege, the severity of the storm, the lack of supplies and the desertion by the Banü 
Qurayzah combined to force Abn Sufyan, the leader of the Quraysh, to abandon the 
siege. 136 As his forces left that night they were followed by the rest of the confederate 
army. This decision was witnessed by IIudhayfah b. al-Yaman, a Muslim scout. 137 Thus 
the battle ended. 
Comparing al-Khandaq with the battles previously discussed, it is possible to make the 
following points. First, the Muslim army used a new style of fighting, which was adopted 
from the Persians. This defensive plan - to dig a defensive trench - dragged the 
pp. 94-95, Ibn Kathir, al Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, pp. 105-106, and al-Ilalabi, al-Sirah al- 
Ilalabiyyah, v. 2, pp. 643-644. 
131 See Sahib al-Bukhäri (Kitäb Mawägit al-Saläh, No. 571, v. 1, p. 214), $ahih Muslim (Kitäb al- 
Masäjid wa Mawädcal-Saläh, No. 631, v. 1, p. 438), and Sunan al-Nasd'i (Kitäb al-Sahli, No. 1366, v. 3, 
p. 84). In addition, in some of the Sirah works it is reported that the Muslim army missed several 
prayers. This point is elaborated in detail in Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, pp. 110-111. 
Also see Naumani, Sirat un-Nabi, v. 2, p. 103. 
132 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 33: 10. 
133 See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, pp. 188-191, al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, pp. 96-97, Ibn Kathir, al- 
Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, pp. 111-112, and al-IIalabi, al-Sirah al Halabiyyah, v. 2, pp. 645-651. Also 
see the section "The Battle of al-Khandaq" in the chapter "The Task of Islamic Military Intelligence" 
(Ch. 6). 
134 Ibn Hishäm, al Sirah, v. 4, p. 206, Ibn Kathir, al Bidäyah wa al Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 114, al-Ijalabi, al- 
Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 648, an d Naumani, Sirat un-Nabi, v. 2, p. 105. 
135 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 33: 9. 
136 Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 205, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 115, and al-I; ialabi, 
al-Sirah al-Flalabiyyah, v. 2, p. 649. 
137 For the rest of the story see the section "The Battle of al-Khandaq" in the chapter "The Task of 
Islamic Military Intelligence" (Ch. 6). 
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confederate army into a long-drawn-out confrontation, 138 which they were quite unused 
to. This was the main factor leading to the lifting of the siege. Second, for the first time 
the Muslim army used the earth brought out of the trench to form an embankment which 
was used for cover and protection. 139 Also, stones were brought and lined up at the edge of 
the trench to hurl at those who attempted to cross. '40 The whole Muslim army worked 
together to build the trench and fortify the buildings. Third, the Muslim army fought not 
only the Quraysh but also allies of the Quraysh who lived on the outskirts of Medina. 
Furthermore, the Muslims had to deal with an internal threat"' posed by a fifth column' 
in the form of the Banü Qurayzah and the hypocrites. Fourth, according to the Qur'an, 
divine involvement played an important role in ending this battle. 142 Fifth, for the first 
time, the Muslims used continuous critical point observation along the trench, and 
passwords at night. Sixth, the defensive plan was not developed against the external 
threat of the confederate army, but against the constant internal threat, i. e. the Banü 
Qurayzah. Seventh, a unique military strategy was executed, as the trench was dug using 
tools borrowed from the Banü Qurayzah and hence, there was an unusual and decisive 
participation by non-Arabs on both sides, i. e. a Persian man and a Jewish tribe. Eighth, 
the Prophet set an example when he himself took part in digging the trench. Ninth, the 
13s This confrontation might be compared to a process of attrition on a psychological level. However, 
attrition can be looked at from different perspectives: it can be the process of weakening or exhausting 
by constant harassment, abuse, or attack. See www. britannica. com. In July 1969, Nasser defined a war 
of attrition as "a long battle to exhaust the enemy. " See Korn, Stalemate, p. 109. Also see Avery, Arych, 
The War of Attrition. In addition, Wasil, al-Sir; ` al-Arabi al-Isräili, p. 411, argues that a war of 
attrition keeps the enemy busy without engaging in an armed confrontation by disrupting his various 
activities. A war of attrition usually attempts to accomplish three objectives: 1) maintaining the high 
morale of the friendly troops, 2) preventing the enemy from accomplishing his previous goal or set of 
goals, and 3) increasing the strength of the bond between the leadership and the civilian population. It 
should be noted that a war of attrition may last for years and may lead to the identification of a fifth 
column. See Dairi, flrä' fi al-Narb, p. 57. Further Manäsarah, al-Istikhbärät al-Askarryyah, p. 65, 
mentions that the outcome of any war of attrition conducted by any army relies mainly on the qualities 
of that army's intelligence. Also see the section "Psychological Warfare" in the chapter "The Role of 
Islamic Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
139 Militarily speaking, a mound can have two functions: firstly, to act as a cover from the view of the 
enemy and secondly as a protection against enemy fire. 
140 On one occasion, Naufal b. al-Mughirah was stoned to death as he tried to jump the trench. See al- 
Tabari, 7änkh al-Taban v. 2, p. 95 and al-I. Ialabi, al-Sirah al--JIalabiyyah, v. 2, p. 637. 
141 The threat took the form of a fifth column; that is, a clandestine group or faction of subversive 
agents who attempt to undermine a nation's solidarity. See www. britannica. com. It should be noted 
that "the concept of the 'fifth column' was invented in 1936 during the Spanish Civil War. The 
Nationalists argued that Madrid would fall to the 'fifth column', rather than surrender to the four 
armies encircling the city. It would be the stay-behind Catholic nationalists, trapped by Republican 
control of the capital, who would be instrumental in provoking internal disorder behind the lines, 
leading to the collapse of defences. " Thurlow, "The evolution of the mythical British fifth column, 
1939-1946", in 20th CenturyBridsh History, vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 477-478. 
142 See the Qur'an, 9: 26 and 33: 9. Also see al-Qurtubi, Tafsiral-Qurtubr; v. 14, p. 144. 
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distribution and division of team work sections resulted in unity of responsibility among 
the Muslim soldiers. Tenth, it was the first time the Muslim army took into consideration 
the securing of resources and supplies over a long period of time. Eleventh, rather than a 
real confrontation this battle was more or less a psychological war; there was not even 
booty to be gained. 143 Nevertheless, the vulnerability of the Muslims remained extreme 
throughout the siege, 144 which means the damage was spiritual rather than material. 
Lastly, this was end of the Quraysh's (and their allies') dream of invading Medina and 
destroying Islam. It should also be noted that the battle exposed the machinations of the 
Munafgi n. '45 
'a3 See the Qur'an, 33: 25. 
1°a See the Qur'an, 33: 10-11. 
gas See the Qur'an, 33: 12-20. 
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III. 4: The Battle of al-Yarmük 
In the first half of the 13`h year AH (634 AD) 116 the battle of al-Yarmilk'47 took place near 
the river for which the battle is named, which is a tributary of the Jordan. "' It was fought 
between the newly born Islamic state and the Byzantine Empire. 149 The Muslim armies, 
which were at that time on various missions in al-Sham, were ordered by the Caliph Abii 
Bakr, who had evaluated the threat presented by the Empire, to come together to form 
one single army in order to prepare for the anticipated confrontation with the huge 
Byzantine force. 15° Heraclius, the Byzantine Emperor [610-641], appears to have also 
made similar plans as he ordered all his armies in the region to assemble at one place. "' 
Furthermore, he ordered his commanders to select a battlefield that was broad in front 
and narrow in the rear. 152 The two armies encamped, each attempting to take advantage 
of the terrain. The Byzantine army camped in al-Waqüsah on the bank of the Yarmilk 
near the monastery of al-Khal, 153 backed by a precipitous hill and facing the Muslims. The 
Muslim army had encamped facing the river with their backs to Medina. "' It is 
'1 Scholars differ regarding the date. For example Grunebaum, Classical Islam, p. 54, holds the battle 
took place in August 636. 
"" According to Kamdl, al-Tariq i1ä Dimashq, p. 403, al-Yarmük was called "Hieromax" by the 
Byzantines. 
'^s See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidiyahwa a1-Nihäyah, v. 7, p. 354, al-Shargäwi, a1-Siddiq, p. 166, and Bahadur 
and Sherwani, Life ofAbü Bakr, p. 71. 
149 See al-Suyiiri [d. 911/1506], 7YrAh al-Khulafä; p. 131. 
iso Al-Yarmiik was not the first battle between the Muslim army and the Byzantines, since a small band 
of Muslim soldiers had faced a large Byzantine army at the battle of Mu'tah. See Sahih aI-Bukhäri 
(Bib: Ghazwat Mu'tah, v. 4, pp. 1553-1555) and Sunan al-Bayhaqi al-Kubrä (Bab: Jawäz Tawllyat al- 
Imam, v. 8, p. 154). Also see the outcome of the battle of Marj al-Safrä' in the last paragraph of the 
chapter "The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
See al-Tabari, 7-ankh al-Taban; v. 2, p. 334. 
isz Kamäl, al-Tariq ili Dimashq, p. 471, mentions that the Byzantine army, while on the march, was 
about nine km in length. Further see the section "The Adversary at the Battle of al-Yarmtik" in the 
chapter "The Adversaries' Strengths and Weaknesses" (Ch. 7). 
u3 Al-Wdgiisah is a massive valley, which contains a trench-like formation used by the Byzantine army 
during the initial stages of the battle. The rock formations have sharp edges in most places. See Yagüt 
al-Hamawi, Mu jam al Buldan, v. 2, p. 626 and v. 5, p. 354, al-Bakri, Muyam ma Istu jim, v. 4, p. 1393, 
and Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests, p. 135. It is also reported that they camped near Dir al-Jabal 
(the mountain hermitage) as in Nu'mani, al-Fq, p. 134. Other historians, such as Ibn Kathir, al- 
Bidiyah wa al-Nihiyah, v. 7, p. 7, claim that they camped near the Ayüb hermitage. There could have 
been more than one hermitage, but the accounts appear to be inconsistent. 
's4 Opinions have varied among historians as to which army established its fighting position first. It 
seems that the Muslims had chosen the location although the Byzantine leaders had had the 
opportunity to deploy their forces in accordance with their Emperor's request. See al-Tabari, 7ärkh al- 
Tabari, v. 2, p. 334, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, pp. 5-7, and Bahdur and Sherwani, Life 
ofAbü Bakr, p. 75. 
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noteworthy that at al-Yarmük the Muslims adopted an offensive strategy. This is in 
contrast to the battles against the Quraysh and their allies, where their strategy had been 
a defensive one. 755 It should also be noted that the Muslim army was about one fifth the 
size of the Byzantine forces. 156 The gathering of such enormous forces on both sides 
indicates that both armies had the intention to permanently eliminate each other's 
presence in the region of al-Sh5m. 157 Unlike in the previously discussed battles, the 
Muslim leader at al-Yarmük was not the head of the Islamic Umma, but a brilliant military 
leader, Khälid b. al-Walid. 158 The leader of the Byzantine army was Bähän, also an 
experienced military commander. 159 After a lapse of more than a month, during which 
several messages were exchanged between the two parties, the Byzantines came out of the 
valley and both armies assembled. 16° Khälid, seeing what his troops had to contend with, 
quickly reformed the Muslim army into 36 to 40 mobilised Kirdüs (sections). 161 This was a 
lss Further see the section "Definition of Islamic Strategy and the Two 'Pillars'" in the chapter "The 
Importance of Islamic Military Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
156 The Muslim army was about 30 to 40 thousand, while the Byzantine forces numbered over 200 
thousand. See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa alNihäyah, v. 7, p. 7, Ibn al-Athir, al-Kämil,, v. 2, pp. 258-259, 
al-Shargdwi, al-Siddiq, p. 166, and Bahadur and Sherwani, Life ofAbü Bakr, p. 71. 
157 Nu'mani, al-Faritq, p. 130, writes: "He (Heraclius) formed the definite resolve of bringing all the 
strength and resources of his empire to bear upon the Arabs once and for all. " 
158 Debate has raged for a long time among historians concerning who was the commander of the 
Muslim army at al-Yarmük. See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, pp. 10-12. It can be argued 
from the way Ibn Kathir illustrated his narration that Khälid was not in fact the senior commander; 
that position was filled by Abü °Ubaydah. If we consider the different speeches given by the well- 
known Companions we notice that the speech of Abü cUbaydah is different. Moreover Abü cUbaydah's 
final speech is reported on the same page as the description of the start of the confrontation. His 
speech appears to be more than a motivational address; it also contains military orders of a tactical 
nature, and concludes: "Until I order you. " This evidence could indicate that he was the commander, 
not Khälid. However, it could be argued that °Amrü b. al'As gave an address similar to Abü 
cUbaydah's, but he was not senior enough in the chain of command. So the choice remains between 
Khälid and Abü °Ubaydah. Evidence that the commander was in fact Khälid can be found in Ibn 
Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, p. 8, where the phrase Yasdir al-Nis an Rajah (The soldiers 
would "go along with or take" his commands) indicates as much. Perhaps the most convincing 
explanation has been provided by a research study (degree in a1-Siyäsah al-Shar"iyyah, al-Ma°had a]- 
Alf Ii al-Qa(ä; al-Riyadh, 1981) on this subject, which argues that Khälid was the leader at the 
beginning of the battle but as it come to an end, i. e. at the time of the distribution of booty, Abü 
°Ubaydah took over the leadership. See al-Qurashi, Awwaliyät al Farvq al Siyäsiyah, p. 89. See also 
Faraj, al-Madrasah, p. 268, Ghazäl, al Ghazawät, pp. 419-420, al-Shantüt, al-Muslimdn, p. 70, and al- 
Khattäb, Khälid, p. 146. 
159 See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, p. 5 and al-Wagidi, Futüh al-Shim, v. 1, p. 190. 
Bähän bore the title Bitriq, "patricius". He is considered to have been a righteous man since he several 
times punished those of his men who committed crimes on their way to the battlefield. See al-Tabari, 
Tän-kh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 335. However in other historical works he is called Mahan not Bähän. For 
example see Bahdur and Sherwani, Life ofAbi Bakr, p. 75. Kamäl, al-Tariq i1ä Dimashq, p. 436, is not 
sure whether he was a Roman or an Armenian. 
160 AI-Tabari, Tan-7h al-Taban; v. 2, pp. 336-337 and Bahdur and Sherwani, Life ofAbü Bakr, p. 76. 
161 For the original meaning of the word Kurdüs see al-Khattäb, Khälid, p. 30. Also see Hitti, History of 
the Arabs, p. 226. 
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new type of formation, which allowed him to move different sections freely and rapidly 
into different positions as the battle situation required. ' Bähän stationed himself on a 
vantage point from which he could see both armies, while Khälid positioned himself in 
the rear of the front line of the cavalry of his section. 163 When the two armies approached 
sufficiently close to each other, one great fighter of the Byzantines stepped out of the 
ranks and called for a duel. This was a favourite style of engagement of the Arabs. When 
Maysarah b. Masriiq moved forward, Khälid stopped him since the Byzantine fighter was 
a "giant and with a superb physique and Herculean strength. s164 As Khälid was talking to 
Maysarah he glanced at Qays b. Habirah, who advanced and killed him. '65 The Byzantine 
army then started to move forward, firing volleys of arrows. 166 The Muslims stood firm for 
a long time facing a furious frontal attack; however, their right wing was driven back in 
great disorder, reaching the female camp, but the women pushed them back into the heat 
of the battle. 16' Along the whole front line each Muslim section had to fight fiercely and 
stand firm in the face of this huge first wave. cIkrimah b. Abi Jahl said then: "Who takes 
the vow of fealty unto death? " Four hundred soldiers, of whom Dirär b. al-Azwar was one, 
took this "grim vow" and nearly all of them were slain on the spot. 168 Furthermore, Ibn 
Qantair, the Byzantine commander of the right wing, attacked the left wing of the Muslim 
army, driving back the Lakhm and Ghassän tribes; some commanders and soldiers, among 
them Yazid b. Abi Sufyän, Qubäth b. Häshim, and Shurahbil b. Hassnah, stood their 
ground, performing prodigies of valour. Said b. Zayd knelt upon the ground, and when 
the Byzantine officer commanding the front line forces approached, Said jumped to his 
feet and killed him. At this point the Uzd tribe was pushed back by the assault, but were 
According to Ibn Kathir, Khälid realised, being a commander of great military experience that the 
Byzantines would launch a massive assault which would smash through any conventionally deployed 
force. It was mainly for this reason that he made the tactical innovation of dividing the Muslim army 
into Kurdfs See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, p. 11 and Ibn al-Athir, al Kämil, v. 2, p. 259. 
162 See Ibn Kathir, al Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, p. 8. 
163 Al-Wägidi, Futäh al-Sham, v. 1, p. 203. In addition, al-Tabari, 7ärikh al-Tabar, v. 2, p. 428, 
mentioned that when they saw the power of the Byzantines the men from northern Arabia, newly 
recruited into the Muslim army, fled, leaving the Muslims behind and seeking refuge in a nearby 
village. 
164 Nu'mani, a! -Fäniq, p. 134. 
165 Al-Wägidi, Futitfi al-Sham, v. 1, pp. 194-195, reported that the victor was not Qays b. Habirah, but a 
youth from the Asad tribe. 
166 On that day, many of the Muslim army lost their eyes to the adversary's arrows. See al-Balädhuri, 
Futüh al-Buldan, v. 1, p. 141. 
167 Ibn al-Dahhäk [206/822-287/900], al Ahäd wa al-Mathäni v. 6, p. 128. 
'ba Nu'mani, al-Färüq, p. 142. 
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rallied by their leader, Mucädh b. Jabal. "" The battle so far had been equally balanced, 
with the Byzantines having slightly the better of it. At this stage, Qays b. Habirah and 
Said b. Zayd, whom Khälid had posted at the rear of the left wing and the rear of the 
centre respectively, rushed from behind and made a simultaneous onslaught. As a result, 
the Byzantine defensive plan collapsed. Khälid had posted the cavalry in the rear, from 
where he made a sudden outbreak, leading a tremendous charge. 10 With a steady 
pressure, Khälid pushed the Byzantine army back, until he reached the Commander and 
killed him. 171 The death of their commander and the overwhelming Muslim assault 
caused confusion among the ranks of the Byzantine army, and they gave way. Caught 
between the ensuing assault from the front and the valley and the chained infantry in the 
rear the Byzantine cavalry were trapped. This situation was a direct result of the 
Emperor's battle plan. Now Khälid gave the Byzantine cavalry the opportunity to flee, 
leaving the infantry unprotected. 12 The Muslims pressed home the attack, driving the 
Byzantine infantry back from the main area of combat until they came to the brink of the 
river. Panic-stricken, most of them jumped into the waters; the others were reported 
missing in action. The battle was over; the Muslim army had won the victory. 13 The 
numbers of their wounded and slain were negligible in comparison to those of the 
adversary. 14 
Al-Yarmük marks a departure from the battles previously discussed for several reasons. 
First, it was fought against a people of the Book, not against pagans. Second, the battle 
did not take place on the Arabian Peninsula, but across the border in al-Sham. Third, the 
Islamic state adopted an offensive rather than a defensive strategy as in the battles of 
169 Hajjaj was the chieftain of the Zubayd clan. See Nu'mani, al-Färi q, pp. 140-142. Ghazäl, al- 
Ghazwät, p. 456, discussed that it was °Ikrimah b. Abi Jahl and his son. Also see Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah 
wa alNihäyah, v. 7, p. 12. 
170 See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari; v. 2, p. 338 and Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, pp. 12-13. 
Also see the map of al-Yarm5k. 
171 Nu'mani, al Färiiq, p. 141. 
172 See al-Tabari, 7ärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 338 and Nu'mani, al-Färlq, p. 142. 
173 Most historians refer to the battle of Yarm5k as yawm al-Yarmi7k, thus indicating to the reader that 
the battle was won in a single day, that of al-Waqidi. For example see Ibn Sacd [168/785-230/845], al- 
Tabagät al-Kubrä, v. 6, p. 20, al-Zamakhshari [467/1075-538/1144], al-Fäfq, v. 3, p. 252, Ibn Hajar, al- 
Isäbah, v. 1, p. 461, Ibn Abi Jarädah, Bughyat al-Talab, v. 4, p. 1893, and Ibn Manziir, Lisän al-: 
4tab, v. 2, 
p. 536. 
174 The disparities in the numbers reported by various authors indicate that some have been greatly 
exaggerated. However, according to the references in use the casualties of the Muslim army were about 
three thousand. By contrast, the Byzantine casualties numbered about 100 thousand including those 
soldiers who jumped in the river. See al-Tabari, 7ärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 338, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa 
al-Nihäyah, v. 7, p. 13, and al-Balädhuri, 
Futüh 
al-Buldan, v. 1, p. 141. 
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Badr, Uhud, and al-Khandaq. "S Fourth, the battle is considered to be the key to the 
Muslim army's subsequent conquest of the Byzantine Empire, which was one of the two 
empires bordering the Arabian Peninsula. It was known that the battle would be decisive, 
and so the Muslim leadership's preparations were extremely thorough. Fifth, although the 
supreme leader of the Islamic community did not take part in the battle, the Muslim 
leadership in the field generally succeeded in maintaining the Arab warriors' morale, 
despite being faced with the might of the Byzantine army. 176 Sixth, Khälid was able to 
read the Byzantines' battle plan and to quickly formulate and execute an effective counter 
plan: to divide the Muslim army into small sections and to allow the adversary's cavalry to 
escape between the Muslim ranks. It should be pointed out that he could count on the 
thorough training of the Muslim army, which was able to adapt to the new plan without 
hesitation. "' Seventh, the Muslim women were ordered to remain in the rear of the army 
to give encouragement and supply logistics as required. Eighth, among the battles under 
study, this was the first where the Muslim army captured a massive booty. 171 
" Wright notes that an offensive strategy is conducted in "an effort to occupy hostile territory, to 
acquire resources from the enemy, to destroy hostile forces ... or to accomplish other military 
objectives. " A defensive strategy is designed to prevent the success of such an effort. See Wright, A 
Study of War, pp. 9-10. Also see the various discussions on defending and spreading Islam in the 
chapter "The Importance of Islamic Military Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
16 `Arab warriors' is used here instead of the more usual Muslim army since the Arabs were not 
anxious to meet the Byzantine army, especially the force brought by Khälid from Iraq. 
'n This was possible because for two decades the Muslim army had been continually involved in 
various confrontations. In addition, as we have noted, the culture of the Arab warrior made his sword 
his inseparable companion; the military virtues were second nature to him. See the section "The 
Reasons for Conflict and the Mounts of the Arabs" in the chapter "Brief Background of the Region 
Prior to Islam" (Ch. 2). 
1e See al-Ba`li [645/1248-709/1310], al-Mutli; p. 436. 
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111.5: The Battle of al-Q5disiyyah 
Al-Qädisiyyah179 is a key area located east of the Arabian Peninsula between the desert of 
Arabia and the swampland and rivers of Iraq. 180 Historians have viewed al-Qädisiyyah as 
the gateway to the Säsänian Empire. 181 The Muslims believed that 'their adversary was a 
people without a divinely revealed Book, which added a further dimension to the 
struggle. 182 The plan of the Muslim commander, Sa'd b. Abi Waggäs, was to entice the 
Persian army into an area which he had already chosen as the arena of engagement. '83 
Similarly to the strategy adopted at the battle of al-Yarmiik, Sacd positioned the army on 
the border between Arabia and the Säsänian lands, which would enable him to either 
advance after victory or retreat after defeat. Following the order of Caliph cUmar, who 
expected a critical confrontation with the Persian army, Sacd stationed his troops on the 
open ground of al-Qadisiyyah. 184 The Muslim army waited for more than four months in 
this position for the Persian army to arrive. 185 Waiting patiently in one spot for weeks on 
end went against the nature of the Arabs, as we have seen in the context of al-Khandaq, 
and the Muslim soldiers began to complain to their leader: "We are sick of this place. 
Move forward. "186 These months were not spent in inactivity, however; the Muslim army 
"" Al-Qadisiyyah was so named after a palace called Qudays. See Yagüt al-Hamawi, Muyam al-Buldän, 
v. 4, p. 293. Furthermore, Ibn al-Mutaraz [583/1188-610/1214], al-Maghrib, v. 2, p. 161 and Nu'mani, 
al-F&üq, p. 91, report that those days al-Q5disiyyah was a small town thirty miles from Kufah in Iraq. 
However in al-Bakri, Mujam ma Istuyim, v. 1, p. 270, it is mentioned that it was named after some 
people from the Qädis tribe from the Kharasan region who were stationed there. For more see al-Bakri, 
Mujam ma Istuyim, v. 3, p. 1042 and Yaqüt al-Hamawi, Muyam al Buldän, v. 4, p. 291. 180 See al-Fayyiimi, al-Misbah al-Munir, v. 2, p. 492. Also, Nu'mani, al-Firüq, p. 91, writes: "Al- 
Qadisiyyah was rich and fertile with canals and bridges which made its position secure. " However, 
later on, he mentions that °Umar chose this position as a result of a previous visit to that area, which is 
questionable since °Umar asked SaCd: "Describe the place where you are and the land between you and 
Medina. Describe it so clearly that I may see it with my own eyes, and become one of you. " See al- 
Tabari, 7ärikh al-7'abar; v. 2, p. 387. 
181 Among them was Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, p. 37. 
181 See the exegeses of al-Tabari, al-Qurtubi, and Ibn Kathir regarding the first three verses of surah al- 
Riim. 
183 See al-Tabari, 75-iikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 393 and Kamäl, a1-Qädisiyyah, p. 236. 
184 See Ibn al-Athir, al-Kämi1, v. 2, p. 304 and Kamäl, al-Qädisiyyah, p. 44. 
185 See al-Tabari, Tärikh a]-Tabar v. 2, pp. 387 & 396, al-Balädhuri, Futüh al-Buldän, p. 255, and 
Kamäl, al-Qädisiyyah, pp. 226-227. 
186 See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 397. In addition, a point related to jurisprudence can be 
considered as supporting this assertion. It is known that SaCd married al-Muthanna's wife after his 
death prior to the conflict. So if we take into consideration the length of time that a widow must wait 
before re-marrying - four months and ten days - we find that Sa°d must have remained several months 
in that region since it is not reported that Sa°d left the area after his arrival with the army. 
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used the military method of offensive operations such as sending various patrols either to 
re-supply to ensure survival or to collect data by either peaceful or forceful means. ' 87 
These operational movements forced the Persian army to come face to face with the 
Muslims. The Persians were massively superior in both men and equipment. ' Before the 
confrontation numerous Muslim ambassadors had been dispatched at different times 
calling the Persian army to Islam. 189 When the Persians rejected these requests the clash 
of the two armies became inevitable. 190 Rustam, '91 the Persian commander, asked Sacd 
either to cross the cAtiq river to them or let the Persians cross to the Muslims' side. Sacd 
gave his assurance to Rustam, and the Persian troops crossed the river and advanced on to 
the battlefield. "' As the two armies occupied their respective positions, Rustam displayed 
great skill in organising his army for the battle. He placed troops thirteen deep and 
reinforced the centre with elephants193 on whose backs armed soldiers were seated, 
leaving at the rear the river of al cAtiq. 194 While retaining the system of tribal units, Saed 
drew up his troops into close ranks leaving no gaps. At their rear was the trench of 
S5bnr. '95 On that day, Sacd b. Abi Waggäs could not take part in the combat due to his 
187 See ibid. v. 2, p. 387. It was a sort of "War of Attrition" as Kamäl, a1-Qädisiyyah, p. 58, calls it. 
As in the case of al-Yarm5k, a variety of figures have been given, some of which are doubtless 
exaggerated while others are too low. For example, Abü Yüsuf [d. 183/800], wrote in his book, al- 
Kharrzij, that the Muslims were about 8000 while the Säsänians were about 60000. Al-Balädhuri, Futtih 
al-Buldän, p. 256, mentioned that the Muslims were about 10000 while the Persians numbered 
120000. It is impossible to make a reliable judgement regarding the exact numbers of both armies. If, 
however, we take into consideration the total area of the battlefield, it is possible that the Persian army 
was about 200,000 strong, while the Muslim army numbered about 30,000. See al-Tabari, Tärikh al- 
Taban, v. 2, p. 394. For further discussion of the numbers see Kamäl, al-Qädisiyyah, pp. 97,120 and 
121. 
189 See al-Tabari, Tän7rh al-Taban, v. 2, pp. 390-393, al-Balädhuri, Futüh al-Buldän, p. 257, Faraj, al- 
Madrasah, pp. 182-183, and Kamäl, al-Qädisiyyah, pp. 55-60. 
190 It is worth mentioning that Rustam was connected to the Säsänian Emperor by a unique chain of 
communications. Men were posted at certain intervals between the scene of the engagement and the 
capital. The man posted at the battlefield called out to the next man the particulars of the incidents as 
they happened and thus the relay of intermediary cries communicated the news to Mada'in with 
marvellous rapidity. By contrast, Sacd relied on sending a daily written report to 'Umar in Medina. See 
Nu'mani, al-Fari q, p. 99 and Kamäl, a1-Qädisiyyah, pp. 57,124, and 125. 
191 Rustam b. Farrukhzäd al-Armani was an Armenian from al-Rayy although some have said he was 
from Hamadhän. He placed his faith in astrology. See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Taban, v. 2, p. 394, and al- 
Balädhuri, Futdh al-Buldän, p. 256. 
'9Z See Ibn al-Athir, al-Kämil, v. 2, p. 315 and Kamäl, a1-Qadisiyyah, pp. 118. 
193 It is worth mentioning that the elephant could not be introduced to the Arabian Peninsula as it 
required substantial supplies of food and water, which were not easily available. More importantly, the 
animal could not withstand the extreme heat of the Peninsula. See Ibn Khalddn, Muqaddimat Ibn 
Khaldrin, p. 273. 
194 See Nu'mani, al-Färüq, p. 99. 
195 This trench was believed to have been dug at the time of Nebuchadnezzar. It was used by the king 
of the Säsänians, Dhii al-Aktäf [309-376 AD], to protect Iraq from the attacks of the Bedouin of 
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illness (boils), so he assigned Khälid b. cArfatah196 to be the field leader. Sacd watched the 
progress of the battle from the upper storey of the old Qudays palace. 
111.5.1: The Day of Armäth197 
On Thursday, 13th of Shacbän, 15 AH (19th of September, 636 AD), the troops took up 
their fighting positions and the reciters of the Qur'än came forward and recited the surah 
al-Anfäl. 198 At the same time the words of poets and the forceful statements of the field 
commanders stirred the hearts of the Muslim soldiers and raised their spirits to the 
utmost enthusiasm. Sacd ordered them not to make full contact until they heard the 
fourth signal: "Allähu Akbar". Some single combats took place. After full contact occurred, 
the Persians' most awe-inspiring weapon, the elephants, proved very effective against the 
Muslim army, terrifying their horses and camels. 199 One Muslim soldier defected from 
Islam and aligned himself with the Persians. 200 He was thus able to advise the Persian 
army to concentrate their attack on the tribe of the Bujaylah, which was the smallest of 
the Muslim tribes and could be considered a weak point in the Muslim ranks. The Persian 
leadership took advantage of his treachery and directed about fifteen elephants and great 
numbers of men against the Bujaylah, who suffered heavy and disproportionate losses. 
Sacd rectified the situation by ordering the Asad to assist the Bujaylah. The combined 
effort of the two tribes eventually succeeded in repelling the onslaught. At the end of the 
day, the Muslims managed to disable the Persians' most effective weapon, moving behind 
the elephants and cutting their girths and tails, maddening the great beasts and throwing 
down their riders. 20' Nevertheless the first day ended with the Persian army having a 
slight advantage. The night was quiet and was therefore called the Night of al-Had'ah 
Arabia. It was later remade by the Muslims, filled with water and named Kara Sa'dah after Sacd b. 
Haräln. Its length was about 900 km. See Kamäl, al-Qadisiyyah, pp. 218-220. 
196 He was one of the Companions, and despite the fact that be acted as the field-commander for 
several days historians have not explained his direct effect on the battle's progress, unlike that of al- 
Qa°qä He died in the year 64/684. See al-Baghdädi [393/1003-463/1071], Tarikh Baghdad, v. 1, p. 
200, al-Dhahabi [673/1275-748/1348], al-Käshif, v. 1, p. 366, and Ibn Hajar, Tagnä al-Tahdhib, v. 1, p. 
189. 
197 Ydgiit al-Ilamawi in his Mu7am al-Buldan, v. 1, p. 154 reports that the Day of Armäth was named 
after the small plant called Armath (sing. Rimth). Taking a different view, Kamäl, al-Qadisiyyah, p. 
145, mentions that it was named Armath since it means linguistically, "mixing together", indicating that 
it was difficult to tell who was winning the battle. 
198 See Naseef, Military Organisation, p. 104 and Kamäl, al-Qädisiyyah, p. 133. 
199 The Arabs, in general, had had no experience of fighting elephants. See Munäsarah, al-Istikhbarät, 
p. 25. 
200 See al-Tabari, 7ärikh al-Taban; v. 2, p. 431, Abii Yiisuf, al-Kharaj p. 31, and Kamäl, al-Qadisiyyah, p. 
135. 
201 See al-Tabari, Tarikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 412 and Kamäl, al-Qadisiyyah, p. 143. Similarly see al- 
Balädhuri, Futüh al-Buldan, p. 258. 
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(tranquility) ; 202 this calm allowed the Muslim medical evacuation force to carry out their 
responsibilities. 203 Women and children provided medical and mortuary services. 204 
111.5.2: The Day of Aghwath205 
On the second day of the battle, as both armies were preparing for combat, a contingent of 
six thousand men, reinforcements for the Muslim army, arrived from al-Sham. When al- 
Qa°gac b. cAmrü, the head of the contingent, rode on to the field, he called out for a duel. 
Bahman Jadhawayhi, the centre field commander of the Persian army, rode out to meet 
the challenge and al-Qa°qa° killed him, taking revenge for the Muslim army which 
Bahman had defeated in the battle of al-Jisr (the Bridge). Bayruzan, the rear leader, 
Shahrbaraz Sijistan, the prince of Sistan, Bazurch-Mehr of Hamdan, al-Binduwan, and 
others were also slain. 20' These defeats greatly affected the Persian troops as they saw 
their notable champions cut down one after another. The Persians' morale was further 
shaken by a crafty plan devised by al-Qacgac: he divided the relieving forces into small 
bands, and as each band reached the battlefield the Muslim army cried out: "Allahu 
Akbar", and so it appeared that troops continued pouring in all day long. Also, al-Qacgac 
showed his inventiveness in another plan: he created a number of frightening 
monstrosities by covering the camels' bodies with clothes and their heads with flowing 
vestments, which scared the horses of the Persians, driving them out of control. 207 At 
noon, full contact occurred and just when the battle was raging furiously, gifts arrived 
from the overall commander in Medina, comprising four of the "choicest Arab steeds of 
rare value" and priceless swords of exquisite workmanship. 208 Umar had sent these with 
the intention of further motivating the troops, and had requested that they should be 
given to the bravest fighters. The fighting continued until midnight. That night was called 
Laylat al-Sawäd (the Night of Blackness). 209 As the two armies separated, the evacuation 
and treatment of casualties was undertaken. 210 
202 See al-Tabari, The History ofal-Tabar; the English Version, v. 12, p. 103. 
203 Hajib b. Zayd al-Ansäri, who had fought at Uhud, was in charge of health and mortuary services. 
See al-Tabari, Ta-iikh al Tabari, v. 2, p. 418. 
204 See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 413 and Nu'mani, al-FAY-6q, p. 102. 
205 "Aghwath" is derived from the word "Ghawth" which means to relieve, since the Persians' most 
destructive weapon had been (temporarily) eliminated and the battle turned to the advantage of the 
Muslim army. See Kamäl, al-Qädisiyyah, 163. 
206 See al-Tabari, The History ofal-Tabari, v. 12, pp. 97-98 and Nu'mani, al-Fäniq, p. 102. 
207 See al-Tabari, 7iarikh al-Tabar, v. 2, p. 414 and Kamäl, al-Qädisiyyah, p. 156. 
208 Nu'mani, al-Fänlq, p. 103. Also see al-Tabari, 7ärikh al-Tabar, v. 2, p. 414. 
209 It is worth mentioning that during the night Sacd's wife released Abil Mibjan, a great warrior, from 
the jail where he had been placed by Sad. He took Sa`d's horse and rode it bravely against the 
Persians, showing great fighting skills. Then he returned secretly to the jail and placed his feet in the 
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111.5.3: The Day of °Amäs211 
On the morning of the third day, the two armies were in position and the ground between 
them was stained red. The elephants were now back in action after being withdrawn from 
the previous day's combat. They were now well protected from behind by soldiers. 
Reinforcements for the Persian army arrived. "' Al-Qa`ga` and `Amrü b. °Asim tricked the 
Persians as they had the previous day, by removing some of their horsemen from the field 
and instructing them to continuously return to and leave the battlefield, giving the Persian 
army the impression of the continuous arrival of reinforcements. Luckily for the Muslims, 
the rest of the Syrian reinforcements appeared as the last group of these horsemen re- 
entered the field. 213 Upon his arrival, Häshim b. cUtbah, the commander of the whole 
Syrian army, executed the 'reinforcements' plan with his own men. 214 As on the first two 
days, duels continued to take place between the horsemen. Nonetheless the elephants 
once again attacked the horsemen and almost pulled them apart. Then, Sacd consulted the 
Persians who had embraced Islam on how to deal with the elephants. 215 They told him 
that the Muslims should cut their trunks and pierce their eyes with arrows. They should 
concentrate especially on the white elephant and the 'scabby one' since all the other 
elephants followed them 216 The Muslims followed this advice and put the elephants out 
of action once and for all, to the great relief of the Muslim army. In the afternoon, full 
contact occurred. The two armies emerged from it equally. 217 Sometime during the first 
half of the night, Tulayhah b. Khuaylid al-Usdi, 218 who was on a mission, moved behind 
fetters. The next day, when Sa°d learned of his exploit, he released him. See al-Baladhuri, Futvh al- 
Buldän, p. 258 and Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, p. 45. 
210 See al-Tabari, 7ärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 417 and Kamal, al-Qädisiyyah, p. 165. 
211 Ibid. 
212 See Kamal, al-Qädisiyyah, p. 176. 
213 See al-Tabari, 7ärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 412. 
21' Nu'mani, al-Fa-iuq, p. 103. 
215 The universality of Islam, according to the Qur'an, 34: 28, allowed this important measure to be 
taken, to the advantage of the Muslim army. Further see the section "Leaders and Intelligence" in the 
chapter `The Task of Islamic Military Intelligence" (Ch. 6). 
216 See al-'j'abari, 7ärikh al-Tabari, v. 12, p. 113. 
217 See ibid., v. 12, p. 117 and Kamal, al-Qädisiyyah, pp. 175-176. 
216 Tulayhah b. Khuaylid was the chief of the Banfi Asad. He was a poet and a soothsayer, and 
commanded respect in Arabia during the days of ignorance. When the Holy Prophet declared his 
mission, Tulayhah became a cruel enemy of Islam. In the battle of al-Khandaq, he sided with the 
Quraysh. In the battle of Khyber he sided with the Jews. In 631 AD when all other Arabian tribes 
accepted Islam, he also became a convert. However, in 633 AD he declared himself to be a prophet. He 
introduced a new way of prayer in which there were no prostrations. Many clans of Central Arabia 
joined him, and soon he once again became a powerful enemy of Islam. When Khalid defeated him at 
the battle of Buzakha, he fled to al-Sham; when al-Sham was conquered by the Muslims, he yet again 
converted to Islam. Later he returned to Arabia and joined the war against the Persians. See al- 
Dhahabi, SiyarAYäm al-Nublä; v. 1, pp. 316-317 and Ibn Hajar, al-Isäbah, v. 3, p. 542. 
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the Persian army and proclaimed three times: "Allähu Akbar". This brought the fighting 
to a temporary halt as the Persian army thought they were being attacked from the 
rear. 219 Then both armies repositioned themselves and some Muslim horsemen rode 
forward to call the Persians to single combat, but the Persians did not respond. They stood 
together and were willing to move only in ordered formation, since Rustam had seen over 
the last three days that the Arabs had the mastery in duelling. Rustam then rearranged 
his forces into ranks thirteen deep. Sa`d ordered his army not to move until they heard his 
fourth signal, i. e. "All5hu Akbar. " Some enthusiastic tribes could not wait for the fourth or 
even the third signal, but rushed forward, and Sacd said: "0 Allah, forgive them and grant 
them victory! 0 for so-and-so (naming each tribe) . "22' The 
fighting carried on all through 
Laylat al-Harr (the Night of Gasping) until sunrise. 
111.5.4: The Day of al-Qädisiyyah 
On the fourth day of the battle the fighting continued relentlessly and both armies 
became exhausted. At this moment, al-Qacgac realised that whoever could patiently 
endure for the next few hours would surely be victorious. He convinced his men of this, 
raising their morale. 221 He and the other commanders then gathered and targeted Rustam 
as their main objective of attack. When the nearest tribes saw what was happening, they 
joined al-Qa`gac and the others. Even the horsemen threw their bows and arrows aside, 
sprang from their mounts and, wielding their swords, pressed hard on the centre. AI- 
Hurmuzän and al-Bayruzän started to retreat. At noon, the Muslims were able to make a 
breakthrough. "A violent western wind" tore away the sunshade from Rustam's seat and 
blew dust in the faces of the Persian army. 222 At this critical moment, one trooper named 
Hilal b. cUllafah al-Tamimi chased Rustam and killed him, then sprang on to his throne 
and proclaimed: "1 have killed Rustam. " This exclamation made the Persian army turn 
towards the throne, and when they saw their leader was not there confusion took hold of 
their ranks. 223 Consequently, after about thirty hours of continuous fighting, a complete 
rout took place. Every Persian soldier fled for his life. The Persian army tried to cross the 
719 See al-Tabari, 7ärikh a! -Taban; v. 12, p. 117 and Kamäl, al-Qädisiyyah, pp. 175-176. 720 See al-'j'abari, The History ofal-Taban; v. 12, pp. 120-121. Also see Nu'mani, al-Fänrg, pp. 106-107. 7" See al-Tabari, 7änkh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 424. 727 Nu'mani, al-Fän7g, pp. 108-109. Also see al-Tabari, 7ärikh al-Tabari, v. 12, p. 123 and Ibn Kathir, al- 
Bidäyah wa a! -Nihäyah, v. 7, p. 44. 721 See Kamäl, a1-Qäd, siyyah, pp. 175-176. 
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bridge, but few were able to do so. The casualties on both sides were very high: the 
Muslims lost one fifth of their men, the Persians almost one third. 224 
Certain specific features of the battle of al-Qädisiyyah made it unique. First, it was the 
first decisive battle of conquest against an enemy whom the Muslims believed to be the 
people of un-revealed Book. ' The Muslim community concentrated its forces and 
attacked the second largest known empire. They were led by one of the noble 
Companions of the Prophet and one of the six candidates to be nominated Caliph after 
'Umar and the army included seventy of the Companions who had fought at Badr 
(Badn-). "6 Second, the newly formed Muslim army fought against the professional army 
of the Säsänian Empire under the command of one of its most skilful leaders, Rustam. 
Third, the Säsänian Empire used a variety of military means against the Muslim army. 
Notably, elephants were used, which most of the Muslim infantry and cavalry had never 
previously fought against. Fourth, the Muslim forces managed to establish the battlefield 
in a key area, which they had chosen in advance. However, they had to endure the 
experience of a long delay, which was against the nature of most of the Muslim soldiers. 
Fifth, this battle, in comparison with those previously discussed, was by far the longest, 
lasting for four consecutive days, and calling for extreme patience, and endurance and 
courage. Sixth, both armies were aware that the battle was likely to be decisive. This can 
be understood from the speech given by the Emperor addressing his field commander, 
Rustam. 227 Seventh, unlike in the other discussed battles, the supreme commanders at al- 
Qädisiyyah did not participate in the fighting. Eighth, the battle is thought to be the key 
to the Muslim army's subsequent conquest of the Säsänian Empire. 228 Ninth, it secured the 
Arabian Peninsula from future Persian attacks. Tenth, unlike al-Yarmük, al-Qädisiyyah 
was fought to attain a number of clearly defined targets, all of which were accomplished, 
such as the returning of the people of that area once more under the Islamic sharJa and 
subjugating the army of the Säsänian Empire. 229 Eleventh, a daily report was sent between 
the main battle area and the Headquarters of the Islamic state in Medina. Twelfth, the 
Prophet's assurance of the fall of the Säsänian Empire, spoken at al-Khandaq, was fulfilled 
as a result of this battle. 
22' The Muslim army lost more than 6000 men; the Persian army lost more than 60,000. See al-Tabari, 
7-ankh al-Tabari, v. 2, pp. 393 and Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, p. 44. 
2' See al-Tabari, 71rikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 434. 
126 See al-Maqdisi [d. 507/1114], al-Bad' wa al-Tärikh, v. 5, p. 188. 
227 See al-Tabari, 7ärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 393 and Faraj, al-Madrasah, p. 273. 228 See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, p. 47 and Kamäl, al-Qädisiyyah, p. 10. 2" See Kamäl, al-Qädisiyyah, p. 10. 
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111.6: Conclusion 
While this chapter's intention has been to give an overall view of the five battles of 
interest, it has also furnished the reader with details of the conditions and circumstances 
the Prophet and his Companions faced. It has briefly described the course of each battle 
and pointed out its significance. This chapter will be used as the main reference for the 
following chapters as needed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine 
It is a key assumption of this study that the expenditure of great effort and the willingness, 
or even desire, to sacrifice one's life for a cause is most likely to be motivated by belief in 
and obedience to a set of beliefs transcending the natural inclinations of the individual. 
For the religious person, and therefore for the committed Muslim, doctrine fulfils this 
motivating function, as it is the expression or embodiment in language of inner conviction 
or faith. 
The effect of Islamic military doctrine on the performance of the Muslim soldiers will be 
investigated in this chapter. First of all, a general definition of Islamic doctrine will be 
discussed, after which the essence of the doctrine will be explained. The implications of 
Islamic doctrine for Islamic military doctrine will be explored and the significance and 
principles of the military doctrine will be defined and discussed. In this context, the five 
battles will be examined to see how Islamic military doctrine affected and shaped the 
performance of the Muslim soldiers. 
IV. 1: The Definition of Islamic Doctrine 
The term doctrine can be defined in both English and Arabic. ' The word doctrine means 
tenet, faith, dogma, creed, credo, belief and article of faith. ' It is originally derived from 
the Latin word `doctrina: 3 The concept is rendered in Arabic by such words as caqida, 
mu`tagadat, dastür, and mabädi' diniyyah or siyäsiyyah. ` In this study, Islamic `doctrine' 
will be equated with cagida. 
Linguistically, caqida (Islamic doctrine) is derived from the word al-`aqd. The term means 
the opposite of hall (discharging). According to al-Ghadiri, it means the connection of one 
thing with another, ' while Ibn Manzür and al-Räzi indicate that it means to knot 
' This study makes reference to Arabic etymology in this and other chapters because most researchers 
think it is important, when investigating the history of the Arabs, to consider the root and thus the 
original meaning of key words. Also, since the Qur an is involved in most parts of this study its own 
words are considered as they were originally revealed in the Arabic language. 2 Oxford, Advanced English Dictionary. 
3 Oxford, The Orford English Dictionary, v. IV, pp. 915-916 and Basb6ý al-Agidah al-Qitäliyah, p. 21. `Karmi, al-Mughni al-Kabirand al-Ballabaki, al-Mawrid; English-Arabic Dictionary. 
Al-Ghadiri, al-Qämis al-ja-mi 
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something. " It is noteworthy, however, that all three are agreed that `agida (Islamic 
doctrine) is the faith that a person has in his heart and conscience. ' 
Terminologically, Islamic doctrine can be identified as follows. 
Al-Fayyümi identified Islamic doctrine simply as the religion which a man believes in. 8 
Abü Ilanifah stated that Islamic doctrine is the heart's recognition of its Lord, His 
Godhood, His divinity, His names, His attributes, and His actions, and consists in loving 
Him more than anything else. As a result a person's effort in whatsoever matter would 
bring him closer to His satisfaction. Abü Ijanifah also emphasised that the heart's 
recognition could be expressed in two ways: 1) recognition of the correct path defined by 
the shari'a leading to Him, and 2) recognition of what He has prepared, in terms of 
reward, for people who follow such a path. ' Abü IIanifah's formulation is very close to the 
one adopted by the study in defining Islamic military doctrine, as we shall see. 
The Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) explained the meaning of Islamic doctrine in some 
hadiths given according to the nature of the inquirer and the prevailing circumstances. 
These hadiths address the wider area that the word imän (faith) covers in Islam. He 
illustrated clearly the meaning of imän when the people of Bann cAbd al-Qays10 asked his 
advice. He replied: "Do you know what is meant by believing in Allah alone? " They 
replied: "Allah and His Messenger know better. " Thereupon the Prophet said: "To testify 
that none has the right to be worshipped but Allah and Muhammad is the Messenger of 
A115h, to perform the prayers (al-$alah), to pay the alms tax (al-Zakäh), to observe 
Ramadan, and to pay al-Khums (one fifth of the booty to be given in Allah's Cause)... "" In 
6 Al-Räzi, Mukhtäral-, Sihäh, p. 189 and Ibn Manzür, Lisän al-'Arab, v. 12, p. 417. 
' Al-Rail, Mukhtär al-$4740, p. 189, Ibn Manzür, Lisän al-Arab, v. 12, p. 417, al-Manawi [952/1545- 
1031/1622], al-Ta'arif, p. 75, and al-Farahidi [100/719-175/894], Kitäb al-Ain, v. 1, p. 140. 
6 Al-Fayyümi, al-Misbäh al-Munir, v. 2, p. 421. ' Abi al `lz [d. 780/1379], Sharp al-Agidah al-Tahäwiyah, p. 65. Also see Ibn Baz [1330/1312- 
1420/2000], Fatäwä Muhimmah, p. 17, and al-Ghazzali [450/1059-505/1112], Qawa'id al-'Aga'id, p. 
118. 
10 Banu 'Abd al-Qays was a tribe belonging to 'Abd al-Qays b. Afsa b. Du'mi, whose lineage ends with 
Rabi'ah b. NizAr. They originally lived in Tihamah in Saudi Arabia and later moved to Bahrain. See 
Ibn Hazm [383/994-456/1064], JamharatAnsäb a1-Arab, p. 295- 
" For the rest of the hadith see $ahih al-Bukhari (Kitäb al-Imän, No. 53, v. 1, p. 29), Sunan al-Nasä'i 
(Kitab al-Ashribah, No. 5031, v. 8, p. 120), Sunan Abü Dd'üd (Kitäb al Ashribah, No. 3692, v. 3, p. 330), 
and Musnad Ahmad (No. 2020, v. 1, p. 228). In another long hadith narrated by 'Abdullah b. 'Umar, 
we find: "One day we were sitting in the company of Allah's Apostle (PBUH) when there appeared 
before us a man dressed in pure white clothes, his hair extraordinarily black. There were no signs of 
travel on him. None amongst us recognised him... He (the inquirer) said: Inform me about Imän 
(faith). He (the Prophet) replied: `That you affirm your faith in Allah, in His angels, in His Books, in 
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addition, in another hadith the Prophet said: "Whoever possesses the following three 
qualities will have the sweetness of faith: the one to whom Allah and His Messenger 
become dearer than anything else, who loves a person and loves him only for A11ah's sake, 
and who hates to revert to disbelief as he hates to be thrown into the fire. s12 The above 
makes clear that a Muslim's relationship with the doctrine of his faith is an internal 
matter, a matter of the heart and not of intellectual conviction. 
It seems useful to mention here what Sayyid Qutb wrote when commenting on the 
preceding hadith: that complete faith is believing in Allah and His Messenger in a way 
that leaves no room for doubt or hesitation; also, one should feel certain and peaceful in 
one's heart about one's faith in Allah. Thus one's outward actions will reflect one's inner 
belief. 13 
Each of these definitions seems to give a different view. Nevertheless, from the above 
statements it is possible to conclude that doctrine from the Islamic perspective entails 
believing in the six pillars of faith, ]' and the obedience of the heart to the commands of its 
Lord without requesting proof of these tenets of faith, and fulfilling these commands 
practically, whether their purposes are understood or not, in order to gain His rewards. " 
His Apostles, in the Day of Judgement, and you affirm your faith in the Divine Decree about good and 
evil. " He (the inquirer) said: "You have told the truth... " He (the narrator, 'Umar b. al-KhaBäb) said: 
`Then he (the inquirer) went on his way but I stayed with him (the Holy Prophet) for a long while. " 
He then said to me: "'Umar, do you know who this inquirer was? " I replied: "Alläh and His Apostle 
knows best. " He (the Holy Prophet) remarked: "He was Gabriel (the angel). He came to you in order 
to instruct you in matters of religion. " See Sahib al-Bukhäri (Kitäb al-Imän, No. 37, v. 1, pp. 80-82), 
Sahib Muslim (Kitab al-Imän No. 8, v. 1, p. 47), Sunan al-Tirmidhi (Kitib al-&än, No. 2610, v. 5, p. 6), Sunan 
al-Nasä i (Kitab al-Imän, No. 4989, v. 97, p. 8), Sunan Abn Dä'üd (Kitib al-Sunnah, No. 4695, 
v. 4, p. 223), and Sunan Ibn Mäjah (al-Mugadimah, No. 63, v. 1, p. 24). 
12 Sahih al-Bukhdri (IGtäb al-&, §n, No. 16, v. 1, p. 14), Sahib Muslim (); 9täb al-Imän, No. 43, v. 1, p. 
66j, Sunan al-Nasä i (Bib: Tam al-Imän No. 4987, v. 8, pp. 
94-95), Sunan Ibn Mäjah (Kitäb al-Fitan, 
No. 4033, v. 2, p. 1338), and Musnad Ahmad (No. 12021, v. 3, p. 103). 
13 Sayyid Qulb (1324/1906-1386/1966], Fi ZiJal al-Qur'' n, v. 1, p. 26. 
" When the Prophet was asked about faith (Imän), he replied: "That you affirm your faith in Alläh, in 
His angels, in His Books, in His Apostles, in the Day of Judgment, and you affirm your faith in the 
Divine Decree about good and evil. " See Sahih al-Bukhäri (Kitäb al-/man, No. 16, v. 1, p. 14), Sahib 
Muslim (Kitib al-Imän, No. 43, v. 1, p. 66), Sunan al-Nasä i (Bib. - Tam al-Imän, No. 4987, v. 8, pp. 
94- 
95), Sunan Ibn Mäjah (Kitab al-Fitan, No. 4033, v. 2, p. 1338), Musnad Ahmad (No. 12021, v. 3, p. 
103), and Sahi Ibn Hibb, 5n [d. 354/965], (Bib: Warfal-Islam wa al-Imän, v. 
1, p. 390). 
is Also see al-Ghazzäli, Qawä id al-Aga'd, p. 118 and Ibn B5z, FatiwäMuhimmah, p. 17. 
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N. 2: The Primary Sources of Islamic Doctrine 
Generally, the main sources of Islamic doctrine are believed to be the Qur'an, the sunna, 
and al-ßmä: '6 
The Quran is believed by Muslims to be literally the word of A11ah, divinely revealed to 
the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), which therefore all Muslims revere and obey as a holy 
scripture. Its reading is an act of worship, and it is considered to be the main source for 
the Muslim community regarding the conduct of daily affairs. It contains a great deal of 
material specifically concerning military affairs, including their rules and procedures, 
whether before, during, or after any war. It enjoins the faithful to fight for the Cause of 
Allah. " The Qur'an says: "We have sent down to thee the Book explaining all things, a 
Guide, a Mercy, and glad tidings to the Muslims. "" 
The hadith literature consists of the narrations of the life of the Prophet and the acts 
approved by him. " During the time of the Prophet, his Companions eagerly learnt hadith 
from him in order to apply them in their life in peace or wartime. There are some hadith 
concerning Islamic doctrine formulated in order to enlighten and increase the 
performance of the Muslim soldiers in battle. 20 
It is believed that ßmä, which means the Consensus of jurists, is the third source of the 
sharica. 21 It is identified as the collective judgement of Islamic scholars made in the light 
16 These are the main Sources of Islamic doctrine according to Basbüs, al-Agidah al-Qitiliyyah, p. 41 
and Husayn, ? I-Agidah al-Askariyyah, pp. 32-40. It should be noted here that both writers fail to 
make a distinction which is essential regarding this concept, since the element of giyis (analogous 
deduction: passing a judgement upon a certain issue by analogy with another on the basis of features 
common to them both) is not relevant here because the elements of aqida are not subject to change or 
estimation, as is the case with jurisprudence. Further see Ibn Hanbal [164/781-241/856], al-Agidah, p. 
82 and Ibn Taymiyyah, Kutub wa Fatiwi, v. 2, p. 8. Further details of interest see al-Amidi, al-Ihkim, 
lbn Hazm, Maritib al-ljmä, al-Juwayni [740/1340-816/1414], al-Burhän, v. 2, pp. 485-513, and al- 
Jurjani [740/1340-816/1414], al-Ta`rifa`t, pp. 24 and 232-233. 
17 In the Qur'an (ETMC), 61: 10-11, it is found: "0 ye who believe! Shall I lead you to a bargain that 
will save you from a grievous Chastisement? That ye believe in Allah and his Messenger, and that you 
strive (your utmost) in the Cause of Allah, with your wealth and your persons: That will be best for 
you, If ye but knew! " Also see the Qut'an, 9: 38-39. 
18 See the Qur'an (EI'MC), 16: 89. 
" See the definition of the hadith Chapter One. 
20 In one occasion the Prophet said: "Rise to enter Paradise which is equal in width to the Heavens and 
the Earth. " See $ahih Muslim (Bib: 77iubt7t al-Jannah Ii al-Shahid, No. 1901, v. 3, p. 1510) and 
Musnad Ahmad (No. 12421, v. 3, p. 136). 
21 For the meaning of the word ijmi°see Netton, A PopularDictionary of Islam, p. 117. 
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of the Qur'an and the hadith at any time after the death of the Prophet. 22 It is 
acknowledged that different types of ýfmä°may exist within Islam. 23 
It should be noted, however, that these sources are similar to those used in figh 
(jurisprudence) with the exception of giyäs (analogous deduction). 24 These primary 
Islamic legal sources, with the exception of the Qur'an, are known to have varied at the 
outset and went through different developmental stages. In the early years of Islam, 
during the life of the Prophet, the Qur'an and the hadith were the only main sources. The 
Companions would constantly refer to him to resolve difficult cases. 25 Generally, after his 
death they used Vm5l but without indicating it as is done in official sources these days. 26 
Questions pertaining to military affairs, as an aspect of Islamic society, are referred to 
these primary sources as the only legislative authorities, despite the existence of a variety 
of different military doctrinal schools. 
It is now necessary to consider the importance of the essence of Islamic doctrine from the 
point of view of the shari`a. 
N. 3: The Essence of Islamic Doctrine 
Husayn and Ghaybah observe that the essence of Islamic doctrine is a strong faith in 
A115h and that He is the source of victory. 27 Muslim scholars consider sincerity to be the 
highest degree of faith and the opposite of al-Shirk (associating partners with A115h. )29 
Consequently, sincerity is understood to be the core of Islamic doctrine. 30 In general it is 
considered to be a combination of pure intention with knowledge, both of which are 
closely related to faith. 31 The rewards of the hereafter depend on the truth of sincerity. 32 
22 Al-tlmidi, al-lhkäm, v. 3, p. 175, Ibn Hazm, Marätib al-Jima; v. 1, p. 8, al-Ghämidi, "Jaridat al- 
Muslimün; Alfäz al- Agidah wa Muý qalahätiha", and Husayn, al-Aqidah al-Askariyyah, p. 39. 21 See al-Shäfi, i [150/768-204/820], al-Risälah, pp. 39-40 and Ibn Hazm, al-]Vubdhah a1-Käfiyyah, pp. 
21-26. 
24 Islamic doctrine is not based on analogy as it is considered thäbitah (to be firmly established) by 
virtue of wahi (revelation). See Ibn Hanbal, al-Agidah, p. 82 and Ba$büý, al-Aqidah al-Qitäliyyah, p. 
32. 
zs For example see Sahih Ibn Hibbdn (Kiräb al-&än, No. 4354, v. 10, p. 169). 
26 See al-Shäfi°i, al-Rlrälah, p. 598. 27 Husayn, al-Aqidah a1-Askar5yah, p. 22, Ghaybah, Mugawwimätal-Shakhciyyah, p. 57. 28 See Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Imän, p. 301-315 and al-Sadlän, al-Niyyah, v. 1, p. 145. 29 AI-Ghazzili, Ihyä' °Ulüm al-Din, v. 4, p. 379. For the meaning of the word shirk see Netton, A 
Popular Dictionary of Islam, p. 231. 30 Here, faith is the core of Islamic doctrine as sincerity is the core of faith. " It will be useful to the reader to indicate briefly these connections, which will be examined in more 
detail later in the chapter, for example in the section "The Principles of Islamic Military Doctrine". 
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The Qur'an promises that good deeds will be rewarded according to the certainty of a 
person's sincerity and his acting in accordance with the sharila. 33 
Terminologically, sincerity means to believe in the oneness of Allah. Al-Ghazzali 
discusses the definition of sincerity in detail when explaining the different approaches of 
some Islamic scholars. 35 The most accurate definition of sincerity, according to al- 
Ghazzali, was given by the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) himself: when he was asked 
about it, he replied that sincerity is to say "Allah is my Lord, " and then to be firm. 36 This 
must be considered the most accurate as well as succinct definition, which in a military 
First, the connection between faith and knowledge: in his Athar al-Imän, p. 53, al-Jarbü° explains the 
relationship between sincerity and knowledge. He writes: "The true faith that purifies and fortifies the 
worshipper is the one that is built upon knowledge, which is brought by the Prophet Muhammad and 
which is supported by revelation. " Al-Jarbü° also points out that none of the fundamentals of faith in 
the Qur'an and sunna can be fulfilled unless they are understood through the knowledge of their 
meanings. Therefore a Muslim's faith is not blind. In fact, later (p. 430) in the same work he states that 
knowledge is one of the fundamentals of faith. It may be understood that he meant to show the great 
effect of knowledge on sincerity, especially in making use of the argument of Ibn Jarir, who explained 
that {St .l} "to whom We gave life" (as in the Qur'an (EFMC), 6: 122), means that We guided him to 
Islam and revived him. Second, we need to consider the connection between faith and intention 
indicated in the following verse (EIMC), 49: 7: "But Allah has endeared the Faith to you, and Has 
made it beautiful in your hearts, and He Has made hateful to you unbelief, wrongdoing, and rebellion: 
such indeed are those who walk in righteousness. " Also see the Qur'an, 24: 47-51. In the explanation 
of the word faith, Ibn Taymiyyah, aJ-Imän, pp. 49-50, states that this word covers all the fields of 
adoration, since any type of love and hate should be judged and understood according to one's 
intention. Ibn Taymiyyah later in the same book, pp. 172-173, quotes Sahl b. 'Abdullah al-Tustari, who, 
when he was asked about faith, said: "Faith is speaking, action, intention, and sunna (working 
according to the Prophet's teachings). " Also see Ibn Qudamah, Lamat al-It tigad, p. 21. 
It should be noted that due to the richness of meaning of the Arabic words in the Qur'an they should 
ideally given in their original form to give the meaning its true strength and emphasis. Care must be 
taken with the translation also, since the Arabic word may indicate meanings and therefore concepts 
other than those generally provided in the books of exegesis. See al-Fughom, Untranslatability of the 
Holy Qur'an, pp. 5-12. 
32 See the Qur'an, 26: 9,37: 84 and 50: 33. Also see the hadith of the Prophet in Sahib al-Bukhari 
(Kitäb al-Wahl No. 1, v. 1, p. 3), Sahib Muslim (Kitib al-Imärah, No. 1907, v. 3, p. 1515), Sunan al- 
Tirmidhi (Kitäb Managib al Jihad, No. 1647. v. 4, p. 179), Musnad Ahmad (No. 300, v. 1, p. 43), Sunan 
al-Bayhagi al-Kubra (Bab: al-Niyyah, No. 181, v. 1, p. 41), al-Sunan al-Kubra (Bab: aJ-WadJ; No. 78, 
v. 1, p. 79), and Sunan Abü Dd'üd (Kitib al--Talaq wa Aqd al-Niyyah, No. 2201, v. 2, p. 262). 
" The Qur an (EI'MC), 26: 89, states: "But only he (will prosper) that brings to Allah a sound heart". 
Further see AbU al-A'15 al-Mawdüdi, Towards Understanding the Qur'an; the English Version of 
Tafhim al-Qur'an, v. 1, pp. 103,213,258,299, and 211. 
" This means to worship Allah alone (the first pillar of Faith). See Ibn Taymiyyah, aJIstigämah, v. 2, 
pp. 302-303, Ibn al-Jazari [544/1150-606/1210], al-Nihäyah, v. 2, p. 11, al-Razi, Mukhtir al-Sihah, p. 
77, and al-Qaraddwi, al-Niyyah wa al-Ikhlas, p. 11. 
35 See al- Ghazzali, Ihya' `Ultim al-Din, v. 4, p. 379. 
" See Sahih Muslim (Bib: Jam? Ausafal-Islam, No. 38, v. 1, p. 65), Sunan al-Tirmidhi (Kitab al-Zuhd, 
No. 2140, v. 4, p. 607), Sunan Ibn M5jah (Kitab al-Fitan, No. 3972, v. 2, p. 1314), and Sunan al-Darimi 
(Kitab al-Rigaq, No. 2710, v. 2, p. 386). 
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context has a great effect on Muslim soldiers due to their knowledge of the source. 37 
However, it should be emphasised that the phrase "be firm" refers to both internal and 
external steadfastness, since the question concerned the internal response of the Muslim 
soldier to the demands of his faith. 
Faith is not constant, however; it varies in the Muslim heart according to its degree of 
certainty and level of belief. It may increase or decrease, depending mainly on how 
intention and knowledge combine in the Muslim's actions. "' 
Al-Nawawi in his Sharh Saht7r Muslim explains that faith's gauge rises and falls in the 
Muslim's heart. He then points out that linguistically the word 'imän' is not subject to 
changes of meaning. Then he discusses faith terminologically, stating that it means: "the 
belief in the heart and the performance of the body. i39 Both he and Ibn Battäl40 argued 
that faith's susceptibility to change is indicated by the Qur'an in the following verse: 
"Those to whom men said: "A great army is gathering against you, so fear them": but it 
(only) increased their Faith: they said: "For us Allah Sufficient, and He is the best 
Guardians. " 
Such verses provide strong evidence that faith does indeed increase and decrease 
according to intention and knowledge, and that this has an important effect on the 
Muslim's heart, attitude and internal conviction which is definitely reflected in his 
external behaviour. This judgement is supported by most of the contemporary and 
classical Islamic scholars such as al-Qurtubi, Ibn Taymiyyah, and al-Shawk5ni. 42 
Therefore, although it can be said that faith cannot be divided into parts or quantified as 
far as the linguistic meaning is concerned, from the terminological perspective faith is 
susceptible to change. 
" For example, see the conduct of Hudhayfah b. al-Yamän at the battle of al-Khandaq. See Sahih 
Muslim (Bib: Ghazwat al Ahzib, No. 1788, v. 3, p. 1414) and Sahih Ibn Hibbän (DhikrHudhayfah b. 
al-Yamin, No. 7125, v. 16, p. 67). 
38 Al 'Abbäd, Causes, p. 12. " Al 'Abbäd, Causes, p. 12 and al 'Azzäz, al-Imin, p. 14. 
'0 His full name was Abü al-Hasan °Ali b. Khalaf b. Battäl al-Bakri al-Qurtubi. He wrote a commentary 
on Sahih al-Bukhäri. He was a judge in Lurgah and died in 449/1058. See aI-Dhahabi, SiyarAlim a1- 
Nubala' v. 18, p. 47. 
" See the Qur'än (ETMC), 3: 173. Also see Qur'än, 9: 124. Also see al-Nawawi, Sharh , Sahib Muslim, 
v. 1, p. 146 and al-Shawkäni [1173/1760-1250/1835], Fath al-Qadir, v. 1, pp. 37 and 46. 
42 See al-Qurtubi, Tafsiral-Qurtubi, v. 4, pp. 289-290, Ibn Taymiyyah, al-/min, p. 34, and al-Shawkäni, 
Fath al-Qadir, v. 1, p. 503. 
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Many scholars have discussed these causes either briefly or in detail. 43 One such scholar 
was al 'Abbäd, the author of the most accurate and detailed discussion of the increasing 
and decreasing of faith. 44Thus it will be useful to follow his schema of the main related 
factors affecting faith's stability. Practising the following behaviours is considered to bring 
about an increase in faith, and neglecting or avoiding them will have the effect of 
decreasing it: 
1. Learning beneficial knowledge derived from the book of A115h and the sunny of His 
Messenger. 
a. Reciting the Qur'än and contemplating it. 45 
b. Knowledge of Allah's most beautiful Names and most Exalted Attributes. 46 
c. Pondering the merits and qualities of the religion of Islam. " 
2. Exerting efforts towards accomplishing sincere righteous actions. 
a. Actions of the heart, tongue and limbs " 
These are considered to be the main factors causing an increase in faith. 
By way of conclusion, we can say that the response of a Muslim to Islamic doctrine 
depends on the increasing and decreasing of faith. This in turn has an effect on the 
implementation of Islamic doctrine as Islamic military doctrine, as will be discussed in the 
next section. 
IV. 4: Islamic Military Doctrine 
After considering the definitions of Islamic doctrine and discussing its essence and sources, 
we will discuss its implementation in the military field as Islamic military doctrine. The 
" Also see Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Imän, al-Ahdal, al-Imän, al-JarbdI, Athar al-Imän, al-Qaradäwi, al-Imän, 
and al-Dhahabi, SiyarA Jam al-Nubala; v. 11, p. 85. 
"Al `Abbäd, Causes, pp. 8-10. 
45 This can be seen to be practically applied immediately before the battles began. Also see Siräj al-Din, 
Hadi al-Qur'an al-Karim ila Ma`rifat al-Awalim wa Ma`rifat al-Kawn. 
46 This was also practised, at least in part, before the battles when the Muslims implored A115h's help or 
proclaimed "Allähu Akbar" as a signal to attack and as a sing of faithful submission to Him. Also see 
Sunan al-Bayhagi al-Kubrä (Kitab al-Asmä' wa al-Siff t) and al-Haläwi Muhammad, wa Lillah al Asmä' 
al-Husna. 
" This was seen clearly in the case of the ambassadors' mission to the adversaries' camps. Also see 
Sayyid Säbiq, Kha, c'ir al-Tash, f al-Islami. 
"Also see in this connection the Qur'an, 23: 1-11, Ibn Taymiyyah, Amal al-Qulüb, and Muhammad 
Kelkel, ., 9yinat al-/man min Atharät al-Lisän. 
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study's construction of the definition of Islamic military doctrine relies on the views of 
some modem Islamic scholars, since it was not defined in classical Islam. Consequently, 
this definition is a modem formulation; however, it is possible to argue that the concept 
was practised during the period under study. The views of some of the Islamic military 
commanders are illustrated here with a view to examining the definition of Islamic 
military doctrine in depth. 
Al-Khattab states from a general military perspective that: "Doctrine is an elevated goal, 
which a man believes in; therefore, he sacrifices his wealth and his life for its sake, since it 
is more valuable than both of them. i49 His definition is general, however, and he does not 
consider doctrine from a specifically Islamic viewpoint. 
In contrast, Basbüs explains that: "It is making Jihad for the Cause of Allah with 
everything a human being owns, with a firm doctrine, spiritual reaction and including a 
clear goal which cannot be abandoned and full preparation to protect this goal. 9P50 
Nevertheless, he does not mention what type of Jihad he is discussing, although his 
definition seems to apply mainly to combat. 
Husayn on the other hand indicates that to adhere to Islamic military doctrine is to 
believe in the high values that spring from the Islamic doctrine, which does not accept 
any hesitation on the part of the believer. He explains that these values are considered to 
be the stimuli of a fighting spirit which causes the believer to sacrifice his wealth, his time, 
and his life for the fulfilment of the goal. They are also essential in preparing the whole 
nation for Jihad in time of war or of peace. Later, he concludes that this Islamic military 
doctrine consists of certain rules necessary to direct the political and military procedures 
governing warfare so that the ultimate aim might be fulfilled. " Ijusayn adds that the 
function and purpose of Islamic doctrine in this context are to instruct and correct Islamic 
military behaviour and to direct it in order to perfect both manners and moral attitudes. " 
Nonetheless, although this seems to be the closest to an ideal definition for the purposes 
of this study, it is too general and does not refer to the promises made in the Qur'an and 
sunna for the benefit of the Muslim soldiers. 
49 A1-Kha4läb, Bayna a1-Agidah, p. 41 and Firestone, Jihäd, p. 132. 
5o Baýbiiý, al-Agidah al-Qitäliyyah, p. 32. Further see Ibn al-Mubärak [118/736-181/798], al-Jihäd. 
51 Husayn, al-Agidah al-Askariyyah, p. 11. 
52 Ibid, p. 18 and al-Sayyid Säbig, al-Agäid al-Islämiyyah, p. 8. 
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The above statements show that Islamic military doctrine is grounded in the high values 
that spring from Islamic doctrine, and governs the implementation of that doctrine in the 
field of military affairs. Firm belief in and commitment to the Islamic military doctrine 
stimulates the fighting spirit of Muslim soldiers, who are already aware of the divine 
promises of victory or martyrdom. These promises were made conditional upon the 
willingness to sacrifice wealth and life and are fulfilled by submitting to certain rules and 
regulations derived from the shari`a, and through the use of military strategy, in order to 
attain above all the ultimate goal, i. e. to serve Allah by submitting without reservation to 
His command to exalt his word above all. Hence, it can be regarded as a part of a divine 
doctrine. 
The phrase `fighting spirit' leads us to discuss one of the most important acts of piety in 
the Islamic military doctrine: Jihad. " This word needs to be understood and defined in 
the Islamic context. Khan identifies Jihad as: "Holy fighting in the Cause of A115h or any 
other kind of effort to make Allah's Word (i. e. Islam) supreme. Jihad is thus to be 
regarded as one of the fundamentals of Islam. "' 
S' Firestone, Jihad, p. 132. For more see Hughes, Dictionary of Islam, pp. 243-248. 
Al-Ba'labaki, al-Mawrid; Arabic-English Dictionary, illustrates that Jihad means effort, struggle, strife, 
fight, and holy war. The Oxford, Advanced Learner's Dictionary, defines Jihad as: "A holy war fought 
by Muslims against those who reject Islam. " Rudolph, Islamic Colonialism, p. 118, objects that the 
previous definition does not cover the exact meaning of the word Jihad. In addition, it should be made 
clear that those who reject Islam are not to be fought due to their rejection of Islam only, as according 
to the Qur'an, 2: 256: "There is no compulsion in religion. " 
s. Khan, Summarised Sah17r al-Bukhg , p. 1049. 
It should be pointed out that there are different types 
of Jihad. Among these, fighting in the Cause of Allah, well performed l; iajj and going to and returning 
from the Mosque as well as others are all called Jihad. See Sahih al-Bukhari (Kitäb al-Jihad, No. 2632, 
v. 3, p. 1026) & (); gtäb a/-fhäd, No. 2842, v. 3, p. 1094), Sunan al-Titmidhi (Kitäb al-Fitan, No. 2174, 
v. 4, p. 471), Sunan al-Bayhaqi al-Kubra (Kitäb al-Siyar, v. 9, p. 25), al-Mundhiri [581/1156-656/1258], 
al-Targhib wa al-Tarh/b, v. 1, p. 133, and al-Mizzi [654/1256-742/1342], Tahdhib al-KamR,, v. 2, p. 144. 
In addition, it is possible to recognise that not fighting back while the Muslims were undergoing 
torture in Mecca was a form of Jihad whereby the believer's patience and endurance were put to the 
test. The Muslims implored the Prophet that they should be allowed to resist persecution, but he told 
them that the time was not yet ripe. See Sunan al-Bayhaqi al-Kubra (Kitäb al-Siyar, v. 9, p. 5) and al- 
Mujam al-Kabir (No. 3640, v. 4, p. 63). 
It is worth mentioning in this context that there is a famous weak hadith which states: "We came back 
from the lesser Jihad to the greater Jihad" which is used in several Medieval and contemporary Islamic 
works. AI-Ghazzali, Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Rajab al-I ianbali and other modern and classical scholars 
regarded this hadith as cia°if(weak). Al-Ghazzali, Ma`ari al-Quds, p. 99, stated: "They (scholars and 
wisemen) indicated that we came back from the lesser Jihad to the greater Jihad. " But in the IhyäT 
'U117m al-Din, v. 2, p. 244, he referred this hadith to the Prophet, mentioning it in a slightly different 
form and illustrating its weakness of narration. Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali [d. 895/1490], JJmi'al-100M wa 
a! -Hikam, p. 196, discussed this hadith but did not refer it to the Prophet. Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Furgän, p. 
197, stated that this hadith has no basis. However, al-Albani [d. 1422/2002], Silsilat al-Ahädith al- 
. ah, hah, v. 3, pp. 478-479, regards the following hadith, with a similar wording, as strong: 
"The best 
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In the Qur'an, the meaning of Jihad is stated clearly in many verses. In fact the call to 
Jihad occurs seventy-four times, " while in the hadith it occurs many more times. 56 This 
repetitive use of the word Jihad is considered by Muslims to show the important role 
Jihad plays in Muslim society and particularly in the military context. However, its essence 
consists of (1) a true and sincere faith, which fixes its gaze on Allah, so that all selfish or 
worldly motives seem paltry and fade away, and (2) an earnest and ceaseless activity, 
involving the sacrifice (if need be) of life, person, or property, in the service of A11ah. 57 
Therefore, it can be understood that there are several ways to fulfil Jihad according to this 
concept. 
Thus, according to Islamic military doctrine the Muslim army fights to accomplish two 
important goals: either victory in battle or martyrdom. 58 The Qur'an says: "Say: can you 
expect for us (any fate) other than one of two glorious things- (Martyrdom or victory)? "59 
It is possible to assert that Muslims believe that Islamic military doctrine differs from the 
doctrine of all other nations in that main goal is fighting in the Cause of A11ah, whatever 
the outcome. 60 
Jihad is the Jihad of al-nafs (desires) in the Cause of Allah" which in turn may strengthen the idea 
that there is a Jihad more difficult than the normal Jihad, i. e. the Jihad of the battlefield. It can be 
stated that the Jihad of the battlefield ends when the combat is over; on the other hand, the Jihad 
between right and wrong never ends. In other words it is an internal continuous struggle between the 
soul's evil desires and the Islamic teachings. 
Thus rejecting a detestable action is considered to be a part of Jihad. However, this rejection relies on 
one's degree of sincerity, as the hadith states: "He who amongst you sees something abominable 
should modify it with his hand; and if he has not strength enough to do it, then he should do it with 
his tongue; and if he has not strength enough to do it, (even) then he should (abhor it) from his heart 
and that is the least of faith. " See Sahib Muslim (Kitib al-Imän, No. 49, v. 1, p. 69), Sunan al-Tirmidhi 
(Kitäb al-Fitan, No. 2172. v. 4, p. 469), Sunan al-Nasa i (Kitib al-Imän, No. 5008, v. 8, p. 111), Sunan 
Abü Da'üd (Kitäb al-Saläh, No. 1140, v. 1, p. 296), Sunan Ibn Majah (Kitib al-Fitan, No. 4013, v. 2, p. 
1330), and Sahib Ibn Hibban (Kitäb al-Imän, No. 306, v. 1, p. 540). Also see al-Tayyar, al-Ikhläs, p. 26. 
ss See Qur'an, 2,190-195,216-218,244,246-252, & 261,3: 139,142,146,154-158, & 200,4: 71-77,84, 
93, & 102,5: 35 & 54,8: 15,16,20-26,39,40,46-48, & 57-66,9: 7-16,20-22,24,29,38-41,73,111, & 
120-123,16: 110,22: 39,40,58, & 78,29: 67,33: 16,17,21,22, & 25,47: 4-7,20-24,31, & 35,48: 4,7, 
& 18-27,57: 10 & 25,59: 2-5 & 11-14,60: 1, and 61: 4& 10-13. 
56 See Sahib al-Bukhari (Kitab al-Jihad), Sahib Muslim (Kitib al-Jihad), Sunan Abii Dä'iid (Kitab al- 
Jihäd), Sunan Ibn Majah (Kitäb allihäd ), and the rest of the hadith Books. 
S' The Holy Qur'an ETMC p. 503. 
58 These alternatives may be subject to application of strategy considered from an Islamic viewpoint. 
See the section "The Definition of Islamic Strategy and the Two 'Pillarsin the chapter "The 
Importance of Islamic Military Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
S' See the Qur'an (ETMC), 9: 52. 
60 The Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 76 says: "Those who believe fight in the Cause of A11ah, and those who 
reject faith fight in the cause of Evil ('I ägut): so fight ye against the friends of Satan: feeble indeed is 
the cunning of Satan. " 
89 
Ch. 4: The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine 
It should be noted that Ibn Kathir did not show any preference between martyrdom and 
victory and preserved the order of the above verse. "' On the other hand, al-Tabari in his 
discussion of this verse, made the order of the events more logical 62 He talked firstly 
about victory and then mentioned martyrdom as a natural end if victory is not 
accomplished. Taking the opposite view, al-Qurtubi suggested that the highest goal of 
Muslim soldiers, as their doctrine dictates, is martyrdom; 63 victory is not the primary goal. 
Al-Qurtubi's view is supported by the actions of those Companions of the Prophet who 
sought martyrdom rather than victory. " These views appear to be irreconcilable, but the 
contradiction may be resolved by considering their relationship to the demands of Islamic 
military strategy, which will be discussed in Chapter Eight. 65 
IV. 5: The Perceived Importance of Islamic Military Doctrine 
Soldiers have a strong need for a doctrine which can motivate them, particularly at 
moments of crisis, to be willing to go against their own desires, and even to overcome their 
natural instinct to survive, sacrificing themselves for a greater cause. " Indeed, this 
farsighted conviction is generally impossible to achieve and act upon unless there is a 
cause or goal of ultimate value. It can be argued that a motivational power transcending 
the merely human, such as Islamic doctrine, is needed to properly organise the soldier's 
relationship with his God, his superiors, and his comrades in arms. 67 Therefore, Husayn 
claims that humans need a divine doctrine, which makes the best use of their abilities and 
provides what will be necessary to attain this goal. 68 The Qur'än says: "On earth will be 
your dwelling place and your means of livelihood for a time. Then learnt Adam from his 
Lord certain words and his Lord turned towards him; for He is Oft-Returning, Most 
61 See Ibn Kathir, Tahirlbn Kathir, v. 2, p. 363. 
62 See al-Tabari, Tafsiral-Tabari, v. 10, pp. 150-151. 
63 See al-Qurtubi, Tafsiral-Qurtubi, v. 8, p. 160. 
6' Further see the Qur'an, 3: 152, al-Tabari, Tafsir al-7'abari, v. 9, p. 189, al-Qurtubi, Tafsir al-Qurtubi 
v. 7, p. 370, Ibn Kathir, Tafsk Ibn Kathir, v. 2, p. 192, al-Tabari, Trikh al-7'aban; v. 2, p. 15, v. 2, p. 106, 
Ibn Kathir, al-BidSyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 5, p. 319, Ibn °Asäkir, Tdrikh Dimashq, v. 2, p. 7, v. 11, p. 352, & 
v. 16, p. 273, and Basbiis, al-Agidah al Qitäliyyah, p 77. 
65 See the section "Islamic Strategy Definition and the Two'Pillars"' in the chapter "The Importance of 
Islamic Military Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
66 See al-Khattäb, Bayna al-Agidah, p. 42 and Husayn, al-Agidah a1-Askariyyah, p. 15. 
67 Further see the coming section "A Divinely Stable Doctrine". 
68 See Husayn, a1-Aqidah al-Askanyyah, p. 15. Also see the section "The Significant Qualities of the 
Muslim Leader: Bravery and Tagwä' in the chapter "The Impact of Islamic Military Leadership" 
(Ch. 5). 
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Merciful. i69 It can be argued that the `certain words' learnt from the Lord were a kind of 
doctrinal teachings. 
After illustrating the perceived importance of Islamic military doctrine, we will now 
consider the reasons for combat prescribed by Islam. 
IV. 6: The Reasons for Islamic Combat 
We have seen above that Muslims believe that fighting in a way true to Islam is not to be 
undertaken for the sake of booty, sovereignty, authority, property, expansion, better living, 
or any other rewards; a Muslim soldier fights with sincerity for the sake of Allah alone. 
Thus Islam transformed the Arabs into fighters for purposes different from those which 
had hitherto motivated them. ' However, it may be asked: "What is the Cause of Allah? " 
Naturally, many explanations have been offered in answer to this question, and there are 
several modern works which have attempted to provide an overall view of the Cause of 
Allah. " Thus, the Cause of Allah as mentioned in the Qur'an and sunna'Z can be 
summarised in the following points: 
1. Monotheism (tawhid) in the field of creed, as in the Qur'än: "Not a messenger did 
we send before thee without this inspiration sent by us to him: that there is no 
God but I; therefore worship and serve Me. "' 
2. Mercy in the field of morality, as in the Qur'än: "We sent thee not, but as a mercy 
for all creatures. "" 
3. Justice in the field of legislation, as in the Qur'an: "Allah commands justice, the 
doing of good, and giving to kith and kin, and He forbids all indecent deeds, and 
evil and rebellion: He instructs you, that ye may receive admonition. 1,75 
69 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 2: 36-37. Also see the Qur'an, 2: 2,38,120,143,185, & 285,3: 4& 73,6: 
71 & 88,16: 36,18: 13,20: 123,39: 23 and 42: 13. 
70 See the section "Reasons for fighting" in the chapter "Brief Background of the Region Prior to Islam" 
(Ch. 2). 
" See al-Sayyid Säbiq, Fiqh al-Sunah, v. 3, pp. 40-41, Husayn, al-Aqidah al-Askariyyah, pp. 47-48, 
Ghaybah, Mugawwimät al-Shakhsiyyah, pp. 10-11, an d Rudolph, Islam and Colonialism, P. 121. n See I; iusayn, al-Aqidah al-Askariyyah, pp. 47-48. 
n See the Qur'an (ETMC), 21: 25. This leads to unity in the worship of the Creator. 
" See the Qur'än (ETMC), 21: 107. This verse directs the practice of Islamic military activities. 
'S See the Qur'än (ETMC), 16: 90. This provides a solid basis for social affairs even in military society. 
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In addition, the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) said: "Verily, I was sent to perfect moral 
character. "" Thus he encapsulated the whole aim of Islam in a simple phrase and verified 
that the doctrine of conquest is justifiable only in the Cause of Allah. 
It is noteworthy that Islamic scholars have used these aspects to limit the meaning of the 
Cause of Allah to specific points. Firstly and above all they have used the term 
`monotheism' as a connection between the Islamic military and Allah, i. e. between Muslim 
soldiers and their Lord, in daily activities, since Islam is a way of life. This relation is 
obviously the cornerstone of the fulfilment of the subsequent points. 77 The second point 
concerns the moral innovations wrought by Islamic doctrine on the Muslim troops. 78 The 
Arabs' brutal method of fighting prior to Islam was changed by Islamic teachings to the 
practice of mercy and morality in warfare, and the reasons for conflict were also changed, 
since they had used to slay each other for foolish reasons such as in the war of Dälhis wa 
al-Ghabrä The third point deals with the justice of legislation, to prove that Jihad is not 
only the way of the sword. So it is possible to say that the spirit of Jihad is found not only 
in fighting, as "the sincere scholar's pen or the preacher's voice or a wealthy man's 
contributions could be the most valuable forms of Jihad. "" For example on one occasion 
the Prophet asked for a donation to prepare the Muslim army. °Uthman b. °Affan donated 
a substantial sum of money, whereupon the Prophet remarked: "There is no harm upon 
Uthman whatever he does after this. "" 
Within Islamic belief, there are about fourteen conditions under which Islamic troops are 
permitted to go into action, but as most of these lie outside the scope of this study, only a 
few will be mentioned here 82 
76 Musnad Ahmad (No. 8595, v. 2, p. 381), al-Mustadrak gala al-Sahiayn (Kitäb Tawän7th al- 
Mutagadimin min al Anbyä' wa a! -Mursalin, No. 4221, v. 2, p. 670), and al-Muwatta' [93/712- 
179/796], (Kitäb flusun al-Khuluq, No. 1609, v. 2, p. 904). 
77 See the Qur'an, 26: 98,37: 84, and 50: 33. 
78 See Firestone, Jihäd, p. 127. 
79 This war lasted for more than forty years and was initially ignited by a race between two horses. 
Further see Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 3, p. 155 and Yagiit al-Hamawi, Muyam al-Buldän, 
v. 1, p. 113. 
80 The Holy Qur'an ETMC p. 503. Also see Ibn `Isä, Sharh Qasidat Ibn al-Qayyim, v. 1, p. 27 and al- 
Sanäfi, al-IsträtViyyah al-'Askariyyah, p. 122. Also the Prophet said: "Use your property, your persons 
and your tongues in striving against the polytheists. " See Sunan Abii DT 5d (Kitäb al -Mid, No. 2504, 
v. 3, p. 10) and Musnad Ahmad (No. 12268, v. 3, p. 124). 
8' Al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyah, v. 3, p. 100. Also see al-Mustadrak gala al-S. ahihayn (Fadä7'Jthmän 
b. Alta-n, No. 4553, v. 3, p. 110) and Ibn Kathir, al Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 5, p. 
4. 
as Among them are fighting the apostate, fighting rebels, fighting against the oppression of despotic 
rulers, and so on. See Husayn, al-Agidah al-Askanyyah, pp. 47-57, Ghaybah, Mugawwirnat al- 
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Muslim scholars have argued that in order that these forms of warfare be undertaken in 
the proper manner a supreme reward is necessary to stir the soldier's spirit, so that he will 
go into combat with an unquenchable desire for victory. It could be said that here the pre- 
eminence of Islamic military doctrine appears distinctively. Allah made a uniquely 
valuable bargain with the Muslim troops so that Islamic military doctrine should be 
realised. The Qur'an says: "Allah hath purchased of the Believers their persons and their 
goods; for theirs (in return) is the Garden (of Paradise): they fight in His Cause and slay 
and are slain: a promise binding on Him in truth, through the Torah, the Gospel, and the 
Qur'an: and who is more faithful to his covenant than Allah? Then rejoice in the bargain 
which ye have concluded: that is the achievement supreme. P, 83 In the normal human 
bargain there is an equivalence in the value of the offers and there are advantages for 
both sides. However, in the divine bargain, the deal is for the advantage of one party; it is 
martyrdom. Allah takes his ephemeral life, and the wealth and goods which he has 
accumulated, and He takes his soul; but in return He gives him everlasting felicities. 84 
This concept of the divine bargain leads us to discuss briefly some of the virtues of Islamic 
military doctrine and the rewards for the Muslim soldiers who fight in the Cause of Allah. 
N. 7: The Virtues of Islamic Military Doctrine and the Promised Rewards 
for the Muslim Soldiers 
Many verses in the Qur'an, as well as many hadiths, discuss the virtue of fighting in the 
Cause of Allah in this life, and life after death. 85 Moreover, the shari`a makes a distinction 
between Muslims who fight for the Cause of Allah and those who do not. In the Qur'an, 
we find: "Not equal are those Believers who sit (at home) except those who are disabled. 
And those who strive and fight in the Cause of Allah with their goods and their persons. 
Allah hath granted a grade higher to those who strive and fight. , 86 
Shakhsiyah, pp. 10-11, al-Sayyid Sabiq, Fiqh al-Sunnah, v. 3, pp. 40-41, Kurdi, The Islamic State, p. 
182, and al-Khalfat and As'ad, al-Askanyyah, pp. 27-30. Further see the discussion of the two `pillars' 
in the section "Islamic Strategy Definition and the Two `Pillarsin the chapter "The Importance of 
Islamic Military Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
"See the Qur'an (ETMC), 9: 111. 
84 See The Holy Qur'an, ETMC p. 536, al-Tabari, Tafsir al-Tabar4 v. 11, pp. 35-36, al-Qurtubi, Tafsir al- 
Qurrub, v. 8, p. 267, and Ibn Kathir, Tafsirlbn Kathir, v. 2, p. 392. 
85 See the Qur'an, 3: 169-174,9: 14,41,52, & 88,29: 69, and 33: 24. Also, see the Kitäb allihäd in the 
hadith books. Also see the coming section "°I'he Element of Strong Motivation". 
86See the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 95. 
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Also, the Prophet's Companions asked him what the work most beloved of Allah is. Thus 
surah al-Saff was revealed, which contains among other verses: "0 ye who believe! Shall I 
lead you to a bargain that will save you from a grievous Chastisement? "87 Muslim soldiers 
consider this a supreme bargain, whereby they give comparatively little and earn much in 
return; in addition they are saved from a severe punishment. Next, this bargain is laid out 
for the beneficiaries: "That ye believe in Allah and his Messenger, and that ye strive (your 
utmost) in the Cause of Allah, with your wealth and your persons: that will be best for 
you, If ye but knew! " This verse shows that what men are required to do is to believe in 
Allah without hesitation, doubt, or any inclination to polytheism. Sacrifices of wealth and 
person are secondary. Here, it can be noticed that the beneficiaries are called upon to 
consider faith and devotion a type of merchandise, which they exchange for their inferior 
desires. In exchange for embracing monotheism and avoiding polytheism and offering 
their valuable goods (wealth and persons): "He will forgive you your sins, and admit you 
to the Garden, beneath which rivers flow, and beautiful mansions in Gardens of Eternity: 
that is indeed the supreme Triumph. s8 Allah has promised Muslims that if they keep to 
this bargain they will be offered things beyond price and beyond imagination. 89 
N. 8: The Significance of Islamic Military Doctrine 
Muslims believe that there are some specific features which make Islamic military 
doctrine different from other military doctrines. These features are regarded by most 
Muslim soldiers as having great significance. They can be found throughout the Qur'an 
and the books of hadith, exegesis, jurisprudence, history, and others. 90 
87 See the Qur'än (ETMC), 61: 10. 
ee See the Qur do (ETMC), 61: 12. 
89 The Qur'än (ETMC), 32: 17, states: "Now no person knows what delights of the eye are kept hidden 
(in reserve) for them as a reward for their good deeds. " Also, in the hadith it is found: "Alläh said: "I 
have prepared for My pious worshippers such things as no eye has ever seen, no ear has ever heard, 
and nobody has ever even imagined, all that is reserved, besides which all that you have seen is 
nothing. " See Sah-ih al-Bukhäri (Bib: Wasfal-Jannah, No. 3072, v. 3, p. 1185), Sahih Muslim (Kitib al- 
Jannah wa Na imuha, No. 2824, v. 4, p. 2174), Musnad Ahmad (No. 8128, v. 2, p. 313), and Sunan a]- 
Därami [181/798-255/769], (Kitib al-Rigiq, No. 2819, v. 2, p. 428). 
9° See the Qur'an, 3: 152, al-Tabari, Tarikh al-7'abari, v. 2, pp. 15 & 106, and Ibn 'Asäkir, Tirikh 
Dimashq, v. 2, p. 7, v. 11, p. 352, and v. 16, p. 273. 
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IV. 8.1: The Well-Defined Goal 
Islamic military doctrine has a well-defined goal, whose attainment requires the exercise 
of many humane, and honourable values; as the Qur'an says: "And strive hard in Allah's 
Cause as you ought to strive (with sincerity and with all your efforts that His Name 
should be superior). He has chosen you (to convey His Message of Islamic Monotheism to 
mankind by inviting them to His Religion of Islam). s91 This clear goal of striving hard in 
A11ah's Cause makes Islamic military doctrine different from many others since it does not 
call on Muslims to protect or to support any individual, or to belong to a specific group; on 
the contrary, it only calls on the faithful to fight in the Cause of A11ah. Basbiis, in support 
of this argument, cites the hadith which narrates that the Prophet had been ordered (by 
Allah) to fight against unbelievers until they testified that none has the right to be 
worshipped but Allah and that Muhammad is A115h's apostle, and offered the prayers 
perfectly and gave the obligatory zakäh. If they did so, they would save their lives and 
property except for what is rightfully due under the shari'a. Basbns finally remarks that 
their reckoning (accounts) would be made by Allah. 92 This hadith explains in some detail 
the clear goal of the Islamic military doctrine. 
This goal seems to have been made clear to every soldier in the Muslim army in all five 
battles. 93 Muslims believe that their daily activities must be dedicated to the satisfaction of 
Allah within the scope of Islam, and if we examine the recitations and speeches delivered 
prior to the battles, it can be understood that the doctrine was well defined due to its 
continuous connection with the shari"a. For example, Rustam, the leader of the Persian 
army at the battle of al-Qadisiyyah, after having engaged in several debates with a 
number of representatives of the Islamic army, who had made clear that their aim was to 
ask the adversary to choose between the three Islamic options (accept Islam, pay the 
jizyah, or fight), said to his commanders: "Haven't you seen that this man and those 
before him did not differ in expressing their united goal? i94 
9' See the Qur'an (ETMC), 21: 78. 
92 Basbüs, al-Aqidah al-Qitäliyyah, p. 75. Also see Sahih al-Bukhari (Kitäb al-Imän, No. 25, v. 1, p. 17), 
Sahib Muslim (Bab: al-Amr bi Qitäl al-)Vic No. 21, v. l, p. 52), Sunan al-Tirmidhi (Bab: Min Surah al- 
Ghäshiyah, No. 3341, v. 5, p. 439), and Sunan al-Nasa i (Kitäb al lihäd, No. 3093, v. 6, p. 6). 
9' Further see the section "Definition of Islamic Strategy and the Two 'Pillarsin the chapter "The 
Importance of Islamic Military Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
94 See al-Tabari, 7än7h al-I-abari, v. 2, p. 403. 
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IV. 8.2: A Divinely Stable Doctrine 
From a Muslim's perspective Islamic military doctrine, being derived from Islamic 
doctrine, is judged to be divine. Basbüs states that Islamic doctrine does not have human 
features. 95 Consequently, it cannot in any way be changed, added to, or subtracted from 
due to its divine nature; otherwise it might be misused in conformity with humans' evil 
desires. ' All in all, it does not change in accordance with the changes undergone by 
humans. The Qur'an states: "Verily, this is My way leading straight: follow it: follow not 
(other) paths: they will scatter you about From His path. "97 If we carefully examine this 
verse we are led to conclude that the Muslim, whether a soldier or not, believes that the 
Creator constructed the path prescribed by Islamic doctrine according to the needs and 
qualities of the creation, and that the Muslim is obliged to follow it and it alone, otherwise 
he will be led astray by evil desires. 
Thus while it is entirely permissible and even desirable for a Muslim army to invade 
territory to gain what the adversary has, the Muslim soldier, whether rich or poor, is 
requested to fight in the Cause of A115h; all other purposes, including the taking of booty, 
are complementary to the essential task 98 As the Qur'an states: "And know that out of all 
the booty that ye may acquire (in war) a fifth share is assigned to Allah; and to the 
Messenger, and to near relatives, orphans, the needy, and the wayfarer. "99 
Thus it can be argued that the five battles under study were fought due to the adherence 
of the believers to the divinely stable doctrine mentioned previously, in the sense that 
each was fought for Allah's sake. This was so because the warriors received their 
teachings from the same divine sources in every battle. Some of these specific teachings 
were revealed after the battle of Badr, such as that governing the treatment of prisoners of 
war, when the Prophet asked his Companions to advise him. 100 
9s See Basbns, al-'Agidah al-Qitäliyyah, p. 76. 
See Mahf`1iz, "Usus al , Agidah al `Askariyyah", p. 27 and Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Siyäsah al-Shar°iyyah, p. 
29. Further see the foregoing section "The Primary Sources of Islamic Doctrine". 
" See the Qur än (ETMC), 6: 153. Also the Qur an (ETMC), 76: 3, states: "We showed him the way: 
Whether he be grateful or ungrateful. " Also see the Qur'än, 32: 7. 
98 See Husayn, al-°Agidah al-°Askariyyah, pp. 47-57, Ghaybah, Mugawwimät al-Shakhsiyyah, pp. 10-11, 
al-Sayyid Säbq, Figh al-Sunnah, v. 3, pp. 40-41, Kurdi, The Islamic State, p. 182, and al-Khalfät and 
As°ad, al-°Askariyyah, pp. 27-30. 
99 See the Qur an (ETMC), 8: 41. 
See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 272, al-Tabari, 7ärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 46, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah 
wa al-Nihäyah, v. 3, p. 297, and al-Halabi, al-Shah al-/Yalabiyyah, v. 2, p. 448. Also see the coming 
section "The Division of Booty and the Treatment of Prisoners of War". 
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Since a divine doctrine may be supported by divine assistance, the next section will discuss 
this matter in detail. 
N. 8.3: The Role of Divine Assistance 
Since the aim of Islamic military doctrine is to serve Allah by exalting His word above all, 
Muslims believe that Allah has aided His servants who fight for His cause in different 
ways. 10' For example, sometimes He reinforces them with angelic troops, who fight side by 
side with them. This is mentioned in the Qur'an: "Remember ye implored the assistance 
of your Lord. And He answered you: "I will assist you with a thousand of the angels, ranks 
on ranks. "'OZ From an Islamic perspective, it is undeniable that this verse assures Allah's 
support of His servants when they seek His help in battle. 103 Nonetheless, since al-Qurtubi, 
Ibn Kathir, and al-Tabari were not writing military exegeses of the Qur'an, they did not 
mention, in their discussions of this verse, that it could be held to mean that Allah has 
promised to help Islamic military forces in a similar way to that in which He helped the 
Prophet and the Companions during their struggles against the non-believers. The verse, 
however, can be taken to be a good illustration of the promise of divine assistance to a 
Muslim army, since these exegetes were discussing the help given by Allah in military 
matters. 
Additionally, it appears that there are forms of support other than the provision of warrior 
angels according to the verse: "Remember He covered you with drowsiness, to give you 
calm as from Himself and He caused rain to descend on you from heaven, to clean you 
therewith, to remove from you the stain of Satan, to strengthen your hearts, and to plant 
your feet firmly therewith. """ Another example of divine assistance can be seen in the 
psychological support granted to the Muslims at Badr: "Remember in thy dream A115h 
showed them to thee as few: if He had shown them to thee as many, ye would surely 
have been discouraged. i105 
101 Further see the section "The Significant Effect of Assistance through Divine Information" in the 
chapter "The Task of Islamic Military Intelligence" (Ch. 6). 
102 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 9. 
103 See al-Tabari, Tafsir al-Tabari, v, 9, p. 189, al-Qurtubi, Tafsir al-Qurtubi, v. 7, p. 370, Ibn Kathir, 
Tafsirihn Kathir, v. 2, p. 192, an d Basbüs, al-Aqidah al-Qitäliyyah, p 77. 
10' See the Qur'an, 8: 11. It appears that the exegeses chosen for discussion report different forms of 
divine assistance. See al-Tabari, Tafsiral-Tabari, v. 4, p. 140 and v. 9, pp. 193-197, al-Qurtubi, Tafsiral- 
Qurlubi, v. 2, p. 242, and v. 7, p. 371, and Ibn Kathir, Tafsirlbn Kathir, v. 1, p. 419 and v. 2, pp. 292-293. 
105 See the Qur'an, 8: 43. 
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One of the main concepts of Islamic military doctrine is the trust that Allah will help His 
servants after they themselves have taken the necessary actions. '06 The Qur'an states: "0 
ye who believe! If ye will help (the cause of) Allah, He will help you, and plant your feet 
firmly. ""' Muslims believe that in these circumstances divine assistance is possible, and 
indeed it is discussed in detail in the Qur'an, the hadith and many different Islamic 
books. 108 
At Badr it seems that there was a tangible divine intervention by means of the angelic 
host. Islamic and non-Islamic historians have, of course, taken different views on this 
subject; however, the Islamic writers and historians have concluded that the angels did 
intervene in the fight. '09 Yamani, who may be taken as representing the modern scholars, 
after a long discussion states that the angels did indeed take part. 10 In addition it is 
reported that the Prophet told the Companions that if they wanted to distinguish between 
those they had killed and those the angels had killed they should look for bums on the 
polytheists' bodies. "' Thus, from the Islamic perspective at least, it is possible to say that 
the angels fought and killed the adversary at Badr, but in the other battles they provided a 
different kind of assistance. "' The matter of divine assistance, therefore, has a powerful 
connection with the subject of the next section. 
N. 8.4: The Element of Strong Motivation 
Islamic military doctrine, being as Muslims believe divinely inspired, unlike secular 
political theory for example, is less vulnerable in its implementation in the 
field to the 
influence of human greed and other vices, and of completing interests, since it aims at the 
106 See al-Mustadrak 'ala al-Sahihayn (Manigib 4mrü b. Umayyah al-Dumri, No. 6616, v. 3, P. 722), 
Sunan al-Tirmidhi (Kitib Siyär al-Qyämah wa al-Ragiiq wa al-Wars; 
No. 2517, v. 4, p. 668), and al- 
Halabi, al-Sirah a1-h(alabiyyah, v. 2, p. 81. 
107 See the Qur an (ETMC), 47: 7. 
108 Further see the section 'The Significant Effect of Assistance through Divine Information" 
in the 
chapter `The Task of Islamic Military Intelligence" (Ch. 6). 
109 See the Qur'än, 8: 12, Sahih Muslim (Bib: al-lmdäd bi a1-Ma1ä'ikah 6 Ghazwat Badr, No. 1763, v. 
3, 
p. 1384), al-Tabari, Tafsir al-Tabari, v. 9, pp. 193-200, al-Qurtubi, Tafsir al-Qurtubi, v. 7, pp. 367 
& 378- 
380, and Ibn Kathir, Tafsir lbn Kathir, v. 2, pp. 293-294. 
11° See Yamäni, Badr al-Kubri, pp. 173-180. 
'11 See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidiyah wa al-Nihiyah, v. 3, p. 282. 
112 See Sahih al-Bukhäri (Bib: Shuhud al-Malä'ikah Badr, v. 4, p. 1467) and Sahih Muslim 
(Bib: a1- 
Imdid 6 al-Malieikah Fi Ghazwat Badr, v. 3, p. 1383). Also see the Qur'än, 
8: 9& 12. Also see the 
section "The Battle of Badr" in the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
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satisfaction of Allah and not of human beings. "' Indeed its invulnerability can be said to 
be absolute, and that all the mundane considerations of human desire have no weight 
when balanced against it. For the Muslim this quality of invulnerability provides a 
powerful motivation. Among the many verses found in the Qur'an encouraging those who 
would serve Allah, the study wishes to emphasise three aspects of motivation. First, it 
promises divine assistance: "0 ye who believe! If ye will help (the cause of) Allah, He will 
help you, and plant your feet firmly. " However, as the verse states, and as the Muslim 
army taking part in the battles under study knew, divine support was not unconditional. 
Second, it promises a reward: "Let those fight in the Cause of Allah who sell the life of 
this world for the Hereafter, to him who fighteth in the Cause of Allah whether he is 
slain or gets victory, We give him a reward of great (value). " Third, it exhorts the Muslims 
to fight against the unbelievers who have taken up arms against Islam: "Those who 
believe, fight in the Cause of Allah, and those who disbelieve, fight in the cause of Taghüt 
(Satan, etc. ). So fight you against the friends of Shaytän (Satan); ever feeble indeed is the 
plot of Shaytan (Satan). t9114 
The Muslims' commanders in the five battles in question gave great importance to the 
practice of encouraging their troops by making powerfully motivating speeches before the 
fight began, as their rousing words would embolden the troops as they went into action 
and as a result, the men would be inspired to give of their utmost. "' Just before the battle 
of Badr, one of the last exhortations they heard from their spiritual and military leader 
was: "Rise to enter Paradise, which is equal in width to the Heavens and the Earth . )1116 It 
is possible to claim that this hadrth would have fixed the Muslim soldiers' hearts and 
minds on their ultimate goal. 
On another occasion, also at Badr, the Prophet again emphasised the reasons underlying 
Islamic combat. He grasped a sharp sword, to encourage his Companions, and called out: 
"Who is ready to take this sword and give it its proper due? " Many Companions asked to 
113 See al-Ghadban, al-Manhaj; v. 2, p. 416. 
114 Respectively see the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 7,74, & 76. Also see Baýbüs, al-Agidah al-Qitäliyyah, p. 81. 
The translation of 4: 76, shows the difficulty of conveying the meaning of the original Arabic into 
English. Two distinct Arabic words, Taghritand shaytin are given the same translation, i. e. Satan. We 
have already refered to this proble, and remind the reader that Arabic words may be presented either 
in transliteration or in Arabic orthography with the closest possible English translation. 
115 Further see the coming section "Steadfastness in the Face of the Enemy". 
116 See Sahib Muslim (Bib: 7hublit aliannah li al-Shahid, No. 1901, v. 3, p. 1510) and Musnad 
Ahmad (No. 12421, v. 3, p. 136). 
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be given it. Al-Halabi records that among them were `Umar b. al-Khattäb, Uamzah b. cAbd 
al-Muttalib, CAli b. Abi Tälib, al-Zubayr b al cAwwäm, and other great fighters. However, it 
was not given to any of them. Then Sammak b. Kharshah inquired: "0 Messenger of 
Alläh, what is its price? " The Prophet said: "It is to strike the enemy's faces with it until it 
is bent. " Then Sammak said: "I will take it for that price. " After he was given the sword, 
he tied a red band around his head with as a sign of his willingness to die for his faith. "' 
It seems that those who responded to the call were driven and shaped by Islamic military 
doctrine, as it is likely that only someone with a deep faith would be prepared to sacrifice 
his life so readily and with such enthusiasm. 
In the foregoing sections, we have discussed the significance of Islamic military doctrine 
with regard to its status as a divine doctrine. Its various aspects have been examined, 
including its importance as a motivational factor. The question arises, however: What are 
its principles? The next section seeks to examine this point. 
IV. 9: The Principles of Islamic Military Doctrine 
Every doctrine has specific principles which distinguish it from others and the principles 
of the Islamic military doctrine differ from those of others for a variety of reasons. 1' 
These principles are not, however, collected in any one place in the Qur'än or hadrth; but 
some modern Islamic military scholars such as Basbüs and al-Khattäb have arranged them 
in points. '19 Each point will be briefly illustrated by the researcher due to limitations of 
space and will be supported by the main sources, i. e. the Qur'än and hadith, as needed. 
The overall construction of these principles will be demonstrated in the following sections. 
IV. 9.1: The Concept of the Just War 
The concept of the just war is one of the aspects of Islamic military doctrine, the benefit of 
which is to allow others to hear and comprehend the word of A115h. '20 For this reason, 
"7 This story is narrated differently in other historical works. See Ibn Hishäm, a! -Sirah al-Nabawiyyah, 
v. 4, p. 13 and al-Mubarakpuri, a1-Rahiq; the English Version, p. 255. 
See Khattäb, Bayna al-Agidah, pp. 104-110 and Basbüs, al-Agidah a! -Qitäliyyah, pp. 87-108. 
However, repetitive points will be omitted. 
120 AI-Tabari mentioned that when the Islamic representatives met Rustam, the leader of the Persian 
army at the battle of al-Qädisiyyah, they told him that Islam was more valuable than booty. See al- 
Tabari, Tä ikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 406. 
It is well understood that, as Johnson observes, the concept of the Just War did not begin with the 
revelation of Islam but already had deep historical roots, both religious and cultural. See Johnson, 
"Historical Roots and Sources of the Just War Tradition in Western Culture", in Johnson and Kelsay 
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before the beginning of any fight the Islamic army is supposed to present the opposing 
forces with three options: accept Islam, pay the jizyah, or fight. 12' The Qur'an states: 
"Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day" and adds the condition: "until 
they pay the jizyah". '22 However, protection of religious freedom is considered to be one of 
the principles of Islamic military doctrine. ' In spite of being constructed on the basis of 
doctrinal unity and opposition to other doctrines, Islamic military doctrine nonetheless, to 
a certain extent, guarantees the freedom of other doctrines under certain conditions and 
within certain limits. 124 The Qur'an states: "Allah forbids you not, with regard to those 
who fight you not for (your) faith nor drive you out of your homes, for dealing kindly and 
justly with them: For Allah loveth those who are just. ""Z Also, it is known that one of the 
most important orders issued by the Prophet, or the Islamic Caliphs when they bade 
farewell to their commanders, was not to harm another religion's devotees or force them 
to become Muslims. 126 Muslims believe that this was also put into practice later; 
Christianity was generously tolerated for 800 years under Islamic rule in Spain. 127 
It can be claimed, however, that the Muslim army on occasion broke some important rules 
of combat prescribed by Islamic military doctrine, specifically in the first three battles. 
However, it should be remembered that in Mecca the Prophet spent approximately 
thirteen years calling the citizens to Islam. Therefore as the battles of Badr, Uhud, and al- 
Khandaq were fought against the Quraysh army, there was no need to call them to Islam 
immediately before the battles. Moreover, the first battle was fought to break the 
Quraysh's arrogance and in the second and third the Muslim army was defending itself. 
With the exception of the battle of Badr, 128 the overall aim of Islamic military doctrine was 
to pass on the message of Islam rather than to kill the enemy's soldiers; this was 
(eds), Cross Crescent, and Sword, p. 3. However, it should be noted that this does not mean that 
Muslims derived this idea from others; as the following discussion shows, they derived it from the 
Qur'an and the hadith. 
'2' See the Qur'an, 9: 29, Sahib Muslim (Kitab a/-Jihad, No. 1731, v. 3, p. 1357), Sunan Abü Dä üd 
(Kitab al-Jihad, No. 2612, v. 3, p. 37), and Sunan Ibn Mäjah (Kitäb allihad, No. 2858, v. 2, p. 953). For 
further discussion see al-Rashid, al-Qiyadah al-Askariyyah, p. 92. 
122 See the Qut an (ETMC), 9: 29. 
123 Basbüs, aI-°Agidah aI-Qitaliyyah, p. 87 and Abü al-A°lä al-Mawdüdi, Shari'atal-Islam, pp. 26-27. 
124 See the Qur'an, 2: 256. Also see Sunan al-Bayhaqi al-Kubrä (Kitab al-Siyar, v. 9, p. 85) and al- 
KhaBäb, Bayna al-Agidah, pp. 15 & 105. 
125 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 60: B. 
" See the coming section `The Twenty'Don'ts"'. 
'Z' For more see Muhammad 'Abd al-Halim, al-Alagat Bayna al-Andalüs 71-Islamiyyah wa Isbaniya al- 
Narraniyyah and Butrus al-Bustämi, Maarikal-Arab Bal Andalas 
" See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 67. 
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particularly true of the battles of conquest, al-Yarmnk and al-Qädisiyyah, where 
ambassadors were sent to persuade the opposing forces to accept Islam. 129 Moreover, the 
Islamic forces did not attack those who were found in places of worship; they aimed for 
soldiers only. 130 
N. 9.2: Respecting Treaties and Conventions 
The solemn promise of a Muslim is considered to be a promise made to Allah, as the 
Qur'an states: "Fulfil the Covenant of Allah when ye have entered into it, and break not 
your oaths after ye have confirmed them; Indeed ye have made Allah your surety; for 
A115h knoweth all that ye do. "'31 Therefore, Islamic military doctrine places great 
emphasis on fulfilling any treaties. Also Allah praises the Muininün (Believers) as the 
ones who "those who fulfil the Covenant of Allah and fail not in their plighted word. "132 
Since Islamic military doctrine insists on respecting treaties and conventions, I. ludhayfah 
b. al-Yaman was prevented from taking part in the battle of Badr. He was ready to join the 
Prophet, but since he had promised the Quraysh not to fight against them when they 
released him, the Prophet did not allow it. 133 This incident reveals that even though the 
Prophet was in need of every available soldier to capture the caravan, solemn agreements 
still had to be respected. Moreover, at the level of military tactics, the Muslims at al- 
Qadisiyyah, despite being outnumbered and having inferior arms, allowed the enemy to 
cross the river, fulfilling a promise they had made to Rustam. These two examples show 
that the Muslims fought fairly both as individuals and collectively, as they maintained 
their firm belief in and practice of the sharica throughout. 
129 This communication was at first conducted by letter. 
130 See al-Tabari, 75-rikh al-Tatar; v. 2, p. 337. See the coming section "The Twenty Don'ts". 
131 See the Qur do (ETMC), 16: 91. 
132 See the Qur'iin (ETMC), 13: 20. 
133 It is narrated in Sahih Muslim (Bab: Al-Wad' bi al-Ahd, No. 1787, v. 3, p. 1414) as follows: 
Hudhayfah b. al-Yaman said: "Nothing prevented me from being present at the battle of Badr except 
this incident. I came out with my father Hasil (to participate in the battle), but we were caught by the 
disbelievers of the Quraysh. They said: "(Do) you intend to go to Muhammad? " We said: "We do not 
intend to go to him, but we wish to go (back) to Medina. " So they took from us a covenant in the name 
of God that we would turn back to Medina and would not fight on the side of Muhammad. So, we 
came to the Messenger of Alldh (peace be upon him) and related the incident to him. He said: "Both 
of you proceed (to Medina); we will fulfil the covenant made with them and seek God's help against 
them. " Ba; büý, al-Agidah al-Qitäliyyah, p. 92, mentions that the second man was a colleague. 
However, Basbüs does not give his reference, therefore it is more likely that the man accompanying 
Hudhayfah was his father. See Al-Dhahabi, SiyarA I MM BI-Nubalä v. 2, p. 364. 
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N. 9.3: The Twenty 'Don'ts' 
Many prohibitions regulate the behaviour of the Muslim soldier. An important hadith 
enumerates about twenty of these, which might be called the twenty `don'ts'. These 
explicitly forbid specific types of behaviour, since the Islamic military doctrine recognises 
that in war soldiers may be tempted to perform actions which have to be controlled 
according to the shari`a. Among these prohibitions are: "Don't kill children, don't kill the 
elderly, don't cut down trees unless for use, don't kill worshippers who remain in their 
holy places" and so on. 13' These are important because they set clear limits beyond which 
the Muslim cannot go without violating his faith. 
Among the more important of these prohibitions are those forbidding the dismembering 
of the dead and pillaging. As to the first of these, Mustafa and Husayn explain that 
Islamic military doctrine preserves the dignity as well as the privacy of the dead 
fighters. 135 They base their opinions on the following verse: `And. if ye punish, let your 
punishment be proportionate to the wrong that has been done to you: But if ye show 
patience that is indeed the best (course) for those who are patient. """ The origin of this 
verse is interesting, and shows the importance of the continuing revelation of the Qur'an. 
llamzah b. °Abd al-Muttalib and other Muslims were badly mutilated after the battle of 
Uhud. When the Prophet saw what had happened, he and his Companions vowed to 
mutilate the non-believers in the next battle in return. 137 However, Allah prevented their 
vengeance through the revelation of the verse quoted above. '38 As a consequence we do 
not have any record of Muslims carrying out mutilation in the five battles under discussion 
in this thesis. 
13` For the rest of the prohibitions contained in the hadith see Sahib Muslim (Kitib al-Jihäd wa al- 
Siyar, No. 1731, v. 3, p. 1357), Sunan Ibn Mäjah (Bib: Wa Siyyat al-Imam, No. 2858, v. 2, p. 953), 
Musnad Ahmad (No. 23028, v. 5, p. 352), Sunan al-Bayhaqi al-Kubrä (Bib: Tahrim Qatla milahü Rieh, 
v. 9, p. 90), Musanaf Ibn Abi Shaybah [159/776-235/850], (Bib. Fi Duä' al-Mushrikin Qabla an 
Yugitalü, No. 33054, v. 6, p. 475), and al-Khattib, Khutab al-Rasül, p. 30. 
13i Kamäl, al-Siyisah, p. 97 and Husayn, al-'Agidah al-°Askanyyah, p. 125. 
136 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 16: 126. Also see Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 54. For further explanation 
see the following paragraph. 
177 See al-Tabari, Tafsir al-Tabari, v. 14, p. 196, al-Qurtubi, Tafsir al-Qurtubi, v. 10, p. 65, and Ibn Kathir, 
Tafsirlbn Kathir, v. 2, p. 593. Also see Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 272, al-Tabari, Tirikh al-Tabari, v. 2, 
p. 46, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidiyah wa al-Nlhiyah, v. 3, p. 297, and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 
448. 
138 See the Qur an, 16: 126. Also see Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 54. 
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Secondly, pillaging is also not allowed by Islamic military doctrine under any 
circumstances even on the battlefield or at a time of great need: ' "No Prophet could 
(ever) act dishonestly if any person acts dishonestly he shall, on the Day of Judgment, 
restore what he misappropriated; then shall every soul receive its due whatever it earned, 
and none shall be dealt with unjustly. i140 
IV. 9.4: The Division of Booty and the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
Even though it is possible to argue that these aspects are closely connected with the 
twenty `don'ts' and should not be separated from them, the Qur'an seems to particularly 
emphasise them, and this emphasis on booty and prisoners of war indicates that these 
matters have a special place in Islamic military doctrine. Unlike in the later battles, in the 
aftermath of the battle of Badr the doctrinal position on these two matters was not clear. 
Later on, the Qur'an was to explain the way that they should be dealt with. The treatment 
of prisoners of war according to Islamic military doctrine falls under three options: they 
are either to be killed, released on payment of a ransom, or released unransomed. 141 
Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that killing prisoners of war happens under very 
restricted conditions, as is illustrated by the following verse: "Therefore, when ye meet the 
Unbelievers (in fight) smite at their necks; at length, when ye have thoroughly subdued 
them, bind (the captives) firmly: therefore (is the time) either, generosity or ransom until 
the war lays down its burdens. i142 The division of booty was also explained according to 
Islamic military doctrine. 141 In the Qur'an, we find: "And know that out of all the booty 
that ye may acquire (in war), a fifth share is assigned to Allah, and to the Messenger, and 
to near relatives, orphans, the needy, and the wayfarer. "144 
Kamal, al-Siyäsah, p. 98 and Husayn, al-Agidah al-Askariyyah, p. 125. 
70 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 161. 
See the Qur'an, the whole surah al-Anfäl, 16: 126,48: 19-21,59: 6-10, & 60: 11, Sahih Muslim 
(Bab: al-Imdäd bi al-Malä'ikah, No. 1763, v. 3, p. 1385), Sunan al-Bayhaqi al-Kubrä (Kitäb Qismat al- 
Fayi' wa al-Ghanäim, No. 12622, v. 6, p. 320), and Musnad Ahmäd (No. 208, v. 1, p. 30). 
142 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 47: 4. Also the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 67, states: "It is not fitting for a Prophet 
that he should have prisoners of war until he hath thoroughly subdued the land. Ye look for the 
temporal goods of this world; but Allah looketh to the Hereafter. " Further see al-Jassas [305/918- 
370/981], Ahkäm al-Qur'an, v. 5, p. 269, Ibn al-Jawzi [508/1115-597/1201], Zäd al-Masir, v. 3, p. 399, 
and Ibn Qudamah, al-Kä! i, v. 4, p. 270. 
Regarding prisoners of war see the Qui'än, 2: 177,4: 35,35, & 91 & 92,5: 89,8: 67-48 & 70-71,9: 60, 
24: 33,47: 4,58: 3, and 90: 12 & 13. 
13 See Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Siyäsah al-Shar`iyyah, p. 29. "` See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 41. For further detail see Able Yüsuf [d. 183/800], al-Kharäj pp. 3-23. 
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At Badr, when the ranks of the Quraysh began to give way, the Muslims followed their 
steps eagerly, slaying them or taking them captive. It was not a long fight; this battle was 
significant since it was the first battle between Islamic forces and unbelievers. It must be 
conceded that at this stage Islamic military doctrine was not clear on the matters of booty 
and prisoners of war. 145 The habit of the pagans, well known to the Muslim forces, was to 
pursue the defeated adversary and to dismember and pillage without restraint. However, 
no such extreme behaviour on the part of the Muslims has been recorded in connection 
with the five battles under study. 
At Badr, the Muslim army collected the prisoners and booty in one place, thus 
demonstrating their loyalty and obedience to the Prophet, even though it was the first 
significant experience of combat they had had as Muslims. While holding the Unbelievers 
in captivity, the Prophet looked into the face of Sacd b. Muldth and understood that it was 
hateful to him to merely take the enemy prisoner: "It was the first victory for the Muslims 
over the forces of polytheism, and he had more liking for killing them than sparing their 
lives. ""' This shows the strong commitment of the Muslim soldiers to their new religion, 
in spite of there being no revealed judgement on the matter. Thereupon the Prophet 
asked his Companions' advice regarding the prisoners. Umar b. al-Khattäb's view 
coincided with that of Sacd. However, the Prophet preferred the opinion of Abu Bakr, 
which was to demand ransom for these captives. On this point, however, a misjudgement 
seems to have occurred, as A115h later revealed that the Quraysh prisoners of war should 
have been killed. 147 Therefore, it is possible to claim that the judgment regarding whether 
to slay prisoners of war or spare their lives depends on the circumstances. It is a question 
of "what benefits Islam". This has become part of the Islamic military doctrine. 
Because there was as yet no revealed judgment about the collective booty, it was divided 
later on according to the surah al-Anfäl, which was revealed afterwards) In addition, 
unlike the other battles, Uhud and al-Khandaq are thought not to have involved either 
booty or prisoners of war. 149 It should, however, be acknowledged that among the Muslim 
145 This concept was later developed in the fiqh. 
Ibn Hisham, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 176 and al-I; ialabi, a! -Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 413. 
See the Qut'än, 8: 67. 
' For al-Anfäl see al-Jassäs, Ahkäm al-Qur' n, v. 4, pp. 222-223. 
19 See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, pp. 42-47 & v. 4, pp. 190-193, al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, pp. 407- 
412 & v. 2, pp. 97-100, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, pp. 39-44 & v. 4, pp. 111-115, al- 
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armies at al-Yarmük and al-Qädisiyyah, and even at the battles against the Quraysh, some 
soldiers may well have fought at least partly for the sake of their share of the booty. It can 
be argued that the Qur'än seems to recognise and deplore this, as in the verse: "Among 
you are some that hanker after this world and some that desire the Hereafter . 
s15.. So even 
when the Prophet and the notable Companions were forming the Muslim army there 
were some warriors in its ranks whose minds were not on the Hereafter. '5' 
IV. 9.5: Victory or Martyrdom 
This element was discussed in detail in section IV. 7 `The Virtues of Islamic Military 
Doctrine and the Promised Rewards for the Muslim Soldiers'; however, some examples 
will be given in order to clarify the matter. We have seen that from the beginning of the 
first Islamic battle, the Prophet emphasised strongly that the Companions needed to fix 
their minds and hearts on the supreme goal - to serve Allah - and to accept victory or 
martyrdom, being certain of their reward. The Muslim soldiers were surely inspired by the 
verse: "Think not of those who are slain in Allah's way as dead. Nay, they live, finding 
their sustenance from their Lord. They rejoiced in the Bounty provided by Allah. " 52 As a 
result, 'Umayr b. al-Humam, a youth of only sixteen, threw away some dates he was eating 
and said: "These (the dates) are holding me back from Paradise. " He then plunged into 
the thick of the battle and died fighting bravely. "' In addition, at the consultation meeting 
just before the battle of al-Yarm5k, Qays b. Habirah said, addressing his commander: "Do 
not leave al-Sham, since if we do not make any progress towards victory, then we will be 
rewarded with Paradise. "154 Earlier in this chapter the principles of Islamic military 
doctrine were discussed and illustrated in relation to their effect on the Islamic soldiers in 
general. These factors will also be considered later in the chapter in order to get a clear 
picture of the roles they played in the five battles. Having discussed the significance and 
Halabi, al-Shah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, pp. 528-533 & v. 2, pp. 651-654, al-Jassas, Ahkäm al-Qur'an, v. 4, p. 255, 
and al-Amadi [551/1156-631/1234], al-Ihkam, v. 4, p. 175. 
150 See the Qur an, 3: 152. Also see the direct relation of this section with the coming section 
"Obedience". 
151 Also see a similar case in the section "The Battle of al-Qadisiyyah" in the chapter "The Battles and 
their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
152 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 169-170. 
133 See Ibn Hisham, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 175, al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 570, and al-Ilalabi, al-Sirah 
al-ffalabiyyah, v. 2, p. 411. 
154 AI-Balädhuri, Futi7h al-Buldän, v. 1, p. 154. 
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principles of Islamic military doctrine, it will serve the purposes of the study to consider at 
this point certain other elements controlling the conduct of the Muslim army. 
IV. 10: Warfare Management Guidelines of Islamic Military Doctrine 
It is generally believed by Muslims that the management of Islamic military activities is a 
special case, since it is connected to the sources of the sharica. The proper management of 
military affairs is considered in most of the works of the modern commanders of Muslim 
forces. "' I iusayn and Basbns mention several doctrinal points regarding the management 
of Islamic military activities, "' but fail to consider two of the most important: obedience 
and comradeship and sense of mission. This will be seen clearly in the following 
discussion. 
IV. 10.1: Awareness and Readiness Levels 
Islam places great stress on the importance of security measures implemented in order to 
prevent the adversary from using the element of surprise. Thorough precautions should 
be undertaken otherwise defeat is to be expected. Throughout history, this factor has been 
believed to have a great effect on the outcome of any battle and the Qur'an specifically 
warns the Muslim army against being taken by surprise. "' The most significant evidence 
of constant vigilance is that prayers are permitted to be postponed in time of war. 'S8 In 
addition, in the hadith, security precautions and awareness of the adversary's movements 
are praised. The Prophet emphasised that the Islamic soldier should be alert at all times. 
He said that the best man is he who holds his horse's Ginn (halter) in the Cause of Allah 
and whenever he hears a shout (warning of) the enemy's approach flies straight into 
action. "' Both the Qur'an and the hadith emphasise the importance of caution and 
vigilance for military personnel at all times, but particularly in time of war. 
We have seen that in several places, the Qur'an and hadith emphasise that Islamic 
warriors should take all necessary measures before depending on Allah as the true source 
tss See Ilusayn, al-Aqidah al-Askar yyah, pp. 47-104 and Basbüs, al-Agidah al-Qitaliyyah, pp. 75-108. 
" Nonetheless, they view this matter rather differently: although Husayn lists and discusses eleven 
major points, and Basbüs deals with ten, they only agree on seven of them. See llusayn, al-Agidah al- 
`Askanyyah, pp. 47-104 and Basbüs, al-Aqidah al-Qitaliyyah, pp. 75-108. 
" Further see this section's close relation with the section "Surprise" in the chapter "The Importance 
of Islamic Military Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
158 See the section "The Battle of al-Khandaq" in the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" 
(Ch. 3). 
u9 Sah-ih Muslim (Bib: Manigib allihäd, No. 1889, v. 3, p. 1503) and Sunan Ibn Mäjah (Bib: al- 
Uzlah, No. 3977, v. 2,1316). 
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of victory. '60 In other words they should be as thoroughly prepared as possible. In the 
Qur'an we find: "Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, 
including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the heart of) the enemies, of Allah and your 
enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know. 
Whatever ye shall spend in the Cause of Allah, shall be repaid into you, and ye shall not 
be treated unjustly. """ Accordingly, Islamic troops are bound by the duty to equip 
themselves with military arms and to prepare themselves in all other ways for battle. In 
another verse Allah addresses the believers in the Qur'an and says that if they help (in the 
Cause of A11ah), He will help them, and make their foothold firm. 162 In the main books of 
exegesis such as those of al-Qurtubi, al-Tabari, and Ibn Kathir, it is rare to find `power of 
doctrine' given as one of the meanings of the word `power'. However, it can be argued that 
in the military context, the word `power' in the above verse also covers the power of 
doctrine. " 
Additionally, the phrase `utmost of your power' may indicate that each Muslim soldier will 
vary in his response according to the amount of Islamic knowledge he has. It is possible to 
say that this verse encourages Muslim soldiers to seek knowledge in all its types, including 
that derived from the exercise of reason in making thorough preparations. '` 
The Muslims' awareness and state of readiness were evident in all the battles except 
before Badr and during the late stages of Uliud. 165 This element may be considered to be 
one of the main factors affecting the Muslim soldiers' battlefield performance. At Badr, 
the Prophet knew he was going to engage the Quraysh after he left Medina even though 
his army was neither well prepared nor fully equipped. This must have discouraged the 
Muslim troops; nevertheless they did not hesitate to respond to the wishes of the Prophet 
160 See al-Qurtubi, Tafsiral-Qurtubi, v. 15: p. 13. 
161 See the Qur'än (ETMC), 8: 60. 
162 See the Qur än, 47: 7. 
163 Mahfnz: "Usus al-`Agidah al-Askariyyah" p. 36, Kamäl, al-Siyäsah, pp. 15-16, and Husayn, al- 
Agidah al-Askariyyah, pp. 143-144 & 157. 
164 See the previous section "The Essence of Islamic Doctrine". 
165 Although the Muslims were not thoroughly prepared for the battle of Badr, an important military 
factor not discussed in most of the relevant Islamic studies may be mentioned here: it can be concluded 
from map of the battle of Badr that the Prophet had chosen the location partly for the reason that the 
morning sun would be behind the Islamic army and facing the non-believers, who were dazzled by its 
brightness. See the section "The Battle of Badr" in the chapter "The Importance of Islamic Military 
Strategy" (Ch. 8). Also see for a similar tactical action in al-Tabari, 72Frikh al-Tabari v. 2, p. 406. 
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when he asked their advice regarding the grave new developments. 166 Moreover, they 
took care to fulfil most military requirements such as consultation, intelligence, camping, 
terrain, reconnaissance, surveillance, and the like. 167 
It is also important to remember that after the Muslim army had won the first stage of the 
battle of Uhud, the archers misinterpreted the situation and left their posts due to lack of 
awareness of the overall circumstances. The Qur'an deplores their lack of discipline: "Ye 
flinched and fell to disputing about the order and disobeyed it. "" 
These two examples show that lack of readiness and awareness can have a decisive effect 
on the ebb and flow of a battle. Moreover it is possible to affirm that it is unreasonable to 
rely on divine support without acting oneself to achieve the desired result. 169 It is worth 
quoting again the verse which confirms the conditionality of divine assistance: "0 ye who 
believe! If ye will help (the Cause of) Allah, He will help you. »170 
IV. 10.2: Steadfastness in the Face of the Enemy 
Islamic military doctrine insists on steadfastness when confronting the enemy. It follows 
several methods in order to accomplish this aim. Among these is that it is forbidden to 
turn one's back on the enemy and flee from the field during a battle. The Qur'an states: 
"0 ye who believe! When ye meet the unbelievers in the hostile array, never turn your 
backs to them. If any do turn his back to them on such a day - unless it be in a stratagem 
of war, or retreat to a troop (of his own)- he draws on himself the wrath of Allah, and his 
abode is hell, - an evil refuge (indeed)! i17I Additionally, the doctrine 
holds such an act to 
be a grave sin, which is counted as one of the seven major sins mentioned in the hadith; 
that whoever runs away will be punished severely on the Day of Judgment. 172 So it can be 
argued that the Qur'an and the hadith condemn this failure in particular, because the 
fleeing of one soldier may lead to the failure of the platoon, which in turn may bring 
Ibn Hisham, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 261, al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabar4 v. 2, p. 26, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al- 
Niyhäyah, v. 1, p. 279, and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Ilalabiyyah, v. 2, p. 385. 
167 For consultation see the coming section on "Consultation". Regarding Intelligence activities see the 
chapter `"I-he Task of Islamic Military Intelligence" (Ch. 6). 
168 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 152. Also see the direct relation of this section with the coming section 
"Obedience". 
169 See the coming section "Remembrance of A11äh, Supplication, and al-Tawakkulwhen Fighting". 
170 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 47: 7. 
171 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 15-16. 
172 See Sahih al-Bukhäri (Kitäb al-Wasäyä, No. 2615, v. 3, p. 1017), Sahih Muslim (Kitäb al-Sidq, No. 
89, v. 1, p. 92), Sunan al-Nasal (Kitäb al-Wasäyä, No. 3671, v. 6, p. 257), and Sunan Abü Dä üd (Kitäb 
al-Wa, saya, No. 2874, v. 3, p. 115). 
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about the defeat of the whole army and even, perhaps, the invasion of the Islamic 
territories. Flight is not the same as a tactical withdrawal, however; and we have seen 
that retreat and the avoidance of martyrdom is permissible in certain circumstances, as 
when the Prophet's life was in danger at Uhud. Thus the above verse illustrates some 
conditions governing the permissibility of turning one's back during the fighting. In detail, 
the three levels of military activities can be used to illustrate this point: at a tactical level, 
with the intention of manoeuvring; at an operational level, with the intention of 
reorganising the fighting unit, and at the strategic level, according to the Islamic strategy 
in use. `3 Moreover, from an Islamic point of view, another verse widens the discussion: 
"Those of you who turned back on the day the two hosts met, - it was Satan who caused 
them to fail, because of some (evil) they had done. """ The exegeses in use indicate that 
cowardice or lack of discipline may not be the only cause of a lack of steadfastness. It is 
also necessary for the individual soldier to avoid sin, as Satan will take advantage of any 
evil he may have done. This verse refers to the battle of Uhud. 15 
At Badr, the testimony of an enemy eyewitness can be cited to show the steadfastness of 
the Muslim troops. 'Umayr b. Wahab al-Jumhi was sent to assess the power of the 
Muslim army. He reported that the Muslim soldiers were too brave to surrender and too 
intent on carrying out their military duties to withdraw without slaying the largest 
possible number of the polytheists. "' This quality came to full fruition at the battle of al- 
Khandaq. The Islamic troops were under great pressure for approximately forty days, 
being vulnerable to be attacked from the front and the rear, while their women and 
children were also under threat. But despite the critical situation, which caused the 
Prophet and some of the Companions to refrain from observing prayers at their correct 
times, the Muslim soldiers held to their positions. "' 
" See the section "The Definition of Islamic Strategy and the Two 'Pillarsin the chapter "The 
Importance of Islamic Military Strategy" (Ch. 8). Rudolph, Islam and Colonialism, p. 24, claims that 
there are two levels, but he divides the second into two parts. 
"` See the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 155. 
'n The matter of this verse is relevant to certain other aspects such as the ones discussed in the section 
'The Significant Qualities of the Muslim Leader: Bravery and Tagwä' in the chapter "The Impact of 
Islamic Military Leadership" (Ch. 5). 
176 See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 169, Ibn Kathir, al Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 3, p. 269, and al- 
Mubarakpuri, al-Rahiq; the English Version, pp. 216-217. 
' Also see the section "The Battle of al-Khandaq" in the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" 
(Ch. 3). 
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The quality of steadfastness should not be considered in isolation, and the next section 
deals with matters closely connected to the foregoing discussion. 
IV. 10.3: Remembrance of Allah, Supplication, and al-Tawakkul when Fighting 
The remembrance of Allah on meeting the enemy and supplication when fighting are 
greatly encouraged since they constitute a fundamental element of Islamic military 
doctrine. The Muslim army was advised to pray to Allah whenever they met the enemy, 
as the Qur'an states: "0 ye who believe! When ye meet a force, be firm, and call Allah in 
remembrance much (and often); that ye may prosper. ""' The exegetes of the Qur'an are 
inconsistent regarding the type of remembrance to be made. However, al-Qurtubi s reason 
is sound and logical, since it appears to be in accordance with the verse. He makes it clear 
that the remembrance of Allah means remembering Him by the tongue, which is in 
accordance with the heart. " Consequently, it can be said that the supplication and 
remembrance of Allah is supposed to be uttered loudly when advancing and before full 
contact. 18' When the armies clash, however, it is recommended that the warriors 
remember and pray to Allah 'in a murmuring voice'. 181 We see therefore that in the first 
stage the tongue takes the leading role in supplication and remembrance, whereas the 
heart continues the mission of supplication and remembrance upon full contact with the 
adversary. 
In addition, supplication is considered to be a direct contact between the servants of Allah 
and their Lord. It is one of the most effective aspects of Islamic doctrine and it is 
encouraged not only in formal prayer but also at any other time one is moved to perform 
it. "' In Jihad, warriors are requested to seek A11ah's help in order to have trust in Him, 
which is engendered through remembering Him by the tongue and the heart. Trust in the 
remembrance of Allah, His promise and threat, His guardianship and assistance, are 
considered by Muslims to be good signs of the military person's faith. 183 The Qur'an and 
18 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 45. 
See al-Qurtubi, Tafsir a1-Qu4ubi, v. 8, pp. 23-24. Also see al-Tabari, Tafsir al-Tabari, v. 10, pp. 14-16 
and Ibn Kathir, Tafsirlbn Kathir, v. 2, pp. 317-318. 
180 Also al-Halabi mentioned that the Prophet asked his men in Medina to repeat loudly the Takbir, i. e. 
saying: "Allahu Akbar", in order to frighten their enemy. See al-Halabi, al-Sirah a1-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 
636. 
181 See al-Tabari, Tarikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 402 and al-Qurtubi, Tafsir al-Qurtubi, v. 8, p. 24. Also see 
Faraj, Fann Idärat al-Malrakah, p. 24. 
'82 See the Qur'an, 18: 46 and Umm Muhammad, Realities of Faith, pp. 57-59. 
183 See Husayn, al-Agidah al-Askariyyah, pp. 93-94. 
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hadith address this matter extensively and in detail. The Qur'an says: "(Remember) when 
you sought help of your Lord and He answered you (saying): I will help you with a 
thousand of the angels each behind the other (following one another) in succession. "184 
The Prophet said: "Two supplications Allah does not return back: supplication in adhän 
(the call to prayer) and Supplication at the heat of the fight. i185 Also, the Prophet 
mentioned that supplication is the weapon of the Mumin. 186 Ibn al-Qayyim commented 
regarding these two hadith that supplication is the most effective weapon. 187 These hadith 
and similar verses emphasise the Muslim soldiers' spiritual connection to their Lord. 
Although it could be argued that this element is likely to have enhanced their 
performance, we should not forget that one of the main elements of the shari'a under the 
concept of al-tawakkul, "trust in Allah", is first to act in such a way as to achieve the 
desired goals, and only after that is al-tawakkul to be considered. '88 
Another aspect which most modern works fail to consider is the temptation to despair of 
Allah's help, especially at critical moments. This temptation may be resisted and 
conquered by the power of faith. The Qur'an states that no one should despair of the 
assistance of Allah: "He said: "And who despairs of the mercy of his Lord, but such as go 
astray? ""' Although this verse refers to Abraham (PBUH), its meaning can be extended to 
indicate that the mercy of Allah is capable of being bestowed on anyone who asks 
sincerely for His help. Hence despair is an indication of lack of faith. This argument can 
be applied to the military field and is developed and sharpened in another verse: "Or do 
ye think that ye shall enter the Garden (of Bliss) without such (trials) as came to those 
who passed away before you? They encountered suffering and adversity, and were so 
shaken in spirit that even the Messenger and those of faith who were with him cried: 
"When (will come) the help of Allah? " Ah! Verily, the help of Allah is (always) near! s190 
At Badr the form of assistance was the participation of the angels in the fight. However, it 
appears that divine support also came in other forms in the same battle as in: "He caused 
184 See the Qur 5n (ETMC), 8: 9. 
Sunan Ab6 Dd'üd (Kitäb W -JAM, No. 2540, v. 3, p. 21). 
See al-Mustadrak `ala al-Sahihayn (Kitäb Al-Du`ä; No. 1812, v. 1, p. 669). It should be noted that 
the word Mu'rnin means 'the faithful'. 
18' See Ibn al-Qayyim, allawäb al-Kä6, pp. 4-5. 
'a See Ibn Bal ah [d. 387/997], al-Ibdnah, v. 2, p. 311 and `Abd al-Wahhäb [1115/1704-1206/1792], 
A gidat al-Firqah al-Näjiyah, p. 13. 
See the Qur'än (ETMC), 15: 56. 
19° See the Qur'än (ETMC), 2: 214. 
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rain to descend on you from heaven, to clean you therewith, to remove from you the stain 
of Satan, to strengthen your hearts, and to plant your feet firmly". 19' Similarly, divine 
assistance appears to have taken place at the battles of Ubud and al-Khandaq. 192 It seems 
very likely that the divine promises and divine assistance in these three battles positively 
affected the performance of the Muslim army. By contrast, at al-Yarmük and al- 
Qadisiyyah, divine assistance was not perceived directly. Nonetheless, a few occasions 
were reported. '93 
The remembrance and supplication of Allah can be seen in all five battles. At Badr the 
Prophet himself performed this duty sincerely, asking Allah to fulfil His promises, 194 and 
divine assistance was rendered. The Prophet prayed: "0 God, if this group perish today, 
you will be worshipped no more till the Day of Judgement. "` This brings the discussion 
to an important point: that according to the consensus among Islamic scholars the 
remembrance and supplication of Allah by the Muslim army in time of war would 
sometimes be rewarded by perceptible divine assistance, as in the battles of Badr, Ubud, 
and al-Khandaq. Moreover the Prophet was able to communicate the divine assistance in 
these battles to the Companions since he was still receiving revelation. Nevertheless at al- 
Qadisiyyah and al-Yarmük, since apparently nothing unusual took place, it has been 
argued that divine assistance was absent. It should be noted, however, that the Muslim 
armies were outnumbered by the Byzantine and Persian troops by four to one; therefore 
from an Islamic viewpoint the stability, patience, and strength of the Muslims and the fear 
in the heart of the enemy may be seen as an instance of divine assistance. As the Qur'an 
states: "0 ye who believe! If ye will help (the Cause of) Allah, He will help you, and plant 
your feet firmly. ""' 
191 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 11. 
192 al-Tabari, Tafsir al-Tabari, v. 4, p. 123, al-Qurtubi, Tafsir al-Qu, 7uh, v. 11, p. 166, and Ibn Kathir, 
Tafsir Ibn Kathir, v. 1, p. 412. Also see the sections on the battles of Ubud and al-Khandaq in the 
chapter "The Battles and their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
193 Respectively see al-Wagidi, Futuh al-Sham, v. 1, p. 169- 170 and al-Tabari, Trikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 
424. 
194 See Ibn Hisham, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 174, al-Tabari, Tarikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 32, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidayah 
wa al-Nihayah, v. 3, pp. 272-276, and al-Ilalabi, al-Sirah al-I alabiyyah, v. 2, p. 406. 
195 See $ahlli al-Bukhari (Kitab Tafsir al-Qur'an, No. 4594, v. 4, p. 1845) and Salzih Muslim (Kitäb al- 
Jihad, No. 1743, v. 3, p. 1363). 
196 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 47: 7. 
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IV. 10.4: Obedience 
Obedience is one of the most crucial elements of warfare. Its military importance is very 
clear and soldiers are praised or reprimanded according to the quality of their response to 
orders. Unlike the Islamic doctrine, some military doctrines, such as those of dictatorships, 
insist on blind obedience on pain of death. 197 In the Qur'an, we find: "0 ye who believe! 
Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those charged with authority among you. 11198 
This verse illustrates the mandatory obedience required of the Muslim to the commands 
of Allah and His Messenger. It is also demanded that the designated authority is obeyed, 
as through it order and discipline are accomplished. However, such obedience is limited to 
the teachings of the shariFa. '99 The Prophet stated that a Muslim has to obey (the order of 
his Muslim ruler) whether he likes it or not, as long as the order does not involve 
disobedience to Allah; but if it does, one should not listen to it or obey it. 200 
Since obedience to the commander is enjoined extensively in the Qur'an and the hadith, 20' 
it is believed that there were no serious instances of wilful disobedience, let alone 
mutinies, in all the five battles, as the soldiers knew that to obey the commander was to 
obey Allah. Nevertheless one should not forget the archers' failure to stand fast at Uhud, 
which had very grave consequences. They disobeyed the direct orders of their military 
leader, who had said: "If you see us snatched into pieces by birds, do not leave this 
position of yours until I send for you. And if you see that we have defeated the enemy and 
trodden on them do not desert your position until I send for you. s202 Consequently, due to 
the heedlessness of the archers the tide of battle turned in favour of the Quraysh army. 
19 See Baýbüs, al-Agidah al-Qitaliyyah, pp. 53-54. 
1B See the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 59. 
See al-Tabari, Tafsir al-Taban; v. 5, p. 150, al-Qurtubi, Tafsir al-Qurtubi, v. 5, p. 261, and Ibn Kathir, 
Tafsirlbn Kathir, v. 1, p. 519. 
200 See Sahib al-Bukhari (Kitab al-Ahkäm, No. 6725, v. 6, p. 2612), Sahib Muslim (Kitäb al-Imärah, No. 
1839, v. 3, p. 1469), Sunan al-Tirmidhi (Kitab al-Jihad, No. 1707, v. 4, p. 209), Sunan al-Nasä'i (Kitäb 
al-Bay, ah, No. 4205, v. 7, p. 159), Sunan Abü Da'üd (Kitab a1-Jihad, No. 2626, v. 3, p. 40), Sunan Ibn 
Majah (Kitab al-Jihad, No. 2863, v. 2, p. 955), Musnad Ahmad (No. 4668, v. 2, p. 17), and al-Nawawi, 
Shari , Sahýýi Muslim, v. 12, p. 230. 2ot See the Qur'an, 4: 59, Sal; iflý al-Bukhari (Kitab al-Abkam, No. 6725, v. 6, p. 2612), Sahib Muslim 
(Kitab al-Imarah, No. 1839, v. 3, p. 1469), Sunan al-Tirmidhi (Kitab al, lihäd, No. 1707, v. 4, p. 209), 
Sunan al-Nasa i (Kitäb al-Baylah, No. 4205, v. 7, p. 159), Sunan Abü Da'üd (); 9täb al, lihäd, No. 2626, 
v. 3, p. 40), Sunan Ibn Majah (Kitab al-Jihad, No. 2863, v. 2, p. 955), and Musnad Ahmad (No. 4668, 
v. 2, p. 17). 
202 See Sahih al-Bukhari (Kitab al-Jihad, No. 2874, v. 3, p. 1105), Sunan Abü Da'üd (Kitab al, rihad, No. 
2662, v. 3, p. 51), Musnad Ahmad (No. 2609, v. 1, p. 287), and al-Mubarakpuri, al-Rahiq; the English 
Version, p. 253. 
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Considering another dimension of the nature of the Arabs, it should be noted that the 
Prophet and the two Caliphs, Abü Bakr and Umar, were careful to take into consideration 
the Arabs' sensitivity on the matter of obeying the commanders of other tribes. 203 It is 
especially noteworthy that at the battles of al-Yarmük and al-Qadisiyyah most of the 
tribes were led by their own commanders. 204 Nevertheless this consideration did not 
amount to a rule of engagement, and on occasion tribal loyalties were overridden for the 
sake of the performance of the army as a whole. 
IV. 10.5: Comradeship and the Soldiers' Sense of Mission 
These elements, which can be said to be intimately connected, are aspects of Islamic 
military doctrine which are of great importance to every individual participating in the 
fight, 205 although the sense of mission has been passed over in some of the modem works 
on Islamic doctrine. The Qur'an refers in a general way to these elements in: "Help ye one 
another in righteousness and piety. "206 With regard to comradeship, the Prophet 
mentioned that the believers are one body and that if a part of it complain the rest must 
share its suffering. 207 
In the five battles under study the soldiers' sense of mission is extremely difficult to judge 
accurately. Nonetheless, the commitment and enthusiasm shown by soldiers in 
accomplishing their designated assignments, especially in the time of war, may reflect 
their sense of mission. The sense of mission may also vary according to its context; for 
instance, the sense of mission towards oneself, one's Lord, one's comrades, and so on. 
In the five battles under study the soldier's sense of mission demanded that they took on 
the responsibility of completing their assigned duties and, if necessary, that they took the 
initiative. This was evident when the Muslim commanders and soldiers were moved to 
express their views regarding battle manoeuvres or other military activities. At Badr, after 
a short discussion with the Prophet, al-Ilabab b. al-Mundhir, who was an ordinary 
Muslim soldier, felt that he ought to advise the Prophet that the best course of action 
would be to deprive the Quraysh of water by filling in the wells after ensuring the 
203 See Faraj, al-Madrasah, pp. 270-271. Also see the coming section "Loyalty and Self-denial". 
2Ö4 See al-Wdgidi, Futüh al-Sham, v. 1, pp. 195 & 201 and Watr, al-Idärah, p. S0. 
205 See al °Asali, al-Madhhab, pp. 138,220, and 347. 
206 See the Qur'5n (ETMC), 5: 2. Also see the Qur'än, 8: 74 and 9: 71. 
207 See Sahih Muslim (Bib: Tarihim al-Muminin, No. 2586, v. 4, p. 999) and Sunan al-Bayhagi al- 
Kubrä (Kitab 
, 
9alat a1 Khusif, No. 6223, v. 3, p. 353). Also see the section "Cooperation and 
Coordination" in the chapter "The Importance of Islamic Military Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
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Muslims' own supply. 208 At Uhud, l; lamzah b. 'Abd al-Muttalib, cAll b. Abi Tälib, CAsim b. 
Thäbit, the Prophet's field-leader, advised that the best way to defeat the enemy and save 
the Muslim army was to attack the Quraysh standard. Hence some historians have called 
Uhud the `Battle of the Standards', as the standard of the Quraysh fell more than nine 
times. 209 Another example can be seen at the battle of al-Qädisiyyah, where Tulaylzah b. 
Khuwaylid al-Usdi, seeking to gain information on a reconnaissance mission, disagreed 
with his group and refused to return until he had penetrated the lines of the Persian army 
and could return with a full report. He passed alone through the enemy lines, emboldened 
by his sense of mission, and brought back a report that reflected the enemy's real strength. 
He knew that this information would help the commander greatly in drawing up his 
tactical and strategic plans. 210 
Considering these three examples, it is possible to argue that most of the Muslim soldiers 
in all five battles, acted responsibly in following their sense of mission, according to the 
concepts of Islamic military doctrine. 211 
IV. 10.6: Loyalty and Self-denial 
Family connections and other human relationships are of secondary importance in Islamic 
military doctrine. In Arab society, ties of kinship212 were held to entail a permanent loyalty, 
which was not to be broken though circumstances might change. For the Muslim, 
however, a higher loyalty took precedence. 213 In the Qur'än we find: "Your (real) friends 
are (no less than) Alläh, His Messenger, and the believers, those who establish the regular 
prayers and pay al-Zakäh and bow down humbly (in worship) . "2"' Thus the criteria set by 
Islam superseded those held by Arab society at that time, and kept the Muslim soldiers' 
loyalty within strict boundaries. 215 
208 See Ibn Hisham, al-Shah, v. 3, p. 162, al-Tabari, T rikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 26, al-Halabi, al-Sira al- 
Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 393, and al-Mubarakpuri, al-Rahiq; the English Version, p. 215. 
209 Al-Suwaydan: "the Sirah of the Prophet", Seines Cassette No 8. Also see Ibn Kathir, Tafsir Ibn 
Kathir, v. 1, p. 413. 
210 Further see the chapter "The Task of Islamic Military Intelligence" (Ch. 6). 
See al-Tabari, 7ärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 398 and Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, p. 39. 
zit For a discussion of tribal loyalties see the section "Tribal Life and Feuding" in the chapter "Brief 
Background of the Region Prior to Islam" (Ch. 2). 
213 See Firestone, Jihad, p. 131. 
214 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 5: 55. 
215 Also the Qur'an (ETMC), 24: 62, says: "Only those are Believers, who believe in Allah and His 
Messenger: when they are with him on a matter requiring collective action, they do not depart until 
they have asked for his leave. " Also see the Qur'an, 5: 55. 
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Moreover, certain other types of loyalty are forbidden in Islam according to the Qur'an: 
"Let not the believers take for friends or helpers unbelievers rather than believers: if any 
do that, they shall have no relation left with Allah except by way of precaution, that ye 
may guard yourselves from them. But Allah cautions you (to fear) Himself; for the final 
goal is to Allah . s216 This does not mean, 
however, that Muslim soldiers are permitted to 
behave like the enemy in their dealings with them, since Islamic doctrine limits their 
actions. "' 
The battle of Badr, however, had a special character because the Prophet and the 
Companions knew that they were going to engage with the Quraysh after they left 
Medina; specifically, they were going to fight their own relatives. Although the army was 
undermanned, lacking support services and without cavalry, the Companions did not 
hesitate to respond to the wishes of their commander when he asked their advice 
regarding the grave new developments, although the intention had been to capture the 
caravan and not to confront the Quraysh and they responded eagerly to the new 
circumstances. 218 At the group level, self-denial as an element of Islamic military doctrine 
was evident at Badr, since it was the first battle with the Quraysh, whom some of the 
Muslims did not want to fight due to the custom prohibiting making war on one's 
relatives. Other reasons included: (1) they were not well prepared for the fight; (2) the 
Quraysh troops were extremely well equipped in terms of arms, mounts, and rations 
(except for water). 219 
Badr, viewed in purely human terms, might be considered merely a fight between feuding 
relatives. However, in terms of Islamic military doctrine it can be conceived as a fight 
between "dark" and "light. " Indeed the Qur'an uses the word furgän, which means 
discrimination connoting the separation between two opposing forces as in: "On the Day 
216 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 28. 
21 See the section "The Twenty`Don'ts"'. 
z18 The Companions knew that sincerity is the main element judged on the Day of Judgement; thus, 
they obeyed the Prophet and marched to confront the enemy. The Prophet had declared that to obey 
the commander is to obey Allah. Therefore, it can be said that the faith of the Companions was 
increased at the time of need. This is believed to be one of the main roles of doctrine. See Sahib al- 
Bukhari (Kitäb al-Ahkäm, No. 6718, v. 6, p. 2611), Sahib Muslim (Kitäb alImärah, No. 1835, v. 
3, p. 
1466), Sunan Ibn Majah (Bab: Itibäcal-Sunnah, No. 3, v. 1, p. 4), and Musnad Ahmad (No. 5679, v. 2, 
p. 93). 
119 See the section "The Battle of Badr" in the chapter 'The Task of Islamic Military Intelligence" 
(Ch. 6). 
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of Furgän (Discrimination)- the day of the meeting of the two forces". "' Thus for the 
Muslims Islamic doctrine took precedence over kinship ties from the first. At Badr, for 
instance, Abü `Ubaydah, a Muslim soldier, killed his father, who was fighting with the 
Quraysh. 22' By contrast, cAbd al-Rahman b. Abi Bakr of the Quraysh avoided his father, 
who was in the Muslim army during the battle. 222 For an example of loyalty and self- 
denial at the individual level one needs to look no further than the behaviour of 
Ijudhayfah b. al-Yaman at the battle of al-Khandaq. He was dispatched, despite being 
very hungry, to scout among the enemy forces on a very dark, cold, and windy night. 
223 In 
addition this element is also seen in the Muslim troops' acceptance of the changes of 
commanders at al-Yarmiik and the appointment of the new commander at al-Qadisiyyah. 
The foregoing discussion has clearly shown that loyalty and self-denial are important 
elements of Islamic military doctrine. 
N. 10.7: Consultation 
One of the main principles of Islamic military doctrine, not mentioned by llusayn or 
Basbns, is consultation. 224 In the Qur'an, we find the believers described as those "who 
(conduct) their affairs by mutual consultation. "225 In addition, it can be seen that the 
Qur'an explains to the Prophet and the Companions the method of consultation in a 
number of verses, as in: "And consult them in affairs (of the moment). Then, when thou 
hast taken a decision, put thy trust in Allah. For Allah loves those who put their trust (in 
Him). "226 Here, the action called for by Islamic military doctrine was that the Prophet 
should seek the Companions' advice and then make his decision. 227 In this connection al- 
Bukhari explains that the decision-maker is supposed to examine carefully the advice 
720 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 41. 
221 In this connection the Qur'an (ETMC), 9: 23, says: "0 ye who believe) take not for protectors your 
fathers and your brothers if they love infidelity above Faith: if any of you do so, they do wrong. " 
272 See Ibn Hisham, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 187, al-Halabi, al-Sirah a! -ffalabiyyah, v. 2, p. 414, and Ibn al-Jawzi, 
Zäd al-Masir, v. 8, p. 198. 
223 See Ibn Hisham, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 191 and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 651. 
14 Shafaat maintains that: "Muslims should decide all matters by consultation. " See 
www. geocities. com/alummah2000/DetailedLookAtConsultation. html by Shafaat, p. 3. See also al- 
Harawi, al-Tadhkirah al-Harawiyyah, p. 13. 
1 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 42: 38. 
726 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 159. 
127 See the previous section "Remembrance of Allah, Supplication, and al-Tawakkul when Fighting". 
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which is put forward. He should then choose the option he judges to be best and that is 
also in accordance with the sharica. 228 
Thus Islamic military doctrine recommends that consultation should be carried out, and it 
can be seen that this occurred in all five battles. Moreover, with the exception of the 
battle of Uhud, all the Muslims' plans based on such consultations were successfully 
carried out. At Uhud, the Prophet sought the advice not only of his Companions but also 
of the hypocrites, whether to fight from inside Medina or step outside the city to meet 
their enemy; the outcome of the battle ran counter to the plan of the Muslim army. 229 
However, the element of consultation as part of Islamic military doctrine was by no means 
eliminated and Allah specifically recommended it strongly immediately after the battle: "It 
is part of the Mercy of Allah that thou dost deal gently with them. Wert thou severe or 
harsh-hearted, they would have broken away from about thee: so pass over (their faults), 
and ask for (Allah's) forgiveness for them: and consult them in affairs (of moment). Then, 
when thou hast taken a decision, put thy trust in Allah. For Allah loves those who put 
their trust (in Him) "230 Despite the conclusion of al-Qurtubi, Ibn Kathir, and al-Tabari 
that the Prophet, already assured of victory, asked his Companions' advice simply for the 
sake of harmony, to endear himself to their hearts and to set an example for the coming 
Islamic generations regarding the importance of consultation, the study argues that the 
views of al-Hasan al-Basri and al-Dahhak are to be preferred 23' They agree that he did 
not know what would happen in this battle despite his dream; 232 he knew only what Allah 
had told him. This conclusion is confirmed when two events are considered: (1) the 
advice of al-IIabbab b. al-Mundhir and (2) the advice of the Prophet regarding the time 
' See Sahib al-Bukhari (Kitab al-IItiiäm bi al-Kitäb wa al-Sunnah). Also see al-Mu°jam al-Awwsat, 
v. 6, p. 365. 
See Ibn Hisham, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 10 and al-Tabari, Tyr kh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 60. 
See the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 159. 
231 See al-Qurtubi, Talsiral-Qurtubi, v. 4, p. 250. 
23z This dream is narrated in similar ways in the various books of hadith. In Sahih al-Bukhari (Kitäb al- 
Manägib, No. 3425, v. 3, p. 1326), the Prophet (PBUH) said: "In a dream I saw myself migrating from 
Mecca to a place with many date palms. I thought that it was al-Yamamah or Hajar, but it turned out 
to be Medina, that is, Yathrib. In the same dream I saw myself brandishing a sword whose blade got 
broken. It came to symbolise the defeat which the Muslims suffered on the Day of Uhud. I moved the 
sword again, and it became normal as before, and that was the symbol of the victory Allah bestowed 
upon the Muslims and their gathering together. I saw cows in my dream, and (heard) "Allah is A7rayt". 
They symbolised the believers on the Day of Uhud. And the Khayrwas the good Allah bestowed upon 
us and the reward of true belief which Allah gave us after the day of Badr. " Consequently, he knew 
that something would go astray, but what it was he did not know. Also see Sunan Ibn Majah (Kitäb 
Ta1biral-Ru)vä, No. 3921, v. 2, p. 1292) and Ibn Hajar, Fath al-Bari, v. 7, p. 307. 
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of an annual planting when he said: "You know better than I about your mundane 
activities. "233 
At Badr, Uhud, and al-Khandaq, the consultation meetings were held with the attendance 
of the overall commander and the Prophet himself participated in all three battles. By 
contrast, in the battles of al-Yarmük and al-Qadisiyyah, the consultation took place 
between the field commanders and their staff but in the absence of the supreme leader, 
Umar b. al-Khattab, who was in Medina. In this connection, Umar b. al-Khattab 
addressed Sacd b. AN Waggas, the commander at al-Qadisiyyah, as follows: "Write to me 
about your situation and the location of al-Qadisiyyah as if I am looking at it. Lack of 
information about your status did not allow me to advise you well. s234 This element of 
Islamic military doctrine was considered so important that they used a daily mail delivery 
to keep each other updated. z35 
IV. 10.8: The Assistance of Non-Muslims 
In this section another significant element is discussed, which is believed to be critical in 
time of war. This element could be discussed at length due to the extensive nature of the 
topic but here, for reasons of space, it will be considered in brief. Generally, the Qur'an 
and the hadith insist on the impermissibility of accepting the assistance of non-believers. 
In the Qur'an, we find: "0 ye who believe! Take not for friends and protectors those who 
take your religion for a mockery or sport whether among those who received the scripture 
before you, or among those who reject faith: but fear Allah, if ye have faith (indeed). "236 
Also the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) said: "We do not seek the assistance of non- 
233 The Prophet's, knowing the future is not the issue here. In the Qur'an it is clear that no one knows 
the future except A11ah. See the Qur'an, 72: 26. Also see the section "The Significant Effect of 
Assistance through Divine Information" in the chapter "The Task of Islamic Military Intelligence" 
(Ch. 6). 
23a See al-Tabari, Tarikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 387. 
23s Further see "Message of Islam to Mankind", www. geocities. com/alummah2000/. 
236 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 5: 57. In this context, but without going into detail, we should consider the 
subject of the abrogating (mansükh) and abrogated (näsikh) verses. An abrogated verse is one whose 
content, or the judgement it conveys, has been abrogated by the content or judgement of a later verse. 
By contrast, the abrogating verse is a verse whose content, or the judgement it conveys, abrogates the 
content and judgement of an earlier verse. See Ibn I; Iazm, al-Näsikh wa al-Mansükh, pp. 6-12, Ibn al- 
Jawzi, Nawäsikh al-Qur'an, pp. 19-35, Firestone, Jihad, p. 173, and Netton, A Public Dictionary of 
Islam, p. 191. For example, see the stages of prohibiting alcohol in the verses, 2: 219,4: 43, and then 
the final stages in the verses, 5: 90 & 91. Also see al-Qurtubi, Tafsiral-Qurtubi, v. 2, pp. 348-352 and al- 
Zuhayli, al-Tafsir al-Munir, v. 2, p. 184. For further examples see Qatadah [60/683-117/735], al- 
Näsikh wa al-Mansfkh, pp. 33-35. 
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believers against non-believers s)237 This seems clear enough, yet al-Turaygi, in his book al- 
Istic, nah bi Ghayr al-Muslimin, discussing this subject in detail, explains that there are 
three different fields where Muslims may need to ask for the assistance of non-believers, 
either for material aid or manpower, or through consultation. The first of these may take 
the form of a loan, rent, or a gift. Al-Turayqi concluded that renting or borrowing is 
permitted, but the question of loans is controversial and is seen as a special case. 238 In the 
matter of Jihad, non-believers are not permitted to join the Islamic forces in other than 
exceptional circumstances. Consultation is permissible but with caution. 239 
On one occasion, the Prophet made clear that the assistance of the non-believers was not 
permitted by Islamic military doctrine. It will be useful to address this issue at both an 
individual and a group level, to get a clear picture of the judgements involved. At Badr the 
Prophet was followed by one strong and brave man known to the Muslim army, who were 
glad to see him. He asked the Prophet's permission to join him, but the Prophet asked: 
"Have you embraced Islam? " He replied: "No, but I will help you and share the booty with 
you. " Then the Prophet said: "We don't ask for the assistance of non-believers against 
non-believers. " After he had made three unsuccessful attempts to join the Muslim troops 
he was later allowed to do so by the Prophet, but only after he had embraced Islam. 24° 
At the group level, another occasion during the battle of Uhud revealed the position of 
Islamic military doctrine on seeking the assistance of non-believers in war. Although one 
third of the Muslim army had returned to Medina just before the battle, for reasons such 
as hypocrisy, the overwhelming majority of the Islamic troops did not hesitate to confront 
the enemy even though they were greatly outnumbered and materially disadvantaged. 
The Muslim army at this stage was in need of any possible assistance. Nevertheless, 
according to the following account, it seems that the Islamic forces believed that they 
would not be fighting on their own, but trusted that Allah would assist them since they 
had done all that was humanly possible to deserve His help. In a narration not mentioned 
by Ibn Kathir but briefly mentioned by al-Tabari and Ibn Hisham, the Prophet on his way 
to the battlefield saw a well-armed company. When he asked: "Who are they? " he was 
23' Sunan Ibn Mäjah (Kitib al-Jihad, No. 2832, v. 2, p. 945), Sunan Abü Dä'üd (Bab: Fi a! -Mushrik 
Youshamu lah, No. 2732, v. 3, p. 75), and Musnad al-Därami (Kitib al-Siyar, No. 2496, v. 2, p. 305). 
238 See al-Turayqi, al-IstAinah, p. 257. 
239 See al-T'uraygi, al-Isti anah, pp. 257-273. 
240 See Sunan Ibn Mäjah (Kitib a1, Iihäd, No. 2832, v. 2, p. 945), Sunan Abü Dä'üd (Bib: Fi al-Mushtik 
Youshamu lah, No. 2732, v. 3, p. 75), and Musnad al-Därami (Kitib al-Siyar, No. 2496, v. 2, p. 305). 
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told that they were Jews and allies of al-Khazraj. He asked: "Have they embraced Islam? " 
and was told: "No. " So he refused to admit them and said that he would not seek the 
assistance of disbelievers against idolaters. 241 On the other hand, although he knew that 
cAbdullah b. Ubayy b. Salül was a hypocrite, the Prophet asked his advice about whether 
to fight in Medina or to venture outside to face the enemy. To give another example, the 
Prophet asked the Banü Qurayzah if he could to borrow some military equipment to be 
used in the battle of Uhud 242 
In conclusion, it is possible to say that these different examples illustrate that Islamic 
military doctrine limits but does not absolutely prohibit the assistance of non-believers. 
1V. 10.9: Psychological Warfare 
This element is considered a factor in modem warfare; it was, however, a concept which 
was understood in the period covered by the study. 43 It can be shown that on different 
occasions the Islamic leaders in the five battles in question sought to prevent a 
psychological attack on the Muslim army. This was accomplished by various means. The 
Prophet himself was present and in command at Badr, Uhud, and al-Khandaq and was 
assisted by revelation. However, revelation and Prophetic leadership were not available at 
al-Yarmiik and al-Qadisiyyah. Despite this, the most notable Muslim warriors would show 
their skills and courage before the armies engaged in battle, when their champions met in 
single combat in front of both forces. Victory would give a tactical advantage and increase 
the fighting spirit of the Muslim soldiers; this occurred in all five battles. 
At Ubud and al-Khandaq, however, single combat occurred rarely. By contrast at al- 
Qädisiyyah and al-Yarmük there were many duels, but at al-Yarmük Khälid b. al-Walid, 
with the eye of an expert, prevented some of the Companions from engaging in single 
combat. Thus it is possible to argue that one of the main tenets of Islamic military 
doctrine was violated, since these Companions were not allowed to seek martyrdom or 
victory. Taking the circumstances into account, one might suggest that the commander 
24' See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 383, Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 9, p. 99, and al-Mubarakpuri, a! - 
Rahiq; the English Version, p. 249. 
242 See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 3, p. 383, Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 2, p. 99, and al-Mubarakpuri, al- 
Rahiq; the English Version, p. 233. 
243 The American Manual, Soldiers Team Development, Book, p. 2, emphasises this point, arguing that 
psychological strength is "the most critical element of a combat-ready team. " Also see the section the 
battles of al-Khandaq and al-Qädisiyyah in the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
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had the right to err on the side of caution in order to prevent a death that might have had 
a negative psychological effect on the Muslim army. 
It can be argued that in all five battles the Islamic forces were in need of an effective 
psychological counterattack, since they were outnumbered by three to one or more. After 
investigation it seems that al-Khandaq was the most psychologically difficult battle the 
Islamic troops ever experienced. As the Qur'an states: `Behold! They came on you from 
above you and from below you, and behold, the eyes swerved and the hearts gaped up to 
the throats, and ye imagined various (vain) thoughts about Allah; in that situation were 
the believers tried: they were shaken as by a tremendous shaking. "244 Natural fear, 
hunger, exhaustion, anxieties, and insecurity were the main challenges faced by the 
Muslim army, according to surah al-Ahzab. Nevertheless the Prophet prophesied the 
Muslim army's defeat of the Byzantine and Sasanian Empires at those very critical 
moments, although it was reported that one of the hypocrites named Muctib b. Qushayr245 
said: "Muhammad is promising us the treasures of the Kings of Byzantium and Persia 
while not one of us can feel safe even when relieving himself. "246 Another measure was 
taken by the Prophet to counter the adversary's psychological tactics. When he heard the 
rumours that the Banü Qurayzah had broken their treaties, he ordered four prominent 
Muslim leaders to investigate and, if the rumour was false, to declare it publicly, but if it 
was true they should not declare it but report it indirectly 24' Unfortunately, the Islamic 
troops soon discovered that what they had suspected was indeed true. 248 
IV. 11: Conclusion 
The chapter has examined the five battles in depth from a number of different angles in 
accordance with the scope of Islamic military doctrine, and always from a strictly Islamic 
perspective. 
244 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 33: 10 and 11. 
245 It should be noted that according to Ibn Hishäm, a1-Sirah, v. 4, p. 180, Mu'tib was not a hypocrite, 
but had been among those who fought at Badr. 
246 See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 100, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 104, and 
al-Halabi, al-Sirah a1--falabiyyah, v. 2, p. 640. 
247 See the section "The Battle of al-Khandaq" in the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" 
(Ch. 3). 
248 See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 179, al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 93, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah 
wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 104, and al-Ijalabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 640. 
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First of all, the term Islamic doctrine and the importance of Sincerity to the doctrine were 
discussed. Then the meaning of Islamic military doctrine was explored and the reasons for 
engaging in the five battles from an Islamic perspective were examined. The result of 
sacrificing life and wealth for those reasons was then considered. The Islamic military 
doctrine's significance, principles, and warfare management were investigated as 
thoroughly as possible within the limitations of the study. Each of these points was 
examined and examples were given. 
The significance of Islamic military doctrine was illustrated first and its divine elements 
analysed. The principles on which the doctrine was based were then examined. At this 
point, the doctrine as it applied to Islamic warfare management was explored since it 
directed the procedures and processes of combat according to certain rules. 
From the discussion, it can be argued that Islamic military doctrine was gradually evolving 
during the five battles. Most if not all the elements considered in this chapter were built 
upon the Qur'än and then the sunna. At Badr, the emphasis was on the treatment of 
prisoners of war and on divine assistance. At Uliud, military stability in the face of the 
enemy was a key factor, highlighting one of the important elements of Islamic military 
doctrine. At al-Khandaq, psychological warfare was at its most effective. In the following 
two battles, al-Yarmilk and al-Qädisiyyah, the spreading of Islam, as one of the goals of 
doctrine, was carried out through conquest. In addition, considering the evidence 
regarding the farewell of the commanders, it can be concluded that the main purpose of 
Islamic military activity was to exalt the word of Allah above all. 249 
Although some might claim that the effect of doctrine alone is enough to win a battle, it 
was not able to guarantee victory for the Muslim army of Khälid b. Sa`id25O at the battle of 
Marj al-Safrä' in al-Shäm. 251 The remnants of his army (c. three thousand) took part in 
the battle of al-Yarmük, and the combined Muslim forces triumphed over greatly superior 
numbers. This victory was accomplished not by any change in commitment to Islamic 
249 For further discussion of this point see the effect of the second 'pillar' in the section "Islamic 
Strategy Definition and the Two 'Pillars"' in the chapter "The Importance of Islamic Military Strategy" 
(Ch. 8). 
20 Kalid b. Said b. al `Äs was one of the earliest Companions to become a Muslim. He migrated to 
Abyssinia, remaining there for more than ten years and then returning to join the Prophet in Khaybar, 
accompanying Jacfar b. Abi 1a-lib. He was assigned the first army to conquer land in al-Sham prior to 
the battle of al-Yarmük. He died during the battle of Ajnadin. See al-Dhahabi, SiyarA°1äm al-Nubali, 
v. 1, pp. 259-260. 
" See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 333. 
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doctrine but by a change of leadership. Therefore it is necessary to discuss the importance 
of the impact of Islamic military leadership in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Impact of Islamic Military Leadership 
In the view of Ibn Taymiyyah men are created with the desire to be leaders or to hold 
authority in general. ' Leaders and followers are encouraged to work cooperatively by both 
the Qur'än and the hadith. The Qur'än states: "Help ye one another in righteousness and 
piety, but help ye not one another in sin and rancour. )v2 Also, the hadith states that every 
Muslim is a "shepherd" of a flock and occupies a position of leadership. ' It follows from 
this that every man in the chain of command from the highest to the ordinary person in 
society has responsibility over others, and therefore any leader can be considered as being 
under the command of a still more senior leader. ` Since humans, according to the Qur'än 
may be ranked in accordance with their ability and quality, those with great abilities and 
qualities will lead those who lack them. ' As will be seen later, Islam demands that leaders 
must possess certain specific qualities; 6 nevertheless, from an Islamic perspective this does 
not mean that their leadership over others is unconditional. ' We should remember, 
however, that leadership is inseparable from hierarchy. ' In addition, it should be kept in 
mind that leadership has been discussed in many works .9 Nonetheless, 
from the author's 
point of view, a specific and detailed study of the cooperative teamwork of leaders at most 
levels, a comparison of their qualities, and their subsequent effect on the performance of 
soldiers has not yet appeared. Hence, this chapter will concentrate on a comparison of the 
Muslim leaders' qualities and will also investigate briefly the effect of the teamwork of 
Islamic military leaders at all levels on the performance of the Muslim soldiers. 10 These 
' See the two books of Ibn Taymiyyah, MajmUcal-Fatäwä, v. 14, p. 324 and Qa°idah fi al-Mahbbah, p. 
99. 
2 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 5: 2. 
3 This hadith discusses leadership in depth. See Sahib al-Bukhäri (Kitäb allum'ah, No. 853, v. 1, p. 
304), Sahib Muslim (); itäb al-Imärah, No. 1829, v. 3, p. 1459), Sunan al-Tirmidhi (Kitäb al, Iihäd, No. 
1705. v. 
4, 
p. 208), Musnad Ahmad (No. 4495, v. 2, p. 5), Sunan al-Bayhaqi al-Kubra (Kitäb al-Wad? ah, 
No. 12477, v. 6, p. 287), and Sunan Abii Da'iid (Kitab al-Iinärah, No. 2928, v. 3, p. 130). 
4 See the coming section "Bravery and Tagwa". Further see Department of the Army, AFOB, p. 26. 
5 In the Qur'an (ETMC), 6: 165, we find: "He hath raised you in ranks, some above others that He may 
try you in the gifts He hath given you. " Also see the Qur'an, 43: 32. 
6 See the two books of Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmu a1-Fatäwä, v. 14, p. 324 and Qa' dah R al-Mahbbah, p. 
138. 
' In the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 58, it is found: "And when ye judge between people that ye judge with 
justice. " It is worth mentioning that al. Abbasi [d. 710/13101, Athär al-Uwal, p. 16, called this verse: 
"The verse of the Princess. " 
8 See the Qur'an, 2: 247 and the chapter "The Importance of Islamic Military Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
9 For example see al-Rashid, al-Qiyädah al-Askariyyah fi Ahd al-Rasal. 
10 Although both Caliphs, namely AbU Bakr and cUmar were strongly committed to the centralisation 
of all decision making, `Umar took this policy much further than Abn Bakr. Thus the study considers 
them according to their degree of involvement in the battles under discussion. See Mustafa, Agälim al- 
Dawlah, pp. 95-125. 
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elements will be discussed in the light of the five battles of interest. The structure of the 
chapter is as follows. First, the definition of Islamic leadership is discussed, after which 
the importance of leadership, unity of command, and types of leadership will be 
considered. Then, the qualities and characteristics of the Islamic leaders are investigated 
and their significance weighed by reference to the Qur'än and the hadith. Next, after 
proving the existence of these qualities, the leadership displayed in each battle is 
examined in order to discover to what extent these qualities were applied. In addition, the 
leaders' effect on the soldiers is discussed, with particular regard to the Muslim soldiers' 
performance in the five battles. Further, taking into consideration all the available 
evidence, a comparison between these leaderships is conducted. Lastly, a conclusion will 
follow. 
V. 1: The Definition of Islamic Military Leadership 
This section will provide the necessary definitions to permit an understanding of the 
concept of Islamic military leadership. First of all, the term 'leadership' can be defined 
both in English and Arabic; in English, to lead means "to show somebody the way, 
especially by going in front", leadership means "being a leader, the ability to be a leader, 
and a group of leaders, "" and leader means head, chief, chieftain, master. 12 Leadership is 
translated in Arabic by such words as tali'ah, markaz amämi mubädarah, hadhü, ghirär, 
ri'äsah, giyädah, and imärah. 13 From an Islamic military viewpoint, among these synonyms 
three, i. e. ri'äsah, imärah and giyädah, are particularly close in meaning to the concept 
indicated by the English word leadership. Nonetheless, these three apparent synonyms 
have both similarities and differences, which need to be clarified. Firstly, the two words 
ri'äsah and qiyädah are used at the same level of the chain of command, " but they differ 
in their respective contexts, since ri'äsah is used in a civilian rather than a military context 
whereas giyädah is essentially a military term. " Secondly, imärah and giyädah differ in 
respect of the chain of command, imärah being higher in rank than giyadah. 16 Although 
" Oxford, Advanced English Dictionary. In the Department of the Army, Military Leadership, p. 1, 
leadership is defined as follows: "Leadership is the process of influencing others to accomplish the 
mission by providing purpose, direction, and motivation. " 
"Webster, Webster's NewDictionar y of Synonyms. 
13 Al-Ba'labaki, al-Mawrid; English-Arabic Dictionary. 
Al-Bali, al-Mutli; p. 378 and al cAsiri, Mahäm al-Qiyädah, p. 10. 
15 For example, see Ibn al-Nadim [d. 385/995], al-Fihrist, p. 454, al-Mäliki [d. c. 799/1397], al-Dib jal- 
Mudhhab, p. 266, al-Qurashi [696/1297-775/1374], Tabagät al-Hanafyyah, p. 246, and Ibn Abi Ya`lä 
[d. 521/1127], Tabagät al ffanäbilah, v. 2, p. 50. 
1' See Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmff'a1-Fat9wä, v. 35, p. 30. 
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the word amid" was widely used in the era that the study covers, in this study `leadership' 
will be equated with giyädah. 'e 
Etymologically, giyädah is derived from gawd. '9 This term means the opposite of sawq. 
qawd is "leading from the front" while sawq is "leading from the rear". 20 
Terminologically, al-Ijalabi identifies al-giyadah as irnärat al-rakb, "travelers' 
leadership . "2' However, al-Halabi's definition is restrictive in that it does not cover the 
generality of the meaning of leadership. His definition seems to be a synonym rather than 
a definition. Al-Rashid identifies leadership with military leadership; that is, the military 
administration which exercises authority over the soldiers and directs them to a 
designated goal in a way that assures their loyalty, trust, respect, obedience, and 
cooperation. 22 In addition, al 'Arif defines leadership by stating that military leadership is 
the military administration which controls and works toward organising the army and 
preparing it for war. It is also responsible for leading and directing its efforts to accomplish 
the assigned missions. 23 Even though those works are considered to have been written 
from an Islamic viewpoint, nevertheless, their definitions may be deemed insufficient since 
they lack any specific reference to Islam. Islam is not only a matter of personal worship; it 
is a way of life that encompasses all aspects, including leadership. 24 Consequently, it can 
be understood that Islamic military leadership can be considered as a military 
administration which employs the Muslim soldiers' abilities according to Islamic principles 
in order to attain certain goals. It is important to mention here that our concept of Islamic 
leadership will be broadly defined to encompass not only political leadership but also the 
military command at all levels of operation. 
As the reader is now familiar with the concept of Islamic military leadership, the next 
section will show the importance of leadership from an Islamic perspective. 
"Amirmeans a leader. This word is rooted in imärah. 
18 Ibn Manziir in Lisän al-Arab, v. 3, p. 371, explains: "Leadership is the source of a Leader. " " The English word leadership does not have the exact meaning of the Arabic word giyädah. 
Therefore it is preferable to illustrate the meaning of the word leadership by referring to the Arabic 
concept. 
20 Ibn al-Mutarraz [583/1188-610/1214], al-Maghrib, v. 2, p. 198, Ibn Manzür, Lisän al-Arab, v. 3, p. 
371, and al-Fayyiimi, al-Misbäh al-Munir, v. 2, p. 518. 
21 Al-Halabi, al-Sirah al hfalabiyyah, v. 1, p. 24. 
22 Al-Rashid, al-Qiyädah, p. 11. 
23 Al cÄrif, aJ-Jaysh, p. 73. 
24 See Sahib al-Bukhäri (Kitäb al lum'ah, No. 853, v. 1, p. 304), Sahib Muslim (Kitäb al-Imärah, No. 
1829, v. 3, p. 1459), Sunan al-Tirmidhi (Kitäb al, Iihäd, No. 1705. v. 4, p. 208), Musnad Ahmad (No. 
4495, v. 2, p. 5), Sunan al-Bayhaqi al-Kubrä (Kitäb al-Wadi7ah, No. 12477, v. 6, p. 287), and Sunan Abil 
Dä'nd (Kitäb al-Imärah, No. 2928, v. 3, p. 130). 
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V. 2: Importance of Leadership 
A leader's position is demanding, as it has to be occupied constantly. ' Ibn Khaldün noted 
that leadership is essential for every group, adding that one person from the group has to 
be chosen and given the authority to organise and control the group. 2' Also Mahfuz states 
that the nature of life and society demands specific leaders for specific objectives. It is 
inescapable that from an Islamic perspective every group of people has to have a leader to 
fulfill the demands of Islam. 27 Furthermore, in explaining the meaning of leadership, the 
Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) considered the matter more profoundly than the above 
understandings. The Prophet stated the minimum number that could be said to form a 
group and thus should assign themselves a leader from among them. He said that if three 
went on a journey, they would have to designate one of them to be their leader. 28 In 
addition, the Prophet illustrated the importance of leadership by himself appointing a 
leader for every group he sent out on a mission. He also sometimes indicated the chain of 
command 29 Moreover, the following verse emphasise the importance of leadership: "0 ye 
who believe! Obey Alläh, and obey the Messenger, and those charged with authority 
among you. "' Taking the above evidence into account, it is clear that Islam endorses the 
importance of leadership. " 
In the next section, it will be useful to provide the reader with a brief idea of the 
cooperative working atmosphere among the Muslim leaders at different levels in order to 
clarify the power those leaders had over each other and to specify the different types of 
connections between them. 
I From a jurisprudential viewpoint, it can be argued that the way Muslims perform their prayers five 
times a day for their whole life is another manifestation of the importance of leadership. 
se See Ibn Khaldiin, Muqdimat An Khaldün, p. 43 and Muhammad, Madä TawäFq al-Simät, p. 28. 
Z' Mahfii 
., al-Madkhal, 
274. Also see al-Rashid, Siyisat al-Islinl, p. 100. 
See Sunan Abii Dä'iid (Kitib al lihäd, No. 2608, v. 3, p. 36), Sunan al-Bayhagi al-Kubra (Bib: a1- 
Qawm You)nirrin Ahadahum idha Sifan7, No. 10131, v. 5, p. 257), and Musnad Ahmad (No. 6647, v. 2, 
p. 177). 
' See the battle of Mu'tah in Sahib al-Bukhari (Kitib Fadiil al-$ahibah, No. 3547, v. 3, p. 1372), Ibn 
Kathir, al-Bidiyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 241, and al-I; Ialabi, al-Shah al- -Ialabiyyah, v. 2, pp. 786-787. 
30 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 59. In addition, the Qur'an mentions most leadership ranks, considering 
them in different ways in different verses. Some of them are, sultin, the Qur'an, 16: 99, malik 59: 23, 
caliph 38: 26, imimah 25: 74. 
31 For examples see the Qur'an, 2: 143,4: 80,83,24: 56,59: 7, & 64: 12, Sahib al-Bukhari (Kitäb al- 
Ahkim, No. 6725, v. 6, p. 2612), Sahib Muslim (Kitib al-Imirah, No. 1839, v. 
3, 
p. 1469), Sunan al- 
Tirmidhi (Kitib a1-Jihad, No. 1707, v. 4, p. 209), Sunan al-Nasa'i (Kitäb al-Bafah, No. 4205, v. 7, p. 
159), Sunan Abü Dä'üd (Kitib al-Jihad, No. 2626, v. 3, p. 40), Sunan Ibn Majah (Kitäb a -Jihad, No. 
2863, v. 2, p. 955), and Musnad Ahmad (No. 4668, v. 2, p. 17). 
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V. 3: Leadership and Unity of Command 
Warfare is considered to be a team activity. 32 Therefore, unity of command at all levels 
plays an important role in fulfilling the objectives of leadership. Rahman and al 'Asali 
differ in their approaches to the idea of leadership and unity of command. Rahman views 
unity of command as being achieved through the collaboration of the various levels of the 
chain of command in executing the leadership's objectives, whereas al cAsali's neglects 
unity of command and emphasises the power of a single leader. 33 It can be argued that 
while both opinions have merits, to view leadership and unity of command 
comprehensively these two views should if possible be combined. This will give a better 
understanding of the link between leadership and unity of command. The Qur'än can be 
said to support this judgment by its statement that unification of command and 
cooperation between chains of command are both important. 34 It may be that during the 
Prophet's time his example in this regard may not be clear, since he (PBUH) occupied 
more than one leadership position. However, the link can be seen in the cooperation of 
Umar as the overall leader and Sacd b. Abi Waggäs, the leader at the battle of al- 
Qädisiyyah. 'Umar asked Sacd to describe to him, clearly and in detail, the land of al- 
Qädisiyyah so that cUmar would be able to choose the most advantageous site for the 
expected confrontation with the Persian army 35 This shows both the singularity of 
command and the cooperation of these commanders 36 
It should now be asked whether these unified commands exercised the same form of 
leadership in the five battles under consideration. Therefore the next section will briefly 
examine the types of leadership implemented by the Muslim commanders. 
sz See Department of the Army, Military Leadership, p. 7. 
See Rahman, Muhammad, p. 59 and al `Asali, al-Madhhab, p. 101. 
sa See the Qur'än, 2: 247 and 5: 2. Also see al-Tabari, Tafsiral-Tabari, v. 2, pp. 606-609 and al-Qurtubi, 
Tafsiral-Qurtubi, v. 1, p. 271 and v. 2, p. 245. 
' It should be mentioned that the early stage of Islam has been described as a period of the strong 
centralisation of rule not only in the time of Abü Bakr, but also during the caliphate of cUmar b. al- 
Khattäb. It seems that this method was followed for several reasons. First, they were greatly concerned 
to keep Islam on the right path, especially during the Riddah wars (caused by the defection of various 
Arab tribes after the death of the Prophet (PBUH). Second, they knew that they were facing the two 
biggest empires in the region and that the men of the Muslim army were outnumbered and ill- 
equipped. Third, the Muslim state was still in the process of formation. Fourth, last but not least, cUmar 
was particularly conscious of his responsibilities as leader. 
' See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-7'abarf, v. 2, p. 387. Further see the section "The Battle of al-Qädisiyyah" in 
the chapter "The Task of Islamic Military Intelligence" (Ch. 6). 
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V. 4: Types of Leadership 
It is essential for men to be convinced that their commanders are well qualified to lead 
them in combat. 37 Thus it is necessary to make the reader familiar with the types of 
leadership practised in the five battles in question. As there can be said to be three types 
of leadership; leadership by conviction, leadership by force, and unplanned (unorganised) 
leadership, the question of the type of leadership to be applied is significant for any leader, 
whose choice will be dictated by the current reality. 38 As far as the Muslim leaderships are 
concerned, al-Bäb's categories are of limited usefulness since unplanned leadership played 
no part in any of the five battles considered by this study. 39 The first two types are 
considered to be the accepted forms, which are generally adopted to achieve the goals of 
the leadership. However, the third type, that is, unplanned (unorganised) leadership, 
cannot generally achieve any objective, however applied. 40 As a result, ruling parties that 
adopt this type of leadership may destroy the interest of the nation. "' To return to the 
other two types, the first is known as leadership by conviction, since the soldiers obey the 
commands of their leaders out of conviction. "' In the second type, leadership by force, the 
leader relies solely on his authority and personality. 43 Hence it can be seen, with reference 
to the first type of leadership, that missions which are conducted to the satisfaction of 
both leaders and soldiers demonstrate the teamwork and willing participation of both. 
This type of leadership brings to the fore the individual soldier's abilities and qualities. 44 
37 See al-Bab, Mugawwimäta/-Qiyädah, p. 147 and Ghaybah, Mugawwimäta/-Shakhciyyah, p. 30. 
31 See al-Rashid, al-Qiyädah, p. 25. 
39 However, to a limited degree the leadership of the Qurasyh army can be seen as unplanned. See the 
section "The Adversary at the Battle of Badr" in the chapter 'The Adversaries' Strengths and 
Weaknesses" (Ch. 7). 
40 This type of leadership can amount to an absence of leadership, so that the soldiers are not 
controlled and directed properly. It is, however, rarely found, especially in the military field where 
soldiers need guidance and directions. Also, they require someone to take care of their affairs in peace 
as well as war. See al-Rashid, al-Qiyädah, p. 11. 
41 See al-Baqari, al-Qiyädah, pp. 38-41. 
42 Al-Rashid considered that leadership by force is of primary importance, but it could be argued that in 
the early period of Islam it was more important to convince than to exert force, otherwise the Muslim 
soldiers would not have so promptly carried out their leaders' plans. It could also be argued that since 
al-Rashid's book is about Islamic leadership he ought to have presented the strongest point first, i. e. 
leadership by conviction. In the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 159, it is found: "It is part of the Mercy of Allah 
that thou dost deal gently with them. Wert thou severe or harsh-hearted, they would have broken 
away from about thee: so pass over (their faults), and ask for (Allah's) forgiveness for them; and 
consult them in affairs (of moment). Then, when thou hast taken a decision, put thy trust in Allah. 
Allah loves those who put their trust (in him). " Thus leniency on the part of the commander is 
advocated by the Qur'an. Whereas the Arabs prior to Islam tended to rely on leadership by force. See 
the section "The Special Characteristics of the Arabs" in the chapter "Brief Background of the Region 
Prior to Islam" (Ch. 2). 
43 Al-Rashid, however, should have differentiated further that leadership by force does not have to be a 
dictatorial leadership. 
44 Mahfüz, al-Madkhal, pp. 290-291. 
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This is a great advantage which is very likely to affect the troops' performance positively. "' 
The second type of leadership attempts to reach its objectives without considering the 
satisfaction of the soldiers. This may lead to resentment and disaffection in the ranks 46 
However, viewing this matter from an Islamic perspective, it is found that Islam 
understands and considers the instinctive nature of the human being. Taking this into 
account, Islamic military leadership deals with the problem of dissatisfaction by applying 
the concept of obedience to the leader. 47 Therefore it can be seen that leadership by 
conviction is the most suitable style of leadership in executing plans and successfully 
attempting goals. If, however, for any reason leadership by conviction cannot be applied, 
the second style may then be adopted. 48 
Thus, it is possible to say that the leadership of the Prophet was mostly by conviction; 
sometimes, however, to a certain extent and at times of crisis he adopted the second 
type49 According to the Qur'an, the Muslims believed that the Prophet was assigned by 
Allah as a leader to be followed, therefore his designation was by the power of the highest 
authority50 
Therefore at the battles of Badr, Uliud, and al-Khandaq the Prophet took the leadership 
upon himself without any objection being raised by the army, who consented to be led by 
the highest human authority of the Muslim community since the opposing forces were 
threatening the very existence of Islam. According to cUrwah b. Maseüd al-Thaqafi, who 
was one of the Quraysh leaders at that time, the Prophet was also practising leadership by 
conviction. " Regarding the appointment of leaders, Abii Bakr and Sacd b. Abi Waggas 
as Al-Rashid, al-Qiyädah, p. 25. 
In this regard we can explore the Prophet's behaviour in the two following cases. In the first he used 
leadership by conviction during the battle of Badr. In contrast, he used the exercise of force at the Sulh 
al-Hudaiyybiyah (treaty of al-Hudaiyybiyah) despite strong opposition. See $ahih al-Bukhäri (Kitäb a! 
Tafsir, No. 4563, v. 4, p. 1832), Sahih Muslim (Kitäb allihäd, No. 1785, v. 3, p. 1411), and Sunan al- 
Därami ()Wb al-Siyar, No. 2507. v. 2, p. 310). Also see al-Rashid, al-Qiyädah, p. 26. 
a' See the section "Obedience" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine "(Ch. 4). 
18 For example, at the battle of al-Qädisiyyah Sa°d had elected Khälid b. `Arfatah but when some of the 
Muslims objected to this decision Sacd had to enforce it, thus moving from the first to the second type 
of leadership. See al-Tabari, Tän7rh a! -Tabari, v. 2, p. 407 and Kamäl, a1-Qadisiyyah, pp. 126-127. 
a' Further see 'Armüsh, Qiyädat al-Rasr71, p. 207. 
so See the Qur'än, 4: 59. Also see the section "Obedience" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military 
Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
s' He addressed the Quraysh after returning from his meeting with the Prophet prior to the treaty of 
al-Ijudaybiyyah. He said: "I have attended the courts of Heraclius, the Chosroes and the Negus, but 
could nowhere see such devotion and ecstasy of love: pin-drop silence reigns when Muhammad talks, 
none can dare to gaze at him; when he performs ablution, numbers rush up to take the water dropping 
down; when he spits his sputum is received on palms of hands and rubbed on faces. " See $ahih al- 
Bukhäri (Kitäb al-Shurüt, No. 2581, v. 2, p. 976), Sunan Abü Dd'Gd (Kitäb al Jihad, No. 2765, v. 3, p. 
85), Musnad Ahmad (v. 4, p. 324), Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 280, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al- 
Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 167, and al-Ilalabi, al-Sirah al-ffalabiyyah, v. 2, p. 699. For this translation see 
Naumani, Shat un-Nabi v. 2, p. 123. 
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were both assigned by the Companions; 52 while Umar b. al-Khattäb and Khälid b. al- 
Walid were assigned by the order of Abü Bakr. 53 However, the nomination of Umar b. al- 
Khattäb to the Caliphate was objected to by some Companions, among them Talhah b. 
cUbaydull5h. 54 Thus, it is clear that the leaders of these battles were differently assigned in 
accordance with the first two forms of leadership, in ways which apparently satisfied most 
of the Muslim troops. In other words, the Muslim soldiers in these battles offered no 
resistance to these types of leadership; on the contrary, they showed full obedience, and 
this acceptance is likely to have affected their performance in these battles. " 
In the next section the most important qualities of the Muslim leader will be discussed 
from the Islamic point of view. 
V. 5: The Significant Qualities of the Muslim Leader 
Many specific qualities of the ideal military leader are known today, " and a selection of 
the most important qualities of the ideal Muslim military leader is discussed below in 
accordance with the objectives of the study. The criteria of selection rely solely on their 
relational effect on leadership from an Islamic viewpoint. In other words, these specific 
features will be discussed in the light of the Qur'än and the hadith. Furthermore, this 
section will investigate whether these qualities were demonstrated by the Muslim leaders 
in question. The section will try to illustrate these features separately and discuss them in 
detail. There may, however, be some degree of integration between these points as they 
52 The Emigrants and the Helpers elected Abü Bakr as Caliph in the Saqifat Banü Sa idah. They also 
elected Sa°d b. Abi Waggäs to be the leader of the battle of al-Qädisiyyah. For the election of Abü Bakr 
see Saliih al-Bukhäri (Kitäb Fa(iil al-Sahäbah, No. 3467, v. 3, p. 1341), Sunan Ibn Mäjah (Bib: Walit 
al-Nabi, No. 1627, v. 1, p. 520), Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 6, pp. 75-76, al-Tabari, T rikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 
233, and al-I lalabi, al-Sirah al-hfalabiyyah, v. 3, p. 475. For the election of Sacd see al-Tabari, Tärikh al- 
Taban; v. 2, p. 381. 53 Khälid was a celebrated combat leader and the Muslim soldiers at that time loved to fight under his 
command. He had the reputation of being a great leader both before and during the early period of 
Islam. See al-Dhahabi, SiyarA°1äm al-Nubalä; v. 1, p. 383 and Khattäb, Khälid, p. 165. 
sa Abü Bakr had forced his decision to elect Umar upon some Companions, as the following Caliph 
chosen from among them was Talba, who objected to the election of Umar due to his previous harsh 
and uncompromising behaviour, which he refused to soften even in the presence of the Prophet or Abü 
Bakr. See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, pp. 352 & 355 and al-Maqdisi, Muthhar, al-Badd' wa al- 
Tärikh, v. 5, p. 167. 
In addition, Talba b. cUbaydulläh al-Taymi [d. 36/656] was one of the Prophet's ten Companions who 
were brought the glad tidings of Paradise by the Prophet. His actions at the battle of Ubud were 
praised more highly than any of his other exploits. See the accounts of the battle of Uhud in Sahih al- 
Bukäri, Sahili Muslim, Ibn Mäjah, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, p. 248, al-Iialabi, a! -Sirah 
al-flalabiyyah, v. 2, p. 522, and Netton, A PopularDictionary oflslam, p. 224. 
ss See the section "Obedience" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
56 See Rahman, Muhammad, pp. 60-97, al-Rashid, al-Qiyädah, pp. 29-36, and al. Asali, al-Madhhab, 
pp. 99-161. 
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are discussed. " After considering each point, this section will attempt to obtain convincing 
evidence pertaining to the leaders of the five battles by analysing the leadership of each 
battle separately. It is important to state at this point that the Muslim leaders could not 
match the qualities of the Prophet. Firstly, they would view his words and actions as 
revelation, and secondly, he held more than one position. For example, he was the overall 
leader, field leader, and a source of the sharila. 
The quality of being among the säbigi n (those having precedence in Islam) was generally 
considered to be one of the most significant characteristics of the Muslim leader. " Al_ 
Rashid states that during the early period of Islam this characteristic was considered of 
great importance and had priority in the assigning of Muslim leaders 59 The Qur'än praises 
the Companions who embraced Islam earlier than others and their supremacy is 
recognised in several verses 60 Also the hadith states that the best people were the people 
of the Prophet's generation, then those coming after them, and then those coming after 
the latter. " Nonetheless, it should be noted that this hadith does not reject the idea that if 
the chosen leader has greater military experience then it is not essential for him to be 
from the first generation of Muslims, the säbigfn. bz 
Experience of warfare (al-khibrah al-harbiyyah) is an essential quality of a leader. ' Ibn 
Qudämah writes that the overall leader is supposed to have a field leader who has 
wisdom in warfare and knows how to use it well. ' Ibn Qudämah's statement appears to 
be supported by the hadith in which the Prophet stated that in practice a leader need not 
be the most religious man as long as he is the most capable and experienced in dealing 
57 See Department of the Army, MilitaryLeadership, p. 5. 
sa The term sabiqün (sing. sabiq) occurs in the Qur'an in several places. See the Qur'än, 9: 100 and 56: 
10. 
59 See al-Rashid, al-Qiyadah, p. 29 and al-Shargawi, al-Siddiq, p. 167. Al-Tabari reports that Umar b. 
al-Khattäb refused to place al-Muthanna b. Härithah, who was not a Companion, in command over 
Jarir b. cAbdullah al-Bujali, who was one of the Companions praised by the Prophet. See Musnad 
Abmad (v. 4, p. 357). Also see al-Tabari, Tarikh al-Taban; v. 2, p. 376. Nonetheless, this cannot be 
applied in all cases since the Prophet put °Amru b. al IAäs in command the battle at That al-Salasil 
despite the attendance of the al-Muhajirin al-Uwalün (the first Companions among those who have 
precedence), among whom were Abu Bakr and cUmar b. al-Kattäb. See al-Tabari, 7a kh al-Tabari, v. 2, 
p. 146, Ibn Kathir, al Bidayah wa al-Nihayah, v. 4, p. 274, and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 3, p. 
200. 
60 See the Qur'an, 9: 100. 
See Sahib al-Bukhäri (Kitab al-Shahadat, No. 2508, v. 2, p. 938), Sahib Muslim (Bab: Managib al- 
Sahabah, No. 2533, v. 4, p. 1962), Sahib Ibn Hibbän (Kitab al-Iman, No. 4328, v. 10, p. 171), Sunan al- 
Tirmidhi (Kitab al-Shahadat, No. 2303. v. 4, p. 549), Musnad Ahmad (No. 114, v. 1, p. 18), Sunan al- 
Bayhaqi al-Kubrä (Kitab Qasim al-Sadagat, No. 13299, v. 7, p. 91), and Sunan Abu Dä'ud (Bab: 
Managib al-Sahabah, No. 4657, v. 3, p. 214). 
62 Al-Shargäwi, al-Siddiq, p. 170, mentions that the letter sent by Abu Bakr to Abu cUbaydah to inform 
him that Khälid was the overall leader of the Muslim army in al-Shim also explained to him that he 
had only chosen Khälid due to his experience of warfare. 
See Ibn Kathir, Tafsirlbn Kathir, v. 1, p. 73. 
See Ibn Qudämah, al-Mughni, v. 9, p. 166. 
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with military activities. ` One may argue that this point contradicts the previous one 
(säbigi7n), but it is clear that it is preferable and to be recommended that the assigned 
leader should be both from among the säbigi n and more experienced in warfare. Also 
many of the säbiqün were not chosen to be in command, probably because they did not 
have the necessary experience of warfare. It is an obvious point that qualities of 
leadership are not given in equal measure to all human beings. 
Bravery (al-shajä`ah) and tagwä are another qualities of the Muslim leader. Thus, the 
Muslim leader is expected to be both physically brave and a tagi. 66 Al-Rashid commented 
that if fear arose in a Muslim leader's heart in accordance with natural human behaviour, 
the love and fear that he felt for Allah, which is tagwä, would make him overcome this 
fear and react bravely to the situation. 67 Tagwä will also restrain a Muslim leader from 
behaving unjustly. 
Although al-Rashid made an important point here he failed to point out another vital and 
essential element of a Muslim's belief system, which will also affect the bravery of the 
Muslim leader; this is one of the six pillars of Muslim belief, a pairing known as al-gadä' 
and al-gadar. 68 In the book of al-Tafsir al-Munir, the author wrote that if sometimes our 
65 See Sahtli, al-Bukhari (Kitäb Fadä'lal-Sahäbah, No. 3462, v. 3, p. 1339), Sahib Muslim (Kitäb Fa(Iä1 
al-Sahäbah, No. 2384, v. 4, p. 1856), Sunan Ibn Majah (Bab: Fadä' Abü Bakr, No. 101, v. 1, p. 38), and 
Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 5, p. 219. 
A tagi is one who has tagwä, meaning the love and fear that a Muslim feels for Allah. A person with 
tagwf desires to seek the good pleasures of Allah and to stay away from those things that would 
displease Him. He is careful not to go beyond the bounds and limits set by Allah. See Bewley, Glossary 
of Islamic Terms, p. 69. 
67 See al-Rashid, a1-Qiyädah al-54skariyah, pp. 33-34 and Mubarak, An Islamic Theory of Motivation, 
v. 2, p. 170. 
In addition, tagwa would also encourage the Muslim leader to be decisive at the moment of 
confrontation. See the Qur'an, 3: 155, Sahib al-Bukhari (Kitäb al-Waräya, No. 2615, v. 3, p. 1017), 
Sahib Muslim (IGtäb al-. 'idq, No. 89, v. 1, p. 92), Sunan al-Nasal (Kitäb al-Wasäyä, No. 3671, v. 6, p. 
257), and Sunan Abü Dä'iid (Kitäb al-Wasäyä, No. 2874, v. 3, p. 115). Also see the section 
"Steadfastness in the Face of the Enemy", in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" 
(Ch. 4). 
68 In this section the researcher is aware that he is dealing with one of the most sensitive subjects of 
the Muslim debate, but it must be remembered that this study is examining the matter of gadä' and 
gadar from the Sunni perspective. Thus the terms need to be clarified first using al-Salih's method: he 
says that the linguistic and terminological meanings of al-gaff and al-qadar are inter-related. The 
linguistic meaning of al gadä' refers to "perfect commanding, decreeing, ruling, accomplishing and 
perfect precision in execution", while al-qadar refers to "setting, commanding, executing, and 
encompassing in due and precise proportions". Terminologically, al-gadar "is the ability of Allah": 
whereby He knew, wrote, willed, and created all things in due proportion and according to a precise 
measure. Allah knew all things that would happen before bringing them into existence and according 
to predestined proportions and measures which Allah had written in a Book called al-Lawh al Mahlu-? 
(The Preserved Tablet). Al--gadä' is the perfectly precise execution and accomplishment of all things 
predestined to occur exactly in accordance with Allah's previous knowledge, Writing, and Will. The 
meaning of al-Lawh al-Mahfüz is the Preserved Tablet wherein Allah recorded everything: in the 
Qur'an (ETMC), 34: 3, it is found: "From Whom is not hidden the least little atom in the heavens or in 
earth: nor is there anything less than that, or greater, but is in the record perspicuous. " Al-Salih, Fate 
in Islam, pp. 9-10. For further information see Ibn Qudamah, Lam'at al-I tigäd, v. 1, p. 21, Ibn `Isa, 
135 
Ch. 5: The Impact of Islamic Military Leadership 
wishes are denied despite our best efforts, the element of qadar will ease the sadness 
caused by the problems that we regularly face. 69 This important factor is illustrated by the 
case of cAbdullah b. Rawahah when he was in command of the Muslim army during the 
battle of Mu'tah. It is clear that he believed in qadar. When he took over the leadership 
after the deaths of the first two leaders, he was for a while reluctant to march forward 
into the heat of the battle. Therefore, to increase his courage, he recited some poems to 
remind himself that if he was not killed during the battle he would certainly die at some 
later date. This recitation had the desired effect and he was then able to advance towards 
the adversary. 70 Last but not least, the Qur'an mentions this subject once again by saying 
that the Prophet was going to "if he died or were slain". " It is from such an assurance 
that the Muslim leader draws his valour and tagwä. It should be added here that if these 
two elements were not effective in instilling bravery into the Muslim leader, a third 
solution is suggested by the Qur'an. A115h has threatened those who retreat due to fear 
with a severe punishment as their reward on the Day of Judgment. 72 
Shark Qasidat Ibn al-Qayyim, v. 1, pp. 72-73, Ibn Abi a1 dIz al-Hanafi [d. 780/1379], Shark al-Aqidah 
al-Tahäwiyyah, p. 277, al-Nasir and Derwish al--layät al-Diniyyah, p. 257, al-Khadhräwi, Qämüs a! - Ah, p. 348, Bewley, Glossary, p. 191, and Netton, A Popular Dictionary of Islam, p. 151. 
In addition, the following verses and hadith can be used to support Salih al-Salih's statement: in the 
Qur'an (ETMC), 54: 49, it is found: "Verily, all things have We created in proportion and measure. " 
Also see Qur'5n, 3: 145 & 154,6: 2,35,57,96, & 125,25: 2,33: 36,54: 49,57: 22,77: 21-23, and 85: 22. 
In the hadith, the Prophet said: "No slave of Allah will (truly) believe until he believes in al-qadar, it is 
good and bad, from Allah and until he knows that what has befallen him was not going to pass him by, 
and that what has passed him by was not going to befall him. " See Sunan Ibn Majah (Bab: Kulla 
Shayin bi Qadar, No. 77, v. 1, p. 29), Sunan Abü Da'üd (Bab: Kulla Shay'in bi Qadar, No. 4699, v. 4, p. 
225), and al-Mustadrak °ala al-Sahihayn (Mentioning Abdullah b. Abbas No. 6304, v. 3, p. 624). In 
addition see Sahib Muslim (Bib: Kulla Shayin bi Qadar, No. 2655 & 2656, v. 4, pp. 2045 & 2046), al- 
Muwatta' (Kitib al-Qadar, No. 1595, v. 2, p. 899), Sunan Ibn Majah (Bab: Kulla Shayin bi Qadar, No. 
83, v. 1, p. 32), Sunan al-Tirmidhi (Kitib al-Qadar, No. 2157, v. 4, p. 459), Sunan Abü Dä'üd (Kitib al- 
Diyyät, No. 4695, v. 4, p. 223), al-Sunan al-Kubra ()6täb al-/man, No. 5883, v. 3, p. 446), and Musnad 
Ahmad (No. 21629, v. 5, p. 182). 
69 See al-Zubayli al-Tafsiral-Munir, v. 27, pp. 328-329. 
70 See Sunan al-Bayhagi al-Kubra (Bib: al-Rukhsah fr al-Raja v. 9, p. 154), Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 5, p. 
29, al-Tabari, Tirikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 151, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidiyah wa al-Nihiyah, v. 4, p. 245, and 
Dhahabi, SiyarATl m al-Nubali; v. 1, p. 239. Also, the famous statement made by Khalid b. al-Walid at 
his death is relevant here. See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidiyah wa al-Nihiyah, v. 7, p. 114. 
For further interest see the following for examples of al-Qadi'and al-Qadar. " 
1) Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Agidah al-Wa-sitiyyah, 2) Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifa'al-Alil, and 3) Ibn Abi al-°Iz al- 
I3anafi, al-Agidah al-Tahiwiyyah. 
71 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 144. 
72 See the section "Steadfastness in the Face of the Enemy" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic 
Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). Also see Sah-ih al-Bukhari (Kitib al-Wasiyi, No. 2615, v. 3, p. 1017), Sahih 
Muslim (Kitib al-Sidq, No. 89, v. 1, p. 92), Sunan al-Nasa i (Kitib al-Wasiyi, No. 3671, v. 6, p. 257), 
and Sunan Abi Dä üd (Kitib al-Wasiiya, No. 2874, v. 3, p. 115). 
The good reward is not mentioned here because in this section the study is considering the natural fear 
of the human being and how it was overcome at that time. 
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Taking into account all the foregoing arguments, it is possible to say that the sharr'a had 
provided three steps that the Muslim leaders had to consider when applying the qualities 
of courage and tagwä in their leadership of the Muslim army. 73 
In connection with the element of taqwa, another point which the Muslim leader should 
at all times consider is that there is always a leader who is above him. This means that he 
does not have ultimate power over others. This element is called al-ragib. 74 The word 
raqib (Watcher) appears in the Qur'an in several places, and thus serves to remind the 
Muslim leader of the higher authority. 75 This element, however, can be adapted to apply 
to leadership from an Islamic viewpoint. 
Thus from the Islamic viewpoint and according to the Qur'an every leader in Islam is 
supposed to acknowledge that there is a higher authority above him; this applied even to 
the Prophet himself. In the Qur'an, it is found: "Is then He Who standeth over every soul 
(and knoweth) all that it doth? s76 
Patience (al-cabr) and endurance (quwat al-talhammul) are closely connected qualities 
needed by the Muslim leader. Leaders at all levels may have courage, but do they have 
the necessary patience and endurance? This factor is essential if Muslim leaders and their 
soldiers are to accomplish victory. '' The Qur'an clarifies the matter and assures us that 
warring parties sustain casualties as a natural result of any fighting activity; this assurance 
has the effect of encouraging any Muslim army to cultivate patience. It makes clear to 
them that if a wound were to touch them, they should be sure a similar wound would 
have touched others. 78 Even though one of the exegeses of this verse is considered by 
many historians as indicating the battle of Badr, it still can be used to refer to any similar 
circumstances. 79 
From an Islamic perspective, determination (al-lhazm) is considered to be an essential 
element in the personality of the Muslim leader. In the Qur'an, it is found: "And consult 
them in affairs (of moment). Then, when thou hast taken a decision, put thy trust in 
73 It should be emphasised that these three steps applied not only to the leadership, but to every soldier 
in the Muslim army. Further see the section "Steadfastness in the Face of the Enemy" in the chapter 
"The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" (Ch. 5). 
74 It should be noted that al-Raqib is one of the ninety-nine names of or attributes of Allah. See Qur'an, 
4: 1,5: 117, & 33: 52, Sahib al-Bukhari (Kitäb al-Riq q, No. 6109, v. 5, p. 2376) al-Nawawi, Sharh 
Sahib Muslim, v. 2, p. 19, and al-Khudrawi, Qämrls al Allä p. 164. 
75 For the word ragib see the Qur'an, 
4: 1,5: 117,11: 93,33: 52, and 50: 18. 
76 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 13: 33. Also see Ibn Kathir, Tafsirlbn Kathir, v. 3, p. 236. 
77See Rahman, Muhammad, p. 65. 
78 See the Qur'an, 3: 140. In addition the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 200, states: "0 ye who believe! Persevere 
in patience and constancy. " 
79 See al-'j'abari, Tafsiral-Tabari, v. 4, p. 103. 
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Allah. "80 In this verse Allah told the Prophet to exercise a prompt determination in 
making decisions. 8' Further, al-Qadhafi explains that hesitation in making decisions at the 
right time is a destructive act against a person or nation. 82 However, al-Qadhafi should 
perhaps have reconsidered his statement and added that making the correct decision at 
the right time is also essential 83 It can be seen that any delay or avoidance in making a 
sound decision may lead to unnecessary consequences. Thus, determination coupled with 
sound timing is believed to be a desirable characteristic of the Muslim leader's 
personality. 84 
Three major areas of a leader's knowledge (ma`rifat al-gä'id), which military leaders at all 
levels should consider are as follows. First, a leader has to know himself, in the sense that 
he must know fully his capabilities, prejudices, weaknesses and strengths. This knowledge 
would clarify for him the consequent advantages or disadvantages he has in relation to his 
opponents85 In this regard, Hudayb argues that it is essential for a leader to know the 
strong points of his character and use them successfully, and to know his weak points in 
order to improve them 86 It can be added that if a leader does not know his own abilities, 
he is unlikely to know the abilities of his soldiers. 87 Therefore he will not be able to assign 
the right man to the right mission88 However, two methods can be followed to solve such 
problems. The leader should choose a good and sincere friend whom he trusts and allow 
him to remind and advise him concerning any mistakes he might make. He should also 
seek self-improvement by continually developing his strengths and working on 
overcoming his weaknesses . 
8' Further, in the hadlth, it is found that the mature man is he 
who blames himself for his shortcomings in the performance of good deeds. 90 
80 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 159. 
81 See al-Qurtubi, Tafsiral-QurTubi v. 4, p. 252. 
as Mucamar al-Qadäfi, Ara'Ba1-Qiy9dah al-°Askariyyah, p. 13. 
"See Department of the Army, Military Leadership, p. 6. In addition, al-Rashid argues that a leader 
has to be determined for two reasons: a lack of determination on his part would 1) cause him to lose 
confidence in himself and 2) cause his men to lose confidence in him. See al-Rashid, al-Qiyädah, pp. 
543-544. 
84 This statement is considered under "Leaders and Intelligence" in the chapter "The Task of Islamic 
Military Intelligence" (Ch. 6). 
85 See al-Rashid, al-Qiyädah, p. 16. 
86 Hudayb and Zaki, al-Qiyädah, p. 113. Also see Ibn al-Qayyim, Ighäthat al-Lahlän, v. 1, pp. 77-80. 
87 Further, such a leader is not likely to be able to assess the strengths and weaknesses of his 
adversaries. This ability is often of great importance for the conduct and outcome of a battle, and is 
considered in the chapter "The Adversaries' Strengths and Weaknesses" (Ch. 7). 
88 See al-Rashid, al-Qiyädah, p. 17. 
s9 See Sunan al-Därami (Bab: al-Rajul Yuhi bi Shay'in fa Yablaghahü can al-Nabi thumma Yacüd, No. 
649, v. 1, p. 169) and Department of the Army, Military Leadership, p. 6. 
9Ö Sunan al-Tirmidhi (Kitäb Sifat al-Qiyädah wa al-Ragäiq wa al-Wara; No. 2459, v. 4, p. 368) and 
Sunan Ibn Mäjah (Kitab al-Zuhd, No. 4260, v. 2, p. 1423). 
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Secondly, in order to accomplish its demands, a leader is supposed to know his job 
thoroughly. In this connection, Hudayb mentions that the leader should understand most 
aspects of his work, whether theoretical or practical. 9' On this point, it may be argued that 
today, in the age of advanced weaponry, it might be possible for the majority of leaders, 
especially those holding the highest rank, to know the theoretical side of their work but 
not the details of its practicalities. However, although the leader should know the 
strengths and weaknesses of the weapons available to him, it is not necessary for him to 
know how to operate them personally in the mission he is about to conduct. The Prophet 
encouraged this aspect of the leader's knowledge when he said that A115h loves the one 
who makes his work excellent. 92 
Thirdly, the leader is supposed to know his men. This will help him to choose the right 
men for the right mission. 93 It can be argued that this knowledge is gained in practice 
mainly through the element of teamwork and close working relationship. When the 
leader shows genuine concern for his men, they trust and respect him. In addition, since 
the leader sometimes lives and works directly with and among his men, such a 
circumstance will allow him to identify and use the best of their abilities as the situation 
requires. 94 Also he should be a good judge of men and be able to act upon that judgement 
at short notice. The Prophet's method of choosing the right man for the right mission was 
either to call him by name or to ask his Companions who had the ability to carry out a 
particular task. 9S This does not indicate that the Prophet did not know his men, but it 
could be interpreted as clarifying a legislative point: that the Prophet was not superhuman 
and did not know all the abilities of each one of his men. He might also have been 
encouraging his men to participate and challenging them to action, since he asked for 
volunteers. 96 
It is a fact that panic and fear are likely to happen in the battlefield environment. 
Therefore, self-control (dabt al-nafs) is an important aspect of military leadership. 
" Hudayb and Zaki, al-Qiyädah, p. 113. 
92 See al-Mu°jam al-Awwsat [260/874-360/971], (No. 897, v. 1, p. 275), Musnad Abt Ya`ld [210/826- 
307/920] (No. 4386, v. 7, p. 349), and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 622. 
93 See al cArif, al-Jaysh, pp. 73-74. 
94 See the American Manual, The ArmyNon-Commissioned Officer Guide, p. 11. 
9s Despite his ability as a chosen Prophet, he sometimes showed himself to have no more than ordinary 
human abilities, which could be learnt from and imitated. 
To cite one example of knowing his Companions: upon hearing the rumours of the breaking of the 
treaties by the Banii Qurayzah, he ordered four prominent Muslim leaders to assure the veracity of the 
news. These messengers would have had a great effect on the morale of their soldiers if they confirmed 
the news, so they would have had to work to increase the men's fighting spirit if the news were true, or 
to be a reliable and effective source of denial. Also see the Qur an, 33: 21. 
% See Ibn al-Qayyim, Zäd al-Ma"äd, v. 3, p. 275. 
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Specifically, for the leaders, it is essential to show coolness under pressure since soldiers 
may lose heart and panic under the severe strain of battle and hence give up. 97 
Consequently, it is possible to say that the Prophet tried to alleviate his men's fear by 
saying that the martyr would not be tempted in his grave. 98 Thus, the Muslim leader is 
supposed to consider this element seriously and apply it in his own behaviour. 
Justice (al--'adl) and equality (al-musäwäh) are two qualities which should be considered 
and examined together. However, a leader may have difficulties in applying them either in 
the relationship between himself and his soldiers or in that between the soldiers 
themselves. 99 Naturally, leaders have different needs according to their different ways of 
thinking. As a result of this, justice and equality may be ignored in some cases, as leaders 
may form special relationships with some of their soldiers, for example because of tribal 
loyalties. Thus, the Qur'an requests all Muslim leaders to be just and to treat their soldiers 
equally. 100 In addition, the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) insisted on the fair treatment of 
all soldiers without making distinction between them-'O' Therefore, the Muslim leader is 
required to take the Prophet as an example of justice and equality, as the Qur'an has 
stated about him: "Ye have indeed in the Messenger of Allah an excellent exemplar for 
him who hopes in Allah and the Final Day and who remembers Allah much. i102 It is 
possible to say that the unlimited justice and commitment to equality shown by the 
leaders in battle would leave the soldiers no excuse for diminishing their performance but 
would rather encourage them to maximise their efforts. 
Appearance (al-mazhar) and personality (al-shakhciyyah) may also be considered from an 
Islamic viewpoint. Although the personality factor and its impact upon leadership has 
97 See Kamal, al-Qädisiyyah, p. 161. 
ve The Prophet was asked why most of the Muminün (believers) would be tempted in their grave 
except the martyr. The Prophet remarked that there is enough temptation in the flourishing of swords. 
See al-Sunan al-Kubrä (Kitib al-Janäfz No. 2180, v. 1, p. 660) and Sunan al-Nasä'i (Bib: al-Shahid, 
No. 2053, v. 4, p. 99). 
" See Beekun and Badawi, "The Leadership Process in Islam", p. 9. It is noticed that Beekun and 
Badawi referred to the hadith of the Prophet, but they did not mention which hadith they were 
discussing. 
1°° In the Qur'an (ETMC), 5: 8, it is mentioned that a Muslim has to do justice and to act righteously in 
a favourable or neutral atmosphere as well as to do justice to people who hate him or to whom he has 
an aversion. See The Holy Qur'mn ETMC p. 283. 
101 See Musnad Alimad (No. 23536, v. 5, p. 411). 
102 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 21: 21. 
In this case the Prophet praised the Muslim fighter, whatever his position in the battle; as he said: 
"Tuba (all kinds of happiness or a tree in Paradise) is for him who holds the reins of his horse to strive 
in Allah's Cause, with his hair unkempt and feet covered with dust: if he is appointed in the vanguard, 
he is perfectly satisfied with his post of guard, and if he is appointed in the rear guard, he accepts his 
post with satisfaction. " Looking at this hadith from the soldier's angle, it could be argued that it would 
prepare them to readily accept their leader's posting. This in turn would help the leader to treat his 
soldiers justly and equally. See Sahib al-Bukhari (Kitib allihäd, No. 2874, v. 3, p. 1105) and Sunan al- 
Bayhaqi al-Kubrä (Bib: Manigib al-Jihad, v. 9, p. 159). 
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been the subject of many studies, it is clear that in the context of Islamic military 
leadership, the concepts which the leader derives from Islam shape his view of life and 
hence influence his actions. They have a major impact upon his leadership and thus affect 
his soldiers' performance. Rahman observes that the brilliant leader is one "gifted with an 
appearance that appealed to everyone and everyone honoured him and respected him. "'o3 
However, the Prophet said: "Listen and obey (your chief) even if an Ethiopian whose 
head is like a raisin were made your chief. "104 Consequently, an impressive physical 
appearance, though important, remains as a secondary factor to the importance of the 
concepts he carries. Furthermore, if the leader has an attractive or commanding 
personality regardless of his appearance, it would influence his enemy as well as his own 
soldiers. 105 Having said that, it is preferable that the Muslim leader should be gifted with a 
good appearance. 
Leaders at all levels should attempt to convince their soldiers of the nobility of the cause 
(nublu al-sabab). The Muslim leaders believed that they were providing their soldiers 
with the most convincing argument possible: that they were fighting in the Cause of 
All5h. 106 As this noble cause was derived from many verses, Rahman argues that these 
verses were the main factor in convincing the soldiers. 107 However, if we examine the 
exegeses of verse 3: 157, it seems that al-Qurtubi: and Ibn Kathir, as well as al-Tabari, 
verified that this verse is addressing any Muslim who calls others to Islam and who first 
applies the teachings of Islam to himself. 108 But, considering in depth al-QurtubF s 
explanation, it is possible to conclude that the reason for fighting (in order to call to 
Islam) is judged to be a noble cause. 109 Therefore, the Muslim leader should carry out the 
duties of leadership bearing in mind the meaning of this verse. 
'03 Rahman, Muhammad, p. 66. 
104 See Sahih al-Bukhari (Kitäb al-Jamä'ah, No. 664, v. 1, p. 247), Musnad Ahmad (No. 12147, v. 3, p. 
114), and Sunan al-Bayhaqi al-Kubra (Bab: Imämatal-'Abid, No. 4897, v. 3, p. 88). 
105 This judgment can be understood from the meeting of Abü Sufyan and the Byzantine Emperor. 
When Abü Sufyan stood before the Byzantine Emperor and gave his testimony, both had to admire the 
personality of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). See Sah-ih al-Bukhari (Kitäb al-Wahl No. 7, v. 1, p. 
8), Sahi Muslim (Kitäb al lihäd wa al-Siyar, No. 1773, v. 3, p. 1395), Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al- 
Nihäyah, v. 4, pp. 263-264, and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 3, p. 286. 
106 See Rahman, Muhammad, p. 72. 
107 See Rahman, Muhammad, p. 72. Also see the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 125: "Who can be better in 
religion than one who submits his whole self to Allah, does good, and follows the way of Abraham the 
truth in faith. " And also the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 157: "And if you are slain, or die, in the Way of Allah, 
forgiveness and mercy from Allah are far better than all they could amass. " 
108 See al-Tabari, Tafsiral-Tabad, v. 24, pp. 117-118 and Ibn Kathir, Tafsirlbn Kathir, v. 4, p. 101. 
109 See al-Qurtubi, Tafsiral-Qurtubl, v. 15, p. 360. 
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Psychological strength (al-quwwah al-nafsiyyah) is held to be the cause of action. 10 
Similarly, the Qur'än is much concerned with the mentality of the Muslims, as it addresses 
and praises them: "Those to whom men said: "A great army is gathering against you, so 
fear them": But it (only) increased their faith: they said: "For us Alläh sufficeth, and He is 
the best Guardian. ""' It can be seen here that the Qur'än strengthened the mentality of 
the Muslim leaders and their soldiers and increased their resolve and courage by directing 
them to rely on the power of Alläh. "2 It is significant that the Qur'än does not say that 
the Muslims derived confidence from the superiority of their arms and equipment, but 
emphasises the importance of psychological strength gained by seeking refuge in Allah. "' 
Moreover, in this regard Rahman states very appositely that man is more psychical than 
physical and his actions are governed more by psychical factors than physical ones. 14 
Furthermore, he notes that to control someone's actions depends on the ability to 
influence his mentality. This is one of the most important aspects of leadership. "' 
In the following section the study will evaluate the leadership of the Muslim army in each 
battle by reference to the qualities mentioned above. Finally a comparison of the 
leaderships will be made by examining all five battles. 
V. 6: Analysis of the Battles 
V. 6.1: The Battle of Badr 
In this battle the leadership of the Muslim army faced a testing challenge to prove its 
worth as a combat leadership which could lead the Muslims in both peace and war. Badr 
was the first fight between the Muslim community and their long-standing enemy. The 
Muslims' leaders in this battle were among the säbiqün, and this gave them a special 
status in the eyes of the Muslim army. Thus the leadership at Badr held the highest 
position of all the säbiqün leaderships of the Muslim community, since the Prophet was at 
its apex. However, direct experience of fighting a particular enemy seems not to be 
applicable here, since Badr was the first armed confrontation with their own tribe. Having 
10 See Department of the Army, Military Leadership, p. 49 and Mubarak, An Islamic Theory, v. 2, p. 
192. 
"' See the Qur'än (ETMC), 3: 173. In the American Manual, Soldiers Team Development, p. 2, it is 
mentioned that the effort required by a difficult situation should be regarded as a means to victory 
rather than a curse on the cause. 
"Z See al-Tabari, Tafsir al-Taban; v. 4, pp. 178-179, al-Qurtubi, Tafsir al-Qurtubi, v. 4, p. 280, and Ibn 
Kathir, Tafsirlbn Kathir, v. 
1, 
pp. 130-132. 
119 American Manual, Soldiers Team Development, p. 2, emphasises this point, arguing that 
psychological strength is "the most critical element of a combat-ready team. " 
14 He also describes the psyche as "the powerhouse of the entire human system. " Rahman, 
Muhammad, p. 81. 
15 See Rahman, Muhammad, p. 73. 
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said that, the leadership was widely experienced in warfare in general, either from battles 
fought before the founding of Islam, for instance Harb al-Fujär, or through the battles or 
expeditions conducted after the establishment of the Islamic army. 16 In addition, we 
should not forget that the Quraysh were in a state of undeclared war with the Muslims 
during the first thirteen years of Islam. These experiences resulted in the new formation 
in which the Muslims fought in this battle. '17 Moreover, at Badr the leadership relied on 
their experience of warfare by calling the Emigrants and Helpers to fight under their 
standards. 
The Prophet, when participating in the first battle, showed his bravery by not shrinking 
from dangerous missions; he made the final decision to meet the Quraysh at Badr despite 
his army's deficiencies in arms and equipment against a much more powerful adversary. "' 
Patience and endurance were shown mostly in the speech the Prophet made to enthuse 
his men immediately before Badr; one of the last rallying cries they heard from their 
spiritual and tactical leader before the battle began was: "Rise to enter Paradise which is 
equal in width to the Heavens and the Earth. s19 Such words would certainly have 
enhanced the soldiers' patience and endurance, especially when the Muslim army saw the 
Prophet share a mount with two other men for the whole journey, thus walking two 
thirds of the distance. '20 He also showed endurance and determination when he refused 
to be accompanied by the rest of the Companions, whose camels were not in Medina. Also 
he did not wait for the return of the scouts. 
In addition the Prophet set an example for his men in the application of the first element 
of a leader's of knowledge, when he chose Abü Bakr and Umar as his closest advisors, 
despite the fact that there were other Companions older than Abd Bakr and Umar, and 
who were from the säbigvn. The advantage of such knowledge was apparent when on one 
occasion `Umar went against the merciful inclination of the Prophet when he sought 
cUmar's advice regarding the prisoners taken at Badr. To the amazement of all, Umar 
16 See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 1, p. 324, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidiyah wa al-Nihiyah, v. 2, p. 289, al-Halabi, 
al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 1, p. 207, Firestone, Jihid, p. 131, and Zakaria, The Makkan Crucible, pp. 63- 
65. Further see the section "The Special Characteristics of the Arabs" in the chapter "Brief Background 
of the Region Prior to Islam" (Ch. 2). 
117 Please see the chapter on "The Battles and their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
18 For the tagwi of the Prophet see Sahib al-Bukhäri (Kitib al-IMtisim bi al-Kitäb wa al-Sunnah, No. 
6933, v. 6, p. 2681), Sahib Muslim (Kitäb al-Half, No. 1216, v. 2, p. 883), and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al- 
Halabiyyah, v. 3, p. 445. 
19 See Sahib Muslim (Bib: Thubt t al-Jannah li al-Shahid, No. 1901, v. 3, p. 1510), Musnad Ahmad 
(No. 12421, v. 3, p. 136), Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 175, al-Tabari, Tirikh al-Tabari v. 2, p. 33, Ibn 
Kathir, al-Bidiyah wa al-Nihiyah, v. 4, p. 278, and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 3, p. 286. 
120 See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 159. 
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remarked that all the prisoners should be slain. 12' cUmar's unexpectedly harsh reply shows 
clearly that he was unaffected by any surrounding influences which might cloud his 
judgment. With regard to knowing his job, the Prophet himself personally directed the 
conduct of this battle, since it was likely to prove the first turning point in the struggle 
against the Quraysh and the key to the survival of the new Muslim community. Its 
outcome would either positively or negatively affect the continued existence of the 
Muslim headquarters. The Prophet knew that he had to stay close to his men in order to 
accomplish his mission successfully. On the matter of knowing his men, the Prophet asked 
three warriors to fight duels with the enemy which he expected them to win. This had a 
great effect on the outcome. 122 At Badr the quality of self-control might not have been as 
clearly displayed as at the battle of Ubud. However, his sense of justice and equality was 
conspicuous, especially when he allowed one of his men to retaliate after he claimed that 
the Prophet had harmed him. 123 The Prophet's appearance and personality seem to have 
been crucial in controlling his men in this battle, when he managed to transform their 
usual method of fighting by forming them into organised ranks . 
12' He succeeded in 
persuading his men to wait for his signal to attack until the enemy was almost upon them. 
On more than one occasion during this battle the Prophet reminded his men of the 
nobility of the cause: as he was approaching Badr, at the appearance of the Quraysh 
army, and just before the battle itself. 1 ' Lastly, the Prophet raised the morale of the 
Muslim army and weakened that of the adversary. 126 Nonetheless, it could be argued that 
the real and most effective use of psychological strength occurred during the battle itself, 
121 See Musnad Ahmad (No. 3632, v. 1, p. 383), Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 176, and al-Ilalabi, al- 
Sirah al-Ha/abiyyah, v. 2, p. 413. 
'22 Despite his ability as a chosen Prophet, he was still considered a normal human being who could 
not read the future, as one of the three men died as a result of the duel. Also it should be mentioned 
that the Prophet was sending his closest relatives since the adversary asked for combatants from 
among the Emigrants. Thus, he wanted to show that he was willing to sacrifice even his nearest kin. 
See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 174, al-Tabari, Tärikh a/-Tabari, v. 2, p. 32, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa 
al-Nihäyah, v. 3, p. 271, and al-I Talabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 402. 
123 See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 174, al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 32, Ibn Kathir, al Bidäyah 
wa al-Nihäyah, v. 3, p. 271, al-Halabi, al-Sirah a/-Ha/abiyyah, v. 2, p. 402, and al-Albäni, Si/silat al- 
Ahädith al-Sahihah, v. 2, Sec. 2, p. 808. 
124 See Faraj, a/-Abgariyyah al-Askariyyah, p. 175. 
'25 Sahih Muslim (Bäh: Thubüt al-Jannah ii al-Shahid, No. 1901, v. 3, p. 1510) and Musnad Ahmad 
(No. 12421, v. 3, p. 136), Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 175, al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari; v. 2, p. 33, Ibn 
Kathir, al Bidäyah wa a/-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 277, and al-Iialabi, al-Sirah al-Ha/abiyyah, v. 3, p. 286. 
126 For the part played by divine psychological strength, see the surah al-Anfäl, Sah-ih Muslim (Bäb: 
Thubüt al-Jannah Ii al-Shahid, No. 1901, v. 3, p. 1510), Musnad Ahmad (No. 12421, v. 3, p. 136), Ibn 
Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 175, al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 33, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al- 
Nihäyah, v. 3, p. 277, and al-Malabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 3, p. 286. 
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when the soldiers were told that the angels were fighting with them. 12' It can be clearly 
seen that the Prophet managed to build a very strong morale and an unbreakable spirit 
among his men by applying these qualities, which had the characteristics of the Islamic 
teaching, something that they were not used to applying to warfare. These qualities 
encouraged his men to do their utmost in opposing the terrifying army of the Quraysh. 
V. 6.2: The Battle of Uhud 
In this battle the Muslim leadership was essentially the same as that in the previous 
battle, i. e. Badr. So the elements of säbigvn and of personality 128 remained, and may have 
been enhanced, since the Muslim army now had greater trust in the Prophet's leadership. 
Furthermore, after Badr the army was more experienced and the men had gained 
confidence from their defeat of the Quraysh army. However, at Ubud they had to undergo 
a different experience, as they were in a defensive position. Since the Muslim community 
was being attacked in its own headquarters, bravery and tagwä were of the first 
importance when the army strode out of Medina to withstand the assault. During the 
battle of Uliud the Prophet displayed great courage, but the battle was indecisive, because 
the archers disobeyed the Prophet's orders. However, the Qur'än deals with the failure of 
the Muslim army and the events of the battle, referring to its outcome as being a matter of 
gadä' and gadar. 129 On the following day, the Prophet gathered the same soldiers who 
had fought in this battle and followed the Quraysh army. "' Thus the aftermath of the 
battle turned to the advantage of the Muslim army. 
Also in the Qur'än it is mentioned that if the Prophet were to die or be killed it would be 
another sign of the sure end of all human beings, signifying that even if a man is not killed 
11 See the Qur'än, 54: 45, Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 172, al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 33, and 
al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-hfalabiyyah, v. 2, p. 406. 
" However, the question may be raised whether the Prophet's personality did indeed help in 
accomplishing their limited success at in the battle of Uhud, since not all his men kept to their 
positions until the end of the battle. It could be answered that the archers left their places only after 
the fight appeared to be over. A more acceptable interpretation, however, is that the Muslim army was 
not always guaranteed victory, and that success depended on their taking the right measures in 
accordance with their doctrine. This interpretation could be said to be supported by Heraclius's 
statement when he met Abii Sufyän in Syria: "Even the Prophets lose sometimes and win at other 
times. " See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 264 and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-h(alabiyyah, v. 3, 
p. 286. In addition the following verse (ETMC), 3: 140 should be considered in this matter: "And that 
He may take to himself from your ranks Martyr-witnesses (to truth). " 
19 Here it is possible to see that despite the cause of the Muslims' failure being attributed by the 
Qur'än, 3: 155, to the sins they had commit, it resolved the matter later by referring to the element of 
al-gadä' and al-qadar. See the Qur'än, 3: 166, al-Tabari, Tafsir al-Tabari, v. 4, p. 166, and al-Qurtubi, 
Tafsir al-Qurtubi, v. 4, p. 265. 
130 See the section "The Battle of Uhud" in the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
Also see Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 52, al-Tabari, 7ärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 75, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah 
wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 49, and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 550. 
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in battle he will surely die according to Allah's will. The Qur'an is addressing the Muslims 
in general, and perhaps particularly the Companions, regarding their ceasing to fight upon 
hearing the rumour that the Prophet had been killed in this battle. It clarifies the question 
of their tagwä; either it was for the sake of the Prophet or for the sake of Allah. "' Hence, 
standing firm against their enemy increased the Companions' patience and endurance. 
This quality was even more clearly exemplified by the Prophet himself: despite having 
been wounded several times during the battle, he (PBUH) insisted on facing Ubayy b. 
Khalaf and killed him with a javelin. 132 It can be observed that determination was 
generally an effective element in the Muslim army's performance in the period covered by 
the study; for example, in the Prophet's refusal to accept the help of a non-Muslim 
company, which enlightened the Muslim army concerning the importance of their 
mission. "' Furthermore, the advantage of determination protected the Muslim army from 
entering into the treacherous ebb and flow of negotiations. 134 Soon after these events, 
when the fighting turned to the advantage of the Quraysh, the Prophet determined to act 
quickly, gathering around him his scattered army and heading towards Mount Ubud. His 
determination inspired cAli b. Abi Taub to lift up the Muslim standard and rally the 
Muslim soldiers. 135 The degree of involvement of the Prophet, as well as that of °Ali, 
prevented the Muslim soldiers from losing confidence, resolved their confusion and 
brought them back to the thick of the battle. '36 The Prophet himself joined in the battle 
despite the fact that he was not expendable. The Muslim leadership therefore faced a real 
test militarily; upon its success depended the success and even the survival of the new 
131 However, this judgment in no way diminishes the shock they felt as they heard that the Prophet 
had been killed. In other words some Companions might have ceased to fight because of the great love 
they bore the Prophet. In this connection it is particularly important that we take into consideration 
what 'Umar b. al-Khattäb did at the death of the Prophet. See Sah-1h aI-Bukhäri (Kitib Fadi'il al- 
Sahibah, No. 3467, v. 3, p. 1341), Sunan Ibn Mäjah (Bib: Wafat al-Nab!, No. 1627, v. 1, p. 520), Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 6, pp. 75-76, al-Tabari, 7ärikh al-Taban; v. 2, p. 233, and al-I; ialabi, al-Sirah al- 
Halabiyyah, v. 3, p. 475. 
132 The Prophet was so physically weakened that he could hardly climb the mountain of Ubud and one 
of his Companions had to assist him. 'Ali b. Abi Tälib remarks that the Prophet trembled as he shook 
the javelin and threw it towards Ubayy b. Khalaf, fatally injuring him. His trembling made the 
surrounding Companions flee from his side. See Sahib al-Bukhäri (Kitib allihid, No. 2874, v. 3, p. 
1105), Musnad Ahmad (No. 2609, v. 1, p. 287), and al-Mubarakpuri, al-Rahiq, p. 253. 
133 See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 9, p. 99, al-Tabari, Tirikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 383, and al-Mubarakpuri, al- 
Rahiq, p. 249. 
134 It is worth mentioning that the Qur'an, 4: 88, reports that the Muslim army had had a moment of 
discussion among themselves on whether or not to fight 'Abdullah b. Ubayy and the forces he had 
withdrawn before the battle of Uhud. See al-I; lalabi, al-Sirah al Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 494. In addition, we 
should note that the Prophet showed great determination in rejecting the manoeuvre suggested by the 
tribe of Ghatafan at the battle of al-Khandaq. See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidiyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 104 
and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-ffalabiyyah, v. 2, p. 640. 
13s See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sfrah, v. 4, p. 21 and al-Tabari, 7ärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 65. 
136 Hesitancy is considered to be a fatal weapon against one's own army. See Department of the Army, 
Military Leadership, p. 6. 
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Muslim community. However, the Prophet knew that he had to fight alongside his men in 
order to accomplish his mission successfully. Also, at Uhud he allowed a fifteen-year-old 
Companion to join in the combat since he was an exceptional archer, which suggests that 
he may have already decided on a plan which required the skills of brilliant archers. 137 
With quickness of thought accompanied by self-control, he managed to determine clearly 
and correctly how to save the Muslim army from being decisively defeated or even being 
slain on the spot. In addition, he insisted on the fair treatment of all his soldiers, making 
no distinction between them. 138 The nobility of the cause was clearly re-emphasised on 
the day of the battle as the Prophet addressed his men and raised their sights above 
worldly wealth. "' Additionally, it can be clearly seen that the Prophet managed to build a 
very strong morale and fighting spirit among his men: after the day of the battle, he was 
able to gather in his wounded, rebuild the army's spirit, and chase the Quraysh forces, 
camping for three days in Hamra' al-Asad. 140 
V. 6.3: The Battle of al-Khandaq 
This battle can be said to be different in character from the two previously discussed, since 
most of the activity took a psychological rather than a physical form. The leadership, 
however, remained the same as in the previous battles, and it had gained in experience, 
which resulted in the execution of a new and different plan. Nonetheless, the leadership 
had to stand firm in the face of the mighty alliance of the confederate army. The Muslims 
showed their trust in their leadership when it was tested, as it had to make the unusual 
and bold decision to dig a trench around Medina. To complete digging the trench would 
take more than two weeks, time they could have used to formulate and carry out another 
plan. 141 The whole enterprise demonstrated close and determined teamwork of the 
Muslim army. 142 Regarding the element of tagwä, its effectiveness was demonstrated when 
Ijudhayfah b. al-Yamän went on a scouting mission to the Quraysh camp. Remembering 
that the Prophet had forbidden him to participate in the battle of Badr because he had 
made an argument with the Quraysh not to fight them, and that he was bound by 
137 See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 12 and al-I; Ialabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 493. 
Also we should bear in mind that only a few hours elapsed between his deciding to accept this archer 
and being in position on the battlefield. 
138 See Musnad Ahmad (No. 23536, v. 5, p. 411). 
139 See al-ITalabi, al-Sirah al-ffalabiyyah, v. 2, p. 496. 
140 See al-Sunan al-Kubrä (Surah al-°Imrän, No. 11083, v. 6, p. 317), Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, pp. 52-53, 
Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 49, al-I Talabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 12, and al- 
Sha°räwi, Ghazawät al-Rasdl, pp. 156-159. 
141 The number of the confederate army was more than the number of the people in Medina including 
the women and children. See al-Ghadbän, al-Manha, v. 1, p. 333. 
142 See the section "The Battle of al-Khandaq" in the chapter "Me Battles and their Significance" 
(Ch. 3). 
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doctrine and tagwä to keep to his agreement, although he had the opportunity to 
assassinate their leader he did not attempt to do so because he knew that the Prophet was 
the one who had the most tagwä, hence, to obey him was to obey Alläh. This shows 
clearly the nature and effect of tagwä with respect to both the leader and his 
subordinate. 143 The qualities of patience and endurance were also put to the test, and it 
could be argued the Prophet and his Companions were tested even more severely than in 
the previous battles, as the adversary's siege lasted several weeks. 144 The leadership was in 
the same boat as their army, and all held out against the allied forces with patience and 
endurance. Despite the treachery of the Banü Qurayzah, the Muslims' leadership 
determined not to falter, even at the last moment, when the Prophet attempted a tactical 
manoeuvre. 145 This determination had its effect, and some of the hypocrites showed their 
true colours. 146 The Prophet also knew his men well as he chose the two Sa`ds and others 
to go and verify the rumour about the Bang Qurayzah since they had relations with them. 
Perceiving the current situation, the Prophet joined in the battle himself and carried out 
his duty among his men, defending the trench to the extent that sometimes he could not 
perform his prayers at the appointed time, which had not happened in the previous 
battles. 147 During the most critical phase of the siege the Prophet was calm and confident, 
as can be seen in the way he received the news of the defection of the Bang Qurayph- 148 
Justice and equality were manifested from the first moment of the battle, when the 
Prophet and the other leaders joined their men in the demanding work of digging the 
trench, and carrying baskets of earth on their own shoulders. They also sometimes shared 
the same meal. 149 The Qur'än praises the Prophet's personality and behaviour as setting 
143 See Sabin, al-Bukhäri (Kitäb al Ahkäm, No. 6718, v. 6, p. 2611), Sahib Muslim (Kitäb al-Imärah, No. 
1835, v. 3, p. 1466), Sunan Ibn Mäjah (Bib: Itibic al-Sunnah, No. 3, v. 1, p. 4), and Musnad Ahmad 
(No. 5679, v. 2, p. 93). Also see the section "The Battle of al-Khandaq" in the chapter "The Task of 
Islamic Military Intelligence" (Ch. 6). 
144 The section 'The Battle of al-Khandaq" in the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
145 See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidiyah wa aI-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 104 and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 
640. 
" See the surah al-Munäfigiin. 
147 See Sahib al-Bukhäri (Kitib Mawägit al-Saläh, No. 571, v. 1, p. 214), Sahib Muslim (Kitib al- 
Masäjid wa Mawäd° al-Salh, No. 631, v. 1, p. 438), and Sunan al-Nasä'i (Kitäb al-Sahli, No. 1366, v. 3, 
p. 84). In addition, in some of the works of biography it is reported that the Muslim army missed 
several prayers, as elaborated in detail in Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, pp. 110-111. Also 
see Naumani, Sirat un-Nabl, v. 2, p. 103. 
108 For details of this incident see Sahib al-Bukhäri (Bib: Marrji, al-Nabi min Ghazwat al Ahzäb wa 
Khurz7jahz i1ä Banff Qurayzah, No. 3891, v. 4, p. 1510), Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 187, and al-Halabi, 
al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 639. 
149 See Sahib al-Bukhäri (Bib: Ghazwatal-Khandaq, No. 3875, v. 4, p. 1505), Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, 
p. 157, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 97, and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 
655. 
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the example for his men. 150 The nobility of the cause was again emphasised when the 
Prophet was breaking up the different types of rock the Muslims encountered while they 
were digging. He declared that Allah had opened for him the Yemen, Syria, and the 
East. "' In addition, the Prophet refused to take up the offer of the Quraysh to purchase 
the dead body of Nawfal despite the straitened economic conditions of the Muslims. "' It 
is possible to say that of the five battles this was an example of psychological warfare. At 
al-Khandaq the Muslim leaders exercised a new dimension of war. The Qur'an describes 
the battle as a psychological battle rather than a combat, and the glad tidings of the 
Prophet, the capture of the twenty-camel caravan and the continuous participation of the 
leaders in the hardships of their men managed to keep the army's spirit steady and under 
control. 
V. 6.4: The Battle of al-Yarmük 
The leadership in the three battles discussed above had been under the command of the 
Prophet (PBUH), who was assisted by the säbigi n: men such as Abü Bakr, I; iamzah b. 
cAbd al-Muttalib, and °Ali b. Abi Tälib. However, Khälid b. al-Walid, who was late in 
embracing Islam and who had in fact fought against the Muslim army in several battles 
was not considered to be from the first säbigdn, in contrast to the Prophet, Abü Bakr, 
Umar, and Sa'd. 153 The last three were among the first forty men to embrace Islam. 
Nevertheless, the soldiers who fought in the battle of al-Yarmilk considered Khälid as 
being from the first generation. "' Khälid possessed what some of the säbiqün lacked: 
brilliant military leadership capabilities. "' His ability gave Khälid the right of 
preeminence to lead men, among whom were some recipients of the Prophet's glad tidings 
to the Companions regarding their entering Paradise (al-Asharah al-Mubashshari n bi al- 
Jannah) such as Abü cUbaydah cAmr b. al-Jarräh and al-Zubayr b. al 'Awwäm. 156 Having 
said that we should not forget that Abü Bakr and Umar were the highest leaders of the 
Aso See the previous section "The Significant Qualities of the Muslim Leader: Justice and Equality". '5' See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 175, al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 92, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah 
wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 100, and al-I; IaIabi, al-Sirah al-Hala biy yah, v. 2, p. 634. 
isz See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari v. 2, p. 95, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 106, and al- 
Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 637. It should be noted that some historians have identified the 
body in question as that of °Amrü b. cAbd Wid al cAmiri. See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, 
p. 107. 
153 Khälid b. al-Walid was not from the first generation of the five Muslim leaders since he did not 
become a Muslim during the Mecca period. He fought against the Prophet in several battles and 
migrated to Medina in the eighth year of the Hijra (about 629 AD). See al-Khattäb, Khälid, pp. 68-69, 
173-199, & 206. 
Asa See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, p. 12. 
. ss Khälid said that the Prophet did not consider anyone else to have an equal ability. See al-Tabari, 
Tänith al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 240 & 325. 
" This took place at the battle of al-Yarmilk. See al-Qurashi, Awwaliyät al-FarLq, p. 89. 
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Muslim army and were also from among the säbigrln. Thus, since they had experience of 
warfare and they held a competence derived from the authority of Islam, assigning them 
as säbigvn leaders increased the performance of the soldiers to its highest level. "' 
Nonetheless, with the exception of the battle of Mu'tah, none of them had prior 
experience of fighting against the Byzantine Empire. "' However, it seems that Khalid b. 
al-Walid was more experienced in mounted combat than most of the others, since he had 
been practising this type of fighting since his youth, and by virtue of the responsibilities 
his kin held in the Quraysh tribes. "' It is recorded that bravery and tagwä were displayed 
by the leaders in the battle of al-Yarmük, i. e. Abü Bakr, Umar, and Khälid b. al-Walid. 
However, it could be argued that the bravery of Abü Bakr and Umar is not strictly 
relevant here since they were not in positions of leadership in the battle itself; 
nevertheless, their knowledge of their men may have influenced the outcome. Regarding 
the quality of tagwä: despite having led the Muslims to victory, Khälid b. al-Walid was 
discharged by Umar, a decision which can be seen as both brave and wise; Khälid did not 
object but obeyed the order of the Caliph, having in mind the element of tagwä even at 
the joyful moment of victory. 16Ö 
Tagwä can also be recognised in the effect of the farewell addresses of the overall leaders 
of the army to their field commanders; these motivated the soldiers to increase the fear of 
Allah in their hearts and thus to fight for His sake and not for worldly wealth. '6' Also, 
Abü Bakr's letter to Khälid ordering him to go to Syria was full of tagwä. '62 
Abü Bakr as the Caliph and thus the supreme leader of the Muslim army at the battle of 
al-Yarmiik was known for his patience and endurance, but it is not possible, even by 
reading between the lines, to evaluate his direct effect on the course of the battle. 16' It 
15' Also see the hadith: "You must then follow my sunna and that of the rightly-guided Caliphs. Hold 
to it and stick fast to it. " See Sunan Ibn Mäjah (Bib: Itibic Sunnat al-KhulaAr, No. 42, v. 1, p. 15), 
Musnad Ahmad (No. 17172, v. 4, p. 126), al-Mustadrak `ala al-Sahihayn (Kitib al-°Ilm, No. 329, v. 1, p. 
174), Sunan Abü Da üd (Bib: Itibi al-Sunnah, No. 4607, v. 4, p. 200), and Sahih Ibn I iibbän (Bib: 
Wasfal-Firqah al-Niiyah v. 1, p. 179). 
'58 See Sahih al-Bukhäri (Kitib Fa(fiil al-, Sahibah, No. 3547, v. 3, p. 1372), Ibn Kathir, a1-Bidiyah wa 
al-Nihiyah, v. 4, p. 241, and al-Iialabi, al-Sirah al-ljalabiyyah, v. 2, pp. 786-787. 
119 Khälid b. al-Walid's kin were in command of the horsemen fighting for the Quraysh both prior to 
and after the revelation of Islam. See Ibn Iiajar, al-Isibah, v. 2, p. 251 and Kattäb, Khilid, p. 55. 
160 See Khattäb, Khälid, pp. 161 & 234. 
16' See al-Tabari, Tirikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 335. Also see the section "The Reasons for Islamic Combat" 
in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
162 See Kamäl, al-Qidisiyyah, pp. 32-33. 
'63 Abü Bakr showed great patience and endurance in the battles of the Riddah wars. See al-Tabari, 
Tirikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 255 and Ibn Kathir, al-Bidiyah wa al-Nihiyah, v. 6, p. 311. 
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seems very likely, however, that Khalid's patience and endurance did have a direct effect, 
as he led the final attack in the battle. " 
Additionally, what is known of Abü Bakr's position does not clearly indicate that his 
determination had a direct effect on the performance of the soldiers at al-Yarmiik; but 
everybody knew the extent of his determination, which was made clear when he decided 
to attack the tribes of cAbs and Dhubyan despite the objections of the closer Companions, 
among whom was Umar b. al-Khattab, who had fought in the Riddah wars. '65 cUmar was 
also known for his determination, especially when he relieved Khalid of the command of 
the Muslim army at the battle of al-Yarmük. Many another leader would have thought 
twice before removing a very successful commander at the peak of his powers. 'Umar's 
intention, according to al-Qurashy, was to make the soldiers clearly understand the real 
power behind their victories and place their trust in A115h. 166 Further, Khalid's 
determination to entirely change the plan regarding the Muslim cavalry at al-Yarmük was 
very risky, especially when we bear in mind that he was facing the overwhelming power 
of the Byzantine army. 167 However, the Muslim soldiers had great trust in his capabilities 
as a military leader. '68 
At the battle of al-Yarmük Abü Bakr and Umar knew what had to be done. They also 
understood, after reading the letters they had received from the leader of the army, how 
important it was for the Muslims to win this battle. '69 Although Abü Bakr was not directly 
involved in locating the battlefield, after he had gathered most of the available men, 
whom he knew well, and sent them to the battle of al-Yarmük he also ordered Khalid b. 
al-Walid to leave Iraq and take over the command of the Muslim army in al-Sham, thus 
demonstrating the principle that the successful leader is the one who knows the 
'64 The patience and endurance of the Muslim's leaders is vividly revealed in an anecdote narrated in 
al-Mustadrak °ala al-Sahihayn concerning this battle. Three mortally wounded leaders under the 
command of Kh5lid b. al-Walid were at the last moments of their lives when they were offered water 
to drink. When the first one was given the water and was about to drink, he saw that one of his 
comrades was looking at the water so he asked for it to be passed to him and did not drink. When the 
second leader was offered the water he saw the third looking at it; so it was passed to him. The third 
man, when about to drink it, saw the first one looking at it again. Then it was offered again to the first, 
but he died before even sipping any of it; the second and third also died before they could drink. See 
al-Mustadrak cala al-Sahihayn (Bib: Manigib °Ikrimah b. Abi Jahl, No. 5058, p. 3, p. 270). 
165 Abil Bakr was determined not to accept that one could be a Muslim while rejecting the zakih, one 
of the five Pillars of Islam, as some powerful tribes argued. He was the most unbending of all the 
Companions in this matter. See al-Tabari, Tirkh al-Tabar4 v. 2, p. 255 and Ibn Kathir, al-Bidiyah wa 
al-Nihiyah, v. 6, p. 311. 
'66 See al-Qurashy, Awwaliyyital-Firriq, pp. 89-94. 
167 See Kamal, al--Tariq ilaDimashq, pp. 474-475. 
168 It was reported that his arrival at the battlefield from Iraq brought the Muslim army great joy. See 
al-Tabari, Tirikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 334 and al-Khaft5b, Khälid, p. 143. 
'fig See al-Tabari, Tarikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 334. 
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capabilities of his men. Abü Bakr's decision to choose Khälid from among the available 
commanders can be seen as illustrating the notion that if the leader knows himself he 
therefore knows the person best qualified to accomplish a mission. In addition, Khälid 
himself knew his own great ability as a warrior and so realised that he had to actively 
participate in the fight. 1' Hence, when negotiations were being conducted before the 
battle of al-Yarmük, Khälid b. al-Walid sent cUbädah b. al-Sämit, who was from the same 
tribe as the opposing negotiator, to represent the Muslim army with a view to influencing 
the negotiations. "' Nonetheless, it is impossible that Khälid could have known all his 
men's abilities thoroughly, due to the huge numbers of the Muslim army and also to the 
continuous arrival of new Muslim soldiers. "' 
At al-Yarmük, the self-control of the leaders directly resulted in bringing the situation 
under control. The often-repeated phrase in Military Leadership, that everyone is afraid in 
combat'73 is not in accord with Khälid b. al-Walid's remark, when he heard one of his 
soldiers referring to the great size of the Byzantine army, that he wished his horse's hoofs 
were a little harder and his enemy doubled. Thus he strengthened the spiritual power of 
his fighting men. 14 Therefore the Muslim leader is supposed to consider the quality of 
self-control and apply it in his behaviour. During the critical point of the battle of al- 
Yarmük, some Muslim soldiers panicked and retreated under the first wave of the attack; 
but generally their leaders kept full control of themselves and did not panic, nor did they 
retreat from the battlefield. 15 For instance, the Uzd tribe had to bear the brunt of the 
assault as Khälid expected. 16 Nevertheless, Mucädh b. Jabal and his son, together with 
some other soldiers, showed extreme valour by standing firm, and called their tribe to 
return. Khälid then ordered Hajjäj, with five hundred warriors, to assist the Uzd tribe and 
push the Byzantine army back. ' 
10 In addition, Khalid knew that he had to be there as soon as possible, so he chose the shortest route 
to Syria even though it was fraught with danger. See al-Tabari, Tarikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 346. 
171 'Ubadah b. al-$5mit was sent to meet Jabalah b. al-Aytham. They were both from the tribe of Wald 
'Amr b. 'Ämr. See al-Wagidi, Fun7h al-Sham, v. 1, p. 156. 
172 At the battle of Nahawand, when 'Umar was informed that some of the leaders known to him had 
been killed, he wept; then when he was told that some other Muslims had also died he wept again. 
The messenger reported that these, however, were not among the people that 'Umar knew. Then 
'Umar, still grieving for them, replied: "What harm can they come to? Even if 'Umar did not know 
them, Allah knows them". This indicates that the Muslim leader did not have to know all his men 
personally in order to know their capabilities and regret their loss. See al-Tabari, 75rikh al-Taban, v. 2, 
p. 520. 
173 See Department of the Army, MilitaryLeadership, pp. 55-56. 
174 See al-Tabari, Tarikh al-Taban, v. 2, p. 337 and Nu'mani, al-Farr7q, p. 139. 
15 See al-Tabari, Tarikh al-Taban, v. 2, p. 338 and Ibn Kathir, al-Bidayah wa al-Nihayah, v. 7, p. 11. 
176 See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidayah wa al-Nihayah, v. 7, p. 13. For further detail see al-Wagidi, Fun7h al- 
Sham, v. 1, p. 195 and Nu'mani, al-Farüq, p. 141. 
"' Hajjaj was the chieftain of the Zubayd clan. See Nu'mani, al-Farüq, p. 140. 
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Abü Bakr's justice and even-handedness may not have had a direct effect, but it was made 
known to everyone through the first speech he delivered. "' cUmar's display of justice and 
insistence on equality, however, was very effective as he removed a celebrated leader, 
Khalid, acting in consideration of the long-term advantage to the cause of Islam. 
The personalities of the leaders at al-Yarmük differed widely. Abü Bakr's personality had 
less effect on the conduct of al-Yarmük than that of Umar, his successor as Caliph. 
Perhaps most importantly, Khalid succeeded in changing the plan of the Muslim army in 
short order, a feat that could not have been achieved unless the leader's personality had 
been able to exert a strong influence. "' Apart from questions of personality, the leaders at 
al-Yarmilk made the cause of fighting clear and emphasised its nobility from the 
beginning. The farewell and letters of Abü Bakr and Umar at the departure of the army 
from Medina show that they were fully aware of the goal of the struggle. "' In addition 
Khalid's speeches both before and during the combat also made clear that the fight was 
for an honourable reason. 181 
Lastly, it appears that Abü Bakr chose Khalid to be in command at the battle of al-Yarmük 
partly because some of the Muslim soldiers in al-Sham had either heard of him or had 
fought under his command in previous battles. Also, Khalid was loved as a military 
commander by many if not all of the Muslim army. Khalid continued to strengthen the 
psychological spirit of his army by assigning some leaders to new positions. He placed Abü 
cUbaydah in the rear of the Muslim army because he intended to make the Amin al- 
UmmaR82 highly visible, so that whoever ran away would feel shame and return to the 
battle. 
V. 6.5: The Battle of al-Qädisiyyah 
In this battle another leadership took over, although Umar was still Caliph. He believed 
this battle was so important that he at first intended to go to lead the Muslim army 
himself, but was prevailed upon to send one of the säbigün Companions to take command. 
He believed that he had to choose one who would carry out this mission promptly, but he 
took several days to decide whom to choose. After consulting most of the Companions in 
18 See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 6, p. 82 and al-Tabari, Tirikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 238. 
19 For the new formation see Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, p. 8. 
180 For example see al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Taban; v. 2, p. 335. 
18' See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, p. 12. 
'82 He was called the Amin hidhihi al-Ummah, "the Trustworthy Man of the Umma", when he was 
sent to Najrän. For the rest of the story see Sähih al-Bukhäri (Kitäb al-Maghäzi, No. 3535, v. 3, p. 
1369), Sahib Muslim (Bib: FacläYJAbi °Ubaydah, No. 2420, v. 4, p. 1882), al-Tabari, Tirikh al-Tabari, 
v. 2, p. 233, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 3, p. 53, and al-Dahabi, SiyarATläm al-Nubali, v. 1, 
p. 12. 
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the region, he chose Sacd b. Abi Waggäs to be in command even though he was not in the 
region. Sacd was the sixth or seventh man to embrace Islam. 183 When he took over, he 
also assigned säbiqün Muslims to be in charge of the standards. 184 This provides a clear 
indication of how important the Muslim leaders considered the quality of the säbigrin in 
this battle. 
Unlike the Prophet, Sacd did not have the advantage of having gained experience in 
warfare fought in battle before the revelation of Islam since he was fifteen years old when 
he embraced Islam. Nevertheless, he had enough experience through having taken part in 
battles or expeditions during the early period of Islam. "' But he had no previous 
experience of fighting against the Säsänian Empire. '86 
`Umar, as Caliph, made a brave decision when he decided to send forces to conquer one of 
the greatest empires of that time. '8' Also `Umar's tagwä can be seen in the letters he sent 
to Sacd, which made it clear that Sa°d should not be unduly proud of being the Prophet's 
uncle, implying that he should have more tagwä. 188 It can be argued that in the battles of 
conquest Sacd matched Khälid's bravery as he remained in command on the battlefield 
despite his sickness, which made movement difficult and painful. "' The bravery and 
tagwä shown by Sacd in leading his men into the fiercest heat of the battle made it clear 
to them that their leader was with them, accepting that whatever happened to them 
would also be his fate. 
`Umar's patience and endurance can be seen in his skilful planning of the battle. Although 
greatly concerned and determined190 to rule the new Islamic State and preoccupied by his 
other duties as Caliph, he asked Sacd to write to him almost daily, and recounted every 
detail of his actions. He also shared with Sacd his decisions on operational and tactical 
183 See Säbih al-Bukhäri (Kitäb al-Zuhd wa al-Raga'9q, No. 2967, v. 4, p. 2278), al-Tabari, 7ärikh al- 
TabaA, v. 2, p. 439, and Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, p. 48. 
184 See al-Tabari, Tirikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 385, Kamäl, al-Qädisiyyah, p. 39, and Hitti, History of the 
Arabs, pp. 141 & 155. 
185 After he embraced Islam, he either joined the Muslim army in combat or heard of its exploits. 
Consequently, it is possible to say that he had had over twenty-eight years' experience when assigned 
to be in command in this battle. 
186 See Sahib al-Bukhäri (Kitäb Fad. §71 al-Sahäbah, No. 3547, v. 3, p. 1372), Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah Wa 
al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 241, and al-I; lalabi, al-Sirah al-ffalabiyyah, v. 2, pp. 786-787. 
187 Umar wanted to go himself at first but as he was chief among the Companions they objected and 
advised him to send someone else. See al-Tabari, 7ärikh a! -Tabari, v. 2, p. 407 and Kamäl, al- 
Qädisiyyah, pp. 126-127. 
188 The Prophet once praised Sacd by saying: "Sa`d is my uncle... " See al-Mustadrak °ala al-S5bihayn 
(Bib: Manägib Sa°d b. Abi Waggäs, No. 6113, v. 3, p. 569). Moreover, `Umar's farewell to Sa`d was also 
full of tagwi. See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 386 and Kamäl, a1-Qidisiyyah, pp. 32-33. 
189 He was suffering from boils. See al-Tabari, Tirikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 407 and Kamäl, a1-Qadisiyyah, 
pp. 126-127. 
190oUmar was also known for his determination, shown especially in the story of his returning Zuhrah's 
booty. See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 426 and Kamäl, a1-Qidisiyyah, pp. 126-127. 
154 
Ch. S: The Impact of Islamic Military Leadership 
movements. 191 Moreover, al-Qa`gac b. cAmr and other Muslim leaders showed great 
patience by fighting continuously for thirty hours without rest; for if the Muslim leaders 
had rested their soldiers would have followed suit. 
Sacd also showed great determination in disciplining his soldiers when some of them went 
against his field commander, Khälid b. cArfatah. 192 He jailed some of them despite needing 
every soldier he could find. 193 His determination allayed the army's fear and disorder. 
Furthermore, although al-Muthanna b. Härithah194 had led Muslim armies in other 
battles in the region, `Umar knew how important it was for the Muslim army to win this 
battle. Consequently, Umar was involved directly in allocating the battlefield for the 
expected - and dreaded - engagement with the Persian army. Sacd also knew that he had 
to be close to the combat especially after the indiscipline of some men in the army, even 
though he would have been excused for remaining at a distance from the battlefield due 
to his sickness. '9' Sacd had also sent several plain-speaking messengers to express the 
Muslims' demands regarding the current situation during the negotiations with the leader 
of the Persian army. '96 Even though Sa'd `knew his men', he, like the leader at al-Yarmnk, 
could not know every man in the army, since it contained soldiers from many tribes. 197 
Despite this, it seems that the Muslim leaders had sufficient knowledge of their men to 
allow them to ease the task of the Muslim army at al-Qädisiyyah. 
cUmar and Sacd also showed great self-control as well as determination as they jointly 
adopted the tactic of making the Muslim army wait for a many months on the battlefield 
they had allocated in advance despite the frustration this caused in the ranks. '98 In 
addition, they were attempting to assuage the psychological damage to the Muslim army 
caused by the defeat at al-Jisr. 
Long before al-Qädisiyyah the Muslim army had known `Umar's commitment to justice 
and equality, which was evidenced after the battle when he reproached Sacd and ordered 
the return of the very valuable booty of al-Jälinüs - one of the Persian leaders- which 
191 See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Taban, v. 2, p. 384. 
192 On another occasion, Sa'd's determination was shown when he ordered his men not to ask about 
moving forward to face the Persian army. See al-Tabari, T rikh al-Taban, v. 2, p. 397. 
193 See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Taban, v. 2, p. 407 and Kamäl, al-Qädisiyyah, pp. 126-127. 
194 He was the chieftain of the Banii Shaybän. He was not one of the Companions and became a 
Muslim after the death of the Prophet. He died before the arrival of Sa°d b. Abi Waggäs. 
195 Sa`d was so close to the action that he could not have run away in case of defeat. See al-Tabari, 
Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 407 and Kamäl, al-Qädisiyyah, pp. 126-127. 
196 Sa°d knew that straightforward characters would present the goal of the Muslim army clearly and 
with spiritual strength. See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 400 and Kamäl, al-Qadisiyyah, p. 113. 
197 See Ibn K5thir, al-Bid, yah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, pp. 30-39. 
198 See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 387 and Kamäl, al-Qädisiyyah, pp. 226-227. 
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Zuhrah1 had seized after he killed him. 200 Sa`d's sense of justice and equality, as well as 
his determination, was made apparent to the Muslim army as he preferred to stay with his 
men rather than in a safe place, although he would not have been blamed had he kept 
away from the battlefield, but he wanted to share the trials of his men as they faced the 
might of the adversary. 201 
In contrast to the limited effectiveness of Abü Bakr at al-Yarmük, cUmar's strong 
personality proved very influential since at al-Qädisiyyah he had the power to motivate 
the army although he remained in Medina. Sa`d's strong personality was also in evidence 
when he quashed and punished the outbreak of indiscipline against his field commander 
and persuaded the other soldiers to obey his commands properly. 202 Moreover the strong 
personality of the leaders was devoted to stressing the noble cause of the battle. 203 
In addition, Umar had sent from Medina several swords and horses of great value to be 
given to those who showed extreme courage in order to increase the psychological 
strength of his army to its highest level. 204 Sa`d and his field leaders also managed to 
increase their soldiers' fighting spirit by engaging in an ingenious deception to persuade 
the Persians that the Muslim army was being augmented by daily reinforcements. 205 Thus, 
it is possible to say that the Muslim leaders at all levels had the necessary combination of 
psychological skills to increase the soldiers' psychical strength and enhance their 
performance in this battle. 
Assessing the contributions of these leaders and considering the implications of their 
qualities, it is clear that they possessed different qualities, whose specific features were 
combined in particular ways. The first three battles were conducted by the same 
leadership, the other two by different leaders. The Prophet himself led the Muslim army 
at Badr, Ubud, and al-Khandaq; and he, from an Islamic perspective, could not be 
matched by any of the other leaders due to his being supported by divine assistance. 
199 His full name was Zuhrah b. 'Abdullah b. Qatädah b. al-Hawiyyah b. al-l; iarith al-A°raj. Prior to 
becoming a Muslim, he was assigned to a high position of leadership by the king of Hajr. See al-Tabari, 
Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 385. 
200 See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 426. For a discussion of this issue see the section "The 
Division of Booty and the Treatment of Prisoners of War" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military 
Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
201 See the map of the battle of al-Qädisiyyah. 
202 Nonetheless, it cannot be said that the whole Muslim army followed his orders exactly because it 
was an immensely difficult task for a leader unable to move freely to control an alliance of various 
tribes facing a huge army. See al-Tabari, Tafsir al-Tabari, v. 24, pp. 117-118 and Ibn Kathir, Tafsir Ibn 
Kathir, v. 4, p. 101. 
203 The farewell of cUmar at the departure of the Muslim armies from Medina and Sacd's speeches prior 
to and during the confrontation made fully clear the honourable goal of the fighting. See al-Tabari, 
Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 386 and Kam5l, al-Qädisiyyah, pp. 32-33. 
204 See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 414. 
205 See ibid, p. 412. 
156 
Ch. 5: The Impact of Islamic Military Leadership 
However, the Prophet possessed many qualities which Muslims in general are required to 
imitate. 2o6 
V. 7: Comparison of the Battles 
The leaderships in the five battles will now be compared and their achievements assessed. 
In the first three battles the leadership remained unchanged. It possessed most of the 
standard qualities discussed in this study. However not all of these qualities were equally 
apparent in each battle. For example, the element of psychological strength was obvious 
and fully applied at the battle of al-Khandaq where the Prophet and his commanders 
were mainly from the säbiqün. At al-Yarmnk, however, the leadership was not considered 
to be from the säbigvn with the exception of the Caliph and other Companions under the 
command of Khälid b. al-Walid. The quality of warfare experience was not the same in 
the five battles. In fact, even though the leadership remained unchanged in the first three 
battles it executed different battle plans and thus underwent different experiences. 2Ö7 In 
fact, it is possible to say that the leaderships had five different experiences of warfare in 
these five battles, except that the leadership at al-Yarmük had previously fought against 
the Byzantine Empire. Nevertheless, they all exhibited the qualities of bravery and 
tagw! 08 and of patience and endurance 209 On examining the available evidence it is 
206 The Qut'än (ETMC), 33: 21, states: "Ye have indeed in the Messenger of Allah an excellent 
example for him who he hopes in Allah and the Final Day, and who remembers A115h much. " 
207 All the appointed leaders of the discussed battles were widely experienced in warfare either through 
battles fought before the foundation of Islam, for instance Harb al-Fujär, or through the battles or 
expeditions conducted after the establishment of the Islamic army. Secondly, it should not be forgotten 
that the Quraysh were in a state of undeclared war with the Muslims during the first thirteen years of 
Islam. Lastly, it could be added that their nature as Arabs made them rely on fighting as a method of 
solving most of their problems. Nonetheless, except during the battle of Mu'tah, none of them had 
prior experience of fighting against the two great empires of that time, i. e. the Säsänian and Byzantine 
Empires. See 1) Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 1, p. 324, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 2, p. 289, al- 
Ijalabi, al-Sirah al Halabiyyah, v. 1, p. 207, Firestone, Jihad, p. 131, and Zakaria, The Makkan Crucible, 
pp. 63-65,2) al-Rashid, al-Qiyädah al-Askariyah, pp. 49-50 and Firestone, Jihad, p. 131, and 3) Sahih 
al-Bukhäri (Kitäb Fadäil al-Sahäbah, No. 3547, v. 3, p. 1372), Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, 
v. 4, p. 241, al-Ijalabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, pp. 786-787, and Nicolle, The Military Technology, 
v. 1, p. 269. 
208 The Prophet's bravery, however, was obvious in the first three battles since he was in command 
while Abii Bakr, 'Umar, Khälid, and Sa°d were not. Indeed, it could be argued that the bravery of Abil 
Bakr and 'Umar was not outstanding since they were not in the position of direct and noticeable 
leadership. In addition, in the battles of conquest Khälid's extensive involvement was the key to victory 
and Sacd remained in command on the battlefield despite his sickness. Thus both showed their 
bravery. Respectively see 1) Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 162, al-Tabari, 7ärikh al-Tabari v. 2, p. 26, Ibn 
Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 3, p. 262, and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 385 and 2) 
al-Tabad, 72frikh al-Tabar4 v. 2, p. 407 and Kamäl, al-Qädisiyyah, pp. 126-127. 
209 It is indisputable that if the Muslim leaders had rested at al-Qädisiyyah their soldiers would also 
have rested. So, they kept themselves as well as their soldiers alert through raids and various other 
military activities. Thus it is possible to say, considering the examples given above, that all the leaders 
in these battles had patience and endurance to such an extent that they were able to transfer such 
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possible to say that all the leaders considered in this chapter satisfied the three elements 
of the leader's self-knowledge, "' and that these were accompanied by the application of 
the element of determination. "' Furthermore, they also fully demonstrated the quality of 
self-control212 and of justice and equality. They differed, however, in appearance213 and 
personality214 since the Prophet possessed the most effective personality of them all. We 
may conclude that the leaderships at al-Yarmük and al-Qädisiyyah were lesser in quality 
in this respect than the leadership in the first three battles; however, they were effective 
enough to win decisive victories. 215 At all five battles, however, the nobility of the cause 
was repeatedly emphasised. 216 Finally, the leaderships in all the battles in question 
demonstrated their mastery of what we call today psychological warfare, but their 
methods differed from one battle to another. 217 
qualities to their soldiers either by setting an example or through encouragement, and hence to 
influence the Muslim soldiers to increase their performance to its highest level. 
210 In addition, in al-Rashid's discussion of the element of self-knowledge, he emphasises that self- 
accounting was one of the important aspects of Umar b. al-Khattäb's leadership. For example, cUmar 
would advise both the leaders and followers by saying "Make an account of your mistakes before they 
are accounted for you. " See Sunan Ibn Mäjah (Kitäb al-Zuhd, No. 4260, v. 2, p. 1423). Also see Sunan 
al-Tirmidhi (Kitäb Sifat al-Qiyämah wa al-Raga iq wa al-Wars; No. 2459, v. 4, p. 368). 
Furthermore, the Muslim commanders themselves had to participate in the fighting, with the 
exception to certain extent of Badr and al-Qadisiyyah, where the battles were considered to hold the 
key to the survival of the new Muslim community and might end in the capture of the Muslim 
headquarters. Therefore, the leader had to join his men in order to accomplish his mission successfully. 
This in turn helped the soldiers to feel secure in their commitment to serve their common goals. 
211 Considering the given examples, we find that the degree of involvement of the leaders prevented 
the soldiers from losing confidence or falling into confusion, and brought them back to the battle. 
212 The examples also show that, as a result of the self-control demonstrated by the leaders, the soldiers 
willingly returned to the battle after the retreat. 
213 Although the leaders were different in appearance, this element still indirectly impacted upon the 
soldiers' performance in the five battles. For example, `Umar and Khälid b. al-Walid were impressively 
tall. For Umar see al-Mu°jam al-Kabir (No. 59, v. 1, p. 65) and al-Qurashy, Awwaliyyät al-Färi7q, pp. 24- 
25. For Khälid see al-Khattäb, Khälid, p. 224 and Kamäl, al-Tariq Ai Dimashq, p. 458. 
214 In addition, it seems that most of the leaders' personalities were characterised by religious fervour, 
though it could be argued that Khälid b. al-Walid seems to have been pre-eminently a military man. It 
should be borne in mind, however, that Islam did not exist only as a religious and spiritual movement, 
for Islamic Shari`a does not accept the separation of state and religion. Islam, therefore, involves every 
aspect of the Muslim's life. See Ismätil, al-Din wa al-°llm, p. 7 and Muhammad Qutb, DiräsätRal-Nafs, 
pp. 311-317. 
215 It should not be forgotten that the strength of the Prophet's personality was supported by divine 
revelation. 
216 Thus, before all the battles in question, the Muslim leaders at all levels repeatedly made clear to 
their soldiers that they were fighting for the Cause of Allah and that their aim was paradise not 
wealth. See al-Sayyid Säbiq, Figh al-Sunnah, v. 3, pp. 40-41, I iusayn, al-Agidah al-Askatiyyah, pp. 47- 
48, Gbaybah, Mugawwimät al-Shakhciyyah, pp. 10-11, and Rudolph, Islam and Colonialism, p. 121. 
217 Thus it is possible to argue that Muslim leaders at all levels had the necessary psychological skills to 
increase the soldiers' psychical strength and enhance their performance in the five battles. 
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V. 8: Conclusion 
Generally speaking, any approach to any phenomenon has its own strong and weak 
points. This chapter has attempted to identify and discuss the relevant ideal qualities that 
the Muslim leader needs to possess and apply in order to reach his goals. In addition, the 
chapter has examined Islamic military leadership from a hitherto neglected viewpoint, as 
it has identified the various concepts of Islamic leadership. The chapter has also furnished 
the reader with an insight into how the Muslim leaders worked together and what types 
of relation existed between them and their men, so that the reader might understand the 
effect of this element on both the leadership and the soldiers. The chapter also discussed 
some important qualities of the Muslim leader using related examples from the five 
battles. Some of these different qualities were occasionally integrated and discussed in 
pairs since they could be said to have a close relationship when they are applied. It should 
be noted, however, that some leadership qualities have not been included since this is a 
study of Islamic history, and so the discussion has concentrated on those qualities 
mentioned in the Qur'än and the hadith. 
In conclusion, the foregoing discussion has shown that Islam recognises and promotes 
certain important qualities, whose exercise permitted the Muslim leaders to have a 
positive influence on their soldiers' performance in the five battles in question. 
However, at the battle of al-Jisr, the commander, although not deficient in his 
commitment to Islamic doctrine, failed in his duty to investigate the strength of his 
adversary and paid the price? '8 In the next chapter we will see that intelligence is of great 
importance to any military commander and that it was vital to the success of the Muslim 
leaders in the battles under discussion. 
216 The battle of al-Jisr occurred between the Muslim army and the Persian army. The Muslim army 
was led by Abn cAbid, from the Bann Thagif. He broke one of the Islamic warfare guidelines - that of 
consultation - of the Islamic Military Doctrine when he refused to accept the advice of his men not to 
cross the bridge, because doing so would not allow them enough room for manoeuvre. The Muslim 
army was defeated, their leader perished and about 4000 men out of 6000 were killed. See the section 
"Consultation" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). For the battle see al- 
Tabari, Tärikh al-Taban; v. 2, p. 366 and Ibn Khayyät [160/777-240/857], Tärikh Khalifah b. Khayyät, 
p. 125. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
The Task of Islamic Military Intelligence 
Throughout history, intelligence gathering has been considered as a major weapon used 
by most nations whether at war or in peace time. ' Intelligence is believed to play an 
important role in determining the outcome of a war. ' The effect of intelligence has been 
measured according to its application at either the individual level or the group level. 
Despite the fact that many nations agree on the importance of intelligence due to the wide 
area it covers, no clear and comprehensive definition exits, although there is a broad 
consensus on its various usages. ' Nonetheless, Islam generally does not permit Muslims to 
use the element of intelligence in the same way as other nations. The Qur'än seems to 
forbid it: "Spy not on each other. "' Yet it also says: "0 ye who believe! Take your 
precautions. And either go forth in parties or go forth all together. "5 These exhortations 
commit the study to define intelligence from the Islamic military perspective. 6 This means 
that the definitions of Islamic writers will be highlighted and criticised as necessary. ' 
However, it should be understood that Muslim intelligence activity was not recognised to 
be the task of a separate military organization. 
VI. 1: The Definition of Islamic Military Intelligence 
To consider the matter in greater depth, the word intelligence is mentioned in the Qur'än 
in the form of its various synonyms, such as tajassasü, tahassasü, al-nadhir, dAllähum, 
' Arthur Ferrill observes: "an organised military intelligence is as old as history itself. " See Neilson and 
McKercher, Go Spy the Land, p. 1. Brogmann, Holding on Reality, p. 1, also emphasises the 
importance of information: "Without information about reality, without reports and records, the reach 
of experience quickly trails off into the shadows of ignorance and forgetfulness. " 
2 Dairi, Ara' fi al-Harb, p. 5, states that the enemy never remain static; they are subject to continuous 
change and development which may occur rapidly both before and during the battle. Thus, even at this 
late stage the strategy and tactics an army has adopted in advance on the basis of intelligence reports 
should be amenable to change according to the new circumstances. 
Manäsarah, al-Istikhbärät, pp. 90-91. 
Neilson and McKercher, Go Spy the Land, pp. 20-21, mention that some nations build their military 
intelligence systems by aiming primarily at the civilian population. On the contrary, the Muslim army 
conducted its intelligence activities according to the demands of the Qur'än (ETMC), 8: 60. For the 
verse quoted see the Quedn, 49: 12. 
'See the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 71. 
6 Even though "intelligence" is a modem term, in Arabic it was used and mentioned in the Qur'än and 
the With. Therefore there is no reason not to use it here. 
A specific definition will be attempted; however, Lawrence Freedman's words should not be 
forgotten: he argues that it is difficult to construct a universal theory of intelligence. See Freedman, 
"Powerful Intelligence" in Andrew and Handel (eds), Intelligence and National Security, No. 2, v. 12, p. 
200. 
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khudhü hidhrakum, and al-`ayn. 8 However, the two words tahassasü and tajassasü have 
almost the same meaning; 9 tahassasü is according to Ibn Kathir slightly different from 
tajassasü since it is sometimes used in to indicate a good manner or the other is to indicate 
an evil manner. 10 However, the opinions of al-Qurtubi and al-Halabi seem to be more 
convincing; they mention that tahassasü means an intelligence mission that is conducted 
by the assigned person himself, i. e. not transferring the task to someone else, whereas 
tajassasühas the opposite meaning. " 
Among the modern writers on Islamic military intelligence discussing partly the period 
under study, Manäsarah considers intelligence to be a well-organised plan which uses all 
available means, including apparatus and information in order to be aware of the enemy's 
political, economic, psychological, and military condition, and hence includes analysing 
and collating the information. This information is handed without delay to the leaders, 
allowing them to make the right decision and implement the necessary strategy. These 
activities would work against counterintelligence, thus guaranteeing the country's 
security. " Al-Dughmi identifies intelligence as the searching out of the enemy's hidden 
news and secret information through the use of intelligence apparatus, particularly at 
times of need, to prepare to counter the enemy's plan. 13 It is noticeable that neither 
definition mentions specifically Islamic characteristics, which is important since the study 
is examining the subject from an Islamic viewpoint. Furthermore, they overlook the effect 
of the intelligence information on the soldiers' performance. It can be argued that such a 
relationship is essential, since a commander's decision based on intelligence will affect his 
troops' performance. Therefore, Islamic military intelligence can be recognised as an 
activity assigned to specially selected personnel, who use all the available means permitted 
s Respectively see the Qur'an, 49: 12,35: 37,34: 14, and 12: 87. However, the word most commonly 
used at the time covered by the study was al-°Ayn. 
It should be acknowledged here that some difficulties exist regarding the usage of the words 'scout' 
(mustaNi) and 'spy' (jasils), since at that time these were synonyms. Ahmad differentiates between spy 
and scout, arguing that the spy collects information under cover and wearing civilian clothes, whereas 
the scout carries out the same task wearing military uniform. In other words the spy is stationed 
behind enemy lines whereas the scout operates between his own forces and those of the enemy, 
although he may cross into the enemy's camp to collect information from the spy. This seems a useful, 
if rough, distinction. See Ahmad, Nahwä Qanün Muwahhad, pp. 76-78. 
' For further usage of the two words see Sahilt al-Bukhäri (Kitäb al-Anbiyä No. 3185, v. 3, p. 1230 and 
Kitäb al-Nikjb, No. 4849, v. 5, p. 1976), Sabi Muslim (Kitäb al-Birr wa al-Sirah wa al Adäb, No. 2563, 
v. 4, p. 1985), Sunan Abü Dä'iid (Bab: al-Shale No. 4917, v. 4, p. 280), Sunan al-Bayhaqi al-Kubrä 
(Kitäb al-Wakälah, No. 11235, v. 6, p. 85), al-Sunan al-Kubrä (Bab: Manägib Häjr, No. 8380, v. 5, p. 
101), Ibn Manz5r, Lisän al-Arab, v. 6, pp. 50-52, and al-Sha°räwi, Tafsiral-Shalräwi, p. 7053. 
10 See Ibn Kathir, Tafsirlbn Kathir, v. 4, p. 214. 
" See al-Tabari, Tafsiral-Tabari, v. 16, p. 333 and al-Halabi, al-Sirah a1-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 381. 
12 See Manaýarah, a1-Istikhbärät, p. 97. 
13 See al-Dughmi, al-Tajassus, p. 27. 
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by Islam to provide the leaders with the proper information in any field of interest, so that 
they can make an accurate assessment of the enemy's strengths and weaknesses and arrive 
at the right decisions, which will affect the soldiers' performance at the time or in the 
future. 14 We will now consider whether intelligence gathering is held to be a legitimate 
activity according to the shari`a. 
VI. 2: The Validity of Intelligence 
Since Muslims rely on the shari'a when considering the legitimacy of almost all of their 
activities, intelligence carried out by them cannot escape being weighed and examined 
from the Islamic perspective. Also, we should remember that intelligence has, for the most 
part, been denigrated as `dirty work'. ` Nevertheless, the Qur'än on many occasions urges 
the necessity of conducting intelligence work in different situations. It urges Muslims to be 
cautious when they are on a mission: "0 ye who believe! When ye go out in the cause of 
Alläh' investigate carefully". 16 Through the sunna, it is also known that on numerous 
occasions the Prophet (PBUH) sent his Companions to gather information. " In fact, he 
himself went to collect information, thus proving the importance and validity of 
intelligence. " Thus, from the early stages of Islam, it could be said that intelligence 
activity was permitted by the teachings of Islam. 
VI. 3: Types and Levels of Intelligence 
The types and levels of intelligence have a close relationship, since the two types of 
intelligence can be applied at all three levels. Hence these two elements will be discussed 
in one section. 
First, intelligence may be divided, according to its activities, into two types, i. e. offensive 
and defensive. An examination of the works of cAbd al-Ghani and Manäsarah on Islamic 
intelligence shows that both authors adopted different approaches in discussing the types 
of intelligence activities: Manäsarah did so briefly, to the extent that he failed to use the 
proper meaning of the words, while cAbd al-Ghani considered them in detail. This study 
is Freedman points out that intelligence agencies seek to find out what others wish to keep hidden. 
However, this study will judge this activity according to Islamic principles. See Freedman, "Powerful 
Intelligence", No. 2, v. 12, p. 198. 
15 For example see Grey, www. wsws. org/articles/2002/mar2002/cia-m20. shtml. 
16 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 94. The Qur'an also urges Muslims to be cautious in, 6: 55 and 49: 6. 
" See Sahib al-Bukhäri (Kitäb al-Jihad, No. 2880, v. 3, p. 1108), Sunan Abü Dä'üd (Kitäb al lihäd, No. 
2660, v. 3, p. 51), and al-Mustadrak °ala al-Sahihayn (Kitäb Ma`rifat al-Sahäbah, No. 4979, v. 3, p. 245). 
'e See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 27 and Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 3, p. 163. 
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will adopt an approach between these two extremes in elaborating on both types of 
intelligence. " 
Firstly, on the one hand, offensive intelligence is that type of intelligence activity which 
aims to collect all the information that will then allow the army to discover the plan of the 
enemy and counter it by measures such as acts of sabotage, political activities, riots, 
psychological war, or necessary action in any other field. 20 
On the other hand, defensive intelligence or counterintelligence deals with matters of 
security and is used mainly to oppose material threats. It may also be used to prevent 
insurrection, conspiracies, internal psychological warfare, and any other destructive 
activities of a country's own people. In addition, and from an Islamic perspective, it 
frustrates the enemy's spies' attempts to collect information about the Muslim army. 21 
Although during the period under study an independent unit formed to work against such 
elements did not exist, the enemy's activities, being themselves simple, were fought against 
in a simple way, 22 and counterintelligence activity played a part in almost all the battles. 
Second, intelligence activities, according to Manäsarah, may also be divided into two 
levels, i. e. strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence. 3 Intelligence activity at the 
strategic level concerns itself with information relating to the intention of the adversary at 
that level, focusing particularly on his weak and strong points. This information is utilised 
by the leadership to construct effective plans of action in both peace and war. 24 
Manäsarah states that the main elements of intelligence at the strategic level tend to be 
centred on the following fields: military, economic, geographical, historical, and social. It 
can be argued that Manäsarah should have added the religious dimension since the 
Muslims were calling others to Islam, and that he should have stated clearly that this type 
of activity was being conducted continuously at both levels. Prior to the battle of Badr, the 
Prophet Muhammad (PPBUH) used intelligence at the strategic level to gather 
information about the caravans of the Quraysh. This resulted indirectly in the battle of 
Badr and therefore also played an important part in bringing about the two subsequent 
19 This way of categorising type intelligence, which were not distinguished by the Muslims during the 
period covered by the study, is adopted for the sake of comparison with the recent views considered in 
the present research. 
20 See Manäsarah, al-Istikhbär7t, p. 72. 
21 See Manäsarah, al-Istikhbärät, pp. 72-73. 
22 At the battle of Badr the Prophet continuously used different means to free the Muslim army from 
the psychological pressure they faced from the Quraysh army. See the section "Psychological Warfare" 
in the Chapter "The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
zs This type of intelligence activity is not mentioned in °Abd al-Ghani's work. See cAbd al-Ghani, Nugrn 
al-Istikhbärät, pp. 74 & 92. 
24 See Glass and Davidson, Intelligence is for Commanders, p. 4 and Manäsarah, a1-Istikhbärät, pp. 74 
& 94. 
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battles, since the Quraysh had to fight for their economic survival by acting to protect 
their caravans. ' Also, prior to the incursion of the Muslim army into Persian territory, 
Umar b. al-Khattäb used intelligence at the strategic level to gather the information he 
needed for the expected confrontation with the Säsänian Empire. 26 It is noteworthy that 
the highest level of leadership of the Muslim army took responsibility for conducting 
intelligence-gathering missions at the strategic level. 
On the other hand, intelligence at the tactical level is that type of activity which is 
sometimes known as fighting intelligence27 or combat intelligence . 
2' This type of 
intelligence activity deals with the field level, that of the individual soldier. 29 It concerns 
itself with the smallest details of intelligence activity such as specific information 
regarding the adversary's arms and equipment. 30 During the first two battles tactical 
intelligence was not required as much as it was to be in the other three due to the limited 
size of both armies. 31 In contrast, unlike the previous battles, the battle of al-Khandaq 
required a greater and more sustained level of intelligence at the tactical level. This was 
due to the long duration of the siege and the different positions of the confederates. At 
the battles of al-Yarmnk and al-Qädisiyyah intelligence at the tactical level was used 
intensively for the following reasons: at al-Yarmük the Muslims were confronting a huge 
army covering a wide area, whereas at al-Qädisiyyah they had to deal with both vastly 
superior forces and the long duration of the battle 32 
However, in breaking down intelligence activities to different levels, Glass and Manäsarah 
omit to mention a possible third type, which fits between intelligence at the strategic level 
and intelligence at the tactical level; that is, intelligence at the operational level. This 33 
25 The Muslim army were seeking to recapture their lost wealth by attacking the Quraysh's caravans 
since they had been forced to leave their wealth behind in Mecca on their migration to Medina. See 
Sahib aI-Bukhäri (Bäb: Ikhä' al-Nabi bayna al-Muhäjirin wa alAnsär, Nos. 3569-3571, v. 3, p. 1378), 
al-Sunan al-Kubrä (IGtäb Amal al-Yawm wa al-Laylah, No. 10013, v. 6, p. 54), and Sunan al-Tirmidhi 
(Kitäb al-Birr, No. 1933, v. 4, p. 328). Also see the story of Suhayb al-Rümi s migration in al-Mustadrak 
Gala al-Sahihayn (Bib: Manägib FJhayb b. Sinän, No. 5700, v. 3, p. 450), Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al- 
Nihäyah, v. 3, p. 174, al-IIalabi, al-Sirah al--ialabiyyah, v. 2, p. 186, and Zakaria, Sunshine at Madinah, 
pp. 66-71. 
26 See Kamäl, al-Qadisiyyah, pp. 29-31. 
27 Manäsarah, al-Istrkhbärät, p. 74. 
28 See Glass and Davidson, Intelligence is for Commanders, p. 4. 
29 To make a further distinction between strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence, strategic 
intelligence is a continuous activity, whereas tactical intelligence is only conducted at the time of need 
and during the conflict. 
31 See Manäsarah, al-Istikhbärät, p. 92. 
31 See the chapter 'The Battles and their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
32 See the map of the two battles in the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
33 In Arabic, it can be called al-Istikhbärät al-Amahyyätiyyah, or Istikhbärat al-Ma'rakah. See al- 
Jabbiiri, al-Amaliyyät, p. 39. 
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type of intelligence activity deals with the whole area of operations. 34 It differs from 
intelligence at the strategic level in that it deals with information regarding potential 
enemy manoeuvres. It also differs from intelligence at the tactical level, as operational 
intelligence takes into account all the surrounding potential threats. At the battle of al- 
Khandaq the Prophet took into account the potential internal threat against the women 
and children. " He assigned a small force to guard the fort where they were being kept, 
ordering that he should be constantly informed of developments in that area 36 
It is clear that the use of intelligence, both offensive and defensive, was adapted to the 
conditions and requirements of battle. Both were enhanced through integration, 
improving the performance of the Muslim army in the battles in question. It is hoped that 
34 A good example of this third type can be seen when the Prophet, while searching for the caravan of 
the Quraysh before the battle of Badr, sent several scouts to cover the expected routes of operation. For 
other examples see Sahih Muslim (Bäb: Thubrit al Jannah lial-Shahid, No. 1901, v. 3, p. 1510), Sunan 
Abü Da'gd (Bib. - Sending Scouts, No. 2618, v. 3, p. 38), and al-Nawawi, Sharh Sahih Muslim, v. 13, p. 
44. 
35 As an attack was feared from the Bang Qurayzah, Salama b. Aslam and a detachment of 200 men 
was stationed outside the fort to protect the women and children. See al-Halabi, al-Sirah a! - 
Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 448 and Naumani, Sirat un-Nabi, v. 2, p. 98. See also the map of al-Khandaq. 36 It is possible to say that falling within these types of intelligence activities and subject to the 
guidelines of Islamic doctrine, there are other types of intelligence gathering which concern the 
activities of individuals. More specifically, the collection of information during the period under study 
may be divided into four different categories: 1) the collection of information on the Muslims by the 
enemy, 2) the collection of information by the Muslims on other Muslims to find what they are hiding, 
3) the collection of information by the Muslims on other Muslims to find what they need, or 4) the 
collection of information about the enemy for the Muslims' advantage. See Musnad Ahmad (No. 
23382, v. 5, p. 392) and al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 388. Regarding the first type, the Muslims 
were ordered to prevent and fight against it by all available means even if this mean eliminating the 
agent. In the hadith, the Prophet permitted the killing of the spy of the Bang Hawäzin. See Sahih 
Muslim (Kitäb al-Jihad, No. 1754, v. 3, p. 1374) and Sunan Abü Da'üd (Kitäb alJihäd, No. 2654, v. 3, p. 
49). The second type was prohibited by the shari'a according to the Qur'an and the hadith. See the 
Qur'an, 49: 12, Sunan al-Bayhaqi al-Kubra (Kitäb al Ashshribah, v. 8, p. 333), and Saliili Ibn I Iibbän 
(Bäb: al-Ghibah, No. 5763, v. 13, p. 75). The third type was considered advisable, since the Muslims' 
ruler was responsible for ensuring that their conditions were good and they did not need any help, 
especially the weak. 'Umar, as Caliph, used to question thoroughly almost every leader under his 
command. His usual question to his commanders (MA All 3I -How did you get this? ) has become 
famous. See al-Khuza°i, Takhrij al-Dalälät, p. 303. Also, at the battle of al-Yarmgk, Khalid b. al-Walid 
toured the camp to make sure that the army had all possible comforts. See al-Wagidi, Funlh al-Sham, 
v. 1, p. 202. The fourth type, spying on the enemy, is required by the Qur'an, 9: 120; it is essential to 
know the enemy's strengths and weaknesses in order to prepare for the confrontation and also to be 
able to use suitable forces. For such an interpretation of this verse see 'Abd al-Ghani, Nuzm a! - 
Istikhbärät, p. 9. Also see al-Tabari, Tafsir al-Tabari, v. 11, p. 64 and al-Qurtubi, Tafsir al-Qurtubi, v. 8, 
p. 291. Further, this factor is an essential element of the Principles of War. See the section "Islamic 
Principles of War" in the chapter "The Importance of Islamic Military Strategy" (Ch. 8). Also see Faraj, 
al-Madrasah, pp. 604-624 and Tllas, al-Rasül, p. 281. It should be stressed that the second type of 
intelligence gathering is prohibited for Muslims under any circumstances, according to the Qur'an 
(ETMC), 49: 12: "0 ye who believe! Avoid suspicion as much (as possible): for suspicion in some cases 
is a sin: And spy not on each other, nor speak ill of each other behind their back. " This view is 
emphasised in Islamic Figh (jurisprudence). For the original meaning of the word 'spy' see Neilson and 
McKercher, Go Spy the Land, p. 35. 
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the foregoing comparison of the different examples has clarified the implementation of 
the various types of intelligence even at the individual level. 
The discussion has made clear that those conducting Islamic intelligence were not free to 
follow their own inclinations, as its use was severely restricted. Apart from Islamic 
prohibitions, intelligence gathering could be materially affected by other factors, including 
manpower resources, which will be discussed in the next section. 
VIA: Manpower as a Resource of Intelligence 
Information was collected by various means during the period under study. These means 
were determined by the conditions of the time and the specific circumstances of the 
battles. Thus, the collection of information depended solely on manpower 37 Consequently, 
the intelligence gatherers were designated by different titles. These included al-'ayn, al- 
camr7, al-mundhir, a1-falilah, da117, the prisoner of war, the enemy's spy, and service 
provided by various people in general 38 It can be seen that most of the resources relied 
heavily on the element of reconnaissance. Despite that, each one of them had a different 
mission to conduct, and they had to use their background knowledge to provide their 
superiors with the information they needed and may have requested, with the least 
possible delay39 However, before the selection of a person whose abilities suited the type 
of information to be collected, three questions had to be considered: what type of 
information was required? when should this information be placed in the hands of the 
leaders? and which person should collect it? ' Since Islam has a universal appeal which 
" Unlike much modern practice, it is worth mentioning that in Islam it is not permitted to make use of 
women's charms for spying purposes. See al-Hirfi, Dawr al-Mar'ah, p. 9. However, al-Hirfi, Dawr a! - 
Mar'ah, pp. 10-16, explains that they can still be used in other ways according to the Islamic teachings. 
38 Manäsarah, al-Istikhbärät, p. 27 and al °Amili, Mawsii'atal-Isdkhbärät, v. 3, pp. 7-53. 
These titles were usually derived from the act or the source of action of the persons concerned 
according to the normal usage of the Arabic language. Generally speaking, a spy is called al- ayn (the 
eye), (pl. "uyrln); al-amil (p1. cumalä) is one who, although not a Muslim, helps the Muslims; al- 
mundhir (warner), (pl. mundhirün) is one who alerts others to an impending danger which he has 
seen and reported without being assigned to do so by his group; and al-dalil (guide), (pl. adilä) is one 
that knows the area and its routes. He can be considered as being from the advance troops, known as 
al-talä'i However, neither Manäsarah, 'Abd al-Ghani, nor al `Amili mentioned the mundhiras a source 
of intelligence even though this title was mentioned and known to the Arabs, which the Qur'an 
confirms in many verses. See Qur'an, 2: 18,3: 32,5: 19,6: 19,29,36, & 130,7: 2,63, & 184,10: 2,11: 
2,14: 44 & 52,19: 97,21: 45,25: 1,26: 28,28: 46,36: 70,37: 177,53: 56,54: 36,78: 40,92: 14, and 
other forms of the word mundhir. Additionally, the word dali! is used in the form dAllähum in the 
Qur'än, 34: 14, where it is possible to say that it can be understood as indicating the importance of 
choosing the right man for the right mission. 
39 See Glass and Davidson, Intelligence is for Commanders p. 63. The phrase "needed and may have 
requested" is used here since sometimes the information that the leader requests may not be the same 
as that brought by the intelligence gatherers; for example, they may come across additional intelligence 
which was not initially requested, but might be vitally necessary. 
4° See Glass and Davidson, Intelligence is for Commanders, p. 14. 
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led to many people embracing the faith, the Muslim army had the opportunity to be 
served by a wide range of people with different skills. " With these resources at hand, 
conducting missions became less difficult for the Muslim army, but whatever the situation, 
the leader would attempt to make the best use of the resources available to him. For 
example, at the battle of al-Khandaq, the intelligence resources were limited and had to be 
carefully used due to the suffocating siege of the confederate army, 42 while the resources 
were both more available and, at the same time, utilised to the maximum during al- 
Yarmük and al-Qädisiyyah. 43 
V1.4.1: Reconnaissance 
One of the important means of intelligence gathering used by the Muslims was 
reconnaissance. 44 The Qur'än commanded the Muslims to be alert and to send patrols for 
that purpose, i. e. reconnaissance units: "0 ye who believe! Take your precautions and 
either go forth in parties or go forth all together. s45 Thus, reconnaissance was considered 
to be the backbone of Islamic intelligence at the time of the Prophet and the following 
two Caliphs. 46 The small numbers of the Muslim army in Medina made reconnaissance 
simple and intuitive. 47 It was sometimes even conducted by only one or two men .s At al- 
Yarmnk and al-Qädisiyyah, however, it became more sophisticated and precise due to the 
expansion of the Muslim army and the wide area the battles covered. 
The reconnaissance missions varied according to the objectives assigned to each patrol. 
For example, the purpose of the reconnaissance could be to locate the enemy, as when the 
41 For example, at al-Khandaq Salmän al-Fdrisi advised the Prophet to dig the trench around Medina. 
See Sunan al-Bayhaqi al-Kubrd (Bib: al-Shaji'ah, v. 9, p. 170), Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 182, and al- 
Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 633. 
42 The story of Na°im b. Masud provides an example of highly secret intelligence activity. See the 
section "The Battle of al-Khandaq" in this chapter. 
43 See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, pp. 188-191, al-Tabari, Tirikh al-Tabari, v. 2, pp. 96-97, Ibn Kathir, al- 
Bidiyah wa al-Nihiyah, v. 4, pp. 111-112, and al-I Ialabi, al-Sirah a! -Halabiyyah, v. 2, pp. 645-651. Further see Ibn Hishäm, The Life of Muhammad; the English Version, p. 458. 
44 See al-Dughmi, al-Tajassus, p. 53. In addition al cAmili, Mawsü'at al-Istikhbärät, v. 1, pp. 255-264, 
considered it one of the three important types of Islamic intelligence. It should be mentioned that 
reconnaissance is one of the essential tasks of any patrol. 
45 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 71. In The Holy Qur'an ETMC p. 232, it is stated that no fight should be 
undertaken without due preparations and precautions. When these are taken the Muslim must go 
boldly forward. "Go forth" is therefore repeated for emphasis, "as our leader determines". Thus it is 
possible to say that the element of reconnaissance should be considered under this aspect. 
46 AI cAggäd, Abgariyyat Muhammad, p. 17, says that the Prophet knew well the advantages of 
reconnaissance and took them into great consideration. Also see al-Dughmi, al-Tajassus, p. 57. 
4' It is noteworthy that only the Emigrants conducted the first patrols because the Helpers had 
promised the Prophet to protect him only in Medina, not outside it. So he did not want to ask them to 
do what had not been agreed upon. Also the Emigrants were not familiar with the terrain surrounding 
Medina, so they were sent to get an idea of it. Further see Ibn Kathir, al-Bidiyah wa al-Nihiyah, v. 8, p. 
57, al-Dughmi, al-Tajassus, p. 55, and Faraj, al-Madrasah, p. 259. 
48 According to Manäsärah, the Prophet asked his Companions to conduct the reconnaissance in small 
numbers. See cAbd al-Ghani, Nuzm al-Istikhbirit, p. 49. 
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Prophet searched for the Quraysh army prior to the battle of Badr. 49 Also, reconnaissance 
could be used in the elimination of a dangerous enemy, as in the assassination of Kacb b. 
al-Ashshraf. 50 Lastly, it could be used to collect information in order to know the 
intentions of the enemy, as the Prophet did prior to the battle of Uhud, when he sent two 
of his Companions to bring the latest news. 51 In fact, even though the Muslim army grew 
and developed, the importance of purpose, time, and boundaries remained unchanged. 
It should be noted here that the use of intelligence can be said to consist of two stages as 
far as the benefit to the soldiers is concerned; first with respect to the leaders and then to 
the soldiers themselves. Glass comments: "A commander who is served by inadequate 
intelligence is courting disaster. 52s Thus it could be argued that the relation between the 
leader and his intelligence is very critical, although the leadership's goals can only be 
accomplished through the right process, which it is the soldiers' duty to bring to a 
satisfactory conclusion. " Therefore, it is essential that this study should describe and 
illustrate the types of relationships existing between the leader and the intelligence 
available to him. 
VI. 5: Leaders and Intelligence 
It is reported that Umar b. al-Khattäb stated that a lying spy was an eye for the enemy 
rather than an eye for the Muslim army. 54 Handel points out in this connection: "In the 
politico-military world of competition and conflict, uncertainty plagues decision-makers 
49 See the section "The Battle of Badr" in this chapter. 
so Ka'b b. al-Ashshraf [d. 3/625] was a poet from the tribe of Tayy' whose mother was from the Jewish 
tribe of the Bang Qurayzah; he encouraged the non-Muslims to fight the Muslims after the defeat of 
Badr. He defamed the Muslim women after he came back to Medina. He was killed by Muhammad b. 
Maslamah. See Manäsarah, al-Istikhbärät, p. 39. 
51 They were Sulayta and Sufyan b. 'Auf. They were buried together in one grave and were called al- 
Qarinän (the Consorts). See Ibn Kathir, Tafsir Ibn Kathir, v. 3, p. 477 and al-Funaysän, Ghazwat al- 
Ahzab, p. 242. 
52 See Glass and Davidson, Intelligence is for Commanders, p. ix. 
ss The Qur'än (ETMC), 4: 59, addresses the ordinary soldiers: "Obey A115h, and obey the Messenger, 
and those charged with authority among you. " In another context the Qur an (ETMC), 9: 128, 
elaborates on the quality of the relationship between the Prophet and his followers: "Now hath come 
unto you a Messenger from amongst yourselves: it grieves him that ye should suffer, ardently anxious 
is he over you: to the Believers is he most kind and merciful. " Further see the section "Obedience" in 
the Chapter "The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
54 See Faraj, al-Madrasah, p. 467. 
This section has benefited from the discussion contained in a modern work, which it has used in the 
interests of the study. The work in question is Handel, "Leaders and Intelligence", in Andrew and 
Handel (eds), Intelligence and National Security, No. 3, v. 3, pp. 3-4. It was thought that the adaptation 
would not only serve this chapter but also support a later chapter, "The Importance of Islamic Military 
Strategy" (Ch. 8) and make a connection with the previous chapter "The Impact of Islamic Military 
Leadership" (Ch. 5). See Dairi, . 4rä'ft aIHarb, p. 25. 
It is felt that detailed discussion of certain points connected with this part of the discussion need not be 
included in the text and therefore the relevant examples in the footnotes. 
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more than any other single element. "" It follows that decision makers are deeply 
concerned with the collection of advance knowledge of the enemy. "' The proper use of 
accurate and timely intelligence can significantly reduce uncertainty, thereby enabling 
political and military leaders to improve the quality of their decisions, develop more 
effective strategies, and conduct more successful military operations. S7 However, the 
relationship between leaders and their intelligence is beset by so many difficulties that its 
problems can never be completely resolved. 58 Thus, the following points will focus upon 
that relationship. " The discussion will also be linked to Islamic concepts and dealt with 
according to the needs of the study. 
The first point concerning the relationship between the leader and his intelligence 
gathering is that if the leader is dogmatic, he will be unlikely to be receptive to new 
information that contradicts his goals or earlier decisions. 60 On the other hand, if he is too 
flexible, his decisions might too easily be apt to change, leading to instability in the 
leadership. " 
The second point concerns the closeness of the relationship between the leaders and their 
intelligence agents. The danger of a close relationship is that it might put at risk the 
intelligence gatherer's sense of objectivity if he knew the leader's plans in advance. 62 On 
ss Handel, "Leaders and Intelligence", No. 3, v. 3, p. 3. 
Tzu said: "Know your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. " Tzu, 
The Air of War, p. 84. 
See Handel, "Leaders and Intelligence", No. 3, v. 3, p. 3. 
58 See Handel, "Leaders and Intelligence", No. 3, v. 3, p. 3. However, in the battles in question, the 
agents' trustworthiness was measured more or less on the basis of their sincerity according to Islamic 
doctrine. See the chapter "The Role of Islamic Doctrine" (Ch. 4). Also see Sahib Muslim (Kitäb al- 
&än, No. 101, v. 1, p. 99), Sunan Ibn M5jah (Kitäb al-Fitan, No. 2225, v. 2, p. 749), and Sunan al- 
Därami (Kitäb al-Buys; No. 2541, v. 2, p. 323). Nevertheless this is not a rule to be applied in all cases, 
since some of the intelligence agents were not Muslims, as at al-Khandaq when the Prophet was 
informed about the Banii Qurayýah breaking the treaty. See the section "The Battle of Badr" in this 
chapter. Also see Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 103. Similarly see Sunan al-Bayhaqi al- 
Kubrä (Kitäb al-Ijärah, No. 11423, v. 6, p. 118). 
59 This section is concerned only with those points which influence the relationship between the 
leaders and their intelligence. See Handel, "Leaders and Intelligence", No. 3, v. 3, pp. 4-6. Nonetheless, 
some of these points will be adjusted to the needs and the demands of the study. 
60 For example, at Badr the Prophet was not inflexible since he changed his plan from pursuing the 
caravan and went ahead with an alternative plan, seeking the advice of his Companions; nor did the 
leaders at a1-Yarmük and al-Q5disiyyah reject new information about their enemies. 
61 From an Islamic viewpoint, it is interesting to note that after the Prophet had decided to camp at 
Badr, accepting the advice of an ordinary soldier regarding the water wells, he rejected the opinion of 
one of the Companions, who asked him to change the location of the camp. See Yamäni, Badr al- 
Kubrä, p. 148. Additionally, in the battle of Uhud when he made his final decision to meet the Quraysh 
army outside Medina, had he been overly flexible he would have turned back when his Companions 
changed their minds and asked him to stay in the city. See the chapter "The Battles and their 
Significance" (Ch. 3). 
6z The Prophet's intentions, when there was need of secrecy, were kept from even his closest 
Companions. For instance, when he had the intention to conquer Mecca (8/630), he did not even tell 
his beloved wife °A'ishah. He took all possible measures to prevent the Quraysh from knowing his 
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the other hand, too distant a relationship would lead to some loss of contact between the 
two parties. The importance of this relationship makes it imperative that both should seek 
to maintain the crucial balance between closeness and detachment. This balance can be 
better maintained if the intelligence gatherer is an effective member of the ruling elite. It 
can be argued that it was to the advantage of the Muslim army, especially in the first 
three battles, that some of the intelligence gatherers were holders of important positions 
in the elite. ` However, this theory is not universally applicable, since at the period 
covered by the study most of the men who were sent on scouting missions before and 
during the battles under study were either decision makers, well-known fighters, or 
persons possessing special skills. 65 However it should be pointed out that even though 
most of the scouts were close to the leaders in all five battles, those leaders provided them 
with only such information as was necessary according to the demands of the current 
situation. 66 
The third point, which is related to the comment above, is that if the leader is provided 
with intelligence by only one source or one advisor, the information is likely to be limited 
or biased. Also, the quality of the intelligence may be affected by the way the advisor or 
gatherer perceives the intelligence, because what he considers important may not be, and 
vice versa. On the other hand, if the leader has too many sources of intelligence, he may 
fall victim to his own biases or resort to military expediency; furthermore, too many 
sources of information may result in the leader's hesitation or failure to choose the right 
plan. Consequently, he might decide to follow an alternative plan that conforms to his 
movements. See Sunan al-Bayhaqi al-Kubra (Bib: Nagd al-"Ahd, v. 9, pp. 232-234), Ibn Hishäm, a! - 
Sirah, v. 5, p. 52, and Ibn al-Qayyim, Zid al-Maid, v. 3, p. 398. 
63 In the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 26, it is found: "Allah doth wish to make clear to you and to guide you 
into the ways of those before you; and (He doth wish to) turn to you (in Mercy): and Allah is All- 
knowing, All-wise. " 
64 The Prophet as well as the other Companions such as Abii Bakr, `Ali, al-Zubayr, Khälid b. al-Walid, 
the two Sa°ds, Zuhrah, al-Qa°qa°, and others were effectively holding positions of leadership in these 
battles. See the later sections on the battles in this chapter. 
65 Tulayhah b. Khawylid al-Usdi was a well-known fighter and was very effective at the battle of al- 
Qadisiyyah. The mission conducted by °Abdullah b. 'Unays can be cited as another example of the 
work of a scout who possessed a special feature: he had never been afraid of any man. When the 
Prophet sent °Abdullah to kill Khalid b. Sufyan al-Hudhali, °Abdullah asked how he would identify 
Khalid. The Prophet replied: "Upon seeing Khalid fear will enter your heart. " Now, since °Abdullah 
had never feared any man, it was easy for him to use this feature to identify and kill Khalid. See Sunan 
Abg Da'iid (Kitib al-Salih, No. 1249, v. 2, p. 18), Musnad Ahmad (v. 3, p. 495) and al-Asbahani [d. 
430/1039], ffilyat al Awliyi, ' v. 2, pp. 5-6. Ibn Sa°d, al-Tabaqit al-Kubri, v. 2, pp. 50-51, mentions that 
°Abdullah began to sweat upon seeing Khalid. 
66 See al-Tabari, Tirikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 387. Also the Prophet did not announce the results of the two 
Sacds' mission to the Banii Qurayrah. Another example is Khalid b. al-Walid's withholding the news 
of Abti Bakr's death despite his relationship with closeness of the Companions. In addition, Sa°d and 
al-Qa°qa° did not inform the Muslims of their plan to have the horsemen pour into the battlefield one 
after another to raise the fighting spirit of the Muslim army at al-Qadisiyyah. 
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preconceived ideas. 67 Also, the desire for large amounts of information and the use of 
large numbers of scouts increases the possibility of being discovered, of receiving false 
information, and of wasting time and resources, and may force the leader to compromise 
between contradictory reports, resulting in a less effective plan. 68 
The fourth point is that although sometimes a leader needs direct access to raw 
information, 69 if he depends upon this continuously he is in danger of acting as his own 
intelligence officer. However, it is possible to say that this point was not applicable in the 
period of the study mainly because military activities at that time were not highly 
organised and the reported information was simple and capable of being clearly 
understood. Nonetheless, in the last two battles the leaders sometimes needed the services 
of translators to translate the new pieces of information flowing from the non-Arabic 
sources. 70 
Lastly, the fifth point concerns the agent's honesty. If he is always honest and insists on 
expressing his honest opinion immediately he may lose access to the leader. " On the 
other hand, if he waits for a time convenient to the leader, he may increase his influence 
but the delay may also decrease the value of the intelligence. 'Z Handel argues that: "One 
of the only solutions to these (and many other) dilemmas, is to be found in the quality of 
leadership. "73 Considering Handel's remark, it is possible to say that the degree of success 
of the Muslim leader depends largely on his personality, experience and ability to strike 
67 The leaders in these battles had more than one source of information and they used a similar 
method of making sure of its accuracy, as when the Prophet sent the two Sa`ds to confirm the veracity 
of the news he had received. See Ibn Kathir, al-&& yah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 104 and al-IT Talabi, al- 
Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 640. 
"' In the first three battles the sources of intelligence were limited and the leader did not have a variety 
of options to choose from. In contrast, at the battles of al-Yarmük and al-Qädisiyyah the leaders had 
several sources and were delayed for a long time before beginning the actual fighting. It is likely that 
they conducted many intelligence activities at the request of the Caliphs, but it was not recorded that 
they were overburdened to the extent that they were unable to implement their plans effectively. See 
the discussion of the battles at the end of this chapter. 
69 By 'raw' information the study means 'unanalysed' information. 
Further see al-Tabari, Tän7ch al-Tabari, v. 2, pp. 390,398, & 304. Also see Glass and Davidson, 
Intelligence is for Commanders, p. 23. 
This was a matter of concern even before al-Yarmnk; on one occasion the Prophet ordered Zayd b. 
Thäbit to learn other languages. See Manäsarah, al-Istikhbärat, p. 32. Further see Ghirbäl, a! - 
Mowsü'ah a1-Arabiyyah, p. 937. 
" Unlike Tzu, Clausewitz was dubious about the value of intelligence work; he asserted that: "Many 
intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain. " Clausewitz, 
On War, p. 117. Also see Tzu, the Art of War, p. 149. In addition, the Prophet repeatedly sent 'All b. 
Abi T51ib on many different occasions, also Sa`d and Tulayhah. See the section the battles in this 
chapter. 
' See Handel, "Leaders and Intelligence", No. 3, v. 3, p. 5. 
7' Handel, "Leaders and Intelligence", No. 3, v. 3, p. 6. 
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the proper balance between competing forces. Moreover, from an Islamic perspective his 
religious conviction should also be emphasised. 74 
Consequently, the degree of the Muslim leaders' response to their intelligence reports is 
very important, considering that their response could affect their soldiers' performance. 75 
VI. 6: The Leaders' Degree of Response to the Intelligence Report 
After examining the relationship between the Muslim leader and his intelligence agents, it 
is possible to argue that the type and quality of the relationship can affect his response to 
the reports he receives. 76 However, he is not free to respond without constraints, as his 
decision will inevitably affect his men. He should therefore respond according the 
accuracy of the source. The Qur'an states: "0 ye who believe! If a sinner comes to you 
with any news ascertain the truth, lest ye harm people unwittingly, and afterwards 
become full of repentance for what ye have done. s77 In addition, his degree of response 
will depend on his trust in the accuracy of the information. 78 Although Handel warns that 
agents might fabricate the information they report to the army, the Muslim agent is bound 
by legal orders and commands, 79 and is therefore not free to report the news he thinks will 
be most likely to please his leaders, 80 because the Qur'an threatens the one who is not 
faithful in conducting his mission. 8' 
74 See the section "Qualities of the Muslim leader" in the Chapter "The Impact of the Islamic Military 
Leadership" (Ch. 5). 
75 Manasarah, al-Istikhbärät, p. 57. 
76 During these battles it was evident that the leaders did not rely on one report for their intelligence, 
but analysed the reports of a number of sources of intelligence before making their final decisions. 
They even sometimes conducted scouting missions themselves. See al `Amili, Mawsu at al-Istikhbirit, 
v. 1, pp. 153-155. 
" See the Qur'an (ETMC), 49: 6. In The Holy Qur'in ETMC, p. 1589, it is found that: "All tittle-tattle 
or reports especially if emanating from persons you do not know are to be tested, and the truth 
ascertained. If they were believed and passed on, much harm may be done, of which you may have 
cause afterwards to repent heartily. " 
78 For further clarification of the problems associated with responding to intelligence reports see Glass 
and Davidson, Intelligence is for Commanders, pp. 29 & 36 and Handel, "Intelligence and Military 
Operation", in Andrew and Handel (eds), Intelligence and National Security, No. 2, v. 5, pp. 3& 26. 
" The Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 77, can be used to say that the sharfa works to purify the intentions and 
activities of both leader and agent: the Qur'an (ETMC), 33: 70, states: "0 ye believe! Fear Allah, and 
Make your utterance straight forward. " Also see Sahib Muslim (Kitib al-Imän, No. 101, v. 1, p. 99), 
Sunan Ibn Majah (Kitib al-Fitan, No. 2225, v. 2, p. 749), and Sunan al-Darami (Kitib al-Buyu No. 
2541, v. 2, p. 323). 
80 At the battle of Badr the Prophet asked cAbdullah b. Masc5d to take an oath that he had killed Abü 
Jahl. See Ibn Hisham, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 185, al-Tabari, Tirikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 37, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidiyah 
wa al-Nihiyah, v. 3, p. 296, and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 419. Also the Qur'an (ETMC), 
74: 31, states: "May arrive at certainty"; this could be used to approve the act assuring the truth of an 
advance report. 
81 In the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 27, it is found "0 ye that believe! Betray not the trust Of Allah and the 
Messenger, nor misappropriate knowingly things entrusted to you. " Also see Musnad Abi Ya'la 
(Musnad cAishah, No. 4385, v. 7, p. 349) and al-Mu°jam al-Awwsat (Bib: Man Ismahz Ahmad, No. 
897, v. 1, p. 275). 
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After having illustrated the varied relations between the Muslim leader and his 
intelligence agents, it is essential to look at possible effects on the soldiers' performance: a 
successful relationship is likely to have a beneficial, if indirect effect on performance. 
VI. 7: The Importance of Intelligence 
An army may manage to make its way to victory even without the contribution of 
intelligence work. This statement is supported by Handel's remark that the information 
provided by intelligence is only a means to an end. In other words, an army may 
compensate for a lack of good intelligence by several means: superior leadership, 
concentrating superior forces at a decisive point, maintaining the initiative, considerable 
material or quantitative superiority over his enemy, or even by having superior training 
and better motivation than the enemy. 82 However Handel goes on to point out that 
intelligence is, "an instrument essential for the achievement of a leader's goals in the most 
efficient way. s83 It is therefore possible to argue that intelligence work can smooth the 
path of an army and help to accomplish victory with minimum damage to men, weapons, 
and material. 84 Thus intelligence is important since it can make possible sound and timely 
decisions. BS It can also prevent counterintelligence and internal harm and destruction. In 
addition, it is an essential element of al-ribät, which is a very significant Islamic concept. 86 
It would seem, then, that the more useful information the leaders have, the better the plan 
they can devise; although, as we have seen, too much information can be harmful87 
Therefore the leader should have more than one intelligence report concerning the same 
goal so that he can make a comparison in order to confirm their accuracy88 
At the battles under discussion, the Muslim leaders were sometimes not satisfied with the 
information they received from various sources. Hence, they would occasionally go on 
scouting missions themselves. The battle of Badr provides an example of that, since the 
82 Handel, "Leaders and Intelligence", No. 3, v. 3, p. 19. Also see by the same author, "Intelligence and 
Military Operation", No. 2, v. 5, p. 13. 
83 Handel, "Leaders and Intelligence", No. 3, v. 3, p. 3. 
84 See Glass and Davidson, Intelligence is for Commanders, p. 40. 
85 See Department of the Army, Military Leadership, p. 6. 
Ribit literally means ribbon, band, lmot. By extension it can be also refer to the continuous practice 
of good deeds by one sent on a mission. Further see Netton, A Popular Dictionary of Islam, pp. 213- 
214, and Penrice, Dictionary and Glossary of the Qur'in, pp. 54-55. In the Qur'än (ETMC), 3: 200, it is 
found: "0 ye who believe! Persevere in patience and constancy; vie in such perseverance; strengthen 
each other; and fear A115h; that ye may prosper. " The verse indicates that patience is one of the main 
elements of al-ribit. Further see al-Qurtubi, Tafsir al-Qurtubi, v. 4, pp. 325-326, Sahih Muslim (Kitib 
al-Salih, No. 251, v. 1, p. 219), Sunan Ibn M5jah (Bib: Manigib al-Ribät, No. 2766, v. 2, p. 429), al- 
Hanbali [816/1414-884/14791, al-Mubbdi; v. 3, p. 313, Ibn Qudämah, al-Kä6,; v. 4, p. 258, al-Suyüp, al- 
Durral-Manthir,, v. 2, p. 417, and Manäsarah, al-Istikhbirät, p. 129. 
ß7 Tzu, The Art of War, p. 149, said: "An army without secret agents is exactly like a man without eyes 
or ears. " Also see °Abd al-Ghani, Nuum al-Istikhbärät, p. 125. 
88 See cAbd al-Ghani, Nuzm al-Istikhbirät, p. 125. 
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Prophet not only sent different patrols continuously prior to the battle but he himself went 
to gather additional information about the Meccan army. 89 
VI. 8: The Value of Intelligence to the Soldiers 
The value of intelligence to the soldiers can hardly be overestimated. It should be noted 
that the Muslim army was requested, as one of the main elements of their religion, to use 
all available means to accomplish their goals. 90 The Qur'an states: "Or gain any gain from 
an enemy: For Allah sufferth not the reward to be lost of those who do good. i91 This verse 
does not specifically refer to the practice of intelligence activities, but the comprehensive 
character of the Qur'an allows for breath of interpretation, and so it is possible to argue 
that the verse indicates in general terms the importance and the rewards of conducting 
intelligence. So, when soldiers are provided with the right information, their actions and 
even intentions are likely to be positively affected. This has a bearing on the Qur'an's 
encouragement of the Muslim soldier to fulfil his duties to the best of his ability: "Against 
them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power. s92 It is therefore necessary to 
consider those elements which can be used to measure the advantages of intelligence to 
the soldiers. Here Glass's statement seems to be applicable: he argues that military 
intelligence is of no value unless it serves the leaders' purposes 93 The argument can be 
taken further: the concept of intelligence can be widened and adjusted to serve not only 
the leaders but the soldiers also, by creating a better fighting atmosphere for them, as the 
following points illustrate. 
First, the soldiers can be helped by the information gathered on the elements of terrain 
and weather. Generally, such advance knowledge would alert the army to the qualities of 
the area of conflict and also would allow it to adopt a better holding position. Glass, 
however, cautions that the elements of terrain and weather are doubled-edged weapons, 94 
helping the army who best uses them and yet hindering the one that does not. Therefore, 
looking at it from a different angle, these elements are also factors influencing an 
adversary's strengths and weaknesses. 
19 See the following battle analysis. 
9° See al-Mustadrak 'ala al-Sahihayn (Bab: Manägib Omni b. Umayyah al-Dumri, No. 6616, v. 3, p. 
722), Sunan al-Tirmidhi (Kitäb Sifat al-Qyämah wa al-Ragä'iq wa a1-Wara; 
No. 2517, v. 4, p. 668), and 
al-IT Talabi, al-Sirah al--Ialabiyyah, v. 2, p. 81. 
91 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 9: 120. 
92 It can be argued that among their duties was intelligence gathering. Further in the Qur'an (ETMC), 
3: 145, it is found: "And swiftly shall We reward those that (serve us with) gratitude. " Hence, serving 
the purposes of the Muslim army is serving Allah. Also see the Qur'an, 3: 146,8: 60, & 29: 69. 
93 See Glass and Davidson, Intelligence is for Commanders, pp. 63 & 68. 
9' See ibid., p. 83. 
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Since the area of conflict may expand, it is essential to know the surrounding terrain. It is 
preferable that the army should know every operational detail of the battle. ' 
Reconnaissance of the terrain is carried out to discover the appropriateness of the 
battlefield, i. e. to know the natural support and the nature of the ground, the routes 
leading in and out of the battlefield, and its control points and critical areas. 96 Thus 
reconnaissance allows an army to know where the enemy is positioned and what to 
expect. In addition, reliable information about climatic conditions as at Badr is a vital 
element because of its influence on both terrain and operation. 97 
Secondly, intelligence is valuable for the army in that it permits the formulation of a more 
effective plan. Handel remarks that without a thoroughly considered plan based on 
intelligence, an army going into combat in is likely to pay a high price and suffer a 
reduction of its effectiveness. 98 In addition, in using intelligence the leader should take 
into consideration the soldiers' abilities and qualities in order to provide them with a plan 
superior to that of the adversary. 99 In other words, information is presented to the leader 
in a form which will help him in the formulation of decisions and plans, and is then 
distributed to all lower level leaders and to the soldiers. 100 Thus, it is essential to use the 
different types of intelligence mentioned above to correctly assess the enemy and make 
preparations based on accurate perceptions. Good quality information enables the army to 
keep to its plan, change its current plan, or make a counter plan. 101 
Thirdly, effective information often makes it possible for the army to thoroughly prepare 
its arms and equipment. It also allows the leader to use the right men and material for the 
right mission. 
I See al-`Amili, Mawsi'at al-Istikhbärät, v. 1, pp. 242-244. Additionally, it is possible to argue that the 
Qur'an, 3: 156, encourages Muslims to travel for either trade or military purposes. These journeys 
broadened the Muslims' experience and enabled them to improve their assessment of the various 
battlefield terrains. Also see the Qur'an, 4: 97 & 100. Furthermore, to ease the burdens of the traveller, 
Islam permits some flexibility in the matter of religious observances. See the Qur'an, 3: 101. 
% See Glass and Davidson, Intelligence is for Commanders, pp. 86-87. Also, Manasarah, al-Istikhbärät, 
pp. 29-30, mentions that the Arabs used the surrounding means to the best of their ability. 
See Glass and Davidson, Intelligence is for Commanders, p. 87. 
98 This means that the leader should not take any action blindly. See Handel, "Intelligence and Military 
Operation", No. 2, v. 5, p. 21. 
" The leader's successful improvement of a plan eases his soldiers' task. In the Qur'an (ETMC), 9: 128, 
it is found: "Now bath come unto you a Messenger from amongst yourselves: it grieves him that ye 
should suffer, ardently anxious is he over you: to the Believers is he most kind and merciful. " 
10° See Glass and Davidson, Intelligence is for Commanders, pp. 40 & 63. Also the Umayyad Caliph, 
cAbd al-Malik b. Marwan, mentioned that delaying news for one hour might ruin the work of a whole 
year. See al-Hirfi, al-Mukhäbarät, p. 243. In addition see al-Qalqashandi [d. c. 300/913], 4Subh al- 
Acshä, v. 1, p. 148 and Handel, "Leaders and Intelligence", No. 3, v. 3, p. 4. 
'°' See Manasarah, al-Istikhbärät, pp. 57-74. 
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Fourthly, surprise is also a very valuable element, to which intelligence may contribute; 
indeed, gathering information in order to launch a surprise attack is an important 
intelligence activity. Of course the enemy is also likely to make successful surprise attacks, 
provided he has access to good intelligence. "' In the Qur'an, it is found: "And lie in wait 
for them in every stratagem (of war). " This verse commands the Muslims to ambush the 
idolaters, and an ambush depends on the element of surprise. 103 Further, Glass mentions 
that surprise may mean discovering that the enemy has launched an attack at a time and 
place least expected. 104 Surprise is not always offensive, however; it is also evident when a 
defensive plan is carried out where and when the enemy least expects it. 10S Additionally, 
the matter of the privacy of information can be included here since privacy can play in 
important role in the surprise factor. The hadith states: "Seek help of privacy to reach 
your needs". 106 In fact what makes intelligence unique and beneficial is privacy. 
Fifthly, obtaining information regarding the adversary's strengths and weaknesses is very 
critical. Intelligence should report the adversary's situation including his dispositions, 
composition, strength, status of supplies, morale, reinforcements, and other 
considerations. 107 What these points suggest is that intelligence work, if used judiciously, is 
considered to be a source of power for an army. It can prevent destruction and even 
elimination by raising the chances of survivability of both the army and, in the present 
case, the Muslim community. 108 Finally, intelligence may be considered still more valuable 
if provided by a divine source, as will be discussed in the next section. 
102 Surprise can be an element of many military activities, whether strategic, tactical, or operational. See 
Hybel, "The Logic of Surprise in International Conflict", in Andrew and Hadnel (eds), Intelligence and 
National Security, No. 1, v. 3, p. 214. 
103 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 9: 5. Also see The Holy Qur'an ETMC, p. 497. 
104 See Glass and Davidson, Intelligence is for Commanders, p. ix. 
105 As in the battle of Uhud; see the section "The Battle of al-Khandaq" in the chapter "The Battles and 
their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
106 See al-Mu'jam al-Kabir (No. 183, v. 20, p. 94), al-Tamhid li Ibn `Abd al-Barr [368/979-463/1071], 
(v. 5, p. 215), and Musnad al-Shihäb [d. 454/1062], (No. 707, v. 1, p. 411). However, it should be noted 
that the narrator of this hadith is Said b. Salläm, who is accused of narrating weak hadith. See al-Räzi 
[d. 327/939], al-Jar/ wa al-Ta°dt7, No. 131, v. 4, p. 31, al-Baghdädi, Tarikh Baghdad, v. 9, p. 80, and al- 
Asbahäni, Hilyat al Awliya; v. 5, p. 215. 
107 See Glass and Davidson, Intelligence is for Commanders, p. 43. 
108 The Prophet encouraged maintaining and increasing the numbers of the Muslims, as in the al- 
Mustadrak'ala al-Sahihayn (Kitäb al-Nika i, No. 2685, v. 2, p. 176), Sunan Ibn Mäjah (Kitab al-Nikah, 
No. 1846. v. 1, p. 592), al-Sunan al-Kubrä (ICitab al-Nikäh, No. 5342, v. 3, p. 271), and Sunan Abü Dä'(id 
(Kitäb al-Nikäh, No. 2050, v. 2, p. 220). 
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VI. 9: The Significant Effect of Assistance through Divine Information 
According to the Qur'an and the hadith, it is possible to say that there have been different 
types of divine assistance wherein Allah has revealed the unseen. 109 The first is 
information reported by an angel in the form of revelation, i. e. the Qur'an, "' or in the 
form of a single occasion which gives assurance regarding a particular future event. "' The 
second is that type of divine assistance which was revealed through the Prophet's 
traditions. "' Allah revealed to him unseen events, which are recorded in the hadrth, 13 
among them those that occurred at the battle of al-Khandaq. 
The third type is the divine assistance which comes in the form of visions, ' 14 mostly of the 
glad tidings of future events. 75 Although these visions vary, we may say briefly that from 
an Islamic perspective, a vision is considered to be legitimate when reported by a 
righteous man. 16 
109 It should be noted that here the researcher is expanding the notion of intelligence, since normally 
intelligence applies to information capable of being gathered by human action, whereas divine 
information is, generally speaking, information regarding the future and hence unknowable to human 
beings. Muslims believe that Allah is the only One who Knows the future. In the Qur'an (ETMC), 6: 
73, it is found: "He knoweth the Unseen. " Also see Qur'an, 9: 94 & 105,13: 9,23: 92,31: 34,32: 6,34: 
3,35: 38,59: 22,62: 8,64: 18,67: 26, and 72: 26. 
For another view of the unseen in the sharifa see Murata and Chittick, The Vision oflslam, pp. 79-80. 
10 In the Qur'an (ETMC), 9: 94, it is found: "They will present their excuses to you when ye return to 
them. Say thou: "Present no excuses: we shall not believe you: Allah hath already informed us of the 
true state of matters concerning you. " In addition, the Prophet was informed that he would either 
capture the caravan or defeat the Quraysh. This was a divine revelation of future events. See the 
Qur'an, 8: 7. Also both al-Qurtubi and al-Ijalabi mention that the Prophet knew in advance that he 
would win this battle. Respectively see al-Qurtubi, Tafsir al-Qurtubi, v. 7, p. 369 and al-Halabi, al-Sirah 
al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 387. Also, verse 12 in surah al-Anfal, should be considered. Similarly, see Ibn 
Kathir, Tafsir Ibn Kathir, v. 2, p. 288. 
"' Sometimes the Archangel Gabriel informed the Prophet about future events in the form of Islamic 
teachings. For example, prior to the battle of Badr, the Prophet placed his hand on the ground, 
indicating the spot where some of the leaders of the Quraysh would be slain. See Sahib Muslim (Kitab 
al-Tawbah, No. 2873, v. 4, p. 2202), al-Sunan al-Kubra (Kitäb al-Siyar, No. 8628, v. 5, p. 187), Sunan 
Abü Da'iid (1/täb al-Jihad, No. 2681, v. 3, p. 58), Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihiyah, v. 6, p. 187, and 
al-Halabi, al-Shah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 395. 
"That the Prophet might be allowed to see some future events is mentioned in the Qur'an, 10: 46, 
13: 40,23: 95,40: 77, and 43: 42. 
113 See Sahib al-Bukhari (Kitib al-Fitan and Bib: ma Qua R Qitil al-Rum, No. 2766, v. 3, p. 1069), 
Sahib Muslim (Kitab al-Fitan, No. 2900, v. 4, p. 2225), Sunan Ibn Majah (Bib: al-Ghazawät, No. 4089, 
v. 2, p. 1369), and al-Asbahani [457/1065-535/1141], Dala'il al-Nubuwwah, p. 234. 
rl` For the original form of the word vision (al-ruyä) see the Qur'an, 12: 43,17: 60,37: 105, and 48: 
27. For the derived forms see the Qur'an, 12: 5,43, and 100. Also see al-Tabari, Tahiral-Tabari, v. 11, 
p. 134, al-Qurtubi, Tafsir al-Qurtubi, v. 8, p. 358, and Ibn Kathir, Tafsir Ibn Kathir, v. 2, p. 425. Also see 
Sahih al-Bukhari (Bib: al-Ru)va min Allah, v. 6, pp. 2563-2568), Sahib Muslim (Kitäb al-Ru), ä, v. 4, pp. 
1771-1775), Sunan Abn Dä'iid (Kitäb al-Salih, No. 876, v. 1, p. 232), 
Sunan 
al-Tirmidhi (Kitib al-Ruya 
v. 4, pp. 532-543), Sunan al-Darami (Kitab al-Ruyä, v. 2, pp. 165-176), al-Nawawi, Sharh S'a nh Muslim, 
v. 2, p. 198, and Ibn Ijajar, Fath al-Bar; v. 12, pp. 390-446. 
15 Al-Qurtubi notes that after the revelation, the good vision remained to tell good news of the future. 
See al-Qurtubi, Tafsiral-Qurtubi, v. 9, pp. 122-130. 
16 For the good vision of the righteous man see al-Tabari, Tafsir al-7'abari, v. 11, p. 134, al-Qurtubi, 
Tafsir al-Qurtubi, v. 8, p. 358, and Ibn Kathir, Tafsir Ibn Kathir, v. 2, p. 425. Also see Sahih al-Bukhari 
177 
Ch. 6: The Task of Islamic Military Intelligence 
Having said that, and taking into consideration all the available evidence, it is clear that 
the vision's message may be either good or bad, or possibly both. "' Lastly, the effect of 
these instances of divine assistance may be either material or spiritual, or both. 18 The 
evidence suggests, and Muslims believe, that these instances of divine information cannot 
have been fabricated; even the Prophet himself had not the power to do so. 19 
VI. 10: The Element of al-Tawriyah 
One of the unique elements of Islamic intelligence is the application of al-tawryah, 
`dissimulation'. This allows the intelligence agent to divert attention from an intended goal 
by making a statement that can hold more than one meaning. "' In the hadith, except at 
the battle of Tabük, whenever the Prophet intended to go into battle, once he had decided 
upon the destination, he deliberately asked publicly about other locations. This served to 
divert attention away from his intended destination . 
121 However, it is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to discuss the elements of divine assistance and al-tawriyah at length; space 
does not permit full discussion of these matters. 
(Bab: al-Ru), min Allah, v. 6, pp. 2563-2568), Sahib Muslim (Kitäb al-Ruyä, v. 4, pp. 1771-1775), 
Sunan Abii Dä üd (Kitab al-Salah, No. 876, v. 1, p. 232), Sunan al-Tirmidhi (Kitab al-Ruyä, v. 4, pp. 
532-543), Sunan al-Darami (Kitab al-Ru ya, v. 2, pp. 165-176), al-Nawawi, Sharh Sahr7r Muslim, v. 2, p. 
198, Ibn Hajar, Fath al-Barr, v. 12, pp. 390-446, and al-Amadi, al-Ihkam, v. 3, p. 140. In addition, al- 
Maqdisi said that the vision should be in harmony with the others, thus strengthening them all. See al- 
Maqdisi [717/1317-761/1360], al-Furü; v. 2, p. 173. In addition, there are also what are known as al- 
Mubashshirat (Glad tidings). See Sahib al-Bukhari (Bab: al-Mubashshirät, No. 6589, v. 6, p. 2564) and 
al-Muwatta' (Kitab al-Ruyä, No. 1715, v. 2, p. 957). 
117 The vision the Prophet had prior to the battle of Ubud should be considered here. Also see the 
Qur'an, 12: 5,43, and 100. Additionally, see the section analysing the battles in this chapter. 
116 This element's effectiveness at the material level was evident, according to the Qur'an when Ibrahim 
(Abraham) was about to sacrifice his son (PBUTA) in accordance with a vision he had seen. See the 
Qur'an, 37: 102. However, it can be argued that its long-term effects were also spiritual. 
19 The surah al-Duha was revealed after the revelation had apparently come to an end. Then the 
Prophet became troubled and his enemy took advantage of the situation. Further see the exegeses of 
this surah in al-Tabari, Tafsir al-Tabari, v. 30, p. 229, Qurtubi, Tafsir al-Qurrubi, v. 20, p. 91, Ibn Kathir, 
Tafsirlbn Kathir, v. 4, p. 522, and Abdul-Raof, The Qur'an Outlined, pp. 142-143. 
120 Further see al-Nawawi, Sharh Sahib Muslim, v. 7, p. 169, al-Razi, Mukhtär a1-., 9ih9h, p. 178, Ibn 
Manzür, Lisan al-Arab, v. 15, p. 390, and al-Jurjani, al-Ta¶rifät, p. 97. 
121 Khan, in his Sahib al-Bukhäri; the English Version, v. 4, p. 127, explains this point well: the Prophet 
concealed the true destination of a Ghazwah by using an equivocation, which indicates apparently that 
one is going to a different destination. Additionally, see Sahib al-Bukhäri (Kitab allihad, No. 2788, 
v. 4, p. 1078), Sahib Muslim (Kitab a1-Dhikr wa al-Du'a' wa al-Tawbah wa al-Istighuir, No. 2769, v. 4, p. 
2128), al-Sunan al-Kubra (Bab: ma Yaf`al al-Imam idhaArad al-Ghazwü, No. 8778, v. 5, p. 239), Sunan 
al-Darami (Kitab al-Siyar, No. 2450, v. 2, p. 289), and al-I Talabi, al-Sirah al-1Yalabiyyah, v. 2, p. 387. 
Thus, according to al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 387, al-tawriyah can be considered as a 
form of deception which the Muslim is permitted to commit in certain circumstances, especially in war. 
However, within that concept and to meet certain needs, lies are permitted in special cases. Further see 
al-Bayhaqi, Shurab al-Iman, v. 4, pp. 203-204, al-Nawawi, Sharh Sahli Muslim, v. 13, p. 45, al-Nawawi, 
Riyäd al-Sälihin, p. 353, Ibn al-Qayyim, Madarij al-Salikin, v. 3, p. 393, Ibn al-Qayyim, Miftah Dar al- 
Sa'adah, pp. 36-37, Ibn Manzdr, Lisan al-'Arab, v. 15, pp. 390-400, and Naumani, Sirat ul-Nabi, v. 2, p. 
46. 
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VI. 11: Analysis of the Battles 
1V. 11.1: The Battle of Badr 
Even before Badr a certain amount of information was already known to the Muslim 
army; however, it was important that other information should be gathered through 
intelligence. The Prophet had a general idea of the state of relations between Medina and 
Mecca. 122 He also knew intimately the strengths and weaknesses of the Quraysh, as he 
himself was a member of a Quraysh clan and had lived most of his life among them. He 
was aware that Mecca did not have a united leadership. 123 In other words, at the strategic 
level he had some important information about the Quraysh army but at the operational 
and tactical levels more was needed. The Muslims must have had knowledge of who was 
going to be in command, what kind of fighters they were going to face, and what their 
style of fighting was likely to be. 
Prior to this battle the Prophet missed the opportunity of capturing the Quraysh caravan. 
Thus, he was cautiously waiting for news regarding its return to Mecca. 124 He therefore 
sent several reconnaissance patrols to search for the caravan. This indicates that even 
though the areas of some of the actual battles were small and limited, Muslim intelligence 
had to cover a massive area (terrain) in order to gather the required information, ' 25 and 
for this, reconnaissance was the most suitable method. Firstly, he sent Talbah b. 
cUbaydalläh and Said b. Zayd to search for the caravan; however, since the Prophet had 
already left Medina they were unable to report their findings. 12' After being informed 
secretly of the caravan's location, the Prophet called for immediate action on the part of 
those who had their mounts at hand. 127 This seems to indicate that the Prophet did not 
tell his Companions of his intention for several reasons: so that he could have time to 
think without any influence, to prevent rumours from being circulated in the Muslim 
122 See the section "The Battle of Badr" in the chapter 'The Impact of the Islamic Military Leadership" 
(Ch. 5). 
123 For the importance of a united leadership see the section "The Unity of Command and Leadership" 
in the chapter "The Impact of Islamic Military Leadership" (Ch. 5). Also see the chapter "Brief 
Background of the Region Prior to Islam" (Ch. 2) for a discussion of the Quraysh leadership. 
124 See al-I; Ialabi, al-Sirah al-I alabiyyah, v. 2, p. 374. 
lu Further, see Handel, "Leaders and Intelligence", No. 3, v. 3, p. 3. 
126 They were unable to report since on their return to Medina they found that the Prophet had not 
waited and had already left to search for the caravan. See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al Nihäyah, v. 8, p. 
57, al-I; Ialabi, al-Sirah al-tlalabiyyah, v. 2, p. 381, and al-Dughmi, al-Tajassus, p. 55. 
127 It is reported that Bisbis b. CAmr al-Juhani [sometimes called Busaysah] went on an advance patrol; 
he it was who reported the news of the returning caravan to the Prophet at his house secretly. Upon 
hearing the news, the Messenger of Allah came out hurriedly, spoke to the people and simply said: 
"We are in need (of men -A W). " See Sahih Muslim (Bib: 7hubüt al-Jannah li al-Shahid, No. 1901, 
v. 3, p. 1510), Sunan al-Bayhagi al-Kubrä (Bab: Jawiz Inlrräd al-Rajul wa al-Rijil bi al-Ghazü, v. 9, p. 
99), al-Nawawi, Sharh Sahur Muslim, v. 13, p. 45, and Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihiyah, v. 3, p. 
277. 
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camp, and because he was confident he was the only one who would make the final 
decision. "' 
Whilst searching for the caravan, he asked a Bedouin about the caravan's position, but the 
man did not know. 129 After reaching the valley of Dhirfän, news reached him of the 
caravan's escape. News of the failure to capture the caravan, which was a vital piece of 
information, necessitated that the Muslims reconsider their situation quickly and carefully, 
as the leader had the choice either to retreat or to march forward. In other words, 
although the main goal of the Muslim army was to capture the caravan, changes in the 
surrounding circumstances encouraged them to carry out further intelligence activities 
regarding the expected confrontation; that is, to continue to use the element of 
reconnaissance. "' The Prophet then sent a man called Ibn al-'Uraygit, an ally of the 
Helpers, to bring him news of the Quraysh army. The latest news the Muslims had 
received had prepared them psychologically for the change of the expedition's goal and 
for the coming events. Their initial plan had also changed in accordance with the new 
situation. "' Now a heavier task was laid on the leader's shoulders: he had to convince his 
men of the need to face the new situation. Therefore, at this point, the Prophet revealed 
that he had been promised one of two things: either the caravan, or the Quraysh army. It 
can be claimed that the Muslim army, after assurance of divine assistance, now proceeded 
confident of victory. 132 
It is possible to say that reconnaissance had provided an early awareness, which had given 
the Muslim leaders enough time to change the army's current task of searching for a 
caravan guarded by forty men to the new reality of meeting a well-equipped enemy. 133 
Intelligence gave an advance perception of the great strength of their enemy, revealing the 
critical position of the Muslim army, as the Qur'än makes clear: "Alläh had helped you at 
Badr, when ye were Helpless. ""' We can see, then, that the Prophet was carrying out 
several intelligence activities at the strategic level to get news of the caravan. The Muslim 
' Further see the section "The Value of Intelligence to the Soldiers" in this chapter. 
129 See al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 385. This man can be considered as being among the 
agents with no particular title. See the previous section "Manpower as a Resource of Intelligence". 130 At an area called al-Dabbah. See Ibn Hisham, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 163, al-Tabari, T rikh al-Tabari, v. 2, 
p. 27, and Yamani, Badral Kubrä, p. 105. 
131 See al-Tabari, Tafsiral-Tabari, v. 9, p. 186. 
132 See al-I Ialabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 387. In the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 7, it is found: "Behold! 
Allah promised you one of the two parties, that it should be yours. " 
133 Intelligence was very effective as it transformed the situation into a new dimension. 
134 The original word in the Qur'an "0" is rendered differently by different translators, none of whom 
give the same impression as the Arabic. Examples of the variety of translations are: Yüsuf °Ali, 
"contemptible little force"; Asad, "utterly weak"; Pickthall, "contemptible"; Malik, "helpless" and King 
Fahd English Translation of the Meanings and Commentary, "helpless". See the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 
123. 
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army's perception of the events had to change, causing them to use intelligence at the 
operational level as they were searching for their enemy. 135 Some of the tribes belonging 
to the Quraysh forces, having been informed of the caravan's escape from the Muslim 
ambush, retreated back to Mecca. 136 Nonetheless, it is not reported that the Muslim army 
was aware of that; if they had known, it would have encouraged them greatly and some 
reference would surely have appeared in the reported speeches of the Muslim leaders. 
During this operation, the Prophet himself sometimes led the reconnaissance patrols. This 
seems to have had a positive effect on the morale of the army and also served to confirm 
the reliability of the different pieces of information he had received. He used one of the 
important elements of Islamic intelligence - al-tawriyah - to collect information . 
13' Then 
he sent another reconnaissance party, which captured some of the Quraysh's slaves. This 
allowed the Muslim army to make sure of the exact location and intention of the Quraysh 
army. 138 Also the Muslims' intelligent questioning of the captives provided them with 
good information concerning the adversary's men, equipment, intention, and some of their 
notables' names. The questioner was able to assess the number of the Quraysh soldiers by 
asking how many camels they slaughtered a day, because at that time one camel could 
provide sufficiently for one hundred men. 139 However, it is not reported whether the 
Muslims tried to learn of possible Quraysh reinforcements or an ambush. Perhaps such 
intelligence was considered unnecessary due to the Muslims' own experience of the Arab 
tribes' method of fighting, or they knew, through questioning the captured water carrier, 
'3s See Manäýarah, al-Istikhbärät, p. 74. 
136 This is another example of disagreement among the Quraysh leadership. 
137 He (PBUH) and Abü Bakr conducted a scouting operation when the Muslim army were in the 
immediate vicinity of Badr. They came across an old Bedouin and asked him if he had any news of 
both parties. He replied that he would tell them if they told him who they were. The Prophet agreed. 
And when they had obtained the necessary information the Prophet told him that they were from " cr 
ciV" (water). This method is used in the Arab world since the location of a tribe's wells - information 
they managed to extract from the old man - indicates the identity of the tribe. However, there is 
another dimension to the Prophet's remark. He was referring to the origin of mankind, as in the Qur'an 
(ETMC), 21: 30: "And We have made from water every living thing. " See Sunan al-Bayhagi al-Kubrii 
(BM: Bath al-°Uyin, v. 9, p. 148), Ibn Hish5m, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 163, al-Tabari, Tä ikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 
27, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 3, p. 262, Ibn Qutaybah [671/1273-734/1334], cUyün al- 
Akhbär, v. 1, p. 194, al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, pp. 381 & 387, and al-Hirfi, al-Mukhäbarät, 
p. 41. 
Additionally, it should be noted that lying was considered to be shameful, especially among the nobles, 
who considered such an act would diminish the status of the liar among his own people as well as his 
enemy. Also the liar would negatively affect his descendants. Regarding such a claim, see the 
statement of Abü Sufyän after he met with the Byzantine Emperor. See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al- 
Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 264 and al-I; lalabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 3, p. 286. 
138 See al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, pp. 387-388 and Manäsarah, al-Istikhbärätl, p. 31. 139 See al-I; ialabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 374 and al-Mubarakpuri, al-Rahiq, p. 215. 
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that this information was unlikely to be useful since they were already outnumbered. 14' It 
is probable that the adversary was able to estimate the number and the status of the 
Muslim army, and that the Muslims themselves knew this. 141 Further, the Muslims' 
evaluation of the terrain allowed them to occupy an advantageous position on the 
battlefield. "' Also, at Badr the intelligence gatherers' activities may be considered as 
fulfilling al-ribät, since they placed themselves in danger and were vulnerable to wounds 
or death at any moment during their missions. "" 
Despite having no agent ('ami7) operating within the Quraysh camp, the Muslims used 
the element of surprise as they knew that their adversary would be short of water, and so 
it was important to control the wells of Badr and cut off the Quraysh from the only local 
sources, 144 at the same time ensuring their own supply. '45 It should be noted here that one 
of the strengths of the Muslims was that all the intelligence information was reported to a 
single commander, who was able to make the final decision. Hence, it is possible to say 
that the leader's degree of response to the information he received enabled him to 
improve the quality of his decisions and thus allowed the army as a whole to make the 
1ao The following incident makes clear that they did not want to clash with the Quraysh. When the 
Islamic intelligence agents captured two of the Quraysh's water-carriers, they brought them to be 
questioned. At the time of interrogation, the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) was standing in prayer. The 
person being questioned said: "I know nothing about Abo Sufyan, but Abü Jahl, 'Utbah, Shaybah and 
Umayyah b. Khalaf are there. " When he said this, his interrogators beat him. Then he said: "All right. 
I shall tell you about Abü Sufyan. " They stopped beating him and then asked him (again) about Abü 
Sufyan. He again said: "I know nothing about Abü Sufyan, but Abü Jahl, cUtbah, Shaybah, and 
Umayyah b. Khalaf are there. " When he said this, they beat him in the same way. When the Prophet 
had finished his prayer he said: "by Allah in Whose control is my life, you beat him when he is telling 
you the truth, and let him go when he tells you a lie. " See Sunan Abü Dä'üd (Bab: Fi al Asir, No. 2681, 
v. 3, p. 58), Musnad Ahmad (No. 13729, v. 2, p. 257), and al-Yamani, Badr, p. 106. 
See al-Mubarakpuri, al-Rahiq, p. 216. 
1az It is possible to say that after the Muslim army had allocated the battlefield at the operational level, 
it had the opportunity to allocate it at the tactical level. Further, see al-Jubbüri, Tadibiral--Amn, pp. 45- 
50. For more on the route of approach see the chapter "The Importance of Islamic Military Strategy" 
(Ch. 8). 
143 In fact, all those scouts who were ordered to go back to Medina had been injured on the way to the 
battlefield; but they, and those who had died on the way, and even the scouts who missed the battle 
were all given their share of the booty, which shows clearly that they were included in the status of 
iibät. See Qur'an, 8: 60 & 16: 97, Sahib Muslim (Bab: Manigib al lihid wa al-Ribät, No. 1888, v. 3, p. 
1503), al-Sunan al-Kubra (Bib: al-Sadagah min Ghuliil, No. 2303, v. 2, p. 31), and Sunan al-Darami 
(Bib: Ayal-$alätAfdal, No. 1424, v. 1, p. 390). 
1aa See Mahfüz, al-Madkhal, pp. 148-157 and Manasarah, al-Istikhbirdt, p. 36. To the advantage of the 
Muslims, intelligence activities enable them to choose the location of the battlefield. This allowed them 
to bury the wells, leaving one for their own use. See the section "The Battle of Badr" in the chapter 
'The Importance of Islamic Military Strategy" (Ch. 8). For the importance of water as a vital resource 
in the Arabian desert see the section "Tribal Life and Feuding" in the chapter "Brief Background of the 
Region Prior to Islam" (Ch. 2). 
'as Similarly, the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 11, mentions in connection with the same event: "He caused rain 
to descend on you from heaven, to clean you therewith, to remove from you the stain of Satan, to 
strengthen your hearts, and to plant your feet firmly therewith. " Also, see the section 'The Battle of 
Badr" in the chapter "The Importance of Islamic Military Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
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proper use of accurate and timely intelligence. It can be argued that at Badr intelligence 
was one of the main sources of power for the Muslim army. 
IV. 11.2: The Battle of Uhud 
It is reasonable to claim that the Muslims knew that at Badr the Quraysh had been badly 
hurt by the loss of both men and dignity among the Arab tribes and thus they would 
surely be seeking revenge. 146 The Prophet (PBUH) was not particularly well prepared for 
the coming attack as he had no intelligence agents in Mecca. For that and other reasons, 
since the battle of Badr, the Muslims continued to send regular patrols. Yet, apparently, 
they were not able to find out about the launching of the attack by these means. 
The first news of the impending battle came when the Prophet received from his Uncle al- 
cAbbäs a letter telling him of the intention of the Quraysh army to attack Medina. 147 This 
source was considered reliable due to the previous support the Prophet had received from 
his uncle . 
14' Al-'Abbäs, taking into consideration the important factor of timing, ordered a 
man from the Banü Ghifär to ride as fast as possible, i. e. to make the journey in three days 
and nights, to warn the Prophet of the impending attack of the Meccan army on 
Medina. 149 The messenger travelled faster than usual, taking only three days to reach the 
Prophet and inform him of the coming attack. Al-cAbbäs' prompt action made it possible 
for the Muslim army to be well prepared. 150 It appears that this source of intelligence was 
a completely voluntary agent, and had not been requested by the Muslim leadership to 
146 See the section "The Battle of Badr" in the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
147 See al-llalabi, al Shah al Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 489 and al-Mubarakpuri, al-Rahiq, p. 246. 
Additionally, it can be claimed that the elements of awareness and carefulness were fulfilled in this 
battle. 
148 Al'Abbäs b. 'Abd al-Muttalib is known for the love and respect he bore for his nephew the Prophet. 
We should not forget that al cAbbäs accompanied the Prophet at his second meeting with some of his 
Medinese supporters at a place called cAqabah; the Prophet twice held secret meetings with this group 
(before the Hijrah in 622 AD) with a view to assuring his protection and safety if he agreed to move to 
the Helpers' city. Even though al-°Abbäs was late in embracing Islam, he felt tenderly towards his 
nephew. See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 2, p. 290, al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 1, p. 562, Ibn Kathir, al- 
Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 3, p. 160, and Netton, A Popular Dictionary of Islam, pp. 36-37. Additionally, 
al-Hirfi, al-Mukhäbarät B al-Dawlah al-Islämiyyah, p. 47, claims that al-Katabi [1305/1888- 
1382/1962], al-Tarätib al-Idäriyyah, v. 1, p. 291, argues that al AAbbäs was a Muslim at the time of the 
battle of Badr, and that he cooperated with the Muslim army for this reason. However, taking into 
consideration the Prophet's statement when he questioned al. Abbäs after the battle of Badr it becomes 
clear that al cAbbäs was not cooperating because he was a Muslim but because he loved and respected 
the Prophet. Further, according to al-Katäni it was not reported that al `Abbäs was a Muslim at the 
time of the battle of Badr. 
149 See al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 489. 
150 It is possible to say that the Prophet continued his method of intelligence gathering in order to have 
continuous detailed information about his enemy's movements and status. The men in Medina were on 
the alert all the time, to the extent that they were praying in their heavy armour in order to be 
instantly ready for any attack. 
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provide information. "' Al cAbbäs' letter was of value in the matter of the adversary's 
power in arms and equipment; it also reported the intention of the Quraysh army. 
Apparently, however, it did not report that the Quraysh had united under the command 
of one leader, i. e. Abü Sufyän, nor did it mention the plan of attack. This omission of such 
important information must have weakened the usefulness of the message. "' At first, the 
Prophet thought that the information should not be given to the Companions until he 
had consulted his closest advisors among the notables, as releasing such news might cause 
disruption in the Muslim camp. 153 Whilst the Quraysh army was in the area of Dhü al- 
IIulayfah, two Muslim scouts were sent to confirm and locate the movement of the 
Quraysh, so that the details of the adversary's arms and equipment could be known, and 
the contents of al cAbbäs' letter about the Quraysh's strengths and weaknesses would be 
confirmed. "' It should not be presumed, however, that the Prophet's action meant that he 
did not trust his uncle; rather, he was acknowledging the importance of collecting as 
much information as possible so as to have a clear picture of his enemy. Also, he needed 
to know how the situation was developing. At this time and as he was responding to the 
incoming information the Muslims' leader was guarded and routes in and out of Medina 
were patrolled and watched. 155 It can be argued that the exact details of the arms and 
equipment of the Quraysh army became known when more information was received 
from an ally of the Muslims. "' Further, the two intelligence elements of `amr7 and 
mundhirwere fulfilled. '57 
151 The informant could be called a mundhirsource. 
152 Al-Jubbüri, Tadäbir al-Amn, p. 36, reports that the Prophet had sent a man named Yäsir b. Sufyän 
al-Kacbi to Mecca to inform him of the latest news. However, in the works of reference used by the 
study this story does not occur. Having said that, it seems there was a man called Bishr b. Sufyän al- 
Kalb!, of the Khuzä°ah, who embraced Islam in the sixth year of the Hijrah (628 AD) and tried to 
protect the Prophet by preventing him from reaching Mecca to perform cUmrah. See Ibn Hishäm, al- 
Sirah, v. 4, p. 276, al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 116, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 
165, al-Maqdisi, al-Bad' wa al-Tärikh, v. 4, p. 224, and Ibn Hajar, al-Isäbah, v. 1, p. 292. 
153 It was reported to the Prophet when he was at Qubä' and he ordered his company not to tell 
anyone about it. See al 'Ali, Ghazwat Uhud, p. 22. 
154 According to al cAli, Ghazwat Uhud, p. 23, they were Anas and Mu'nis the sons of Fadälah and al- 
Habäb b. al-Mundhir. 
155 See al-Halabi, al-Shah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 490. This showed that the element of al-ribät was 
fulfilled. 
156 When the Quraysh reached a place called Dhü Tuwä, Sälim al-Khuzä°y and some of his kinsmen of 
the Khuzäcah left the Quraysh and informed the Prophet of the latest developments in the Quraysh 
army. See al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-I alabiyyah, v. 2, p. 490. It also should be mentioned that S51im b. 'Amr 
al-Khuzäry was the chieftain of one of Khuzdcah tribes; they had an early treaty with the Prophet 
which was later on strengthened by the treaty of al-Hudaybiyyah. Of particular interest are the poems 
he spoke before the Prophet when the Quraysh and their allies from the Banü Bakr broke the treaty of 
al-Hudaybiyyah and killed some of the Kuz5cah men in Mecca. See al-Qurtubi, Tafsiral-Qurtubi v. 8, p. 
65, Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 5, p. 88, and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al--ialabiyyah, v. 2, p. 490. This action of the 
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Now that they knew the numbers of the Quraysh army the Muslims were driven to 
consider the possibility of fighting them in Medina, where they could increase their 
numbers to more or less match their enemy's and use the city's obstacles and their 
knowledge of its boundaries. 158 It appears, however, that the Muslims' reading of the 
attack on Medina was incorrect since the Quraysh army did not attack straight away but 
chose to camp next to the Uhud mountains. At this juncture, the Prophet shared his 
information with the army and sought their advice. The ensuing debate revealed that 
some of the Companions underestimated the adversary since they insisted on confronting 
them outside Medina even though this was against the notables' wishes. Under pressure, 
the Prophet agreed, since the key to success was the morale of the Muslims and hesitation 
was not acceptable. 
While the Muslim army was on its way to the battlefield, the Prophet had a vision, which 
was interpreted as promising that one of the main leaders of the Quraysh would be 
killed. "' When the standard bearer of the Quraysh army was subsequently killed in a 
duel, the Prophet told his Companions that the vision had been fulfilled. 160 It seems that 
this explanation of the vision increased the fighting spirit of the Muslim army. Once again 
trust of the Prophet had in his men was put to the test as he asked for someone to lead 
the whole Muslim army by a route which would allow it to slip past the Quraysh army 
unnoticed. Any mistake might ignite the fight before the Muslim army could take up its 
position. 161 The effect of the element of al-dahl was successfully used as it managed to 
Khuza°ah benefited the Prophet's strategic plan. See the chapter "The Importance of Islamic Military 
Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
157 The informants were al'Abbas, his messenger, and the kinsmen of the Khuz5cah. It could be added 
that although that each of them had a different mission, they all reported their information with the 
least possible delay. 
158 See the section "The Battle of Ubud" in the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" (Ch. 3). 159 However, this was not the whole story of the vision. It contained both good and bad news for the 
Muslim army. See Sah-ih al-Bukhari (Kitäb al-Maghäzi, No. 3853, v. 4, p. 1498), al-Mustadrak Gala al- 
Sahihayn (Kitäb Qasm al-Fayy; No. 2588, v. 2, p. 141), Sunan al-Bayhaqi al-Kubrä (Kitäb Qasm al- 
S'adaq, R, No. 13061, v. 7, p. 41), Ibn l-Iajr, Fath al-Bari, v. 7, p. 346, and Ibn al-Qayyim, Zäd al-Ma'äd, 
v. 3, pp. 193-194. 
The vision, as translated by al-Mubarakpuri, occurred as follows: "By Allah, I have dreamt of -I 
implore Allah it be a dream of bounty- cows slaughtered and that there was a groove in the pointed 
top of my sword (the point of my sword hilt), and that I had inserted my hand into an impenetrable 
armour. " Al-Mubarakpuri continues: "the interpretation of 'the cows' was that some of his men would 
be killed, and 'the groove at the pointed top of his sword' was that a member of his House would be 
hurt. As for the 'armour', it was Medina. " AI-Mubarakpuri, al-Rahiq; the English Version, p. 247. 
See al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, pp. 387-388 and Manasarah, al-Istikhbärat, p. 31. 160 The standard bearer was Talhah b. °Uthm5n b. Abi Talbah from the Banü cAbd al-Dar. See Ibn 
llajr, Fath al-Bari, v. 3, p. 346 and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 490. 161 We should bear in mind the Quraysh supremacy in arms and equipment and should also remember 
that their way of disposing their forces in fighting order needed little time to accomplish. See the 
section "The Battle of Uhud" in the chapter "The Importance of Islamic Military Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
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allow the Muslim army to use a shortcut to get to the battle area and move into an 
advantageous battle position. 16' The Muslims' intelligence work enabled them to perform 
a surprise manoeuvre and appear at the least expected position, and their detailed 
knowledge of the terrain allowed them to execute an effective defensive plan. 163 However, 
it is clear that the plan the Prophet had formulated was a risky one; as for the Prophet's 
decision to accept a brilliant young archer into the army, this could be an indication that 
he might have decided in advance that he was going to use and station the archers on the 
flank of the Muslim army to protect it from the cavalry of the Quraysh. 164 Also, his 
estimation of the adversary- was correct as he used the terrain's natural obstacles to 
support his army against the adversary's superiority in men and equipment. It could be 
argued that, as at Badr, the Muslims' intelligence activities at Uhud were a major factor in 
their survival. "' 
W. 11.3: The Battle of al-Khandaq 
At al-Khandaq intelligence was a key factor throughout the progress of the battle, which 
was in effect a long siege. It was often used during the battle despite the adversary's 
strong blockade, which the Qur'an describes. The Qur'än states: 'Behold! They came on 
you from above you and from below you. "'66 If their intelligence activities had not been 
conducted in good time, the Muslim army would have been in great trouble had divine 
assistance not come to their aid. 167 One of the elements of Muslim military intelligence 
was that of al-ribät which was fulfilled through continuous effort such as surveillance) 
Also of great importance was the breaking of the adversary's united leadership. The 
Muslims' extensive knowledge of the confederates allowed them to correctly assess their 
162 See Ibn Hisham, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 11, al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabar , v. 3, p. 
67, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa 
al-Nihäyah, v. 3, p. 239, al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-fialabiyyah, v. 2, p. 495, and al-Mubarakpuri, al-Rahiq, p. 
252. It appears that the Prophet used the intelligence element of dalil, "guide". 
163 For details of their position see the section "The Battle of Uhud" in the chapter "The Battles and 
their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
164 The effectiveness of the archers was due to a thorough analysis of the terrain, which is one of the 
major elements of intelligence; hence it could be argued that the Muslim army, acting on this 
intelligence, were better prepared for battle. See the section "The Battle of Ubud" in the chapter "The 
Battles and their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
165 AI-Hirfi, al-Mukhäbarät, pp. 54-55, says that intelligence in this battle was a source of power for the 
Muslim army. 
166 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 33: 10. 
167 One of the important elements of the Muslims' belief at that time was that Islam would be spread 
and the Prophet would be protected. The Qur'an (ETMC), 5: 67, states: "0 Messengerl Proclaim (the 
Message) which bath been sent to thee from thy Lord. If thou didst not, thou wouldst not have 
fulfilled and proclaimed His Mission. And Allah will defend thee from men (who mean mischief). For 
Allah guideth not those who reject Faith. " 
168 The women in the fort also had a part in fulfilling this element, as one of them stayed on watch and 
later on managed to spot the adversary's scout and kill him. See al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, 
p. 636 and Naumani, Sirat un-Nabi, v. 2, p. 98. 
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motivation . 
'69 As our analysis progresses, other elements of intelligence will be discussed 
as necessary. 
Initially, it should be pointed out that since the battle of Ubud, the Prophet had continued 
to send out messages and patrols within the region. He must have realised that the 
Quraysh would never abandon their strategic goal of destroying Islam. Therefore the 
Muslims had to be constantly on the alert in case of an attack from their main enemy. 
Once again the Muslims' strategic plan bore fruit when the Prophet was informed of the 
confederacy's movements by a non-Muslim group, the Khuzäcah. 10 The source appeared 
to be reliable as it had proved itself at the battle of Uhud. However, this new information 
seems to have contained substantial details of the confederacy's apparently overwhelming 
superiority in terms of men and equipment. The Muslims were therefore able to draw a 
clear picture of the approaching forces. This shows the advantage the Muslim army 
derived from face-to-face questioning of the messengers, who also reported on the 
leadership of the confederate army and the cause of such a huge attack. The Muslims 
therefore knew that withstanding such an attack would be more difficult than in the last 
two battles, hence they needed to prepare well. Once again, as at Badr, it was necessary to 
take account of the time factor and consider how long it would take the confederates to 
march from Mecca to Medina. The response of the Muslim leader was prompt and well 
judged as, after some discussion, the Prophet went on a field reconnaissance to examine 
the possibilities of applying Salmän's suggestion that they should dig a trench. "' The 
Muslim leadership thought that this plan would improve the position of their inferior 
forces. Their immediate reaction to the new events shows that they did not underestimate 
the power of the huge confederate army, which they had never faced before. "' Here, 
apparently, the Muslims' perceptions matched the reality of the adversary's strength. 
However, the Muslim army had to race against time to finish the trench before the arrival 
of the confederate army. 13 While they were digging the trench, the Muslim army kept on 
the alert to the extent that they had their weapons with them all the time, even at 
169 The closest Companion of the Prophet, Abü Bakr, was the most knowledgeable man concerning the 
ways of the Arab tribes. He knew their leaders, their religion, and their social life. See Ibn Ijajar, al- 
Isäbah, v. 4, pp. 169-175 and al-Shargäwi, al-Siddiq, pp. 12-13. 
170 Once again the Khuzäcah warned the Muslims of the coming threat. It seems that among the main 
historical works still in use, only al-Halabi reports this source. He claims that the Khuzäcah made the 
trip in four nights. See al-Halabi, al-Sirah al--Jalabiyyah, v. 2, p. 631. 
171 Due to this reconnaissance, the Muslim army had an effective plan for defence. See al-Halabi, al- 
Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 631. 
172 See al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-tlalabiyyah, v. 2, pp. 632-633. 
173 They were in such a hurry that when they had no other way of carrying the sand, they used their 
own clothes. Even Abü Bakr and cUmar carried the sand in this way. See al-Halabi, a1-Sirah a! - 
flalabiyyah, v. 2, pp. 632-633. 
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prayers, which is thought to fulfil the element of al-ribät. "4 While they were digging, it 
was promised through divine assistance that the Muslims would definitely conquer the 
lands of al-Sham, Persia, and Yemen. 15 This intervention seems to have raised the 
believers' spirits and at the same time exposed the hypocrites. 16 The good news was also 
spread throughout the Muslim army. It is possible to say that the Muslim army was 
fortunate that it had been forewarned, which allowed the soldiers to complete the trench 
before the arrival of the confederate army. 177 Drawing upon his previous experience with 
the Jewish tribes of Banü Qaynugac and Banü al-Nadir, "' the Prophet despatched a force 
to guard the rear, 179 possibly because the Muslims were already suspicious of the Banü 
Qurayzah. Therefore, they sent a force to watch for any movement in the rear despite not 
having any hard evidence. 180 Later the Muslims' intelligence was very effective, revealing 
new and important information in the report of the Banü Sucnah, Asad, Usayd, and 
Thadlabah, who refused to break their treaty with the Prophet; 18' as expected, it bore news 
of the desertion of the Banü Qurayzah. The Muslim community now appeared to be 
trapped between the confederates at the front and the Banü Qurayzah at the back. If both 
adversaries had taken serious concerted action the Muslim army would have been split 
into two, potentially resulting in the defeat of the Muslims and the success of the 
confederate plan. It is possible that the Muslim leadership considered the likelihood that 
the news could be a trick of an unreliable source. The Prophet despatched some of his 
174 They guarded the routes into Medina around the clock. See al-I; lalabi, al-Sirah al-ffalabiyyah, v. 2, 
p 647 and al "Ali, Ghazwat Uhud, pp. 22-23. 
175 See al-Sunan al-Kubra (Bib: al-Nahi can al-Tafarruq R al-Shi"ib wa al Awdiyah, No. 8858, v. 5, p. 
269), Ibn Kathir, al-Bidiyah wa al-Nihiyah, v. 4, pp. 97 & 99, and al-I; ialabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, 
p. 633. It is possible to say that such divine intelligence increasingly exposed the hypocrites. See the 
Qur'an, 33: 12. In contrast, it raised the spirits of the Muslims. It is also believed to be referred to by 
the verse (ETMC), 3: 26: "Say: "0 A11ah! Lord of Power (and Rule), Thou givest power to whom thou 
pleasest, and Thou strippest off power from whom thou pleasest: Thou enduest with honour whom 
Thou pleasest, and thou bringest low whom Thou pleasest: in Thy hand is all good. Verily, over all 
things Thou hast power". 
176 See Ibn Kathir, Tafsirlbn Kathir, v. 3, p. 477. 
177 Al-Mubarakpuri argues that if this army had attacked Medina without warning it would definitely 
have exterminated all the Muslims. Al-Mubarakpuri, al-Rahiq, p. 311. 
178 Despite the treaty the Prophet made with them, they broke it. See the Qur'an, 59: 2,3, & 4, Sahih 
al-Bukhari (Bib: ffadith Banü al Nadir, No. 3804, v. 4, p. 1478), Sunan Abü Da 5d (Bib. - Fi Khabar a! - 
Na(fir, No. 3004, v. 3, p. 156), and al-I Talabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 342. 
179 See the section "The Battle of al-Khandaq" in the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" 
(Ch. 3). 
180 In this they were obeying the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 71, which states: "0 ye who believe! Take your 
precautions. " 
181 See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidiyah wa al-Nihiyah, v. 4, p. 103. Their faithfulness if keeping the treaty is 
praised in the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 199, states: "And there are, certainly, among the People of the Book, 
those who believe in Allah, in the revelation to you, and in the revelation to them, Bowing in humility 
to Allah: they will not sell the Signs of Allah for a miserable gain! " 
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Companions to confirm this serious news. 182 So as not to weaken the resolve of the 
Muslim army, he asked them to act as follows: if it were true, they should not declare it 
openly but indicate it in a particular manner that the rest of the Muslim army would not 
understand; otherwise they should announce its falsehood openly. When the Prophet was 
assured of this news, he loudly said: "Allähu Akbar, glad tidings 0 Muslims. s183 The 
Prophet, facing such a threat, clearly determined not to alarm his men, and indeed these 
words from their Prophet seem to have affected them positively. In fact, an enemy scout 
was killed as he reached the fort, intending to report the status of the rearguard of the 
Muslim army. 1B"Later on, the Prophet wished to undertake an intelligence manoeuvre at 
the operational level to weaken the adversary's position by convincing the tribe of 
Ghatafän to retreat, but the plan was not carried out due to the wishes of some notables 
of the Helpers, 185 presumably because it might have revealed the weak position of the 
Muslim army. However, the slow pace of the battle made it easier for the Muslim army to 
collect information and pass it to their leader, but this was only at the tactical level of 
intelligence since their movement was limited. 186 
As the situation got harder, the Muslim leaders took responsibility for different 
intelligence activities such as protecting or searching for vulnerable points. 187 From an 
Islamic military intelligence perspective, this battle increasingly exposed the hypocrites. "' 
182 It was reported that the Prophet sent al-Zubayr b. al-`Awwam to as certain the threatening news. 
Because of his mission al-Zubayr was called Hawariyyu Rasulu Allah. See Sahib al-Bukhari (Kitab al- 
Jihad, No. 2692, v. 3, p. 1047), Sahib Muslim (Bab: Managib Talhah and al-Zubayr, No. 2415, v. 4, p. 
1879), Sunan Ibn Majah(Bab: Manägib al-Zubayr, No. 122, v. 1, p. 45), Sunan al-Tirmidhi (Bab: 
Managib al-Zubayr, No. 3744, v. 5, p. 646), and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 639. Another 
version narrates that he sent the two Sacds, °Abdullah b. Rawahah, and Khawat b. Jubayr. See Ibn 
Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihayah, v. 4, p. 104 and al-IT Talabi, al-Sirah al-«alabiyyah, v. 2, p. 638. 
183 See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihayah, v. 4, p. 103 and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 
638. 
184 See Ibn Hisham, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 187, al-Tabari, Tarikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 96, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah 
wa al-Nihayah, v. 7, p. 105, and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 639. 
185 See the section "The Battle of al-Khandaq" in the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" 
(Ch. 3). Also see al-IIalabi, al-Sirah al-flalabiyyah, v. 2, p. 640. 
186 See Sahib al-Bukhari (Kitäb al-Jihad, No. 2691, v. 3, p. 1046), al-Sunan al-Kubrä ()6tab al-Managib, 
No. 8213, v. 5, p. 60), Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihayah, v. 4, p. 103, and al-Ijalabi, al-Sirah al- 
Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 638. 
187 One night the Prophet could not go to sleep until he asked for some one to go and protect a 
vulnerable point. To add to his worry, some confederate warriors managed to cross at a shallow point. 
See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihayah, v. 4, p. 103 and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 638. 
Nonetheless, even though a few good horsemen managed to cross, the rest of the confederate army 
could not follow them. See al-Ijalabi, al-Sirah al-Ijalabiyyah, v. 2, p. 647. 
188 In this regard the Qur'an (ETMC), 33: 12, mentions: "And behold! The hypocrites and those in 
whose hearts is a disease say: "Allah and His Messenger promised us nothing but delusions! " Further, 
see the Qur'an, 4: 88, Sunan al-Bayhaqi al-Kubrä (Kitab al-Siyar, v. 9, p. 31), and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al- 
Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 628. 
It is acknowledged that in a crisis a man cannot hide his true thoughts, as the Qur'an states on various 
occasions. See the Qur'an, 10: 12,16: 53, and 17: 67. 
189 
Ch. 6: The Task of Islamic Military Intelligence 
At this time a well-known man of the confederates named Natim b. Mas°nd al-Thaqafi 
became a Muslim and secretly reported to the Prophet, informing him that no one knew 
of his being a Muslim and that he was willing to do whatever was necessary to help lift 
the siege. 189 Thus, Nadim made a demand related to the Islamic concept of leadership, as 
he asked for permission to conduct his plan, and the Prophet used one of the Islamic 
intelligence methods as he allowed Naiim to fulfil it. 19' The Prophet asked him to do his 
best to lift the siege and so he did. Nevertheless, it appears that the Muslim army's 
leadership probably did not rely much on Nadim's efforts at the beginning, but he was to 
play an important role in lifting the siege when he tricked the confederate army. 19' The 
Muslim leader did not limit or distrust Nacim's offer. Thus, it seems that he allowed him to 
choose the best way he could think of. Also, it is possible to say that Nadim was not 
experienced and his skills or plan were not clearly known to the Prophet, so it would have 
been risky to send him on an important mission. 192 Nevertheless the Prophet gave him 
free rein since he, though new to the faith, knew best the status of the adversary. Al- 
II Ialabi reports that towards the end of the siege, Gabriel informed the Prophet that Allah 
would send both a strong cold wind and junüd193 against the confederate army. " It can 
189 The element that at that time Islam was continually served by people of numerous races and tribes 
gave Na'im b. Mas`gd al-Thaqafi, as well as the Bang Sucnah, the opportunity to help the Muslims in 
this battle, and they assisted the Muslim army in conducting their missions. See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, 
v. 4, p. 188, al-Tabari, 7ärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 96, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 111, and 
al-Iialabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 649. 
190 See the section "The Element of al-Tawriyah" in this chapter. 
191 Responding to the wish of the Prophet, Nalim carried out a successful strategic plan by holding 
separate talks with the confederates and then with the Bang Qurayzah since he had good relations 
with the leaders of both. He reported to the Prophet secretly and asked if he could accomplish any 
mission the Prophet wished to be carried out. The Prophet said: "You are only one man among us, so 
go and create distrust among the enemy to draw them off us if you can, for war is deceit. " He made a 
plan which led to the creation of dissension between the confederate army and the Bang Qurayzah. 
His role was one of the most effective factors in breaking the confederates' agreement with the Bang 
Qurayzah. See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 273, al-Tabari, 73-rikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 28, Ibn Kathir, al- 
Bidiyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 3, p. 164, and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 449. 
192 In this connection the following verse (ETMC), 4: 71, could be cited: "0 ye who believe! Take your 
precautions. " Also see the third point in the section "The Significant Qualities of the Muslim Leader; 
the Leader's Self-knowledge" in the chapter "The Impact of Islamic Military Leadership" (Ch. 5), which 
states that the leader should know his men. Therefore, assigning any mission to a new Muslim at this 
very critical moment was very risky. Additionally, he was known by the other Muslims as a non- 
Muslim, so he would be treated as a non-Muslim. 
193 In the edition of the Qur'än used by the study (ETMC) junrld, found in 9: 26 and 33: 9, means 
literally "soldiers". However, some important exegetical works (those of which are al-Tabari, Tafsiral- 
Tabari, v. 21, p. 126, al-Qurtubi, Tafsiral-Qurtubi, v. 14, p. 144, Ibn Kathir, Tafsirlbn Kathir, v. 3, p. 471, 
and al- Zuhayli, al-Tafsir alMunir, v. 21, pp. 258-259, claims that junüd means angels. They should not, 
however, have limited its meaning to denote angels only, since the Qur'anic verses, 48: 4&7 and 74: 
31 do not limit its meaning in this way. Furthermore, the meaning of juni7d may be said to encompass 
the psychological effect of Allah's support and blessing of the Muslim soldier. 
194 Al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 648. Also see Sahib Muslim (Bib: Ghazwat al Ahzab, No. 
1788, v. 3, p. 1414). 
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be argued that during the battle of al-Khandaq the Muslims' counterintelligence activities 
reached the highest level of activity, by managing to create discord between the 
confederate army and their allies among the Banü Qurayzah. 195 Consequently, the 
Prophet carefully chose one scout and informed him that that night something would 
happen in the confederate camp, and whatever happened he needed to be aware of. 196 He 
also briefed him before his departure and ordered him to stick to his mission without 
carrying out any additional activities. 197 
At the battle of al-Khandaq the Prophet used all available means to collect the required 
information; he used the method of continuous assessments. The terrain reconnaissance 
prior to the confrontation helped the Muslims to make a more effective defensive plan. 
However, despite the fact that the intelligence of the Muslim army was very limited in 
relation to the length of time the battle lasted, it had a great effect on the execution and 
outcome of the battle. 198 Therefore, it can again be argued that intelligence was an 
important source of power for the Muslim army at al-Khandaq. 199 
N. 11.4: The Battle of al-Yarmük 
The intelligence factor in this battle has not received much attention from Muslim 
historians perhaps because firstly, they were unable to collect the necessary information, 
secondly, the leaders concealed the most important information as a matter of security, 
and finally, because of the extraordinary circumstances of the battle they did not see the 
need to record intelligence details. 
195 See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, pp. 188-191, al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, pp. 96-97, Ibn Kathir, al- 
Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, pp. 111-112, and al-ITalabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, pp. 645-651. 
196 Al-Halabi reports that the Prophet did not send an irascible scout such as al-Zubayr b. al- Awwäm, 
who was known to be a man of quick temper, because he knew that obtaining information about the 
enemy was more valuable than killing a few of them. See al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 653 
and °Abd al-Ghani, Nuzm a1-Istikhbärät, p. 36. 
197 It seems that the Prophet chose Hudhayfah b. al-Yamän specifically since he knew he would be a 
better scout than the others, partly owing to his self-restraint. When Hudhayfah was about to be 
discovered, his quick thinking saved him. The story is as follows. When I; iudhayfah crept into the 
Quraysh camp and was able to sit among them, he heard Abü Sufyän shouting and calling on his men 
to make sure that there was no spy of the Muslim army among them. He straightaway took the 
initiative and grabbed the men to his right and left, asking them to identify themselves. Both men did 
so, but to his good fortune, they did not ask who he was. Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 191, Ibn Kathir, 
al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 114, and al-IT Talabi, al-Sirah al-«alabiyyah, v. 2, p. 653. Additionally, 
it can be claimed that the three steps required to send a scout on a mission were fulfilled. See the 
section "Manpower as a Resource of Intelligence" in this chapter. 
198 The only two scouts sent out prior to the battle had been caught and killed. See al-Halabi, al-Sirah 
al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 628. 
199 It should be noted that the Prophet said after this battle: "Now we will invade them; they will not 
invade us". See Sahib al-Bukhäri (Bib: Ghazwat al-Khandaq, No. 3883, v. 4, p. 1508). In this sense al- 
Khandaq is the turning point in the relationship between the Muslims and the Arabs in the Peninsula. 
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Having said that, this battle is different from those previously discussed and it needs 
special care in the assessment of the Muslims' intelligence work. However, it seems that 
there were certain key factors of intelligence in this battle, for example continuous 
surveillance, working undercover as a non-Muslim traveller, controlling the reporting of 
information to the soldiers, and the use of interpreters. 
What the commanders knew before the battle influenced its progress since some of them 
had travelled among and dealt with the Byzantines before. They had a certain amount of 
knowledge about the Byzantine army and what their morale was likely to be after several 
battles with them, where both sides had tasted both victory and defeat. 20° At al-Yarmük 
they knew with certainty that they were outnumbered as far as men and equipment were 
concerned. 201 Therefore, they were aware that this new dimension of fighting against a 
relatively unknown foe implied that the Muslims' intelligence needed to work carefully in 
an unfamiliar area, for the adversary's forces spoke a different language. 202 Nevertheless, 
although it can be argued that everyone in the Muslim army knew that they would not 
have had the courage to even think of attacking such a powerful empire in the years prior 
to Islam, this perception seems to have encouraged them to pursue intelligence activities 
at the strategic level. In addition, knowing that they were fulfilling the element of divine 
assistance, they were prepared and determined fight, since they knew that their Prophet 
had been told by a supernatural source that they would conquer the region of al-Sh5m. 203 
This conviction made it possible for the Caliph and his commanders to gather together a 
great force. However, it should be noted that divine assistance largely ceased when the 
Prophet passed away. 204 
First of all, it should be recognised that to move secretly to collect information from a 
powerful army is a risk in itself. An adversary who speaks a different language makes the 
task even harder. However, that the Muslims' intelligence was working against the 
Byzantine army, which could not differentiate between an Arab of the Quraysh and one 
200 Among these battles were Thätu Atläh, Mu'tah, and Usämah's raid. See Kamäl, al-Tanq i1ä 
Dimashq, pp. 144,145,149,151, and 152. 
201 Regarding the Byzantines' resources of men and equipment see the section "The Byzantines and 
Säsänians" in the chapter "Brief Background of the Region Prior to Islam" (Ch. 2). 
202 The study is not able to understand the reason these difficulties were not reported. 
203 See al-Sunan al-Kubrä (Bab: al-Nahi can al-Tafarruq & al-Shi`äb wa al Awdiyah, No. 8858, v. 5, p. 
269), Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, pp. 97 & 99, and al-Malabi, al-Sirah al-h(alabiyyah, v. 2, 
633. 
204 For the types of the divine assistance see the section "The Significant Effect of Assistance through 
Divine Information" above. 
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from Badiyat al-Sham, eased their mission somewhat. 205 Indeed, it might have been even 
easier than usual, since there were other Arabs who were not Muslims living with and 
fighting alongside the Byzantine army; however, their movement within the enemy camp 
was more likely to be discovered by an Arab adversary than by a Byzantine. Also, the 
flexibility of the Islamic military doctrine made their mission less difficult, as they were 
excused from practising their daily worship in its original form, for instance the prayers. 206 
Similarly to the battle of al-Khandaq, the advantage of early intelligence saved the Muslim 
army from being eliminated in the region of al-Sham. 207 Scouts informed them about the 
massive numbers of the Byzantine forces and their movements 208 The reliability of the 
sources was not questioned or discussed, as far as can be known from the historical 
records. Further, the leaders gathered some information themselves. Due to his previous 
experience in the region of al-Sham, Ab5 Sufyan was able to allocate the battlefield at the 
operational level. 209 It can be argued that the reliability of this source of intelligence was 
beyond question. While the Muslim army retreated in the region of al-Sham, its 
intelligence agents kept the leadership aware of the adversary's movements. "' The scouts 
reported that the Byzantine army was stationed in an area near al-W5qüsah. 211 As far as 
the battlefield itself is concerned, one might argue that the accurate intelligence of the 
205 Had they been fighting other Arabs they would have been discovered straight away because of their 
dialect. See the section "Tribal Life and Feuding" in the chapter "Brief Background of the Region Prior 
to Islam" (Ch. 2). 
206 Similarly, see the case of °Abdullah b. Unays which is narrated in Sunan Abü Dä'üd (Kitäb al-S'aläh, 
No. 1249, v. 2, p. 18), Musnad Ahmad (v. 3, p. 495), al-Asbahäni, -iyliyat al-Awliya; v. 2, pp. 5.6, and Ibn 
Sa°d, al-Tabagatal-Kubrä, v. 2, pp. 50-51. 
207 They were saved since the leaders of the Muslim armies, as well as the Caliph, were mostly agreed 
on gathering together and fighting their adversary from one tactical position. See al-Tabari, Tätlich a! - 
Tabari, v. 2, p. 335 and Kamäl, al-Tar q0 Dimashq, p. 431. Al-Tabari uses the term ahassa, which can be understood in two ways: the first meaning is that the Muslim army conducted intelligence work 
themselves, as would be indicated by the word tahassasü; secondly he could have meant ahassu, 
meaning to feel. It seems that he used the first meaning. Also see the section "The Battle of al-Yarmük" 
in the chapter "The Importance of Islamic Military Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
208 To a certain extent, this allowed them to know their adversary's strengths and weaknesses. See al- 
Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 334 and Kamäl, al-Qädisiyyah, p. 431. Also see the section "The 
Adversary at the Battle of al-Yarmnk" in the chapter "The Adversaries' Strengths and Weaknesses" 
(Ch. 7). 
209 It seems that Abü Sufyän and some of the well-known leaders at al-Yarmük had visited the area as 
traders both before and after the foundation of Islam. See al-Tabari, Tätlich al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 333 and 
Kamäl, al-Tar q ilä Dimashq, p. 130. 
In the Qur'än, the surah Quraysh mentions the journeys of merchants made between Mecca and other 
places. Further see al-Tabari, Tafsir al-Tabari, v. 30, pp. 306-308, al-Qurtubi, Tafsir al-Qurtubl, v. 2, p. 
201, and al-Zuhayli, al-Tafsir, al-Munir, v. 30, pp. 412-418. 
210 See the section "The Battle of al-Yarmilk" in the chapter "The Importance of Islamic Military 
Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
211 See al-Tabari, Tätlich al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 334, Yagüt al-Hamawi, Muyam al-Buldan, v. 5, p. 354, and 
Kamäl, al-Tariq i1ä Dimashq, p. 433. 
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Muslim army allowed them to choose the battlefield at the operational level whereas the 
Byzantine army chose the battlefield at the tactical level. 212 
Prior to the fight, the Muslim army sent more scouts to find out about the loud sounds 
emanating from the adversary's camp. 213 This shows how close the two armies were to 
each other and also demonstrates the extent of their precautions and mutual suspicion. 
During the negotiations, unlike in the three battles previously discussed, the leader, 
himself Khälid b. al-Walid, went to meet the adversary in his own camp214 in order to 
discover more about the Byzantines and particularly how they might be defeated. After 
the negotiations ended in failure, a scout warned the Muslim army of the attack on the 
following day. 215 This information was of prime importance and had a powerful bearing on 
the conduct and outcome of the battle, as the Muslims were able to prepare and position 
their men in good time. It is noteworthy that al-Tabari was more accurate when he used 
the Arabic word tahassasv in his discussion of the gathering of intelligence that night; the 
word indicated that the information was reported by a Muslim scout. This would make 
the information more reliable at that moment and in that situation. 216 During the early 
hours of the confrontation, two visions granted to Abü CUbaydah and Abü Mirthid al- 
Khawläni were spread among the Muslim army. 217 These were thought to be instances of 
divine assistance, and increased their resolve. 218 In the heat of the fighting a message 
arrived from Medina instructing Abü CUbaydah to take over the command and Khälid to 
relinquish it. However, if at that moment the news had been spread in the Muslim army it 
would have affected its fighting spirit. This does not mean Abü cUbaydah was not a 
capable leader, or was not liked, but the removal of a leader that the soldiers loved, 
trusted, and admired at the most critical moment of the fight was bound to have had a 
212 See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 334, Bahadur and Sherwani, life ofAbü Bakr, pp. 73-74, and 
Kamäl, al-Qadisiyyah, p. 432. See the section 'The Adversary at the Battle of al-Yarmilk" in the 
chapter "The Adversaries' Strengths and Weaknesses" (Ch. 7). For a tactical assessment see the section 
"The Battle of al-Yarmnk" in the chapter "The Importance of Islamic Military Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
213 For the reasons for these sounds see the section 'The Adversary at the Battle of al-Yarmük" in the 
chapter "Me Adversaries' Strengths and Weaknesses" (Ch. 7). 
214 See Kamäl, al-Tar q i19 Dimashq, p. 435. Khälid negotiated with his adversary only within the 
limitations of the three options prescribed Islamic Military Doctrine. See the chapter "The Role of 
Islamic Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
215 In the early hours of the day of the attack, while the Byzantine army was preparing its soldiers, 
Khälid and his commanders were working to dispose the ranks of their soldiers as quickly as possible. 
See al-Tabari, 7ärikh al-Tabar v. 2, p. 335 and Kamäl, al-Tariq i1ä Dimashq, p. 468. 
216 See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 335. 
Further his usage of this word coincides with its usage in the Qur'än, 12: 87, in the passage where 
Jacob (Yacqüb) tells his sons to look for Joseph (Yüsuf) and his brother (PBUTA). 
217 Further see Kamäl, al-Tar q ilä Dimashq, p. 468. 
218 Kamäl writes: "The Muslims were happy and rejoiced at the glad tidings". Kamäl, al-Tariq i1ä 
Dimashq, p. 469. 
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greatly negative effect on their performance. 219 But it should be recognise that `Umar, the 
Caliph, showed his wisdom when he chose a shrewd man to deliver his message. On his 
arrival this messenger was able to read the situation of the Muslim army and did the right 
thing, keeping the news of the transfer of command and the death of the Caliph to 
himself and giving the glad tidings of fresh reinforcements to the soldiers. It can be 
argued that Khälid made a wise decision by not telling anyone about the message until 
the end of that day's fight. Withholding the news saved the Muslim army from severe 
confusion and internal defeat. 220 Of all the intelligence activities carried out during the 
battle itself, this can be considered the most effective. Generally, it could be argued that 
since al-Yarmük was a short fight, most of the intelligence activities were conducted prior 
to the confrontation. 221 
IV. 11.5: The Battle of al-Qädisiyyah 
Intelligence activities were carried out for many months prior to the battle of al- 
Qädisiyyah, therefore only those activities which had a direct effect on the battle itself 
will be discussed. First of all, the Muslims had had previous experience of the power of 
the Persian army. They knew that it belonged to one of the two most powerful empires of 
that time. They had fought against it several times during the previous two years and had 
both lost and won. However, now, speaking of this battle and his perception of it, Umar 
said that al-Qädisiyyah was the gateway to the Säsänian lands. 222 The intelligence work 
for this battle started when Umar asked the people of Iraq who had arrived in Medina to 
go back under Sa`d's command. When Sa`d took over the leadership, he was urged by the 
previous leader in the Iraq region, al-Muthanna b. Härithah, not to fight the Persian army 
on its own territory but in an area close to the border with the Arab lands. " This advice, 
which was based on extensive knowledge and analysis, coincided with the view of Caliph 
cUmar. 224 Their perception was that the Säsänians would gather the best of their forces 
219 The Muslim soldiers were optimistic when they were guided by Khälid since they knew his ability 
as a military leader. cUmar remarked when he was informed of Khälid's death that he had succeeded 
in everything he did. See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, p. 117. 
220 Keeping problematic information secret was very effective at al-Yarmük. The news carried from 
Medina was that the beloved Caliph was dead. If such news had spread it might have shattered the 
spirit of the Muslim army. 
2 
spirit 
was a one-day battle. See the section "The Battle of al-Yarmiik" in the chapter "The Battles and 
their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
222 It could be argued that Umar thus pointed out in advance the next intelligence goal which the 
Muslims needed to concentrate on. See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 386. 
223 This intelligence information limited the area of operations for the Muslim army. It demonstrates 
the effect of intelligence on the army's position in the battle at the operational level. For a full 
discussion of this point see the section "The Battle of al-Qddisiyyah" in the chapter "The Importance of 
Islamic Military Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
224 See al-Tabari, 7W kh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 386. 
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against them. Therefore, the morale of the adversary, and the numbers and condition of 
his men and equipment, had to be continuously observed, since constant surveillance 
brings the best information. The need for this information focused the Muslims' 
intelligence activity at the operational level. Also, it allowed the Muslim army to have an 
advance perception of the next battle and what it would be like. In fact, Umar knew well 
what was in store when he addressed Sacd: "And know that you are advancing towards a 
severe trial and be patient, patient. "225 
Therefore, Umar requested Sa'd to send extensive patrols, `saräyä, in advance to obtain a 
clear picture of the terrain and the movements of their enemy, either the Arab tribes living 
there or the Persian army. 226 
Additionally, it is noteworthy that the highest leader, cUmar, was kept continuously 
informed since he requested Sald to write to him daily about what he had discovered. 22' 
Sa`d sent patrols into the Sawäd228 to conduct raids while he was travelling to the 
battlefield. On one of these raids the Muslims captured a large booty including Säsänian 
women. These scouts' activities were beneficial at the strategic level as they drew the 
Persian army to a specific spot. Sacd was informed that Rustam was leading the Persian 
army, 229 and it is likely that the experienced men of Iraq who knew the Persian army well 
would have confirmed that the Emperor had sent against the Muslim army one of his 
greatest military commanders of that time. Up until this moment the numbers and 
equipment of the adversary were not certain, and it seems that Sa`d's information was not 
communicated to the army, but it did confirm the perception of the Muslim leaders that 
the next battle was going to be a destructive fight and that the outcome would be decisive. 
Consequently, Sacd sent forward Zuhrah, one of his commanders, to secure the front and 
to search for their enemy while he was on his way to the battlefield of al-Qädisiyyah. 23o 
Scouts were sent day and night to search for and secure the front line and to seek more 
information. "' When the Säsänian Emperor asked to negotiate with some Muslims, Umar 
225 See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 423. 
226 See al-Jubbiiri, Tadäbiral--Amn, pp. 45-50 and cAbd al-Ghani, Nuzm al-Istikhbärät, pp. 92-93. 
227 cUmar ordered Sa`d to be very cautious, especially when Sad reported that all the people of the 
Sawäd who had entered into treaties with the Muslims had gone back on their pledges. They were 
even collaborating with the Säsänians and were preparing for war against the Muslims. See al-Tabari, 
Tärikh al-Taban; v. 2, p. 387. 
228 Sawäd means the lowlands of Iraq. See Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 155. 
229 See al-Tabari, 7ärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 387. 
230 Ibid. 
231 Zuhrah, °Asim b. °Amrii, and others were continuously carrying out intelligence work. See al-Tabari, 
Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 388. 
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ordered Sacd to send capable envoys232 who would represent the Muslims skilfully and at 
the same time collect more information. "' Umar knew that an envoy who impressed the 
enemy would, in modem terms, have a negative psychological effect on his morale. 4 Our 
knowledge of the messengers indicates that most of them possessed an imposing 
appearance and a strong personality, which was calculated to impress the adversary. 235 
Also, it seems that Sacd sent men who could be trusted to succeed in such a mission, as 
cUmar had requested. 236 Apart from the matter of their appearance and personality, their 
number included Companions, well-known fighters, frequent visitors to the Säsänian 
Emperor, and Persian speakers. Surprisingly perhaps, among Sacd's envoys were former 
apostates from Islam (Munadün) "237 
Among the many reconnaissance parties which Sacd sent out, that of Tulayhah b. 
Khuwaylid al-Usdi and others, 238 when they were on their way, came across a huge army 
camping nearby 239 This was to prove a turning point. They had two alternatives: either to 
carry on the reconnaissance, or to retreat and report their findings. The men preferred to 
go back and tell Sacd what they had found, which was surely the more reasonable 
course240 However, as the great numbers of the enemy became clear, Tulaybah insisted on 
gathering more information and he himself captured a man from the Persian army and 
took him back for questioning. 241 He needed to make sure that any further perception of 
the enemy was built on strong evidence. This incident illustrates that Tulayhah's 
reconnoitre was carried out differently as it was conducted by force, and his behaviour was 
232 As with Khälid's negotiations at al-Yarmük, these envoys were ordered to put only three options to 
the adversary: accept Islam, pay the jizyah, or fight. See the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military 
Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
233 Envoys should be able to collect information as well as convey the message of their leader well. See 
al-Tabari, Mi kh al-Tabari, v. 2, pp. 389-390. 
234 See al-Tabari, Tätlich al-Taban; v. 2, p. 389. 
235 See the section "Appearance and Personality" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" 
(Ch. 4). One of the messengers, Rib°i b. cTmir, was not particularly tall; but we should not forget that 
he was the one who suggested at the latest stages of negotiations to send only one envoy in order to 
show the Säsänians that the Muslim army was not much concerned about them. His shrewd advice led 
Sa'd to send him. This shows that appearance is a more subtle factor than one might at first think. 
236 See al-Tabari, Tarikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 389 and Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, p. 38. 
237 Sacd was following the advice of cUmar not to use the apostates in positions of command in the 
army, since such positions would allow them to be in charge of other Muslims and they might mislead 
them. However, some of them had great skills, which could serve Islam better than those of many 
others. 
238 There were in fact two groups: one was led by Tulayhah b. Khuwaylid and the other by °Amrii b. 
Ma'di-Karib al-Zubaydi. See al-Tabari, Tätlich al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 397. 
239 See al-Tabari, Tärkh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 397. 
240 According to the Department of the Army, the intelligence agent should not wait until he has 
complete information on the enemy to report; even small amounts of combat information are useful. 
See Department of the Army, Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks, p. 12. 
241 See al-Tabari, 7ärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 398 and al-Tha'älibi [d. 1363/1944], Khiläfat al-Siddiq wa 
al-Faniq, p. 219. 
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certainly questionable since he had put his life at risk. Having said that, his luck held, and 
in any case the movement of one man can be more secure than the movement of many. 
Also, it was possible to take advantage of the Säsänian's inability to distinguish him from 
one of the non-Muslim Arabs travelling with and serving in the Persian army for various 
purposes. 242 Whatever the facts may be, he was the one most responsible for revealing 
details of the amount of arms and equipment carried by the Persian army. 24' After a few 
days the captive embraced Islam, and Sacd was able to use him as an advisor and a spy in 
the Persian camp. Although this might have been dangerous due to his close relation with 
the non-Muslims, he acted as Nadim had done at the battle of al-Khandaq. 244 Once again 
the Muslim army fully utilised and benefited from the skills offered by different races and 
tribes who had embraced Islam. 24S At this stage, the function of the Muslim army patrols 
altered from pressing the Persian army to come forward to concentrating on collecting 
information. "' 
Again, several envoys went to meet Rustam and put to him the three options of Islamic 
military doctrine. "' From an intelligence point of view, since the efforts of the Säsänian 
leaders to win over the Muslim negotiators with wealth and gifts proved fruitless, it is 
possible to claim that the identical message they were all conveying constituted a 
psychological attack on the adversary. Their steadfastness made it clear that the Muslim 
army was determined to accomplish its goals. 2 The last envoy brought the news that the 
fight would start the following day. 249 
The Muslim army, however, failed to appreciate the power of the Persian material, i. e. 
how difficult it would be to fight against their elephants, despite the fact that a Muslim 
army had fought against a Persian army equipped with elephants at the battle of Dhät al- 
242 This shows that the strategic plan of choosing the battlefield was starting to bear fruit. For details 
see the section "The Battle of al-Qädisiyyah" in the chapter "The Importance of Islamic Military 
Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
243 See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 399. 
244 This shows that apart from knowing his men, a good leader should be a good judge of men, and be 
able to act on his intuition at short notice. See the section "The Significant Qualities of the Muslim 
Leader; the Leader's Self-knowledge" in the chapter "The Impact of Islamic Military Leadership" 
(Ch. 5). 
245 As at al-Khandaq, when Salmän al-Färisi advised the Prophet to dig the trench before Medina. See 
Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 182 and al-I Ialabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 633. 
246 See the section "The Battle of al-Qädisiyyah" in the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" 
(Ch. 3). Also see al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 398. 
247 See the section "The Concept of the Just War" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military 
Doctrine" (Ch. 4). Also see al-Tabari, Tänkh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 406. 
249 See al-Tabari, Ta-rikh al-Taban; v. 2, pp. 401-403. For a full discussion of this point see the section 
"The Significance of Islamic Military Doctrine" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" 
(Ch. 4). 
249 See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 406. 
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Saläsil in the first month of the year 12 of AH (Apr. 633 AD). "' Had they taken proper 
account of this weapon it is likely that they would have attempted to eliminate the threat 
before the battle began, or at least made a plan to do so later. When Sacd eventually asked 
the newly converted Muslims whether the elephants had vulnerable spots, they specified 
the eyes and trunks. 25' 
Sacd continued to send out night scouts to protect critical points and also to get news of 
the Persian army. 252 One of these scouts' reports resulted in both armies resting for several 
hours on the third night before the fighting started again at midnight (there was a full 
moon). It seems that the view of both armies was that whoever carried on fighting to the 
end would be the victor; stamina was a crucial factor after three long consecutive days of 
fighting. The Qur'an states: "0 ye who believe! Persevere in patience and constancy; vie 
in such perseverance. "253 Sacd's first recognition of the good progress the Muslim army 
was making in the Night of al-Harir came when he heard the poem of al-Qa°qä`. 254 
Despite his continuous concern to collect information during the battle, it is not reported 
that Sacd conducted any intelligence activities himself. "' Additionally, no visions of glad 
tidings were reported in this battle. 256 Unlike in the other battles under study, the element 
of al-rib, t at al-Qädisiyyah was particularly effective as it served to control the impatience 
of the Muslim army. 257 
250 See Kamal, al-Tariq i1ä al-Madä'in, p. 212. Also see the section "The Battle of al-Qadisiyyah" in the 
chapter "The Battles and their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
251 See al-Tabari, TYr kh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 406. This is another instance of the advantages of different 
races embracing Islam. See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 419. They also specified for them the 
two most important elephants, which the other elephants followed; these became the targets of the 
next attack. 
252 See the section "The Battle of al-Qadisiyyah" in the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" 
(Ch. 3). See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 421. 
253 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 200. Both al-Qurtubi and al-Zuhayli state that the phrase "vie in such 
perseverance" implies that the Muslims should have greater patience than the non-Muslims. See al- 
Qurtubi, Tafsiral-Qurtubi, v. 4, p. 221 and al-Zuhayli, al-Tafsiral-Munir, v. 4, p. 213. 
254 See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 423. It is worth mentioning that one of the methods the 
Arabs used to announce their intentions was to proclaim them aloud in the form of poetry. 
255 See Hirfi, al-Mukhäbarät, p. 123. 
256 However, Ibn Taymiyyah, Minhäj al-Sunnah, v. 8, p. 204, mentions that an instance of divine 
assistance did occur which assured the support of Allah for the Muslim army. According to Ibn 
Taymiyyah, `Aim b. °Amr was sent on a patrol looking for sheep and cattle, he encountered a man on 
the edge of a thicket, and asked him where the cattle and sheep were; the man swore that he did not 
know. It became clear, however, that he himself was the cowherd, for a bull then exclaimed `By God, 
f he is lying! Here we are. " Asim went in and led the bulls away. Also see al-Tabari, zärikh al-Tabari, 
v. 2, p. 388 and Ibn al-Athir, al-Kämil, v. 2, p. 303. For the translation see al-Tabari, Tarikh al-Tabari; 
the English Version, v. XII, p. 28. 
257 See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 397. 
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The above evidence leads us to conclude that Sacd used all available means to collect the 
information he needed. 2 8 Although each scout and patrol had a particular mission, they 
all had to use their knowledge, daring and skill to provide their leaders with the 
information they needed and had requested with the least possible delay. 259 Their good 
work allowed the leaders to choose the battlefield at all levels, i. e. strategic, operational, 
and tactical. Even though the leadership sometimes failed to respond promptly to the 
whole range of information they received about the adversary, their intelligence allowed 
them to do their best to prepare their men, arms, and equipment for the decisive battle 
with the Sasanian Empire. 
The preceding discussion has shown that at al-Qadisiyyah intelligence was a source of 
power, was a contributing element of al-ribät and prevented the destruction of the 
Muslim army. 
VI. 12: Comparison of the Battles 
From the foregoing discussions and analyses of the five battles, it seems that the element 
of Islamic military intelligence affected the soldiers' performance differently in each battle. 
However, the intelligence-gathering environments in the last two battles were more 
difficult since the Muslims were confronting professional armies with different religious 
backgrounds. We have seen that purely Islamic concepts were applied in some cases 
which varied from one battle to another. Additionally, some general points shared by 
other schools of intelligence were examined from an Islamic perspective. 
Divine assistance was involved in most of the battles in varying degrees. However, in the 
first three battles, it was manifested in its three types while the revelations to the Prophet 
were still in progress. 26° At al-Yarmiik the last two types, advance information in the 
Qur'an and the Ihadtth, and vision, were manifested, and at al-Qadisiyyah only the second 
type was involved. 
The element of al-ribätwas seen to cover a wide area of performance; this Islamic element 
was an important factor in all the battles. In fact, the longer the battle, the more this 
element was in evidence. Hence, the last three battles were mainly affected by this 
element since the Muslim army had to bear the hardships associated with these battles for 
a long period. 
258 IIanzalah al-Tamimi was helpful in guiding the Muslim army to Iraq since he was an experienced 
man of the Iraq region. See Kamäl, al-Qädisiyyah, p. 67. 
259 See Glass and Davidson, Intelligence is for Commanders, p. 63. 260 See the forms of divine assistance in the section "The Significant Effect of Assistance through 
Divine Information". 
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Al-tawriyah is another purely Islamic concept. Since it was not continually employed as al- 
ribät was, the use of this element was reported only at the battles of Badr and al-Yarmnk. 
It allowed the Muslim army to gather the information it needed without having to resort 
to deception. 
Intelligence was conducted in two forms: tahassasü, `look by yourself and tajassasl, 
`others might do it for you'. 26' In these battles, the Muslim armies conducted both types. 
The element of tahassasü, however, was not fulfilled at Uhud or al-Khandaq, since the 
army at that time was fighting for the survival of the community and was not yet 
experienced in highly organised warfare as it was in the last two battles. 
Additionally, it can be argued that information provided in these battles had an impact 
upon the Muslim army both spiritually and materially. Reconnaissance was a most useful 
tool in three of the battles, but was not much used in the battles of Ubud and al-Khandaq, 
where preventive intelligence proved most effective. 262 In contrast, it was the major 
element in the form of subjective intelligence gathering in the other battles. Additionally, 
while terrain was not a major factor chosen by the Muslims at al-Yarmnk, it was clearly 
advantageous in the other battles, especially al-Khandaq. Additionally, speed and secrecy 
in collecting and reporting information were two elements employed in an Islamic manner 
which were maintained and used positively in all the battles. Secrecy was particularly 
effective at al-Yarmük, and speed at al-Khandaq. 263 
Generally, the adversaries' strengths and weaknesses were discovered and clearly 
understood. However, at al-Yarmük there were few intelligence activities prior to the 
confrontation. The lack of intelligence activity was especially critical prior to the battle of 
Badr. 
The element of planning, which was based on the above elements, was properly carried 
out even though it was disrupted at the battle of Ubud. However, the best examples of 
planning based on intelligence can be seen in the battles of Badr, al-Khandaq, and al- 
Qädisiyyah, although there was a major flaw in planning at al-Qadisiyyah, where the 
Muslims had at first no way of dealing with the Persians' elephants. 
VI. 13: Conclusion 
In this chapter, after defining the term Islamic Military Intelligence, the study went on to 
prove its validity from an Islamic point of view. Following this, the types of intelligence 
261 Since both types were ordered and conducted by the Prophet, this would allow them to be counted 
as a part of the sharifa. 
262 See the Qur'än, 4: 71. 
263 See the stories of the two Sa'ds for secrecy and the story of Bisbis for speed, referred to in the 
discussions of the battles of Badr and al-Khandaq in this chapter. 
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gathering including reconnaissance, which is considered to be one of the main methods, 
and manpower as an important resource, were investigated. Next, the leader's relationship 
with his intelligence gatherers and his degree of response to their intelligence reports 
were examined. This was followed by an analysis of the importance of information 
gathering and its value to the soldiers. In the last part of the theoretical section of this 
chapter, the elements of divine assistance, i. e. revelation and vision, and of al-tawrryah 
were investigated. 
The events of each battle were considered in the light of the theoretical section, and a 
critical analysis was attempted. Lastly, the battles were compared in order to show how 
Islamic military intelligence proved to be a key factor in the Muslim army's successful 
achievement of its goals in all five battles. 
Therefore, from the evidence considered, albeit briefly, in this chapter it seems that 
Islamic military intelligence was a source of power for the Muslim armies in the five 
battles. It used all the available means, i. e. both divine assistance and human abilities. The 
Muslim armies in these battles gathered and acted upon the collected information 
according to the commands and teachings of Islam. This conclusion is supported by 
Handel's argument that a weak army with first-rate intelligence would be victorious over a 
strong army with weak intelligence. 264 
Once the leader is provided with the necessary intelligence information, he can build an 
accurate assessment of the adversary's strengths and weaknesses. On the basis of this 
assessment he can then construct the necessary strategic and tactical plans, taking the 
appropriate measures which will allow the army to attain its goals. 2' The next chapter 
considers the importance of knowing the adversary's strengths and weaknesses, referring 
in detail to the battles under study. 
264 However there are obviously other factors essential to the achievement of victory. See Handel, 
"Intelligence and Military Operations", No. 2, v. 5, pp. 33-65. 
265 For a similar view see Glass and Davidson, Intelligence is for Commanders, p. 40. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The Adversaries' Strengths and Weaknesses 
This chapter plays an important part in the study since it concentrates on the various 
powers opposed to the Muslims. Every power has its own strengths and weaknesses, 
which are key factors in the course and outcome of any battle. In the five battles 
considered by the study the stability of these factors varied greatly in accordance with the 
effect of both internal and external factors. However, there are standard measures that 
can be used to determine, with some confidence, the strengths and weaknesses of the 
Muslims' adversaries. For the sake of balance these strengths and weaknesses will be 
analysed to complete the picture already partly drawn by the analysis of the Muslims' 
intelligence activities presented in chapter six. 
Among these external and internal influences were those of religion, leadership, military 
mobilization, psychology, terrain, and planning. It should be noted, however, that some of 
these factors were recognised by the Muslim army, as stated in chapter six, while others 
were not. This chapter also draws on the discussion presented in chapter two, "Brief 
Background of the Region Prior to Islam". 
VII. 1: The Adversary at the Battle of Badr 
It can be argued that the Quraysh lost this battle for three main reasons: first, their army 
was not united by religious conviction, and they were consequently unable to comprehend 
the vital unifying effect of the Muslims' religious motivation; second, their overconfidence 
in their own power and underestimation of their adversary; third, the increasing divisions 
among the leadership. This section will attempt an assessment of the relative importance 
of these three causes of defeat. 
The Muslims already knew a great deal about the Quraysh army. They knew that the 
Quraysh were divided, commanded by a squabbling disunited leadership, and driven by 
different motives. ' Nevertheless the Quraysh owed their reputation among the Arabs 
' For evidence of a divided leadership, it is worth mentioning that even while the Quraysh army was 
on its way to the battlefield, more than one clan broke away and retreated. This is in accordance with 
the third type of leadership. See the section "Types of Leadership" in the chapter "The Impact of 
Islamic Military Leadership" (Ch. 5). Also see Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 166, al-Tabari, Tärikh al- 
Tabari, v. 2, p. 29, and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 391. Further see the section "The 
Special Characteristics of the Arabs" in the chapter "Brief Background of the Region Prior to Islam" 
(Ch. 2). 
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partly to religion: they were united by a veneration of the Kacbah and their idols. 2 
However, despite this reputation, their main reason for fighting the Muslims was not a 
religious one, since of all the varied pronouncements of their leaders not one emphasised 
religious differences. 3 Moreover, the Quraysh's religion was well understood by the 
Muslims, since they themselves had practised it prior to Islam. Therefore, it can be said 
that the Muslim army was well aware that a true and single united religion, such as they 
practised, did not exist among the Quraysh forces. Further, the Quraysh as a whole were 
not known as the most pious people of Arabia; they were the custodians of the Kacba, but 
their piety was partly driven by economic factors. 4 In fact, even though their city was a 
focus of Arab religious feelings, their lack of a unifying religion caused disunity from the 
beginning. Hence, on the one hand, one of their strengths was that they were custodians 
of this focus of belief. This was certainly an important factor in their morale. On the other 
hand, their lack of true religious commitment was a weakness when fighting the Muslims, 
whose strong religious motivation made them a `band of brothers' and forged an 
unbreakable comradeship. 5 The Quraysh were incapable of understanding the unifying 
affect of Islam on the Muslims since such a religious power was beyond their experience. 
Thus they were led to make a serious misjudgement of how the battle would proceed. 
In terms of manpower alone, the Quraysh army was superior to the Muslim army by a 
factor of more than three to one. 6 The Muslims' sources of information told them of their 
adversary's military superiority and that the expected confrontation would be against the 
Quraysh alone without their allies. ' The Muslims also learned that the Quraysh forces 
included a high proportion of their nobility. This news disheartened some of the Muslim 
soldiers, who would rather not have met the Quraysh army in such circumstances. In this 
2 In The Holy Qur'' n ETMC p. 2015, it is found that the Quraysh were given the honour and profit 
due to their position as servants of the sacred shrine of the Ka'bah. Also see the section "The Arabian 
Peninsula before to Islam" in the chapter "Brief Background of the Region Prior to Islam" (Ch. 2). 
3 Among them was Abn Jahl, one of the highest ranking Quraysh leaders, who insisted that they 
proceed to Badr and stay three nights there to conduct festivities. See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 165, 
al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabar, v. 2, p. 28, al-Halabi, al-Sir-ah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 390, and al- 
Mubarakpuri, al-Rahiq, p. 212. Additionally, this matter is mentioned in the Qur'än (ETMC), 8: 47: 
"And be not like those who started from their homes insolently and to be seen of men. " 
4 The Quraysh also used to sell the pilgrims sculpted stones to carry with them on the journey back to 
their tribes. See al-N5sir and Dirwish, al-Hayäh al-Diniyyah, p. 23. 
s See the section "The Element of Strong Motivation" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military 
Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
6 In this connection the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 7, describes the Quraysh army as al-shawkah, meaning'the 
one with the power', indicating that they were superior in men, arms, and equipment to the Muslim 
army. 
' See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 164 and al-Tabari, Tärkh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 28. For the alliance factor 
see the section "Tribal Alliances" in the chapter "Brief Background of the Region Prior to Islam" 
(Ch. 2). 
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connection the Qur'an says: "Ye wished that the one unarmed should be yours. "8 This was 
an initial weakness of the Muslims which can be considered as strengthening the 
adversary, even though the Quraysh were unaware of it at the time. The same might be 
said of the initial disappointment of the Muslim army over losing the caravan. 9 It is 
probable, however, that the escape of the caravan increased the Quraysh's confidence, as 
despite the extensive intelligence activities of the Muslim army, the adversary, at first, was 
able to win a kind of victory due to the abilities of its cautious leader, Abü Sufy5n, 10 whose 
scouts had alerted him to the impending Muslim ambush. After evaluating the threat, he 
sent a man to warn the Meccans so that their caravan could be saved; although, as we 
have seen, he did not wait for reinforcements but avoided Badr and evaded the Muslim 
forces. This success, although temporary, gave the adversary some psychological 
advantage. On the other hand, knowing that they would soon meet the Muslim army after 
the escape of the caravan unsettled the Quraysh forces and caused them to hesitate. '1 
Although the Muslims knew of the Quraysh nobility's involvement, their intelligence did 
not report that when a nobleman had not been able to join the advancing army, he had 
sent someone instead of him to represent him in the battle, as historians have later 
revealed. 12 This action weakened the Quraysh somewhat, as the replacement could not 
have been as effective as the nobleman himself, who could have offered valuable advice 
and been supported by his kinsmen and clan loyal to him. 13 
The Quraysh's rush to join battle with the Muslims indicates that they underestimated 
their adversary's power, and therefore failed to take time to consult together or to make 
s See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 7. 
Some of these points strengthened the Quraysh army only indirectly, since they were not recognised 
at the time, as the Qur'an, 8: 7, later makes clear. Also note the comment of Ibn Mas°ild that he never 
thought that any among the Muslim army were seeking worldly wealth until the Qur'an, 8: 7, revealed 
that fact. See Musnad Ahmad (No. 4414, v. 1, p. 463) and Ibn Hajar, Fath al-Bari, v. 7, p. 348. 
10 See al-IT Talabi, al-Sirah al-hfalabiyyah, v. 2, p. 374. 
The Qur'an states that a Higher Power was directing both armies towards confrontation. The Qur'an 
(ETMC), 8: 42, states: "Remember ye were on the hither side of the valley, and they on the farther 
side, and the caravan on lower ground than ye. Even if ye had made a mutual appointment to meet, ye 
would certainly have failed in the appointment: But (thus ye met), that Allah might accomplish a 
matter already decided. " 
'Z Nevertheless, the histories in question can be criticised as they mislead the reader through the way 
they structure the following sentence: "When a man could not go he had sent someone instead". They 
make it sound as though there were many men who did not go and were replaced by others, whereas 
they specifically mention only Abn Lahab. Abü Lahab sent as a replacement al- t4b. Hishäm, who 
owed him some money. See Ibn Hishäm, a1-Sirah, v. 3, p. 156, al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 24, 
and Ibn Kathir, al Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 3, p. 258. 
" It was not possible for this study to ascertain whether substitution was carried out in the other 
battles or not. In other words, it is not clear if this practice was usual in the Arab method of fighting. At 
any rate, no similar incidents were reported in any of the other four battles considered by the study. 
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adequate preparations. 14 The Quraysh army's underestimation of the Muslim army is also 
shown by its refusal of the reinforcements offered by Khaffäf b. Imä' al-Ghifäri. 15 
Additionally, when one of their slaves was captured while bringing water, they should 
have considered the possibility that the Muslim army had taken control of the wells and 
could deny them access to fresh water, which is what happened. 
It would surely have raised the Muslims' morale if their intelligence had managed to 
inform them that the Quraysh army was weakened by division, even up to the last 
moment before the battle. The Quraysh were undecided whether to press forward with 
the confrontation or not. 16 The weakness and division of the Quraysh army appeared 
clearly when their opinions divided after the escape of the caravan, whether to take 
revenge for the killing of the son of Ibn al-Hadrami, or to heed the argument of 'Utbah b. 
Rabicah, who tried to dissuade the Quraysh from fighting. 17 This major rift severely 
damaged the fighting spirit of the Quraysh army, which received a further blow when 
cUmayr b. Wahb al-Jumhi reported that the Muslims had no protection other than their 
swords but were determined to conquer or die. 18 The Quraysh's timely gathering of 
intelligence was a strength but its interpretation and effect weakened their resolve. 
The extent of this weakness can be seen in Abü Jahl's decision to call on the bereaved Ibn 
al-Hadrami, who succeeded in rallying the Quraysh army. This shows that the Quraysh 
14 They did not discuss either the way to approach or what type of tactic they were going to use. For 
example, they were in such a hurry that 'Utbah b. Rabi°ah, who was one of their leaders, had no 
helmet even when fighting a duel. See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 172 and al-I; Ialabi, al-Sirah al- 
Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 400. 
15 Khaffäf b. Imä' al-Ghifäri offered the Quraysh army, as they passed, his tribe's arms and equipment. 
They accepted his gift of some camels, and thanked him for his other offer but declined it. See Ibn 
Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 169. 
16 The Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 47, states: "And be not like those who started from their homes insolently 
and to be seen of men, and to hinder (men) from the path of Allah. For Allah compasseth all that they 
do. " The use of the plural form "those" may show that they did not have an overall leader and were 
divided between number of contending leaderships. 
17 cUtbah b. Rabi°ah said: "You will gain nothing if you fight Muhammad and his Companions. By 
Allah! Each man of you would hate to look at the face of the one who had killed his uncle or his 
relatives". See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 170. 
Also the element of a1-1acabiyyah should not be forgotten since the Arabs' culture enjoined them to 
help each other, and especially their blood kin even when they were mistaken. See the section "Tribal 
Life and Feuding" in the chapter "Brief Background of the Region Prior to Islam" (Ch. 2). 
18 The Quraysh sent out 'Umayr b. Wahab al-Jumbi in an attempt to assess the power of the Muslims. 
He reported that the Muslim army numbered about three hundred men, and that the Muslims were 
too brave to surrender and intended to carry out their military duties: they were "keen to fight to the 
last man. " Later he made sure that the Muslims had not been reinforced. See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, 
p. 169, al-IT Talabi, al-Sirah a1-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 396, and al-Mubarakpuri, al-Rahiq, pp. 216-217. 
Possibly, he might have reached this conclusion since the Muslim army was away from their protected 
city, Medina, and had neither room nor enough mounts to escape; they had to either defend 
themselves or die. Additionally he might have seen the formation of the Muslims and their behaviour 
in their camp. 
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army was on the point of deciding to abandon the fight, being torn between two loyalties. 
Although they were won over by the case of Ibn al-Hadrami, they were not 
wholeheartedly committed to the conflict, as they had almost been persuaded by cUtbah's 
argument. Additionally, it can be argued that the Quraysh's leaders were more occupied 
with fighting over the leadership than with how to seize the advantage by uniting. All 
these factors must have affected the Quraysh soldiers' performance, especially knowing 
that Ibn al-Hadrami was an ally of cUtbah b. Rabi`ah, who had been urging retreat. Even 
during the battle itself these doubts must have weakened the Quraysh; the enthusiasm 
generated by Ibn al-Hadrami was fragile and constantly in danger of being undermined by 
the equally morally compelling argument that they should cease fighting men related to 
them and return to Mecca. 
From an economic point of view the Muslims' perception that the Quraysh army would be 
short of the main resource of survival in the desert of Arabia, i. e. water, was correct. 19 
They must have known that if the Quraysh army approached the battlefield and saw the 
Muslims occupying the wells, their fighting performance was likely to be less effective. 
Thus the Muslims' taking control of the wells gave them a strong tactical advantage 
That the new concepts held by the Muslim army were hated by many tribes in the region 
can be considered a source of weakness and potentially advantageous for the adversary, as 
the Muslims were away from their base in Medina. However, the Quraysh failed to take 
advantage of this factor, due to their underestimation of the Muslim army and 
exaggeration of their own strength. 
As for intelligence, the Muslim army was very well acquainted with the Quraysh's method 
of fighting; yet, the Quraysh intelligence was able to give neither a report of the Muslims' 
expected method of fighting nor a clear understanding of their motivation. 20 Nevertheless, 
the Prophet's intelligence gathering was not new or unique or essentially different from 
the Quraysh's. Therefore the Quraysh can be criticized; but in their defence it must be 
acknowledged that they were dealing with an unprecedented situation: unable to 
comprehend the motivation of the Muslim army, even a united Quraysh force would not 
19 This shows that the Quraysh were ill-prepared: they were not carrying enough water and were 
thirsty even before the battle. Of course the amount of water they could carry was limited, but they 
should not have forgotten that the Arabs mostly fought over control of water wells. Nevertheless it is 
possible that they trusted their kinsmen not to deny them access to water; if so, they must have chosen 
to forget that in Mecca they had tortured and slaughtered Muslims, as well as stripping them of their 
wealth prior to emigration. See the section "The Battle of Badr" in the chapter "T'he Battles and their 
Significance" (Ch. 3). 
20 See the section "The Battle of Badr" in the chapter "The Importance of Islamic Military Strategy" 
(Ch. 8). 
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have been determined enough to engage in a religious war, which it was not familiar 
with. 21 The result was that the Quraysh focused their attention on the military strength - 
the material capability - of the Muslim army; they failed to realise that high morale 
born 
of religious conviction was the key psychological advantage of the Muslims. Thus the 
Quraysh were able to collect information but unable to interpret it correctly. Further, they 
had already decided where the advantage lay and so had grown overconfident. 
Consequently, once they had already decided that they were going to win, everything they 
perceived, they perceived in the light of this judgement, which turned out to be wrong. 
This helps to explain their lack of foresight regarding water supplies. They were not, of 
course, the first, not would they be the last, to fail to adapt to new circumstances; but it 
can be argued that one of the keys to their defeat was that they chose to fight the battle 
on the basis of their past experience, while Badr was a new situation. It was this 
experience that convinced them that their superiority in manpower and equipment would 
secure an easy victory. 
It seems, then, that the balance of material power was to the advantage of the Quraysh 
army, 22 but spiritual power lay with the Muslims. Further, the Muslims' assessment of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the Quraysh was neither underestimated nor exaggerated 
since their status was reported accurately and judged thoroughly. 23 
VII. 2: The Adversary at the Battle of Uhud 
In certain respects the Quraysh had changed since the defeat of Badr. One of the key 
factors of Ubud was that the whole army was focused on a single clear aim from the 
initial steps of preparation for battle. The cause now motivating the Quraysh army was 
revenge for the injury to their pride, which had been struck a grievous blow at Badr. Abü 
Sufyän went so far as to order that no one in Mecca was to mourn their dead until 
another - and this time successful - attack had been made on the Muslims. 
It was a 
deliberate attempt to raise the morale of Mecca. 24 
21 It should be noted that the Quraysh's experience of the Muslims in Mecca was that they had been 
able to torture them with impunity. Also, according to cUrwah b. Mascüd al-ThagafFs statement prior to 
the treaty of al-Hudaybiyyah, the Quraysh did not realise the absolute determination of the Muslims to 
defend their Prophet. This shows that the Quraysh lacked an accurate reading of the Muslims' morale. 
See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 281, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 167, and al-Halabi, 
al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 699. 
zz A man who came to watch the battle said that he thought to wait for the right moment to take 
something of value out of the Muslim camps since he was certain of a Quraysh victory. See Ibn 
Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 181 and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 426. 
23 This will be discussed in detail in the section "The Battle of Badr" in the chapter "The Importance of 
Islamic Military Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
24 Abu Sufyän's order appears to have been unprecedented in the Arab world at that time. 
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Several clashes had taken place since Badr, but only a decisive victory over the Muslims 
could assuage the Quraysh's humiliation. 25 It had been to the disadvantage of the 
Quraysh that their adversary had been part of Arab tribal culture and knew its ways 
intimately. 26 This only increased their anger, and the watchword throughout Mecca was 
"revenge". 27 Besides the prohibition on public mourning, no attempt was made to ransom 
those taken captive at Badr. 28 Although, again, religious conviction on the part of the 
Quraysh was of little importance, their desire for revenge was a unifying factor and a 
strength of the Quraysh army, which was allowed time for a thorough preparation. 29 
The Meccan leadership aimed to maximise the Arabs' anger against the Muslims, with 
some success: the Quraysh managed to gather together most of its power and to enlist the 
support of some clans from the tribes of al-Allabish30 to attack Medina and eliminate 
Islam. 31 They also used other methods of recruitment including hiring poets to persuade 
the tribes to fight the Muslims. 32 It also appears that some leaders were accompanied by 
their wives. 33 
The status of the Quraysh religion had remained unchanged since Badr, and it could be 
argued that the Muslims did not need to verify this. The Muslims must have been aware, 
however, that the Quraysh would surely not be unprepared for the coming battle, a battle 
they knew was inevitable given the Quraysh's loss both of men of their and reputation 
See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 5. 
ze For a discussion of the advantage of the Muslim army in this respect see the section "The Battle of 
Uhud" in the chapter "The Task of Islamic Military Intelligence" (Ch. 6). 
27 Al-Mubarakpuri, al-Rahiq; the English Version, p. 245. 
28 Some mourners, however, went secretly a short way from Mecca to give vent to their grief privately. 
29 The statement of al-Mubarakpuri, al-Rahiq; the English Version, p. 246: 'The Quraysh precipitated 
and accelerated their preparations for a decisive battle with the Muslims" does not seem to be correct 
since the preparations lasted several months. 
31 The Ahäbish were a combined tribe made up of some clans of the tribes of al-Qärah and Banü 
Layth. Its name was taken from the mountain called I iubshi close to Mecca where the alliance was 
agreed. See Ibn Manzür, Lishän al-Arab, v. 6, p. 278. 
31 Sunan al-Bayhaqi al-Kubrd (Kitäb al-Wad? ah, No. 12620, v. 6, p. 32) and Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 2, 
p. 21. 
32 See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 6. Also see the section "The Special Characteristics of the Arabs" in 
the chapter "Brief Background of the Region Prior to Islam" (Ch. 2). For the important position of the 
poet in his tribe see al-Rushood, The Poet, pp. 93-168. 
33 Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 11, uses the word al-Dalan, "women", but does not give 
the exact number. Nevertheless he implies that the leaders had their wives with them. The rest would 
have had the choice to take their wives had they so wished. Al-I Ialabi mentions about fifteen women. 
See al-Ilalabi, al-Sirah al-I. alabiyyah, v. 2, p. 489. 
We might ask whether this practice was common among the Arabs, in order to maintain their 
enthusiasm until the battle. For an answer see the section "The Reasons for Conflict and the Mounts of 
the Arabs" in the chapter "Brief Background of the Region Prior to Islam" (Ch. 2). 
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among the Arab tribes. 34 Despite these suspicions, to the advantage of the Quraysh, it 
seems that the Muslim leadership was not engaged in any urgent preparations to 
withstand this attack as, according to the available information, they had not stationed 
any intelligence agents in Mecca to keep them informed of the latest Quraysh plans. This 
is not to say that the Muslim leadership underestimated the Quraysh; it is likely that they 
were already prepared for any attack, being more or less continually at war. 35 The new 
community needed to establish its position in the region, where only the strongest were 
able to survive. 36 Additionally, it is not reported that the Muslims were aware that the 
Quraysh had united under a competent and wily commander, Abü Sufyän, whose cunning 
had accomplished the escape of the caravan from the Muslims' ambush. This unification 
was bound to strengthen the power of the adversary since unity of command is a very 
important aspect of leadership. 37 Moreover Abü Sufyän harboured the greatest rancour 
against the Muslims because he had lost most of his supplies in al-Sawyq and sustained 
heavy economic losses as a result of other caravan attacks. 38 Up to this moment, the 
Quraysh's strategic goal was clear but the way to execute it was not. In other words, the 
Quraysh were able to control activities at the strategic level; however, at the tactical level 
their adversary managed to decide the course of events. 39 
As we have seen, the Quraysh's intention was reported at the beginning of these events; 
yet, the strength of their arms and equipment remained unknown until much later when 
the Quraysh reached Dhü al-Hulayfah, about twenty miles from Medina. This time Abü 
Sufyän allowed the soldiers to bring their women so that they would be encouraged to 
34 Further see the section "The Reasons for Conflict and the Mounts of the Arabs" in the chapter "Brief 
Background of the Region Prior to Islam" (Ch. 2). 
31 This is to judge from the Muslims' point of view. However, such a judgement may be misleading, 
since al-Khandaq was to reveal that a timely knowledge of the adversary's intentions is invaluable. 
36 Several battles and raids had been conducted by the Muslim community since the battle of Badr. 
Among the most important were the battles of Bang Salim, Bann Qaynugac, al-Swayq, Qarirat al-Kadr, 
Ghatafän, and Najrän. See al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 342. 
See the section "Leadership and Unity of Command" in the chapter "The Impact of Islamic Military 
Leadership" (Ch. 5). 
37 See the section "Unity of Command" in the chapter "The Impact of Islamic Military Leadership" 
(Ch. 5). 
3ß See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 310, Ibn al-Qayyim, Zäd al-Ma`äd, v. 3, p. 189, and al-I Ialabi, al- 
Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 479. Also see al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari v. 2, p. 54 and Ibn Kathir, al- 
Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 5, p. 217. 
39 See the section "The Battle of Uhud" in the chapter "The Importance of Islamic Military Strategy" 
(Ch. 8). 
210 
Ch. 7: The Adversaries' Strengths and Weaknesses 
fight "manfully" (Brujrilah). 40 This was an important decision on the part of Abü Sufyän 
for two reasons: first, to encourage his men; second, to regroup the whole army. 
To the advantage of the Quraysh, the Muslims' expectation that they would be attacked in 
Medina was a misjudgement, since in the event the Quraysh army camped next to Mount 
Ubud, probably intending to force the Prophet (PBUH) and his warriors to join battle 
outside Medina. On the face of it this was a good tactical decision, since if the Quraysh 
had entered Medina the Jewish tribes who had a treaty with the Muslims might have 
become involved. Also the city was the Muslims' base and the Quraysh would have been 
fighting on unfamiliar and dangerous territory. In any event, the Quraysh army succeeded 
in drawing the Muslims out of Medina by allowing their horses and camels to graze on 
the Medians' farms. 41 
It cannot be argued that at Ubud the Quraysh were overconfident, as they had been at 
Badr. 42 In fact, the Quraysh army came to this battle having experienced defeat. On the 
Muslim side it is possible that some of the Companions underestimated the strength and 
determination of the adversary since they requested that battle be joined outside Medina 
despite the advice of their leading figures. The Muslims' underestimation of their 
adversary can also be seen in the disobedience of the archers. 43 Thus, it seems that the 
Muslims' decision to confront such a large army outside Medina was a tactical error, as 
their adversary gained the advantage by weakening their defensive plan. 44 It is a pivotal 
factor that the Quraysh were able to choose the battlefield at the operational level. This 
was more or less to the advantage of the Quraysh army. Yet, they were not able to secure 
a decisive tactical position. Although the balance of advantage lay with the Quraysh, the 
negligence (i. e. failure to pay attention to a necessary matter) and nonfeasance (omission 
to perform some necessary action) of the adversary were made plain when a whole army 
was allowed to manoeuvre around their camp and take up a superior position without 
being noticed or intercepted. This indicates that the Quraysh's precautions were grossly 
I Al-Mubarakpuri, al Rahiq, p. 246. This word connotes the need to enthuse the warriors and prevent 
their desertion. The tactic was practised by the Arabs. For example, Malik b. °Awf, the leader of 
Hawazin, ordered his people to take their wealth, women, and children when they confronted the 
Muslims away from Taif. See Sahih al-Bukhari (Kitab al-'Itq, No. 2402, v. 2, p. 89) and $ahih Muslim 
(Bab: 1`ta'al-Mu'allafati Qulübuhum, No. 1059, v. 2, p. 735). 
" See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidayah wa al-Nihayah, v. 4, p. 14. 
'Z Further see the section "The Battle of Uhud" in the chapter "The Importance of Islamic Military 
Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
43 For the archers' disobedience see the section "The Battle of Uhud" in the chapter 'The Battles and 
their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
" This unexecuted plan was suggested by the Prophet and other well-known figures in Medina. See 
Ibn Hisham, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 59, al-Tabari, 7ärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 60, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidayah wa al- 
Nihayah, v. 4, p. 157, and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Flalabiyyah, v. 2, pp. 492-493. 
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inadequate and it seems that no scouts were stationed at critical points. They also failed to 
take advantage of the retreat of one third of the Muslim army commanded by the 
hypocrite cAbdullah b. Ubayy. 45 At this critical juncture, therefore, the Quraysh made two 
mistakes in the matter of intelligence: first, the intelligence gathering itself was poor; 
second, they were not vigilant. Nonetheless, the Quraysh were justified in being confident 
as they greatly outnumbered the Muslim army, but the Muslim leadership redressed the 
balance by using the terrain's natural obstacles to the advantage of the Muslim army. 
Thus the balance of power shifted in the Muslims' favour as the battle progressed. 
Several weaknesses of the Quraysh were exposed during the battle itself; most notably 
perhaps their inability to defend their standard was a major tactical weakness, as was the 
failure to destroy the archers at the outset despite three attempts. 46 Further, decisions that 
seemed wise at the time turned out to be miscalculations; the choice of terrain, and the 
decision not to attempt to take Medina are obvious examples. Generally speaking, 
however, the Quraysh's greatest error was yet again to underestimate the skills, 
imagination, and commitment of their adversary. 
VII. 3: The Adversary at the Battle of al-Khandaq 
The main points to note about the adversary's conduct in this battle are the unification of 
different tribes and their constancy during the siege. However, this external appearance of 
unity was not matched internally, as was shown when the Muslim army succeeded in 
splitting the confederacy through its leadership. The confederacy's overconfidence was 
also critical; it appears that the Quraysh had not learned from their mistakes at Badr and 
Uhud. 
Initially, twenty chiefs of the Jewish tribes, together with some notables of the Banü al- 
Nadir, made an "unholy" alliance with the tribes of the Quraysh and other tribes, 47 
combining against the Muslims in order to achieve a range of objectives while promising 
their allies full support (but without contributing men) . 
48 Thus a confederate army was 
as See the section "The Battle of 1Jhud" in the chapter "The Importance of Islamic Military Strategy" 
(Ch. 8). 
See ibid. 
" The Quraysh, Kinänah and other allies from Tihämah in the south rallied, ranked and recruited four 
thousand men under the leadership of Abü Sufyan. From the east came the tribes of Banü Salim, 
Ghatafan, Banü Murrah, and others. See Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 171, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa 
al-Nlhäyah, v. 4, p. 95, and al-Mubarakpuri, al-Rahiq, p. 311. 
48 The phrase "unholy" (ghayrMugaddas) is used by al-Mubarakpuri to show that this alliance was not 
mainly undertaken for any religious purpose, but largely for economic reasons, at least on the part of 
the Banü al-Nadir and the Quraysh; and probably the Ghatafan and Kinänah, and the other tribes 
expected to be well rewarded. In The Holy Qur'än ETMC, p. 1722, the reasons are given as follows: 
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raised. The Muslims' military intelligence failed to take note of the activities of these 
Jewish tribes -a definite shortcoming given the circumstances. 
49 From the religious point 
of view the situation had changed somewhat: the Quraysh started preparing for this 
battle enthused with the belief that their religion was better than the Muslims', or so they 
had been informed by the People of the Book 5° According to the Qur'än, they committed 
blasphemy, which is an inauspicious beginning to any alliance. 51 Unlike the Muslim force, 
the adversary was from different religious backgrounds and had joined forces only to 
eliminate the new and expanding religious power. 52 Moreover, it seems that the main 
thrust of the confederacy's preparation consisted of attempts to persuade the tribes to 
agree on a single goal: attacking Medina. Even though the main cause of the impending 
battle was not the interests of the Quraysh alone, and despite the lessons of the battle of 
Ubud, it seems that the Quraysh did not make any attempt to keep its intention to attack 
Medina secret. It would have been to their advantage to use the element of surprise, 
which might have allowed them to counter any unexpected plan put into action by the 
Muslims. 53 It seems that yet again the adversary was placing too much reliance on the 
superiority of men and equipment. 54 If they had sent an advance scouting party they 
might have recognised the importance of the Muslims' trench and ordered the troops to 
reach Medina as soon as possible. As delegations were never sent due to the clear 
intention of the tribes of al-Khazraj and al-Aws, i. e. the Helpers, to defend the Muslims, 
the confederate leadership was unable to make a reliable assessment of the morale of the 
commanders and troops of the Muslim army. 55 The confederacy was further 
"The Meccan Pagans want to keep their own unjust autocracy; the Medina Hypocrites wish for their 
own domination in Medina; and the Jews want their racial superiority established over the Arabs. " 
49 However, if we consider this matter from a different angle we find that the Muslims were unwilling 
to send their men to live among the non-Muslims, as these men had come to Medina expressly to learn 
about Islam. It was also important to keep as many men as possible in Medina to respond to any 
unexpected events. 
5° In this connection the Qur'än (ETMC), 4: 51, states: "Hast thou not turned thy thought to those who 
were given a portion of the Book? They believe in Sorcery and Tagüt and say to the Unbelievers that 
they are better guided in the (right) way than the Believers! " 
51 Their blasphemy is mentioned in the phrase, (ETMC), 4: 51: 'They believe in Sorcery and Tagi t'. 
52 The first part of the previous verse shows that the People who had been given a portion of the Book, 
the Jews, had a greater and truer knowledge than the Idolaters. Despite this, to the main books of 
exegesis maintain that this battle was instigated for other than religious reasons according to the 
Qur'än, 4: 54. Also see al-Tabari, Tafsir al-7'abari, p. 5, p. 150, al-Qurtubi, Tafsir al-Qurtubi, v. 5, p. 249, 
and Ibn Kathir, Tafsir Ibn Kathir, v. 1, p. 312. Also, see the section "The Battle of al-Khandaq" in the 
chapter "The Battles and their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
13 See the section "Manpower as a Resource of Intelligence" in the chapter "The Task of Islamic 
Military Intelligence" (Ch. 6). 
s4 For whether this superiority enabled them to make a better tactical deployment, see the section "The 
Battle of al-Khandaq" in the chapter "The Importance of Islamic Military Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
s5 However, Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 2, p. 657, state that letters were sent between the two leaders. 
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disadvantaged by the fact that the amount of their arms and equipment was revealed at 
an early stage of the battle, and that the intention and leadership of the confederacy were 
also known. 56 Also at al-Khandaq the Quraysh had allied themselves with other powerful 
tribes in the region, which brought a new dimension to the challenge of accomplishing 
their plan. 57 
The confederacy's first success occurred as its forces marched toward Medina: they were 
able to capture and kill two of the Muslims' scouts, thus depriving the Muslim army of 
intelligence about the confederacy's advance 58 On the other hand, it can be argued that if 
the adversary had engaged in intelligence activity at the strategic level they would have 
been forewarned of the Muslim's unfamiliar method of defence instead of being surprised 
on discovering it. They would at least have prepared themselves better in the matter of 
supplies. Be that as it may, the confederate position was strengthened by the defection of 
the Banii Qurayzah. 59 It can also be claimed that the intelligence activities of the 
adversary at the operational level made it possible for them to threaten the Muslim army 
on several fronts. Further, the adversary's intelligence activities consisted of continual 
observation of the trench and seeking, there and elsewhere, for any weak or unguarded 
points. In fact, they tried to penetrate once or twice but were not successful, and one of 
their scouts was killed in another location. 60 Nevertheless, through their activities at the 
operational level of intelligence, the confederates were able to initiate another phase of 
fighting from the south by persuading the Banü Qurayzah to join them against the 
Muslim army without the knowledge of the already restricted Muslim intelligence sources. 
On the front line, the unity of the confederate leadership was weakened by the decision of 
some of the allies to retreat without the knowledge of Abü Sufyän. Moreover, as their 
supplies could not reach them easily the adversary, failing to realise that the trench would 
hold them in their position for a long period because this method of defence was 
unfamiliar in Arab warfare, eventually began to run short. Additionally, at the operational 
16 See the section "The Battle of al-Khandaq" in the chapter "The Task of Islamic Military Intelligence" 
(Ch. 6). 
57 For the number of the tribes in the confederacy see the section "The Battle of al-Khandaq" in the 
chapter "The Battles and their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
se They were Sulayt and Sufyän b. cAuf. See al-IIalabi, al-Sirah a1-Ha1abiyyah, v. 2, p. 628. 
s9 See Sah1h al-Bukhäri (Kitäb al lihäd, No. 2692, v. 3, p. 1047), Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, 
v. 4, p. 104, al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Jjalabiyyah, v. 2, pp. 368-639, and al-Funaysän, Ghazwat al Ahzäb, p. 
44. 
60 When a man from the BanU Qurayzah reconnoitred the fortress which sheltered the women and 
children, he was killed by Safiyyah d. cAbd al-Muttalib (an aunt of the Prophet). See Ibn Hishäm, al- 
Sirah, v. 4, p. 187, al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 96, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, p. 
105, and al-I; ialabi, al-Sirah al «alabiyyah, v. 2, p. 639. 
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level, the adversary's intelligence failed to secure supplies sent by the Banü Qurayzah, 61 
whose caravan was either not sufficiently well protected, or it was travelling in such a way 
that it could easily be noticed. It could be argued that at this stage of the confrontation 
the confederacy was itself under siege because of the far distance of their cities, because 
the orchards of Medina were unreachable, and due to the loss of the caravan sent by the 
Banü Qurayzah. Certainly the lack of supply lines was a weakness of the adversary, who 
failed to organise such lines at any time during the siege. 62 Moreover it seems that this 
failure impacted negatively on the confederate army's morale, as they resorted to sending 
night scouts to search for any weak or unguarded points. 63 What made the adversary's 
position worse was the slow progress of the battle, and the fact that every tactic they 
employed was unsuccessful. 64 Although a few good horsemen managed to cross the 
trench, the rest of the confederate army was prevented from following their example. In 
the only recorded clash one of their most admired heroes was killed. There seemed to be 
nothing the confederacy could do to raise its morale, and the longer the siege went on the 
more desperate and short of supplies they became. Unwilling to abandon hope, the 
confederate leaders attempted to conduct various intelligence activities themselves, such 
as searching for vulnerable points during the day and by night. 65 Abü Sufyän must have 
known that if he did not make any progress this time he might not be able to gather such 
a combined force in the future. This was also the Prophet's view. He said: "(After this 
battle) we will go to attack them (i. e. the infidels) and they will not come to attack us. "66 
Just as the leadership was divided internally, it was also divided externally since it should 
not have been so easily convinced by, or at least should have investigated thoroughly, the 
new tale told by Na°im b. Mascüd. 67 Logically, such fatal news should have been treated 
with suspicion. It may be concluded that the confederates' hearts were no longer in the 
61 The Muslims captured a twenty-camel caravan of food supplies which had been sent by the Bann 
Qurayzah to the confederate army on the northern side. It was captured by chance by a group of 
Helpers who were on their way to the cemetery. See al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-, Yalabiyyah, v. 2, p. 647. It 
consequently gave the Muslims some relief against starvation. 
62 The reason the confederacy did not organise a supply line from Mecca, which was distant but secure, 
remains unknown. 
63 See al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 647. 
6a See the section "The Battle of al-Khandaq" in the chapter "The Importance of Islamic Military 
Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
6s See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 103 and al-I; Ialabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, pp. 
647 & 649. 
66 See Sahih al-Bukhäri (Bib: Ghazwat al Ahzab, No. 3883, v. 4, p. 1508). 
See Ibn Hish5m, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 273, al-Tabari, 7ärikh al-Tatar, v. 2, p. 28, Ibn Kathir, al Bidäyah 
wa al-Nihäyah, v. 3, p. 164, and al-Halabi, al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 449. It should be noted that 
Na°im b. Masc9d is sometimes referred to as al-Ashjadi, and sometimes as al-Thaqafi. For his different 
family names see the previous references and also see Naumani, Sirat un-Nabi, v. 2, p. 105. 
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struggle, as mentioned in the Qur'än. 68 Two questions arise to which the study has been 
unable to discover satisfactory answers: why was there no coordination or effective 
communication between the allies, i. e. the Bang Qurayzah and the confederates, and why 
were they unable to derive any advantage from the long siege they imposed upon the 
Muslim army? 
Towards the end of their fruitless siege, the confederate army, disconcerted by the cold 
and windy weather, lack of proper supplies, and disappointment with their allies, the Bang 
Qurayzah, gave up and returned home. At the last moment, the confederate army failed to 
secure its area as it was penetrated by a Muslim scout, who managed to collect up-to-date 
information about their miserable situation and report the speech of their leader Abu 
Sufyän. 69 
Even though the Quraysh army had failed twice to accomplish its goals, the adversary 
had not learned from their mistakes at Badr and Uhud, as they continued to 
underestimate the Muslims' creativity. Had they learnt as much as possible about their 
enemy, especially the psychological strength and endurance they derived from their faith, 
they might have formulated an effective plan. 
The confederates began very confidently; they considerably outnumbered the Muslim 
army and were sure of the financial support of their Jewish allies; yet such was the degree 
of uncertainty or indecisiveness created within their ranks by the Muslim army's 
steadfastness that they were paralysed by the unprecedented tedium, discomfort and 
stress of a long siege, and failed to press home their initial advantage. 
VII. 4: The Adversary at the Battle of al-Yarmük 
The adversary at al-Yarmgk was completely different from the Quraysh and their allies in 
every respect. The Muslims recognised that the Byzantines were not only immensely 
powerful; they were potential invaders and being a 'people of the Book', were also driven 
by religious motives. 70 The Byzantines were determined to defend their faith, as well as 
their lands and their Empire. Despite this they had not had a long history of conflict with 
68 The Qur'än (ETMC), 59: 14, states: "Thou wouldst think they were united, but their hearts are 
divided. " 
69 Abü Sufyän announced to the army that the supplies had run short, the weather was cruel, the Jews 
had deserted and the siege was no longer possible. See al-Halabi, al-Sirah aI-1Yalabiyyah, v. 2, p. 653. 
70 Further see Stout, "Justice and Resort to War", in Johnson and Kelsay (eds), Cross Crescent, and 
Sword, pp. 3-29. 
For discussing their power see the section "The Byzantines and Säsänians" in the chapter "Brief 
Background of the Region Prior to Islam" (Ch. 2). 
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the Arabs, and tended to be disdainful of what they saw as an inferior culture, a view 
which, while increasing their motivation and their morale, proved to be fatally mistaken. 
71 
Nevertheless the Byzantine leadership intended to leave nothing to chance, but to gather 
its utmost power to annihilate the Muslim army or expel them permanently from the 
region. In fact after a long chase and the failure of their plan at the strategic level, the 
Byzantine leadership knew before the battle that the confrontation would have to be final 
and decisive; if they failed it was unlikely that they would be able to gather such a 
powerful force again and there might be no second chance. 
Prior to the battle, the Byzantine Emperor had sent several large armies to al-Sham to 
confront each Muslim army separately. 72 However, it seems that the adversary was unable 
to keep their movements and plans secret, 73 and so their strategy became known to the 
Muslims, who discovered both their intentions and the extent and nature of their arms 
and equipment. The Byzantines probably perceived the coming battle in terms of a 
struggle between religions, since they had their priests lead the army to the battlefield. 
74 
Up to this moment the adversary could be said to have the advantage in both material 
and control of terrain. 
Even though there is no direct evidence that the adversary's intelligence agents were 
reporting the movements of the Muslim army, it can be argued that such a powerful 
Emperor would have had the means to gather information about the army his forces were 
about to confront. 75 The Byzantines knew that the Muslim army would not retreat to 
Medina; therefore in obedience to their emperor's command the adversary made camp in 
an area which had been allocated in advance. 76 
The Byzantines' continuous observation of their adversary allowed them to locate and 
77 observe the Muslim army's movements at the strategic level. Although it was to their 
71 Further see the section "The Byzantines and Säsänians" in the chapter "Brief Background of the 
Region Prior to Islam" (Ch. 2). 
I See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 335 and Kamäl, al-Tariq i1ä Dimashq, p. 431. Also see the 
section "The Battle of al-Yarmilk" in the chapter 'The Importance of Islamic Military Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
73 This allowed the Muslims to discover their adversary's strengths and weaknesses. See al-Tabari, 
Tän7rh a! -Tabari, v. 2, p. 334 and Kamäl, al-Qadisiyyah, p. 431. 
Also see the section "The Battle of al- 
Yarmiik" in the chapter "The Task of Islamic Military Intelligence" (Ch. 6). 
74 See Kamäl, al-Tar q ilä Dimashq, p. 474. 
75 In this connection see Keith and McKercher, Go Spy the Land, p. 1. Also see Glass and Davidson, 
Intelligence is for Commanders, p. 68. 
76 See the section "The Battle of al-Yarmük" in the chapter "The Importance of Islamic Military 
Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
n See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 334, Yaqüt al-l; iamawi, Mujam al-Buldän, v. 5, p. 354, and 
Kamäl, al-Tariq i1ä Dimashq, p. 433. For a comparison see the section "The Battle of Badr" in the 
chapter "The Importance of Islamic Military Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
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disadvantage that certain of the Muslims' leaders had some knowledge of the terrain of al- 
Shäm, 78 at the operational level it is possible that the adversary might have deliberately 
allowed news of the location of their final camp to reach the Muslim army in order to 
bring them to the chosen battlefield. 79 
The Byzantines' leadership were concerned to maintain the troops' fighting spirit, and 
ensured that morale was increased through the joy aroused in the camp by the gifts the 
Emperor had sent. 80 The moment the gifts were distributed seems to have been carefully 
chosen as the confrontation was expected to occur shortly. This also shows that the 
Muslims' intelligence activity at the operational level did not match that at the strategic 
and tactical levels, since the cause of the adversary's rejoicing was not reported on time, 
and so the Muslim army was about to go into a situation without full preparation. Unlike 
in the previous three battles, requests were made that the leaders of both armies should 
negotiate concerning the reasons for the confrontation and the goals of the invasion . 
81 
This would appear to have been to the advantage of the adversary, who needed to make a 
more accurate assessment of the Muslim army's strengths and weaknesses. Also the 
Byzantines wanted to test their enemy's commitment to the fight, since various offers were 
put forward to the effect that if the Muslims retreated, they would be given gifts and 
charity to be collected yearly. 82 It can be argued that these offers were a psychological 
manoeuvre and were recognised as such by the Muslim leadership. 83 Therefore, both sides 
intended to derive the maximum benefit from face-to-face negotiations. 84 The Byzantines 
would have the opportunity to assess the Muslim army's loyalty and its willingness to 
fight, while the Muslims would, it was hoped, gain valuable information. Despite the 
adversary's manifold intelligence activities, they were unable to prevent their plan falling 
into the Muslims' hands; this seems to have been a clear failure of security, which was of 
'8 See al-Tabari, Tarikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 333 and Kamäl, al-Tariq i1ä Dimashq, p. 130. Also see the 
section "The Battle of al-Yarmük" in the chapter "The Task of Islamic Military Intelligence" (Ch. 6). 
" See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 334, Bahadur and Sherwani, Life ofAbü Bakr, pp. 73-74, and 
Kamäl, a1-Qädisiyyah, p. 432. For a strategic and tactical assessment see the section "The Battle of al- 
Yarmük" in the chapter "The Importance of Islamic Military Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
80 The rejoicing was due to the arrival of new gifts sent by the Emperor to his army. The source does 
not state whether these were mainly for the commanders or were distributed to the whole army; but 
they had been for the leaders only the 'loud sounds' of acclaim would surely not have reached the 
Muslims' camp. See Kamäl, al-Tariq i1ä Dimashq, p. 435. 
ar See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, p. 7 and Kamäl, al-Tar q i1ä Dimashq, p. 435. 
82 See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, p. 10. 
89 See the section "Psychological Warfare" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" 
(Ch. 4). 
140n one occasion, it was reported that the adversary tried to take advantage of the situation by 
sending one of their commanders to ask that the Muslims should send a delegation to meet their field 
commander. See Kamäl, al-Tariq ilä Dimashq, p. 435. 
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great benefit to their enemy. 85 The deficiencies in their intelligence performance, at a 
moment when speed of communication was of crucial importance, can be seen at the 
strategic and operational levels; a vital piece of news failed to reach them which they 
could have used to great advantage - the death of the Caliph. 86 That this valuable 
information, which would probably have turned the tide of battle immediately to the 
advantage of the adversary, was not reported, shows that the Byzantines' intelligence 
activities grew weaker as the battle drew to an end. Since they were a large professional 
force, they should have watched all the points of access to the Muslims' position and 
captured the messenger. Most if not all of the adversary's intelligence activities were 
conducted prior to the battle due to the effectiveness of the Muslims' precautions 87 
Moreover, the adversary had to use the services of interpreters in order to comprehend 
and act on the information they received, which might be considered a weakness; but this 
was not a problem for them, due to their long experience of fighting with neighbouring 
powers speaking different languages. 
The Byzantine Emperor ordered all his forces to engage the Muslim army in a frontal 
assault, and that the troops should be disposed in a battlefield broad in front and narrow 
in the rear. 88 It is possible to argue that at the beginning of the battle the adversary's plan 
was likely to bring a quick victory: it was reasonable to suppose that the massive cavalry, 
supported by archers firing showers of arrows, would defeat the Muslim army, which 
would have surely failed to break the infantry from the front or outflank it, since the 
Byzantines were greatly superior in numbers and equipment. 
It is reported that many of the adversary's infantry were chained together, but it is not 
clear whether this would have had a negative or a positive effect. 89 Presumably the 
es In the early hours of the day of the attack while the Byzantine army was preparing its soldiers, 
Khälid and his commanders were working to deploy their troops as quickly as possible. See al-Tabari, 
Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 335 and Kam5l, al-Tariq i1ä Dimashq, p. 468. 
'6 At the strategic level the adversary should have installed spies in Medina to report new 
developments such as the arrival of reinforcements. 
87 See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Taban, v. 2, p. 333 and Kamäl, al-Tang i1ä Dimashq, p. 130. Also see the 
section "The Battle of al-Yarmiik" in the chapter "The Task of the Islamic Military Intelligence" (Ch. 6). 
81 See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Taban, v. 2, p. 334 and Bahadur and Sherwani, Life ofAbü Bakr, pp. 73-74. 
It seems that he intended to push the army to its limit as he left no space for them to escape in the case 
of defeat. 
8' See al-Tabari, Tänkh al-Taban, v. 2, p. 335. 
This chaining of the adversary's soldiers would have been advantageous only if the cavalry and archers 
had succeeded in creating confusion and inflicting heavy losses among the Muslims. Moreover, if they 
were chained willingly and the course of the battle had been clearly in their favour they would have 
been able to advance confidently or form an unbreakable barrier. Their morale would have been high 
and they would have fought valiantly to support their comrades. On the other hand, if they were 
chained by force their morale would have been low from the start, and the prospect of defeat would 
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Byzantines were confident of its effectiveness, and furthermore it was a method used in 
the professional army of the Säsänian Empire. 90 Since infantry fighting among the Arabs 
was largely a matter of duelling, the chained footsoldiers were little more than captives 
forced to defend themselves or die. It might be, however, that the Byzantine leadership 
wanted to prevent their troops from breaking ranks in the event of the defeat of the 
cavalry because if the frontal assault was broken, it would hardly have been possible to 
regroup such a large force. 9' In fact the infantry played no decisive part in the action, 
other than to block the cavalry's retreat. In the ensuing confusion desperation drove the 
infantry to jump into the river. Thus the Byzantine plan to rely on the power of the 
cavalry and the archers at the beginning of the assault came to nothing. 92 Additionally, as 
the battle started, to the disadvantage of the adversary, one of their field leaders became a 
Muslim. 93 
At the beginning of the battle the adversary seemed to have every advantage over the 
Muslim army, but these decreased as the battle progressed and the Muslims' tactical plan 
eventually triumphed. 94 
It is clear that the adversary's intelligence gathering was sometimes very beneficial, 
sometimes less so, and that it varied as the actual battle drew closer and failed completely 
towards its end. 
VII. 5: The Adversary at the Battle of al-Q5disiyyah 
The adversary at al-Qädisiyyah was very different from those discussed previously, mainly 
in religion, motivation, tactics, communications, equipment, and language. ' However, 
while these factors might be considered to be both strengths and weaknesses, the Persian 
have been likely to cause panic, since a chained army cannot manoeuvre easily. In such circumstances 
an army trapped from behind must have been demoralised and desperate. 
The Muslim army of course was treated very differently, as the Qur'än and the hadith state. See the 
section 'The Significant Qualities of the Muslim Leader: Bravery and Tagwä' in the chapter 'The 
Impact of Islamic Military Leadership" (Ch. 5). 
91 See the section 'The Battle of al-Yarmiik" in the chapter 'The Importance of Islamic Military 
Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
92 Commenting on the circumstances, Qays b. Habirah said that cavalry needs the support of infantry. 
See al-Tabari, 7ärikh al-Tabar, v. 2, p. 422. 
93 See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, p. 10. 
94 See the section "The Battle of al-Yarmük" in the chapter "The Importance of Islamic Military 
Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
' Rodinson, Muhammad, p. 6, has vividly described the Persian forces: "The army was very powerful. 
The principal shock troops, the cavalry, were recruited from the nobility. These horsemen were clad in 
close-fitting armour and formed, in the mass, something like a solid wall of metal gleaming in the sun. 
Behind the cavalry came the elephants, striking tenor into the enemy with their trumpeting, their 
smell and terrible appearance; and after them the footsoldiers, a rabble of peasants conscripted for 
military service and of little practical value. A great deal more useful were the auxiliary forces made up 
of mercenaries and of mounted warriors from the Persians' warlike subject peoples. " 
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army was undoubtedly a real challenge for any power, let alone for a new invader such as 
the Muslims. In addition, it can be argued that the Säsänians had learned from the defeat 
of the Byzantines at the hands of the invaders, and that these lessons were applied at al- 
Qädisiyyah. 96 
The references in use show that the Persians were not a people of a divine Book, which 
can be considered a disadvantage. The Muslims believed that they were no better than 
fire-worshippers. 97 However, despite the differences in the religious backgrounds of the 
Persian troops, they were united by the conviction that it was necessary to destroy the 
Muslim army 98 Their motivation was based upon their desire to protect their various 
interests, but the fact that they were not primarily driven by religious zeal might be 
regarded as a weakness. 99 One potentially important factor was that the Persians' religion 
did not permit them to bury their dead. 100 During a battle, therefore, they would leave 
them on the battlefield. It can be argued that this would have had a negative effect on 
their morale, especially during a battle lasting several days. 
The Persian army came to this battle knowing the instability of the Emperor's position. '01 
However, the current Emperor, Yazdajird [d. c. 652], had assigned the best of his 
commanders to lead this huge force. 102 This was Rustam, who was fully authorised to take 
any necessary measures. It was a strength of the Persians that he had the trust and 
' See the section "The Battle of al-Qädisiyyah" in the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" 
(Ch. 3). 
9' See Ibn Kathir, Tafsirlbn Kathir, v. 3, p. 426, Ibn Hajar, Fath al-Bäri, v. 3, p. 426, and Faisäl, tiarakat 
a1-Fath, p. 95. For more see Sälim, "al-Jazirah al cArabiyyah", No. 3, v. 1, p. 135. 
98 The Säsänian army in this region mainly consisted of Persians and Arabs. The soldiers were 
therefore of mixed backgrounds and varied in their faith, social life, and origins. For more see the 
section "The Byzantine and the Säsänians" in the chapter "Brief Background of the Region Prior to 
Islam" (Ch. 2). 
99 It can be argued that if the main motivation of the Persian army had been their religion, Muslim 
historians would have mentioned it, as they did when recounting the battle of al-Yarmilk. Further, it 
would have been reflected in the Muslim army's narration of the battle, but the Persians, unlike the 
Byzantines, made no attempt to perform a religious ceremony such as lighting a fire on an altar, which 
would have indicated that their opposition to the Muslims was a religious matter. 
100 See Ibn al-Athir, al-Kämil, v. 2, p. 326 and Kamäl, al-Tariq i1ä al-Madä'in, p. 118. 
The official Persian religion was Mazdakism, sometimes referred to as Zoroastrianism. Its main purpose 
was to fight on the side of good against the forces of evil, whatever forces form these might take. They 
believed that their prophet Zoroaster, or Zarathustra, had come down to earth some three millennia 
before. Zoroastrians are now settled in north-west India. There are currently about 130,000 adherents 
of the faith world-wide. See Hinnells, The Penguin Dictionary. Also see 
www. geocities. com/zoroastrianismtoday/intro. txt. 
101 See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 1, pp. 493-494. In addition, al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 1, p. 460, 
mentions that, within a space of four years, no fewer than ten Säsänian rulers had ascended the 
Imperial throne. For more see al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 1, pp. 491-494 and Kamäl, al-Tariq i1ä al- 
Madä in, pp. 104-105. 
102 See al-Tabari, Tarikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 133, Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 6, p. 194, and 
al-I. Ialabi, al-Sirah al-flalabiyyah, v. 6, p. 194. 
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blessing of the Empire's rulers and was accompanied by other leaders of high rank and 
ability. It should be noted, however, that the Emperor's rejection of Rustam's advice - that 
he should appoint another leader - limited the Persians' strategic options if the army 
should be defeated. 103 In fact, the leaders of the Persian army approached this battle 
knowing that other Persian commanders had suffered defeats since the victory at al-Jisr 
the (Bridge) (c. 14/635) and that these had weakened the position of the Säsänian 
Emperor in Iraq. 104 On the one hand, this could have lowered the army's morale; on the 
other, this knowledge could have been a source of strength since they were moved to 
proceed slowly and cautiously. Rustam's slow advance certainly succeeded in causing the 
Muslim soldiers to run out of patience and complain to their leaders, 105 and there was the 
admittedly remote possibility of mutiny. 106 Also, his slow progress allowed Rustam to 
make continuous assessments and better preparations. He also organised an excellent 
system of communication by creating a chain of men, the first of whom was at his camp 
and the last of whom was stationed at the Emperor's palace in the capital. 107 Despite his 
competence and loyalty, however, we know from the letters Rustam sent to his brother 
that he had been pressured to take command of this army and had been unwilling to do 
so; this was clearly a defect in the army's leadership. '°8 
Unlike at the battle of al-Yarmük, the Emperor himself asked to meet a Muslim 
delegation. 109 It is possible to argue here that the Emperor considered the Arabs to be an 
ignorant nation but not weak militarily. However, his words should not be taken at face 
value as expressing his real opinion, to which his army's actions in the field are a far better 
guide. The Emperor's statements constituted an attempt to engage in psychological 
103 See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 393. 
104 After their great victory at the battle of the Bridge, they were defeated in minor battles and also at 
the more important battle of al-Buwayb. See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 373, Ibn al-Jawzi, al- 
Muntazim, v. 4, p. 148, Ibn al-Athir, al-Kämil, v. 2, p. 290, and Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, 
pp. 29-30. 
105 It was known that to remain for long in one encampment was against the Arabs' nature. So his 
action was effective whether he intended it or not. See al-Tabari, 7ärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 394. 
106 What Rustam did not know is that disobedience to proper authority is considered to be a major sin 
in the sharia, and is considered as such in Islamic Military Doctrine. See the section "Obedience" in 
the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
107 The chain of communication required the participation of about 5000 men, each one of whom, 
except the first and last, had to be within earshot of two others. 
108 See al-Tabari, 71ikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 394. 
109 It can be argued that there was no need to present the three options prescribed by Islamic military 
doctrine to the Emperor himself since he had been called to Islam by the Prophet some years before, 
and Muslims believe that the Christian scripture containes a prophecy made by Jesus (PBUH) himself 
that a later phophet would be named Ahmad. See the Qur'an, 2: 89 & 146,6: 20,7: 157, and 61: 6. 
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warfare at the strategic level against the Muslim army; "° he could also have been trying 
to assess the Muslims' consistency of commitment, and it also showed the over-confidence 
the Emperor had in his army. 
Thus, the Persians had prepared a massive army, three or four times bigger than that of 
the Muslims, aiming through positive morale to destroy them once and for all. They had 
also mobilised a large number - about thirty - of war elephants to secure an overwhelming 
tactical advantage. Their position was also strengthened at the operational level in that 
before the approach of the Persian army there were many tribes in the region of Iraq who 
had revolted against the Muslims and desired again to be subjects of the Säsänian 
Empire. " This should have given the Persians a considerable advantage over the 
Muslims, who were now unable to rely on the Arab tribes in the region, but the Persians 
failed to profit from the situation since they had not kept their part of the agreement to 
protect them, and the tribes no longer trusted them. "2 
As Rustam saw his warriors cross the river and take up their positions for battle, his 
confidence knew no bounds. He remarked to one of his officers: "With this army we will 
shatter the Arabs into pieces. " The officer replied: "If God wills it, " whereupon Rustam 
retorted: "Even if He does not will it. i113 
With hindsight it is obvious that it was dangerous for the Persian army to cross the river 
into what turned out to be a trap, but from their point of view their battle position was 
likely to be advantageous. Nevertheless they had not learned from their wrong assessment 
of the Muslim army leadership at the battle of the Bridge or even from their defeat at the 
battle of al-Buwayb. However, it is important to understand that this position, with the 
river at their back and the Muslim army in front, was considered to suit their method of 
fighting. ' 14 
The best of the Persian warriors fought duels with their Muslim counterparts at the 
beginning of the battle, which was a substantial tactical error as this was the method of 
fighting the Arabs preferred. In addition, it resulted in the death of one of their most 
valuable leaders and of other warriors of repute. This was a severe blow to the Persian 
I" On one occasion the Emperor said: "I know of no other nation on earth that was more miserable, 
smaller in numbers, and more rancorous than you. " See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari; the English 
Version, v. 2, p. 36. 
"' For more detail see the section "The Byzantines and Säsänians" in the chapter "Brief Background of 
the Region Prior to Islam" (Ch. 2). 
12 See al-Tabari, T rikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 396 and Ibn al-Athir, al-Kämil, v. 2, p. 308. 
From an Islamic point of view this is a blasphemy. See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 407 and 
Ibn al-Athir, al-Kämil, v. 2, p. 305. 
114 For more detail see the section "The Battle of al-Qädisiyyah" in the chapter "The Importance of 
Islamic Military Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
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army militarily and psychologically. However, to their advantage, at the approach of the 
Persian elephants the Muslim horses panicked, causing great confusion among the 
cavalry. The Persians pressed the attack and the Muslims fell back. The power of this 
unfamiliar weapon almost tipped the scale of the fighting twice: in the early stages of the 
first and third days of the four-day battle. Therefore, at the beginning the elephants were 
clearly a strength, but the Persian army became tactically over-reliant on them, and was 
gravely weakened by their elimination on the third day. ' 15 
The Persian army, similarly to the Byzantines, created a tactical problem for themselves by 
chaining their infantry and thus limiting their ability to manoeuvre. If only one of the 
chained soldiers became exhausted or was killed, the performance of the others could not 
but be affected. ' 16 Additionally, they were unable to use arrows since the confines of the 
battlefield were so limited and no advantage could be gained from the terrain. Further, it 
can be argued that the Persian practice of not burying the dead would have made the 
sight of thousands of their slain comrades in arms covering the battlefield unendurable, 
especially if we bear in mind that according to our references huge numbers were killed in 
the first two days. "' 
The Persian army's morale continued to deteriorate as continuous reinforcements of the 
Muslim army apparently kept pouring into the field throughout the battle. ' 18 This shows 
the poor intelligence of the Persian army at the operational level; they were unable to 
discover the trick played by the Muslim leadership. 119 The Persians were also exhausted 
after continuous fighting over twenty-four hours. It seemed that victory would be won by 
the side with the most stamina. When Rustam was killed, the Persian army's resistance 
collapsed. The long fight had broken their resolve. 120 
Towards the end of the battle the balance of advantage had clearly changed. At the 
beginning, a Persian victory seemed assured, but after the elephants were eliminated the 
advantage was with the Muslim army. The morale of the Persians had fluctuated 
"5 For more details of the elephants' performance see the section 'The Battle of al-Qädisiyyah" in the 
chapter "The Battles and their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
116 This study can find little justification for chaining the soldiers. For a brief discussion of the 
advantages and disadvantages of chaining soldiers see fn: 89 in the section "The Battle of al-Yarmük" 
in this chapter. 
See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, p. 44 and Kamäl, al-Qädisiyyah, p. 167. 
See the section "The Battle of al-Qädisiyyah" in the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" 
(Ch. 3). 
i9 For details see the section "The Battle of al-Qädisiyyah" in the chapter "The Importance of Islamic 
Military Strategy" (Ch. 8). 
120 The Department of the Army, Soldiers Team Development, p. 2, emphasises this point, arguing that 
psychological strength is "the most critical element of a combat-ready team. " Also see the section 'The 
Battle of al-Qädisiyyah" in the chapter'The Battles and their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
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according to the flow of events during the battle; nevertheless, their leadership, the 
destructive power of an unfamiliar weapon - the elephants - and their well-considered use 
of the terrain helped the Persian army to sustain the battle to the last moment. 
VII. 6: Comparison of the Battles 
The battles of interest will now be briefly compared and discussed with reference to the 
factors of religion, leadership, military strength, intelligence, creativity, and psychology. 
Concerning religion, we have found that the adversaries differed in their backgrounds. 
However the study's research has shown that the religious factor was of small importance 
except in the case of the Byzantines at al-Yarmük; but it could also be argued that the 
adversary's relative lack of religious zeal was a grave disadvantage, confronting as they 
were an enemy whose strength, unity, loyalty, stamina, and fighting spirit were 
overwhelmingly driven by a steadfast commitment to a religious cause. It is noticeable 
that throughout history the conflicts between nations that have been sustained over a 
long period have mainly been conflicts of religion. Hence, as far as comradeship is 
concerned, the adversaries' armies could not match the Muslims. In addition, in all five 
battles the adversary judged the Muslims as Arabs and not as Muslims and so failed to 
give their religious motivation the importance it deserved. Consequently, they were - 
inevitably - unprepared for the tenacity with which their enemy fought, and could not 
adapt to the new circumstances. 
Regarding leadership, it was found that the adversary's leadership at Badr was poorly 
organised, consisting as it did of disunited tribal leaders rather than one supreme 
commander. Additionally, at al-Qädisiyyah Rustam was ordered to take command against 
his better judgement. Both these types of leadership can be considered as 
disadvantageous. On the other hand, the leadership in the other three battles was in the 
main united and able to make sound decisions - despite the interference of higher 
authorities at al-Yarmük. Continuous assessments of the Muslim army were beneficial at 
the strategic level, except at Badr, where assessment was largely absent. At the operational 
level, however, the leaders at Uhud, al-Khandaq, and al-Qädisiyyah failed to give 
sufficient attention to this element, although at al-Yarmük, the Emperor had sent separate 
armies to take advantage of the small numbers making up the Muslim armies spread 
across the region of al-Sh5m. 121 Further, we find that in every battle one of the main 
failings of the leadership was their initial over-confidence. 
12' See the section "The Battle of al-Qädisiyyah" in the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" 
(Ch. 3). 
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Militarily, the numbers of men and amount of equipment of the adversaries in all five 
battles were definitely superior to those of the Muslim armies, whom they outnumbered 
by at least three to one. In addition the Persians at al-Qädisiyyah had the immense 
advantage of their thirty elephants, a weapon even the Byzantines could not match. It was 
therefore reasonable that they should have been confident; yet, the Muslims' judicious use 
of the terrain and skilful planning successfully countered this superiority. The Muslims 
were also superior in stamina, as at al-Khandaq and al-Qädisiyyah. 
Even though the adversary's intelligence activities were far from perfect in these battles, it 
can be claimed that they made positive attempts to use this factor as best they could. The 
Quraysh's intelligence gathering gradually improved, while the Byzantines and Persians, 
being professional soldiers of great, although declining, empires, had their own ways of 
gathering the information they needed about the Muslim army, and it must be admitted 
that the chain of communication established by the Persian leadership was certainly one 
of the most impressive phenomena of that battle. Nevertheless the Quraysh failed to take 
advantage of the terrain, while at al-Yarmük and al-Qädisiyyah the location and terrain 
appear to have satisfied the adversaries. 
A weakness common to all the adversaries was that they were generally content to rely on 
traditional methods of fighting and failed to match the Muslims' creativity, although at al- 
Yarmük, it is reported that Mahan used a plan the like of which had not been seen. 122 
This lack of creativity is especially noticeable in the Quraysh's conduct at Badr, Ullud, and 
al-Khandaq; they could not cope with the imaginative flexibility of the Muslim army. 
As far as the factor of psychology is concerned, this varied according to circumstance, but 
generally the Muslims had the advantage. The adversary's disunited or unwilling 
leadership and the chaining of the infantry were negative factors. Previous defeats were 
also important. All of these circumstances had a negative impact on the adversary's 
fighting spirit. 
VII. 7: Conclusion 
This chapter has examined in some detail the strengths and weaknesses of the Muslims' 
adversaries. A brief introduction explained the importance of having a separate chapter to 
discuss this subject. The significance of each battle was considered from the adversaries' 
viewpoints. A brief analysis followed of the various factors of importance in each battle. A 
comparison was then made to highlight the similarities and differences between the 
" See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Täbari, v. 2, p. 336. 
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adversaries. Lastly the conclusion drew attention to certain key points. It should be noted 
that this chapter has relied on the second chapter of the study to build its arguments. 
Since `on paper' as we have seen, the adversaries in all five battles were massively superior 
to the Muslim armies, the question arises, how did the Muslims, militarily speaking, 
manage to overcome this superiority? Specifically, what types of strategy did they use to 
defeat these apparently invincible powers and accomplish their goals? In the next chapter 
we will discuss the element of strategy from the Islamic military viewpoint. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
The Importance of Islamic Military Strategy 
Strategy, generally considered, is a very broad concept which may be thought to cover 
almost every aspect of daily life capable of being organised and planned. Since Muslims 
believe that everything they do must be in accordance with the Islamic shari'a, it follows 
that their ultimate goal is to conform their thoughts and actions to its precepts and 
purposes; in short, to serve Allah: "I have only created Jinns and men, that they may serve 
Me. "' This verse emphasises that this is indeed the ultimate, and the only unalterable and 
eternally valid goal of every action or intention of every Muslim? Hence, it can be argued 
that it is in the light of this verse that the broadest conception of Islamic strategy, which 
subsumes the category of Islamic military strategy, should be considered. However, this 
general notion of Islamic strategy is too large a matter to bring within the scope of this 
study, which is focussed here upon the narrower characteristics of Islamic military 
strategy. Further, the study is innovative in that the following discussion will consider 
Islamic military strategy by investigating the validity of the principles of war, as commonly 
understood, from an Islamic point of view. 
However, it should be noted that of all the factors considered so far that of strategy is the 
most closely connected with doctrine, since Islamic military strategy is governed by Islamic 
military doctrine and is indeed that doctrine's expression in the conduct of military 
campaigns. 
The chapter is organised as follows. First, it will define the term `strategy' itself and 
consider its place in relation to the Islamic shari`a and to what the study will define as the 
main `pillars' of Islamic strategy in general, which are to some extent subject to 
circumstances. Second, the chapter will discuss the narrower term `Islamic military 
strategy' and its fulfilment through serving these two pillars. Third, the most relevant 
principles of war will be examined from an Islamic point of view. Fourth, the chapter will 
explain how these principles are implemented through the practice of military strategy, 
operations, and tactics. Fifth, the most important principles will be compared and analysed 
with reference to the five battles in question. Lastly, some conclusions will be drawn. 
See the Qur'an (ETMC), 51: 56. 
s See the discussion of Islamic doctrine in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
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The ultimate and unalterable goal at the highest level, as we have seen, is to serve All5h. 3 
This concept will be considered after we have briefly attempted to define the term 
`strategy'. 
VIII. 1: Definition of Islamic Strategy and the Two `Pillars' 
As is the case with many scientific and technical terms, the word strategy is derived 
indirectly from the Greek; strategos may be translated as `commander in chief; but as 
Luttwak suggests, it "does not carry the connotation of the modern word. s4 The Shorter 
Oxford Dictionary identifies strategy as "the art of projecting and directing the larger 
military movements and operations of a campaign" .5 Strategy is also considered to be built 
upon previous experience and available information. 6 In Arabic, however, no single word 
conveys the meaning or range of meanings the word has in English. 7 However, its Arabic 
equivalents are fann al-sa wq, fann or dilm idärat al-harb, and waddc al-khutat wa idärat al- 
camaliyyät al-harbiyyah. 8 In addition, Tläs mentions that the Greek word strategos means 
the art of leading troops9 while al-Sanäfi says that strategy means the art of military 
planning. 10 It is clear, then, that these definitions in both Arabic and English firmly 
connect the word with the theory and practice of war. However, while the primary 
meaning is generally accepted to be the general direction of a military campaign, the 
concept in recent and current usage covers a far wider range of activity and is commonly 
applied to the fields of economics, politics, sport, business, and so on. " 
Therefore strategy in the military sense can be said to serve a higher strategy; in the 
present case Islamic military strategy should be judged not only by its success on the 
battlefield but also by its conformity with the essentially religious purposes of Islamic 
strategy as defined by Islamic doctrine. 12 The Qur'än states: "Invite (all) to the Way of thy 
3 See the definition of Islamic military doctrine in the chapter of "The Role of Islamic Military 
Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
Luttwak, Strategy, p. 239. Also see the following section. 
Shorter Oxford Dictionary. 
b See Brewer, Perception and Reason, p. 23. 
Further see Ibn Manziir, Lisän al-Arab, al-Rani, Mukhtär al-Sihäh, and aI-Zamakhshari, al-Fä'iq. 
8A rough English equivalent of these phrases would be "the art or science of planning and 
administering military activities. " See al-Ba°labaki, al-Mawrid; English-Arabic Dictionary. 
See Turkumani, al-Madhähib, p. 38. 
10 See al-Sanafi, al-Isträtijiyyah al-Askariyyah, p. 20. 
" See MaWz, al-Madkhal, p. 28. 
'Z See the Qur'an, 16: 125. Also the command to spread Islam appears in various verses and texts as in 
2: 119-225,21: 92,23: 52,39: 15 & 54,41: 33,42: 13 & 53,43: 43,61, & 63,48: 2,20, & 28,61: 9,67: 
22,72: 13, and 98: 5. 
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Lord". 13 This verse enjoins Muslims to spread Islam, but not by any means necessary; they 
are instructed to propagate the faith "with wisdom and beautiful preaching; and argue 
with them in ways that are best and most gracious: for thy Lord knoweth best, who have 
strayed from His Path, and who receive guidance. s14 Force is not to be the first resort: 
"And have patience with what they say, and leave them with noble (dignity). ls 
Therefore, this general Islamic strategy can be said to be fulfilled through two essential 
`pillars', or means of faithfully serving Allah: defending and/or spreading Islam. 16 But 
military might is not the only, or even the chief means; Islam may also be defended or 
spread through economics, political activity, diplomacy, scholarship, moral example, and 
so on. Thus while the study's focus is upon Islamic military strategy, it should be 
understood that using military means to defend or spread the faith is to be considered the 
last resort. 17 In this connection the Qur'an says: "But if the enemy incline towards peace, 
do thou (also) incline towards peace. "18 So it can be said that for Muslims there is no 
merit in armed conflict for its own sake. 19 
While it is possible to argue that many verses in the Qur'an regarding Islamic strategy can 
be cited as relevant depending on the approach to their interpretation, the study will, in 
accordance with its purposes, limit itself to a small number of verses, which seem to be 
sufficient to illustrate the broadest scope of Islamic military strategy. 20 
VIII. 1.1: Definition of Islamic Military Strategy 
Although both Tläs and al-Sanäfi deal with strategy from an Islamic viewpoint, they do 
not discuss it within the context of the sharlla. 21 Therefore their definitions should be 
reconsidered and amended from a more strictly Islamic perspective: so one might say that 
Islamic military strategy is the Muslim commander's art of leading his troops within the 
13 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 16: 125. 
14 See the rest of the previous verse, 16: 125. 
15 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 73: 10. 
16 It should be emphasised that during the period under study Islamic military strategy was never 
either purely defensive or purely offensive; but it should be noted that the Prophet's strategy was 
largely defensive whereas in the battles of conquest the strategy was mainly offensive. 
17 See the section "The Concept of the Just War" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military 
Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
18 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 61. 
19 See The Holy Qur'an ETMC p. 487, fn: 1228. 
20 Among them for instance is: "To those against whom war is made, permission is given (to fight), 
because they are wronged; and verily, Allah is Most Powerful for their aid" See the Qur'an (ETMC), 
22: 39. 
21 See the previous definitions of both writers. In addition, Faraj wrote a book entitled al-Madkhal i1ä 
al-Agidah wa al-Isträt, Viyyah al-Askani yah al-Islämiyyah, but it does not discuss the concept of 
Islamic military strategy. 
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main guidelines of the shari`a in order to accomplish the ultimate goal of the Muslim 
army through unswerving devotion to either of the two main pillars of general Islamic 
strategy. This broad definition raises the question of the relationship between Islamic 
military strategy and Islamic shari`a. 
The Qur'an states: "Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress 
limits; for A115h loveth not transgressors. "22 This verse reveals that fighting is only 
permissible in self-defence, and then only within well-defined limits. It also succinctly 
expresses the essence of the Islamic military strategy's first goal: to defend the faith. 23 
Nevertheless the Muslim army was given permission to retaliate against any aggressor. It 
is important to notice here that this verse is one of the first to enjoin the Muslims to 
change their stance from being a peaceable group, following the instruction of "more than 
seventys24 verses not to fight, to being an independent and united community which was 
not merely permitted, but definitely commanded, to defend itself under certain 
restrictions. 25 The verse is clearly suited to the conditions under which the Muslim 
community was living during their early years in Medina; it is also applicable to their 
situation in the first three battles. 
It has been widely argued that the Muslim army initiated an aggressive campaign against 
the Quraysh after the emigration. However, after careful investigation it can be argued 
that this view, which relies on the biographical works taken from Ibn Hisham without 
considering the books of hadith, is misleading. Abn Dä'iid, one of the main narrators of 
the hadith, recounts that the tribes in Medina received letters threatening severe 
retribution if they did not expel the Prophet (PBUH) and the Muhäjirün. 26 This indicates 
that the Muslim community needed to remove the threat posed by the Quraysh against 
their supporters in Medina. Also, they needed to show their adversaries that they were no 
longer weak and that they were willing and able to defend themselves and their new 
22 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 2: 190. There among the classical exegetes a debate concerning whether 
this verse was the first to be revealed permitting Muslims to fight or whether 22: 39 was the first. 
However, both verses emphasise the importance of not making war except in self defence. Further see 
al-Qurtubi, Tafsir al-Qurtubi, v. 2, pp. 348-352 and al-Zubayli, al-Tafsir al-Munir, v. 2, p. 184. Also see 
al-Mustadrak Gala al-Sahi'hayn (Kitib al lihäd, No. 2376, v. 2, p. 76), al-Sunan al-Kubrä (Kitib al lihed, 
No. 4292, v. 3, p. 3), and Sunan al-Tirmidhi (Bab: Surah al-Hajj, No. 3171, v. 3, p. 32). 
See The Holy Qur'in ETMC p. 79, fn: 204. It should be remembered that a factor which could 
affect the validity of this verse is the concept of abrogating and abrogated verses. See the section "The 
Assistance of Non-Muslims" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
24 See al-Zuhayli, al-Tafsiral-Munir, v. 17, p. 227. 
2s For details of the prohibition of some specific practices conducted prior to Islam see the section "The 
Twenty'Don'ts"' in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
26 See Abü Dd'üd (Kitib al Kharij wa al-Imirah wa al-Fayy, No. 3004, v. 3, p. 156) and Musanaf cAbd 
al-Razäq (Bib: Ghazwat Band al-Na(fir, No. 9733, v. 5, p. 358). 
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lands. 27 Hence, it is possible to say that these letters had a great influence in bringing 
about the first three battles. 
The second goal of Islamic military strategy during the period covered by the study is 
indicated in the verse: "And fight them on until there is no more persecution and the 
religion becomes Allah's. But if they cease, let there be no hostility except to those who 
practice oppression". 28 Most of the exegeses in use reported that the aim of the Muslim 
army was to spread Islam peacefully but if this was prevented force could legitimately be 
applied. 29 Historical reports of the period relate that the Muslims had sent several letters 
to inform people about Islam, but their messengers were either killed or prevented from 
carrying out their mission. 30 
It is possible to argue that this verse inspired and justified the Muslim invasion of the 
Byzantine and Sasanian Empires, thus fulfilling the second `pillar' of Islamic strategy, since 
it freed them to take aggressive action in conveying their message. The statement of 
°Abdullah b. Umar b. al-Khattab upon his refusal to join the itnah, "turmoil", 31 could be 
used to support the view that the Muslims' strategy at that time accorded with the 
guideline of the verse: "We have not sent thee but as a (Messenger) to all mankind, giving 
them Glad tidings, and warning them (against sin), but most men know not. "32 Thus the 
Prophet and his Companions were commanded to inform people everywhere of his 
message, but the peaceful propagation of Islam was not always possible. 33 The Prophet's 
messengers were killed, his letters were torn up, Medina was threatened with invasion and 
34 men were sent to bring him before their emperors. On one occasion, the Prophet said, 
27 See al-Ghadbän, al-Manhaj, v. 1, p. 232. 
See the Qur'an (ETMC), 2: 193. It should be noted that the original Arabic word is ; A' whose more 
precise meaning is persecution, which is the suppression of some opinion by violence, force, or threats. 
See The Holy Qur'an ETMC, p. 92, fn: 239. 
29 See al-Tabari, Tafsir al-Tabari, v. 2, pp. 192-194, al-Qurtubi, Tafsir al-Qurtubi, v. 2, pp. 352-354, Ibn 
Kathir, Tafsirlbn Kathir, v. 1, pp. 227-229, and al-Zuhayli, al-Tafsiral-Munir, v. 2, pp. 187-188. 
31 For example see Ibn Hajar, Fath al-Bari, v. 7, p. 511 and Ibn al-Qayyim, Zad al-Ma`äd, v. 3, p. 381. 
31 This turmoil or temptation, which is known in Islamic history as Brnat magtal °Uthman, emerged 
upon the assassination of the Caliph cUthmän b. cAffan. Further see al-Mustadrak °alä al-Sahihayn 
(Bab: DhikrMagtalAmiral-Muminin °Uthman, v. 3, pp. 107-116), al-Jämic [d. 151/768], (Bab: Magtal 
°Uthmän, v. 11, p. 444), and Ibn Abi Bakr [674/1276-741/1341], al-Tamhid wa al-Bayän, pp. 138-197. 
32 See Sahib al-Bukhäri (Kitab al-Tafsir, No. 4243, v. 4, p. 1641), al-Sunan al-Kubrä (Kitab al-Tafsir, 
No. 11026, v. 6, p. 298), and Musnad Ahmad (No. 5690, v. 2, p. 94). For the verse see the Qur'an 
(ETMC), 34: 28. Also see Qur'an, 13: 30,17: 106,21: 107,35: 24, and 48: 8. 
33 See the section "Islamic Military Doctrine" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" 
(Ch. 4). 
3' However, the order to fight and seek victory or martyrdom, as mentioned in the section "Islamic 
Military Doctrine" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4), is bound and 
restricted by the Qur'an, 8: 61: "But if the enemy incline towards peace, do thou (also) incline towards 
peace. " In this connection, in the commentary of The Holy Qur'an ETMCp. 487, fn: 1228, it is found: 
"While we must always be ready for the good fight lest it be forced on us, even in the midst of the fight 
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regarding the Sasanian Emperor, who had tom up the letter he had sent: "Allah will tear 
up his kingdom". 35 In the case of the Byzantines, there were several incidents which 
provoked the Muslims to conquer al-Sham; among them was the killing of the Prophet's 
messenger before he could fulfil his mission, 36 and their preparing to invade Medina. 37 
We have seen that Islamic military strategy38 must at all times be conceived and practised 
in the light of the shan`a of Islam in order to fulfil certain goals. However, it should be 
noted that the military strategy of defending Islam can be pursued together, according to 
need, with the military strategy of spreading the faith. In fact, it should be emphasised 
that during the initial stages of constructing the fledgling state of the Islamic community 
and completing the revelation of Islam, it was logical to insist that the strategic imperative 
demanded that the faith should be defended before it could be spread. Hence, the two 
`pillars' - unlike the absolute duty to serve Allah - are to some extent subject to the 
surrounding circumstances 39 
we must always be ready for peace if there is any inclination toward peace on the other side. There in 
no merit merely in a fight by itself, but to establish the reign of peace. " In support of this view the 
Qur'an (ETMC), 2: 256, says: "Let there be no compulsion in religion. " 
" See Sunan al-Bayhaqi al-Kubrä (Bäb: Izhär Din al-Nabi v. 9, p. 181) and Ibn al-Qayyim, Zäd al- 
Ma`äd, v. 3, p. 689. 
36 He was al-Härith b. cUmayr al-Uzdi, who was killed by Sharhabil b. °Amrii al-Ghassäni before he 
could deliver his message. See Ibn Hajar, Fath al-Bari, v. 7, p. 511 and Ibn al-Qayyim, Zäd a1-Ma°äd, v. 3, 
p. 381. It should be mentioned that Prophet would not countenance the killing of his messengers while 
he had the power to revenge their slaughter. For example, on one occasion, the rumour that `Uthman 
b. °Affän, his messenger to the Quraysh, had been killed, caused the Muslims to take a solemn pledge 
at the insistence of the Prophet that they would sacrifice their lives to avenge the death of their 
Companion and stand firmly by their Prophet under all conditions. See the Qur'an, 48: 18, Sahib al- 
Bukhäri (Bäh: Manägib °Uthman b. Affän, No. 3495, v. 3, p. 1352), Sahib Muslim (Bäh: Bay°at al- 
Ridwän, No. 1856, v. 3, p. 1483), Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 283, and al-I Talabi, al-Sirah al- 
Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 702. 
3' See Ibn Sayyid al-Nds, 'Uyrrn al-Athar, v. 2, p. 339. 
It is known that the best way to defend against an external aggressor is through a mobilised defence, 
which means moving the theatre of operations to the adversary's territory. See al-Ghadbän, al-Manhaj, 
v. 3, pp. 96-97. 
38 It should be mentioned that in the coming pages when the study uses the term 'military strategy', 
'Islamic military strategy' is meant, this having been already understood from the theoretical 
discussion. 
39 It can certainly be argued that from the moment the Prophet first spoke in Mecca he was spreading 
Islam, but generally speaking the first phase consisted of constructing a defendable nation. This 
explains why it has been thought necessary to discuss the strategy of Islam in this way. There was as 
yet no power base; therefore, the Muslims had to construct a form of Islamic state which would 
consolidate the power necessary to defend or spread the faith by military means. Yet the Muslims were 
spreading Islam, but not through military activity: in several consecutive years, the Prophet asked the 
tribes in the Ilajj seasons to give him protection while he was calling people to Islam. And although on 
a few occasions patrols were sent out for the purpose of exploring the area around Medina and trying 
to intercept the Quraysh's caravans, these could not be described as the activities of an organised 
Muslim army; it would be more accurate to call them skirmishes, which were not conceived and 
executed in order to spread Islam. 
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VIII. 2: The Relationship between Religious Decisions and Military 
Decisions40 
Since Muslims believe that military decisions, like all other decisions, are subordinate to 
religious precepts and aims, military strategy must be decided according to the teachings 
of the shan'a of Islam. Also, since the supreme leader of the Islamic community (the 
Caliph, after the Prophet's death) was essentially a religious leader, 41 almost all his 
decisions were religious in nature, and all strategic, operational and tactical decisions were 
subject to religious considerations. Therefore, the military leader could not act 
independently but was under the command of the supreme leader. 42 This situation 
necessitated good coordination between both leaderships. As a result the field commander 
was considered to be a valued adviser on military matters; nevertheless his power to 
decide strategy was limited. It could not be formulated or carried out on purely military 
grounds. Hence, military decisions had to be compatible with the religious principles 
which governed the conduct of war, and a military decision could not override a religious 
decision, even though the field commander might think it would bring a quicker or more 
decisive victory, or even prevent defeat. It should be noted here that the mechanism by 
which these decisions were made and carried out became clearer as the revelation 
continued. 43 Therefore, it can be argued that just as the religious or higher strategic 
decision took precedence over any purely military strategic decision, the caliph took 
precedence over the field commander, and thus that in Islam there was, and continues to 
be, a hierarchical relationship between religious decisions and military decisions. 
This study has explained in the foregoing section the importance of Islamic military 
strategy as a guideline for the Muslim army, although subordinate to the unchangeable 
imperatives of defending and spreading the faith in order to serve Allah. These goals are 
to be attained through military means, which are changeable, according to military 
principles. These military means are 1) strategy, 2) operations, and 3) tactics. It is 
therefore necessary at this point to discuss briefly the relationship between military 
strategy and its implementation at the operational and tactical levels. 
4Ö See Turkumäni, al-Madhähib, p. 72. 
41 See the section "The Significant Qualities of the Muslim Leader: Säbiqüri' in the chapter "The 
Impact of Islamic Military Leadership" (Ch. 5). 
42 See Turkumäni, al-Madhähib, p. 72. This element is more evident in the last two battles. 
43 See the section "The Division of Booty and the Treatment of Prisoners of War" in the chapter "The 
Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
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VIII. 3: Relationship between Strategy, Operations, and Tactics 
Although the Muslim leadership considered that it was essential that Islam should be 
defended or, later, spread through military activity, they were well aware that the aims of 
Islamic military strategy had to be conceived and executed in accordance with the 
ultimate goal of Islamic strategy generally. 
We have seen that the goal of Islamic military strategy is to serve the two main 'pillars' of 
the higher, or more general, Islamic strategy, and that these are constants and their 
purpose, to serve Allah, is eternal and unalterable. However, these somewhat theoretical 
considerations need to be fulfilled in reality through the specific, practical means of 
operations and tactics. 
Thus while military strategy concerns the widest scope of military activities, it must be 
implemented in detail through operational and tactical activities. 44 It can be said that 
operations are related to strategy in that they accomplish its goals through a narrower 
focus. The operational level is concerned with the possibilities of attaining these goals in 
the theatre of operations without specifying in great detail the way they are to be 
accomplished. Further, the distinction between strategy and tactics may be summarised as 
follows: strategy is a continuous activity at the broadest level, whereas tactics only come 
into play at the time of need; the Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines tactics as, "The art or 
science of deploying military ... 
forces in order of battle, and of preparing ... manoeuvres" 
45 
It is clear from the brief discussion above that strategy is not dictated by operations and 
tactics but that these are elements of, and subordinate to, military strategy 46 It should be 
noted, however, that the Qur'an recognises the importance of tactical manoeuvres in the 
first five verses of the surah al 'Adiyat. 47 Also, it can be argued that strategy in general 
ends in the 'pitched battle' and is thus focussed with increasing intensity through the 
operational levels 48 
VIII. 4: Islamic Principles of War 
According to Henderson, the principles of war can be considered principles of military 
strategy. 49 Nevertheless, there are different views as to how many of these principles may 
44 See Turkumäni, al-Madhähib, p. 39 and Ahmad, Nahwa Qänün Muwahhad, p. 91. Also see al `Ärif, 
al-Jaysh, p. 174. 
" See the Shorter Oxford Dictionary. 
46 See Buffer, Introduction A La Strategie, p. 17. 
4' See the Qur'än (E7MC), 100: 1-5. 
48 Henderson, The Science of War, p. 39. 
4' See Henderson, The Science of War, p. 42. 
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be usefully discussed and differentiated. Also some are very closely connected while 
others are best considered to some extent as standing alone. 50 In addition, it must be 
admitted that the principles of war are not explicitly referred to by the verses of the 
Qur'an. Hence the question arises, does the Islamic shari`a have an opinion on these 
principles? Moreover, if it does not take a clear position, is it possible for this study to 
attempt to use its understanding of the Qur'an and the hadith to construct an acceptable 
set of Islamic principles of war? This is what this section will investigate. It should be 
stressed that some of the verses covered below may not appear to be directly relevant; 
however, the task of this study is to make a connection between these principles of war 
and the verses in the Qur'an through an academic analysis. In addition, there are elements 
which could be effective in applying these principles, such as the quality of the warriors 
involved, which are relevant to the discussion. 
Since the military aspects of Islamic military strategy are always subservient to the 
doctrinal aspects, as we have seen in the foregoing discussion, the principles of war in this 
chapter will be discussed according to an Islamic perspective. 51 This intention calls for the 
adoption of a new method, which is to interpret several verses in order to shed light on 
the principles, as generally understood, as they were applied before, during or even after 
the battles of interest. 52 It should be noted, however, that this section does not discuss the 
principles in a chronological framework, as its focus is on their validity and application 
from an Islamic point of view. Further, since the chosen verses are capable of more than 
one interpretation, some verses will be used in more than one context to strengthen the 
argument. This course is considered preferable to allowing the inclusion of verses of 
doubtful relevance merely for the sake of avoiding repetition. 
VIII. 4.1: Morale 
Morale (al-macnawiyyät)53 is a major principle of war. Its importance is acknowledged in 
the teachings of doctrine and the statements of military commanders. It is usually 
considered to be the primary source of a soldier's energy and fighting spirit. In works 
so See Khalfät and As°ad, al-Askariyyah al-Islämiyyah, pp. 97-111 and Faraj, Fann Idärat al-Ma'rakah, 
p. 150. Additionally, they do not constitute one solid set of principles but vary somewhat according to 
the background of the military school. See °Armüsh, Qiyädat al-Rasril, pp. 173-174. However, the study 
has chosen to consider the points which are agreed upon by strategists who discuss them in the light of 
Islamic norms, i. e. the Qur'an and hadith. 
si See the previous section "The Relationship between Religious Decisions and Military Decisions". 
sz Khalfät and Ascad, a1-Askariyyah al-Islämiyyah, p. 9, remark that Islamic military strategy starts 
where Islamic military doctrine ends. 
13 See Khalfät and Asead, al-Askariyyah al-Islämiyyah, p. 109. 
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devoted to military matters throughout history morale has been thought to be a major 
influence on the outcome of a battle. It is also a matter thoroughly considered by the 
Islamic shari°a. In the present context it is possible to say that the Muslim army applied 
this principle in three main ways. First, the Muslims believed that their task was justified 
by their doctrine. 54 Second, the trust they had in their leaders removed any doubt or 
hesitation. " Third, they were dedicated heart and soul to the protection of their brothers 
in religion. 56 The Qur'an discusses morale in various verses, for example: "If there are 
Twenty amongst you, patient and persevering, they will vanquish two hundred: if a 
hundred, they will vanquish a thousand of the Unbelievers. "57 Thus in military terms 
Islam changed the concept of quantity - mere numbers of men - to that of quality - the 
instilling of the military virtues through the inspirational force of Islamic doctrine as 
revealed to the Prophet. In many verses the Qur'an promises rewards for those who fight 
for Islam, for example, as in: "Those who believe, and emigrate, and fight for the faith, in 
the Cause of A11ah, as well as those who give (them) asylum and aid, - these are (all) in 
very truth the Believers: for them is the forgiveness of sins and a provision most 
generous. "" In addition, the hadith emphasises the great virtue and benefit of fighting for 
the faith; the quantity of similar statements indicates the importance placed on raising 
and maintaining morale. For example, the Prophet (PBUH) said: "A single endeavour (of 
fighting) in Allah's Cause in the afternoon or in the forenoon is better than all the world 
and whatever is in it. "" However, high morale can only be built and sustained by a unified 
command, which will be discussed in the next section. 
VIII. 4.2: Unity of Command 
The second important principle is unity of command, which means that every task of 
every soldier is the ultimate responsibility of a single commander. Only thus can unity of 
Sa Further see the section "The Reasons for Islamic Combat" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic 
Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
ss Further see the section "Types of Leadership" in the chapter "The Impact of Islamic Military 
Leadership" (Ch. 5). 
56 Further see the section "Loyalty and Self-denial" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military 
Doctrine" (Ch. 4). See also Sahih Muslim (Kitäb al-Birr wa a! -Shah wa al Adab, No. 2587, v. 4, p. 1999) 
and Sunan al-Bayhagi al-Kubra (Kitäb Sa1ät a1-Istisgä; No. 6223, v. 3, p. 353). 
57 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 65. 
58 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 74. 
59 See Sahih al-Bukhari (Kitäb al-Jihad wa al-Siyar, No. 2643, v. 3, p. 1029) and Sunan al-Tirmidhi 
(); gtäb Fadä 5! a1-Jihad, No. 1651, v. 3, p. 181) . 
237 
Ch. 8: The Importance of Islamic Military Strategy 
effort be ensured. 60 The Qur'an states the importance of unification of command: "And 
obey Allah and His Messenger; and fall into no disputes. Lest ye lose heart and your 
power depart; and be patient and persevering: For Allah is with those who patiently 
persevere. s61 Here, the stress is on obedience to the leadership, and the prohibition of 
discord. We may understand from this that the Qur'an is recommending a new concept of 
comradeship, which could be used to transform the entrenched practice of casabiyyah in 
Arab life into an Islamic brotherhood. 62 This can be seen in the warriors' acceptance of 
commanders from other tribes despite their long history of destructive vendettas and 
tribal wars. Hence, it can be claimed that the function of this principle is based on a 
comradeship of the faithful. This principle is intimately connected with another, that of 
cooperation and coordination. 
VIII. 4.3: Cooperation and Coordination 
Cooperation and coordination (al-ta'äwun)`' means unifying the effort and working 
together harmoniously in order to reach the goal. Islam has much to say on this matter, 
which it discusses in several places, as we have noted in the chapter on Islamic military 
doctrine. In addition, the Qur'an clarifies the need for cooperation and unity of effort and 
their connection with the principle of obedience. ` The Qur'an states: "Those who 
believed, and emigrated and fought for the faith, with their property and their person, in 
the Cause of Allah, as well as those who gave (them) asylum and aid, -these are (all) 
friends and protectors, one of another. "" It must be emphasised that this cooperation is 
not merely the result of obedience to an external authority; Muslims believe, following the 
Qur'an, that this principle can only be fully applied through the coordination and 
cooperation of their hearts, as the Qur'an states: "And remember with gratitude Allah's 
favour on you; For ye were enemies and He joined your hearts in love, so that by His 
Grace, ye became brethren. "66 It is possible, then, to argue that the Qur'an's discussion of 
60 Leadership and unity of command, though closely related, are not identical. See the section 
"Leadership and Unity of Command" in the chapter "The Impact of Islamic Military Leadership" 
(Ch. 5). 
61 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 46. 
62 Further see the section "Leadership and Unity of Command" in the chapter "The Impact of Islamic 
Military Leadership" (Ch. 5). 
63 See Khalfat and Ascad, al-°Askariyyah al-Islämiyyah, p. 105 and Faraj, Fann Idärat al-Macrakah, p. 
179. 
64 See the section "Obedience" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
6s See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 72 and 9: 71. 
66 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 103. Also see the Qur'an, 5: 2. 
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matters related to this principle shows its important relationship with the principle of 
unity of command. 
VIII. 4.4: Surprise 
The principle of surprise means to strike the adversary at a time, at a place, or in a manner 
for which he is least prepared. 67 Its essential nature was summed up by the Prophet 
(PBUH), when he said: "War is deceit. "68 It relies much on the element of intelligence. "' It 
can be argued that its demands are considered clearly by the Qur'än: "Beleaguer them, 
and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war). "" This verse directs the army to be 
aware and fully alert when lying in ambush, and encourages endurance and patience, 
which link the principle to the operational level of the Islamic military strategy. " 
In this connection, since this verse has several meanings other than that given above, it 
can also be used in connection with a plan of defence such as digging a trench to repel a 
besieging force. 72 So it is possible to say that the principle of surprise is considered and 
encouraged in its widest sense in the Islamic sharica. 
VIII. 4.5: Security 
Security, which means taking measures to prevent being taken by surprise, is another vital 
principle of war. 73 Among these measures is assuring the security and safety of the army 
as well as its support lines. The Qur'än emphasises that Muslims should not trust or easily 
accept offers of friendship or aid from non-Muslims, even their closest relatives: "0 ye 
who believe! Take not My enemies and yours as friends (or protectors), offering them 
67 See Khalfät and Ascad, al-Askariyyah al-Islämiyyah, p. 100 and Faraj, Fann Idärat al-Ma rakah, p. 
165. 
68 See Sahib al-Bukhäri (Bib: al-Narb Khidcah, No. 2846, v. 3, p. 1102) and Sahib Muslim (Bib: al- 
Tab 6V `ala Qat1 alKhawirij, No. 1066, v. 2, p. 746). 
69 See the section "The Value of Intelligence to the Soldiers: Surprise" in the chapter "The Task of 
Islamic Military Intelligence" (Ch. 6). 
'° See the Qur'än (ETMC), 9: 5. 
" The element of endurance should also be considered under surprise. See the section "The Significant 
Qualities of the Muslim Leader; Patience and Endurance" in the chapter "The Impact of Islamic 
Military Leadership" (Ch. 5). Of course, it is not only the leader who should exhibit these qualities; 
they are also essential to the effectiveness of his men. 
72 Here once again there is a problem of translation, since in Arabic the words are and . C. 
which are difficult to translate accurately. According to the exegeses and dictionaries the verse can be 
said to have several meanings. Also see al-Tabari, Tafsir a! -Tabari, v. 10, p. 78, al-Quriubi, Tafsir al- 
Qurtubi, v. 8, p. 73, and Ibn l; lajar, Fath al-Bari, v. 8, p. 314. Also see Ibn Manznr, Lisin al-Arab, v. 8, p. 
109 & v. 3, p. 358. Further see the different translations of the Qur'än including those of Pickthall and 
Yusuf Ali. 
7' See Khalfät and As°ad, al-Askariyyah al-Islimiyyah, p. 104 and Faraj, Fann Idirat al-Ma rakah, p. 
175. 
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(your) love, even though they have rejected the Truth that has come to you, and have (on 
the contrary) driven out the Messenger and yourselves (from your homes), (simply) 
because ye believe in Allah your Lord! If ye have come out to strive in My Way and to 
Seek My Good Pleasure, (take them not as friends), holding secret converse of love (and 
friendship) with them: for I know full well all that ye conceal and all that ye reveal. And 
any of you that does this has strayed from the Straight Path. s74 This long verse needs to 
be quoted in full since it deals in detail with the threats that might harm the Muslim 
community. 75 
The Arabs' system was to form alliances which usually involved protection of their 
movements in the desert; however, Islam developed this arrangement through 
jurisprudence, since awareness of security concerns is essential at the level of troop 
movements. The Qur'an states: "When ye travel through the earth, there is no blame on 
you if ye shorten your prayers, for fear the Unbelievers may attack you: For the 
Unbelievers are unto you open enemies. )176 It is also possible to use the general concept of 
the following verse to refer to military security in those cases where an army is marching 
or even in combat: "0 ye that believe! Betray not the trust of Allah and the Messenger, 
nor misappropriate knowingly things entrusted to you. "77 Even though this verse is 
general in nature its relevance to security lies in its insistence on loyalty to Allah and His 
Messenger, since an act of betrayal obviously constitutes a grave breach of security. It can 
be argued that the prohibition is not only of consciously willed treachery, but also of the 
careless or undisciplined execution of an important mission. In addition, the Qur'an 
discusses a similar case related to the security of the army at the tactical level, which gives 
a deep insight into the importance attached to this principle. The verse in question 
concerns the soldiers' performance of their prayers at a decisive moment in a 
confrontation: "When thou (0 Messenger) art with them, and standest to lead them in 
prayer, let "one party of them stand up (in prayer) with thee, taking their arms with them; 
when they finish their prostrations, let them take their positions in the rear. And let the 
other party come up - which hath not yet prayed - and let them pray with thee, taking all 
74 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 60: 1. Further see The Holy Qur'än E7MC, p. 1728, fn: 5409. Also see the 
Qur än, 60: 2. 
7S Further see the section "The Assistance of Non-Muslims" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic 
Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
76 See the Qur'än (ETMC), 4: 101. Similarly see the Qui'än, 3: 121 and 4: 71. 
77 See the Qur'än (ETMC), 8: 27. Similarly see the Qur'an, 3: 118,4: 139 & 144,5: 21,51, & 57, and 9: 
23. 
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precautions, and bearing arms. 08 Thus even the pattern of prayer can be modified when 
Islam itself is threatened. Indeed, the significance of this verse should not be 
underestimated as it is the only place in the Qur'än where the method of performance of a 
prayer, Saläh, is described in detail. 
One further example will serve to emphasise the importance given to security; the Qur'än 
states: "0 ye who believe! take your precautions, and either go forth in parties or go forth 
all together. " 79 
VIII. 4.6: Choosing the Target and Aiming for it 
Choosing the target and aiming for it (ikhtiyär al-gasd wa idämatih) is an important 
principle of war. 80 The Qur'an explains and emphasises the need for a clear and well- 
defined goal. In many places, the focus on and the repeated calls to "serve Allah" show 
the importance of discerning one main goal and then aiming to attain it without doubts or 
distractions. ß1 Subsidiary goals, such as those of Islamic military strategy, tend to be 
accomplished by collective action, which the Qur'an often enjoins and praises, as in: "Only 
those are Believers, who believe in Allah and His Messenger: when they are with him on 
a matter requiring collective action, they do not depart until they have asked for his leave: 
those who ask for thy leave are those who believe in Allah and His Messenger. "82 
Also, it is possible to argue that the following verse is relevant to the discussion of this 
principle, as it states: "Allah has not made for any man two hearts. "" In this context it 
means that a man cannot hold two inconsistent attitudes; so it is possible to claim that he 
should concentrate on one main object in order that his approach and performance should 
be effective 84 
78 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 102. For further explanation see al-Mustadrak Gala al-$ahihayn (Kitäb a! - 
Jihäd, No. 2432, v. 2, p. 92) and Sunan al-Tirmidhi (Kitäb Fa(fä'il al-Jihad, No. 1639, v. 4, p. 175). 
79 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 71. 
See Khalfat and As°ad, al-Askariyyah a1-Islämiyyah, p. 108. 
81 See the Qur'an, 2: 21,5: 72 & 117,7: 59,65,73, & 85,11: 50,61, & 84,16: 36,23: 23 & 32,27: 45, 
29: 16 & 36, and 71: 3. Also see the previous definition of Islamic military strategy. Further see the 
section "The Well-Defined Goal" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
82 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 24: 62. 
83 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 33: 4. 
84 See The Holy Qur'an ETMC p. 1238, fn: 3669 and al-Zuhayli, al-Tafsiral-Munir, v. 21, p. 234. 
In addition, the Prophet himself provided an example of keeping to the main objective when he made 
a manoeuvre by leaving the main route and avoiding confrontation with the Quraysh troops on the 
march to Mecca. He then forced them to accept negotiations after long years of confrontation. See al- 
Mu'jam al-Kabir (No. 14, v. 20, p. 15), Ibn Hisham, al-Sirah, v. 4, p. 276, and al-Halabi, al-Sirah a! - 
Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 692. 
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A good leader will often choose a set of goals and then concentrate on one of them as the 
major or the most pressing one. 85 Advising the person responsible for choosing the most 
advantageous course of action, the Qur'an states: "0 ye who believe! When ye go out in 
the cause of Allah, investigate carefully, and say not to any one who offers you a 
salutation: "Thou art none of a Believer! .... Therefore carefully investigate. "" The 
repetition of the phrase `carefully investigate' emphasises this principle, suggesting that 
when the Muslim army is on a mission it should not deviate from the main designated 
goal. In addition, the Muslim soldiers are warned not to take it upon themselves to decide 
the goal and bend the principle in order to profit materially. Here the goal is intimately 
connected with the overall strategy of Islam. 
VIII. 4.7: Offence 
The principle of offence87 means to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. The Qur'an, 
generally, encourages the implementation of this principle by clear demands or by 
pointing out its advantages. On many occasions there is a clear order for offence, for 
example: "0 Prophet! Strive hard against the Unbelievers and the Hypocrites, and be firm 
against them. i88 The Qur'an explains further, and clearly, how the principle is to be 
applied: "Go ye forth, (whether equipped) lightly or heavily, and strive and struggle, with 
your goods and your persons, in the Cause of Allah. s89 Additionally, the Prophet's urging 
of his Companions can also be used to illustrate this principle; he pressed them to go to 
reinforce the Muslim army, which had left Medina some time before 90 Thus it is possible 
to say that the sharl'a has focused directly or indirectly on this principle of war. 
VIII. 4.8: Chasing the Enemy 
Chasing the enemy (al-mutäradah) entails following the vanquished and trying to stop 
them from regrouping and returning to the battlefield. 91 The importance of this principle 
85 See the section "Obedience" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
" See the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 94. Also see al-Tabari, Tafsir a/-Taban; v. 5, pp. 223-226, al-Qurtubi, 
Tafsir al-Qurtubl, v. 5, pp. 336-341, and al-Zuhayli, al-Tafsir al-Munir, v. 5, pp. 214-218. 
81 See Khalfät and Ascad, al-Askariyyah al-Islämiyyah, p. 102 and Faraj, Fann Idärat a/-Ma'rakah, p. 
170. 
88 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 66: 9. Also see Qur'an, 49: 1 and 9: 38. However, it should be noted that 
there are aspects to be considered in this matter other than a purely offensive position. See the section 
"The Concept of the Just War" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
89 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 94. Also the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 84, states: "And rouse the Believers. " 
9° See al-Sunan al-Kubra (Bab: Manägib Jäbir b. Abdul/ah, No. 8249, v. 5, p. 69) and Musnad Ahmad 
(No. 22619, v. 5, pp. 300-301). 
91 See Khalfat and As`ad, a/-Askariyyah al-Islämiyyah, p. 107 and Faraj, Fann Idärat al-Ma'rakah, p. 
181. 
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of war can be seen in the Qur'än, as it illustrates the need to scatter not only the 
adversary's warriors but also the people who follow the adversary's forces, not necessarily 
killing them but preventing them from returning to the battlefield: "If ye gain the mastery 
over them in war, disperse, with them, those who follow them. s92 Thus the Muslim army 
is commanded to pursue the defeated and retreating forces, together with their followers, 
and prevent them, by dispersing them, from regrouping with the same army, being 
reinforced by another army, or being strengthened by any sort of power even if it is not a 
military power. 93 Hence it can be argued that this principle of war is well considered in 
the shan`a. 
VIII. 4.9: Mass and Force Concentration 
Although some theorists separate the principles of mass and force concentration, it is 
thought more convenient for the purposes of the study to bring them together. So a 
general definition covering both might be: to concentrate combat power at a decisive 
place and time, directing every military operation towards clearly defined, decisive and 
attainable objectives. However, it should be understood that mass, which means to 
concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time, 94 should not be simply taken to 
mean superiority in numbers of troops or quantity of equipment, as the Qur'an states: "On 
the day of Ijunayn: behold! Your great numbers elated you, but they availed you naught: 
the land, for all that it is wide, did constrain you, and ye turned back in retreat. "95 
Therefore it can be argued that the following verse can be taken to refer to the principle 
of mass: "Truly A115h loves those who fight in His Cause in battle array, as if they were a 
solid cemented structure. i96 The phrase "solid cemented structure" implies massiveness, 
firmness and impregnability, in other words a concentration of power. Therefore by this 
criterion to dispose the available forces in a single easily penetrable line is not to 
concentrate one's forces but to use mass in an incorrect way. Therefore, the Qur'än advises 
that the deployment of the soldiers should be sufficiently concentrated to be able to repel 
any attack by being as resistant as a "solid structure". However, our understanding of this 
ex See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 57. 
93 The original Arabic word is 3;.: ä , is translated as disperse in the main translation of the 
Qur'an in use, 
i. e. The Holy Qur'an EMTC, p. 486, which does not, however, convey the wide meaning of the 
original. Therefore the study has consulted the main Arabic lexicons for its discussion of this verse. See 
Ibn Manzür, Lisän al-'Arab, v. 3, p. 237 and al-nazi, Mukhtär al-Sihäh, v. 1, p. 141. Also see the section 
"Awareness and Readiness Levels" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
94 See Khalfat and As'ad, al-Askariyyah al-Islämiyyah, p. 98 and Faraj, Fann Idäratal-Ma'rakah, p. 155. 
See the Qur'an (ETMC), 9: 25. 
See the Qur'an (ETMC), 61: 4. 
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verse should not be limited to material aspects only, since it can be argued that the solidity 
recommended by the Qur'an is also a matter of spiritual power. This consideration links 
this principle of those of morale and cooperation and coordination, as well as to the 
principles of leadership and training. 
In addition, the last verse may be related to another principle not easily separable from 
mass; that is, the principle of force concentration, which means to direct every military 
operation towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. 97 The Qur'an says: 
"Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of 
war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies of Allah and your enemiess98 The 
phrase "to the utmost of your power" does not indicate superiority of numbers, but rather 
that power should be concentrated to the utmost degree 99 Also, although it can be argued 
that the phrase "including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the 
enemiess100 refers primarily to the equipment available to the army, the meaning of the 
verse should not be limited to material considerations, since 'power' denotes spiritual as 
well as material strength. 101 Finally, in connection with both these principles, it should be 
noted that on one occasion, prior to the battle of Mu'tah, the Prophet asked almost 
everyone in Medina to go with the army to Mu'tah. 102 
Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that the Qur'an considers mass and force 
concentration in both their material and spiritual aspects. 
VIII. 4.10: Economy in the Use of Force 
This principle involves allocating the minimum essential combat power to secondary 
efforts. However, this does not mean that the task should be accomplished using the 
minimum combat power. The principle indicates that the leader should judge wisely and 
effectively when deploying his troops, so that he will be free to be able to make any 
necessary manoeuvre using secondary power. Although this principle is not mentioned in 
the Qur'än, as far as the researcher is aware, one verse could be adduced to show the 
importance of economy in the use of force. It is: "It is not for the Believers to go forth 
" See Khalfät and As°ad, al-Askariyyah al-Islämiyyah, p. 99 and Faraj, Fann Iderat al-Ma'rakah, p. 
160. 
9e See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 60. 
For a discussion of the term `power' see the section "Awareness and Readiness Levels" in the chapter 
"The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). Also see Khalfät and As`ad, al-Askariyyah al- 
Islämiyyah, p. 98. 
10° The original form is ", J;; J (Steed of war). See the Qur'an, 8: 60. 
101 Hence, this verse links the idea of mass with the idea of morale. 
102 See Musnad Ahmad (No. 22619, v. 5, p. 300). 
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together: if a contingent from every expedition go forth to devote themselves to studies in 
religion, and admonish the people when they return to them, that thus they (may learn) 
to guard themselves (against evil). s103 So it is not considered right that all the faithful 
should go to war at once, since religious study and instruction are also of great importance 
for the attainment of the ultimate goal, to which every action a Muslim undertakes should 
be directed. Hence, this verse may be taken as indicating the desirability of dividing the 
available forces into primary and secondary capabilities, where both are dedicated to the 
service of Allah. 
In connection with this principle we might also consider the verse: "Make not thy hand 
tied (like a niggard's) to thy neck, nor stretch it forth to its utmost reach, so that thou 
become blameworthy and destitute. s104 Now according to the exegetical works, this verse 
concerns spending money in the cause of Allah, but it can be interpreted to suggest that a 
leader should be aware of the importance of economy in the use of force when he 
positions his troops; he should not carelessly mass them in one particular place and forget 
the opportunities afforded by reserving a certain number to secondary efforts. 'OS Hence, it 
is possible to claim that the principle of economy in the use of force should be linked with 
that of simplicity, which means to prepare and execute clear, uncomplicated plans and 
clear, concise orders, and which is also a part of the next principle of war. 
VIII. 4.11: Manoeuvre and Simplicity 
Manoeuvre means the positioning of military resources to favour the accomplishment of 
the mission and also to place the adversary in a position of disadvantage through the 
flexible application of combat power. For maximum effectiveness, moreover, manoeuvre 
should be combined with the principle of simplicity, as complexity all too often results in 
confusion and may lead to defeat. In addition, although manoeuvre in itself may not 
produce a decisive result, if properly employed it makes decisive results possible through 
the application of the principles of offence, mass, economy in the use of force, force 
concentration, and surprise, as we will see in the verses cited below. 106 Although this 
principle is not mentioned explicitly in the Qur'än, it can be argued that several verses 
make reference to it, as in: "Remember ye were on the hither side of the valley, and they 
'03 See the Qur'än (ETMC), 9: 122. 
See the Qur'än (ETMC), 17: 29. 
'ßs See al-Tabari, Tafsir al-Tabaii, v. 6, p. 301, al-Qurtubi, Tafsir al-Qurtubi, v. 13, p. 73, and Ibn Kathir, 
Tafsirlbn Kathir, v. 3, p. 38. 
1Ö6 Several authors have discussed this principle in conjunction with these other five. See Khalfät and 
As'ad, al-Askariyyah al-Islämiyyah, p. 103 and Faraj, Fann Idärat al-Ma'rakah, p. 172. Also see 
Boatner, "Principles of War", in www. civilwarhome. com. 
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on the farther side, and the caravan on lower ground than ye. i107 This also shows the 
connection of this principle with that of mass. Furthermore, another verse shows the 
importance of manoeuvre in attacking from different sides: "Behold! They came on you 
from above you and from below you, and behold, the eyes swerved and the hearts gaped 
up to the throats, and ye imagined various (vain) thoughts about All5h! i108 It also shows 
the connection of this principle with those of offence and surprise. These two verses 
demonstrate the importance given to the principle of manoeuvre by Islam. 
In addition, it is narrated that the Prophet said that war is deceit. 109 Hence, it is possible to 
claim that within the wide range of usage of the Prophet the principle of manoeuvre as 
well as that of surprise can be considered under this hadrth. 110 Therefore it can be argued 
that this principle of war is discussed in the Islamic teachings, broadly understood. 
Having discussed the principles of war from a theoretical viewpoint, the study will now 
consider the practical application of these principles in the battles of interest. It will be 
shown that some principles were more effectively used than others, and that some were 
used in combination while others were not. In addition, as the discussion will make clear, 
the following examination of the principles of war will be enriched by referring to other 
chapters of this study, and therefore comparisons and cross references will be made when 
they are thought to be relevant. It should also be noted that the principles will be 
discussed according to their relative importance and whether or not they were used in 
combination. 
VIII. 5: Analysis of the Battles 
VIII. 5.1: The Battle of Badr 
As mentioned above, the principles of war will be considered according to their 
importance and degree of involvement in this battle. Accordingly unity of command and 
morale are judged to be of the greatest significance, although surprise should not be 
forgotten since it was very effectively integrated with manoeuvre. 
Although the Muslims had taken the step of seeking to attack the Quraysh's caravan, they 
were, it could be argued, merely responding to a transgression of the peace. The hadith 
107 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 42. 
108 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 33: 10. 
1Ö9 See Sahib al-Bukhäri (Bab: al-Ijarb Khud`ah, No. 2864, v. 3, p. 1102) and Saltih Muslim (Kitäb al- 
Jihäd wa al-Siyar, No. 1739, v. 3, p. 1361). 
10 However, al-Nawawi, Sharh Sahrh Muslim, v. 12, p. 45 and Ibn Hajar, Fath al-Bari, v. 6, p. 158, 
agreed that the breaking of treaties is not included or permitted in this case. 
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reported that the Quraysh had forced the Muslims to take up arms in self-defence, since 
they had sent two letters: One threatened the Jewish tribes and the unbelievers of 
Medina that there would be dire consequences if they did not expel the Muslims, and 
another threatened the emigrants gathered in the city. " In addition, the `three options' 
of the Islamic war doctrine were not put to the Quraysh army. ' 12 This indicates that at 
this stage the Prophet's forces were not spreading Islam, but defending it. As for the battle 
itself, morale was crucial if the Muslim army was to be able to match the numerous and 
well-equipped forces of the adversary; and in several ways, either through divine 
assistance or other principles, morale was indeed raised. The last words the troops heard 
from their Prophet before the battle were: "Rise to enter Paradise. "' 13 It can also be seen 
in the army's collective determination to achieve the goal. ' 14 Spiritually, therefore, the 
army went into battle powerfully motivated by their desire to serve A115h. This high 
morale had been created prior to the battle and was sustained throughout the 
engagement. "" 
As can be said of all five battles, at Badr the command of the Muslim army was united, 
which enabled it to quickly take important decisions, including the one to engage with the 
numerically superior Quraysh rather than retreat, as the Qur'än explains. "' Furthermore, 
the Prophet was fully aware of the situation and, encouraged by prayer, was able to 
control the course of events. He also knew that he could rely on another principle of war, 
that of the full cooperation and coordination of the whole Muslim army. "' This principle 
allowed the Prophet to choose the goal and to aim for it. 
Also, as we have seen, Badr was a defensive action, and strategically the Muslims aimed to 
secure several goals, among which were: securing their main base in Medina in case the 
Quraysh did not stop at Badr; operationally, to prevent their position in the region from 
being eroded by the Quraysh; and tactically they were promised one of two alternatives: 
See al-Ghadbän, al-Manhaj, v. 1, pp. 217-218. 
"Z See the section "The Concept of the Just War" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military 
Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
13 See the section "Production of Powerfully Motivating Elements" in the chapter 'The Role of Islamic 
Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
14 See the section "The Well-Defined Goal" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" 
(Ch. 4). 
"S See the section "The Element of Strong Motivation" in the chapter 'The Role of Islamic Military 
Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
16 See the Qur'än, 8: 7. 
117 The concept of this element is derived from the element of consultation. See the section 
"Consultation" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
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either the caravan or the adversary. 118 In addition, it can be argued that at the operational 
level the Muslim leadership had made provision against any attack from other quarters, 
having concluded several treaties with various local tribes, including the Banü Dumrah 
and Banü Mudlij. 119 Further, the securing of the wells and the leadership on the 
battlefield were well managed. 120 However, the principle of surprise was crucial in this 
battle. Two elements were used: burying the wells and the novel formation of the 
ranks'121 both of which demonstrated the Muslims' tactical superiority. 
Regarding the principle of mass and force concentration, it should be remembered that it 
entails concentrating power at a decisive place and time, and is not dependent upon 
superior numbers. Thus it can be argued that the Muslims made good use of mass at Badr, 
even though their aim had been to capture the caravan and they were lightly equipped. 
The Prophet did not wait for reinforcements, which would have meant losing the 
initiative and the principle of surprise. His effective use of this principle, in combination 
with unity of leadership and high morale, proved decisive. He also chose the terrain and 
the right formation for the combat. He disposed his forces in two parallel lines, which 
fulfilled the principles of mass and force concentration, as they were able to rain arrows on 
the adversary without breaking ranks. " 
This manner of deployment also relates to manoeuvre, where the strategic plan was clear, 
and the tactical plan was put into action as the two armies faced each other on the day of 
the battle. 123 The Prophet's forces, advancing in ranks, were tactically superior to the 
Quraysh, who also had the morning sun in their eyes. The effect of the Muslims' arrows 
coming out of the sun, as it were, must have been disconcerting. 124 However, it should be 
emphasised here that the Muslims were also successful in the traditional method of 
18 For further detail on these goals see the section "The Battle of Badr" in the chapter "The Battles 
and their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
19 Respectively see Ibn Hishäm, al-Sirah, v. 3, p. 135 & v. 3, p. 143, Ibn al-Qayyim, Zäd al-Ma"äd, v. 3, p. 
163, & v. 3, p. 166, and al-Mubarakpuri, al-Rahiq, pp. 197 & 199. Also see Sahib al-Bukhäri (Kitäb al- 
Maghäzi, No. 3733, v. 4, p. 1546). 
120 See the Qur'än, 8: 7. Also see the section "The Battle of Badr" in the chapter'The Battles and their 
Significance" (Ch. 3). 
121 See the section "The Battle of Badr" in the chapter 'The Battles and their Significance" (Ch. 3). In 
addition, Henderson, The Science of War, p. 41, mentions that the distribution of force plays an 
important role in battle. 
See the Qur'an, 8: 7. 
See the Qur'än, 61: 4. 
rsa See the direction of approach in the map of the battle. 
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fighting, often in single combat. 12' At Badr the Prophet adopted a defensive position 
which allowed him to make good use of the terrain. "' 
As for the principle of chasing the enemy, this was unnecessary at Badr. It was enough to 
have eliminated the principal leaders by, as Muslims believe, divine assistance. Many of 
the Quraysh's notable fighters had also been killed, which broke the morale of the 
adversary and thus prevented the remaining seven hundred fighters from regrouping and 
returning to the battlefield, even though the Muslim army was encamped for three days 
after the confrontation. 127 
In addition, the principle of economy in the use of force was not applied in this battle 
since the Prophet needed every warrior to be involved in the fighting. 
We have seen that at Badr some principles of war were crucial while it was not possible to 
apply others. It is reasonable to argue, however, that most of the principles were 
considered and fulfilled at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels. 
VIII. 5.2: The Battle of Uhud 
At Uliud the strategy was different from that applied at Badr, since this time the adversary 
was intent on attacking Medina and threatening to destroy the Muslim community. Again, 
the Muslim army's strategy was not one of offensive action, and so they could be said to be 
serving the first `pillar' of Islamic military strategy, i. e. to defend Islam. At Uhud, as at 
Badr, the chief principles affecting the conduct and outcome of the battle were unity of 
command, morale, and manoeuvre. 
The morale of the whole army was high despite the disagreement with cAbdullah b. 
Ubayy, who caused the retreat of one third of the army at a most critical moment, as the 
Muslims were enthusiastic and looking forward to rewards similar to those given to the 
men who had attended the battle of Badr, and to demonstrating their loyalty and 
honour. '28 However, as the battle began to turn in the Quraysh's favour the morale of 
some of the men wavered when they thought the Prophet had been killed. 129 By contrast, 
125 See the section "The Reasons for Conflicts and the Mounts of the Arabs" in the chapter "Brief 
Background of the Region Prior to Islam" (Ch. 2). See also the story of `Ali b. Abi 'j glib, who called 
upon a man to come down to him from the top and managed to kill him. See Yamäni, Badr, pp. 159 & 
160. 
126 See Kamdl, al-Askariyyah R al-Qur'an, p. 63. Further see the section "The Battle of Badr" in the 
chapter "The Battles and their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
127 See the Qur'än, 8: 7. 
128 For a similar case see the story of Anas b. al-Nadir in Sunan al-Tirmidhi (Bib: min Surah al-AhzäA 
No. 3201, v. 5, p. 349) and Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 11. Further see al-Mustadrak 
gala al-$ahihayn (Kitäb al-Jihad, No. 2557, v. 2, p. 130). 
129 See Ibn al-Qayyim, Zäd al-Maid, v. 3, p. 209 and Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 34. 
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the morale of others remained unaffected as they sacrificed themselves to save the 
Prophet. Their self-sacrifice was integrated with the principle of choosing the target and 
aiming for it, since to save the Prophet was surely to save Islam. It should be noted that 
the Qur'än makes a distinction between the intention or goal of the Muslims who had 
hesitated to meet the Quraysh at Badr and that of the hypocrites, led by Ibn Ubayy, who 
retreated at Uhud. 130 
Further, these two principles (choosing the target and aiming for it and morale) were 
directly carried out through unity of command, which allowed the army, even at the most 
critical moment of the Muslim community, to save their religion. Through unity of 
command the Prophet and his warriors managed to choose the right manoeuvre and the 
right route of escape for what was left of the Muslim army on the battlefield at the right 
moment. It was able to change the element of quantity to the element of quality while 
they were engaged in the defence of Islam. It also succeeded in integrating several 
principles, among which were mass and force concentration, where the right location was 
chosen, providing a decisive and timely position on the battlefield for both the main body 
and the detachment of archers stationed on the mountain - this also fulfilled the principle 
of economy in the use of force. '31 
At the start of the battle the Muslim army's security was effective; on the mountain the 
Prophet's position was protected. It should be noted that the adversary was seeking above 
all to eliminate the united command, as the announcement of their leader, Abü Sufyän, 
made clear. '32 
Again, before the battle itself the principle of cooperation and coordination was fruitful at 
the strategic level when the Muslim army was warned of the coming attack by one of their 
allies. 133 The application of this principle, however, broke down as the battle progressed; 
first through the retreat of one third of the Muslim army, second through the 
disobedience of the archers, and lastly through the flight of most of the army to Medina. 
Thus the principle of security was also breached, for the action of Ibn Ubayy showed that 
from a strategic point of view it was necessary to defend Islam against hypocritical friends 
and allies. Nevertheless the principle of coordination and cooperation was reasserted 
13o See the section "The Battle of Uhud" in the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
131 See the section "The Battle of Uhud" in the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
132 See the section "The Adversary at the Battle of Uhud" in the chapter "The Adversary's Strengths 
and Weaknesses" (Ch. 7). 
133 Further see the section "The Battle of Uhud" in the chapter "The Task of Islamic Military 
Intelligence" (Ch. 6). 
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when the remnants of the Muslim army, their wounds having been dressed, pursued their 
enemy the following day. 134 
The principle of manoeuvre was well applied at the beginning of the battle; yet it was not 
successfully implemented during the latter stages, leading to heavy losses among the 
Muslims. Initially the Muslim army seemed capable of defeating their enemy despite 
being outnumbered. At first the leadership was successful, as it stationed the troops in the 
right place at the right time, and directed all the power it had at its disposal towards a set 
of decisive and obtainable goals: defending Islam as a strategic goal, defending Medina as 
an operational goal, and outmanoeuvring the adversary through the right application of a 
well-conceived plan and the right usage of terrain. Hence, it is possible to say that at the 
beginning of the battle, the right application of manoeuvre and simplicity of plan allowed 
the leadership to fulfil the principles of mass, force concentration, economy in the use of 
force, and surprise. 
Even when the tide of battle changed, again the right manoeuvre saved what was left of 
the Muslim army, who sought the protection of mount Ubud. This manoeuvre can be said 
to have fulfilled various strategic, operational, and tactical goals: it protected the Prophet 
from assassination, it saved Medina from being invaded by the Quraysh and dominated by 
the hypocrites and the increasingly hostile Jewish tribes, and it prevented the elimination 
of the most notable leaders and warriors of the Muslim army. Thus the Muslims were able 
to regroup after the battle and take advantage of the Quraysh's decision not to drive 
forward to take Medina (which would almost certainly have been militarily and 
diplomatically costly). This successful manoeuvre proved the importance of the principle 
of security. 
The principle of chasing the enemy was therefore carried out for strategic reasons, chiefly 
to demonstrate that the Muslim army was still powerful and that its morale had not been 
crushed, since the pursuers were the same warriors who had been involved in the 
confrontation at Ubud. It was also strategically necessary to counter any Quraysh claims 
that Uhud had been a disastrous defeat for the Muslims, and to raise morale in 
preparation for the next confrontation; for the outcome had not been decisive, and the 
Muslims would soon show that their inventiveness, courage and determination could yet 
win the day against numerically superior forces. 135 
134 See the section "The Battle of Uhud" in the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
'3s See the section "The Battle of Uhud" in the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
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VIII. 5.3: The Battle of al-Khandaq 
The overall Islamic military strategy remained unchanged at al-Khandaq; similarly to the 
two previous battles, the Muslims were still acting in accordance with the verse "but do 
not transgress limits. ""' In other words, they adopted the same principle: that of 
defending their faith against an apparently overwhelming attack.. Hence in this battle 
some principles of war retained their importance, such as unity of command, morale, and 
security, while others, such as the principle of offence, were not implemented; however, 
others, such as economy in the use of force, were used inventively. Some were used alone, 
and some in combination, as will be shown in the following discussion. 
It should be noted here that the Companions did not hesitate to meet the adversary 
outside Medina, despite their huge numbers, as the Muslims had learned from their 
mistakes at Uhud. 137 The Muslims' morale was put to the test in terms of the element of 
sincerity, 138 as the actions of the hypocrites were not as significant as other circumstances, 
according to the Qur'an: "They were shaken as by a tremendous shaking. i139 The 
Muslims' morale was raised when they saw their leaders working side by side with them 
in digging the trench; but as their situation became more difficult and challenging this 
high morale needed to be maintained. This was accomplished by an effective unity of 
command. The leadership had to contend with the lack of food, the threat to the warriors 
and their families, and a powerful and united enemy eager to eliminate them once and for 
all. The leadership was able to rise to this challenge, and to raise and preserve the army's 
morale in difficult conditions. The demands they made of the men were responded to 
with enthusiasm and courage; here we can see the army's full cooperation and 
coordination in action. A well-conceived defensive plan, incorporating the principle of 
surprise, was put into action with all speed, as the adversary's arrival was imminent. Here 
surprise was integrated with manoeuvre to produce a new method of fighting, which 
disconcerted and bewildered the confederacy, as siege warfare was unfamiliar among the 
Arabs. The confederacy was not the only threat to the Muslims' security; there was also 
the matter of the breaking of one of the strategic treaties. "' Hence only the Muslims' 
success in holding off the adversary at the trench could guarantee full security, and 
136 See the Qur'än (ETMC), 2: 190. 
137 In the hadith is it narrated: "Do not wish to meet the enemy, but if you meet him stand firm". See 
Sahib al-Bukhäri (Kitäb aI-Jihad wa a1-Siyar, No. 2804, v. 3, p. 1082) and Sahib Muslim (Kitäb al- 
Jihäd wa al-Siyar, No. 1742, v. 3, p. 1362). 
138 Further see the section "Me Essence of Islamic Doctrine" in the chapter "The Role of Islamic 
Military Doctrine" (Ch. 4). 
139 See the Qur'an (ETMC), 33: 11. Also see Ibn Hajar, Fath al-Bari, v. 7, p. 347. 
140 For the content of the treaty see al-Halabi, al-krah al-Halabiyyah, v. 2, p. 291. 
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therefore economy in the use of force needed to be used to close the gap that had been 
created by the broken treaty. In this connection, it can be argued that had it not been for 
the strategic treaties with the non-Muslim tribes, such a secure and surprising defensive 
plan could not have been carried out successfully. "' In addition, the trench needed to be 
secured against any force attempting to cross it. So it can be argued that the phrase: "lie 
in wait for them" does not refer only to an ambush, where it might be necessary to wait 
for half a day; as the events of this battle show it may also be cited in connection with a 
besieged army's need to prevent an adversary from attacking. It also incorporates an 
important subordinate element, also praised by the Qur'an; that of patience and 
perseverance. 142 
At al-Khandaq the Prophet continually reminded his men of the main goal and his 
assurance of victory. He also made it clear that at the strategic level the Islamic military 
goal was not only to defend but also to spread Islam, as he promised his Companions that 
they would conquer the Yemen and Syria as well as the Sasanian lands. 143 While serving 
both to raise morale and to convey the message of Allah, this assurance united and 
directed the thoughts and actions of the Muslims to the ultimate goal even before the 
battle started; that is, while they were digging the trench. 144 For this reason above all, 
although they were threatened from both front and rear, their stamina stood the test. 
Overcoming exhaustion and fear through high morale, cooperation and coordination, and 
the efforts of their united leadership, they held to their positions and aimed unswervingly 
at the designated goals. 
Had they not implemented the principles of mass and force concentration, the Muslim 
army would not have been able to make good use of the two principles of surprise and 
security, especially as they were engaged in a race against time and needed to ensure that 
the trench would not be crossed. Therefore force concentration was a matter of deploying 
forces of equal strength along the defensive line to protect the trench rather than one of 
constructing a fighting formation. This apparently simple manoeuvre, however, required 
continuous supervision; and here again unity of command was most effective, showing the 
141 For the treaties with the non-Muslim tribes see the section "The Battle of al-Khandaq" in the 
chapter "The Task of Islamic Military Intelligence" (Ch. 6). Also see Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa a! - 
Nihäyah, v. 4, p. 167. 
142 For a similar view see Luttwak, Strategy, p. 47; he mentions that defence will continue to obtain an 
advantage, moral as well as material, so long as resistance persists. 
143 See the section "The Battle of al-Khandaq" in the chapter "The Impact of Islamic Military 
Leadership" (Ch. 5). 
144 See the event of the rock in the section "The Battle of al-Khandaq" in the chapter "The Impact of 
Islamic Military Leadership" (Ch. 5). 
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leadership's tactical superiority in this respect. It can also be claimed that the principle of 
economy in the use of force can be seen in the detachment of two hundred men, which 
increased the principle of mass as it protected a vulnerable area at the right time. 
Nevertheless the question might be raised whether this principle was always implemented 
wisely, for it cannot be denied that the forts where the women and children were held 
remained vulnerable to an attack from the rear. 
As we have seen, at al-Khandaq the Muslims used a different manoeuvre and tactic; the 
battle was essentially defensive in nature and casualties were few; cold, weariness, 
frustration, and hunger, rather than swords and arrows, finally defeated the besieging 
forces. Although the confederacy had learnt from their mistakes at Badr - they had not 
attacked in the summer when water supplies are a crucial factor - they were short of food, 
unused to siege warfare (and somewhat scornful of it), and increasingly cold at night. In 
operational and tactical terms, the Muslim leadership's choice of terrain proved crucial to 
the successful outcome of the confrontation, as it had at Badr. On the other hand, even 
though this plan disrupted the attacking force, 145 it did not allow the Muslim army to 
develop other strategic plans such as capturing prisoners of war and booty, or to fulfil the 
two principles of offence and chasing the enemy. 146 However, this merely serves to 
emphasise that strategy must be flexible in its conception and execution, and each new 
circumstance requires a revision of the strategic approach. 147 
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that at al-Khandaq some principles were of crucial 
importance while others were negligible. But in general one can say that the joining of the 
tribes into a united confederate army faced the new community with a powerful 
challenge. 148 Henceforward the Muslims' strategy would be, in part, to forestall any plan 
the adversary might conceive against them, on the principle `forewarned is forearmed'. 141 
The strategy adopted in connection with the battle of al-Yarmük was a result of this new 
conception. 
145 Henderson, The Science of War, p. 41, mentions that disrupting the force of the adversary's plan is 
an essential element. 
146 The principle of chasing the enemy was developed later on in another battle known as the Ghazwat 
Bann Qurayzah. See the Qur'an, 33: 26, Sahial-Bukhari (Kitäb al-Jihad, No. 2658, v. 3, p. 2035), and 
Sahib Muslim (Kitab al-Jihad wa al-Siyar, 14o. '1769, v. 3, p. 1398). 
147 See Ahmad, Nab wa Qänün Muwahhad, p. 91. 
148 For details of the tribes in the confederacy see the section "The Battle of al-Khandaq" in the chapter 
"The Battles and their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
149 See the causes of the battle of Mu'tah and the expedition of Usamah b. Zayd. See Sahib al-Bukhari 
(Kitäb Fadäil al-Sahäbah, No. 3547, v. 3, p. 1372), Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihayah, v. 
4, 
p. 241, al- 
IHalabi, al-Sirah a1-Halabiyyah, v. 2, pp. 786-787, and Kamäl, al-Tar q i1ä Dimashq, pp. 144,145,149, 
151, and 152. 
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VIII. 5.4: The Battle of al-Yarmük 
Al-Yarmiik marked a change in the Muslim army's strategic approach. The Prophet was 
no longer among them, and the emphasis had shifted from defence of the faith - `the first 
pillar' of the Islamic military strategy - to spreading Islam. This had been made possible 
by the Islamic army's conquest of the Arabian Peninsula, which now proved a rich source 
of both men and equipment, and could provide a strategic terrain in case of defeat. 
Similarly to the battles discussed previously, at al-Yarmük some of the principles, such as 
unity of command, morale, and manoeuvre, were conspicuously applied, while others did 
not need to be as effectively used as they had been in the other battles. Again, some were 
well integrated, thus enhancing their effectiveness. 
The Muslim leadership was united under one convincing unity of command. They knew 
that the field commander was himself under the command of the supreme leader, i. e. the 
Caliph, 70 who nonetheless placed great value on the military advice he received from the 
commander. This unity of command eased the transmission of the field leadership from 
Khalid to Abü °Ubaydah. However, it might be placed at risk if it was not continually 
strengthened by consideration of the ultimate goal. The unity of the field command 
prevented the leaking of the news of the Caliph's death, which would have been 
destructive of the troops' morale at a critical moment in the fighting. Here, unity of 
command was integrated with the application of another principle of war, security; the 
securing of this information, it can be argued, helped to produce a positive outcome. A 
care for security was not only seen in this event, moreover; the leadership also divided and 
disposed the soldiers according to their own tribes so that they would be prevented from 
killing one another by mistake, since they had no distinctive uniform by which they might 
recognise one another. Also their battle-gear made recognition more difficult. "' 
Predicting the outcome at al-Yarmük was a task quite unlike the apparently similar 
calculations they had made before, especially as both armies were so well prepared. 
Therefore, morale needed to be raised and maintained. This was done primarily by 
ensuring that every man was aware of the purity of the cause that united the army. The 
goal - to serve Allah through spreading Islam - was clear, and moreover the conflict was 
to take place for the highest motives and against a respected adversary. The Byzantines 
u° See Turkumdni, al-Madhähib, p. 72. Also see the section "The Significant Qualities of the Muslim 
Leader: Säbiqün" in the chapter "The Impact of Islamic Military Leadership" (Ch. 5). This element is 
observable in the last two battles. 
'S' See Ibn Khaldlln, Mugaddimat Ibn Khaldrin, p. 272. 
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were a `people of the Book', unlike the Sasanians, and so when the armies clashed, it was 
not for mundane reasons. They were fighting for their faith. 
Cooperation and coordination was evident in a variety of ways; for example, all the tribes 
were willing to obey the commands of one field leader without question or hesitation and 
accept his changes regarding leaders and deployment of forces as the new plan 
demanded. The notables responded quickly to the demands of the plan and came together 
to discuss the imminent threat. The newly received information that the Byzantine army 
had united focused their minds on the need for unity among the Muslims. Their 
cooperation exemplified the joining together of the best of the Muslim abilities and 
experience in the region, and their wise use, to the Muslim army's advantage. Their effort 
demonstrated the unity of command, where sound advice as well as personal sacrifice was 
crucial to the outcome. "' 
It seems at first glance that the principle of surprise - as it applies to an ambush - was not 
implemented, because both armies had laid their tactical cards on the table. Nevertheless 
this principle was evident at a crucial moment of the battle when manoeuvre assured its 
effectiveness. In addition, it might be argued that the adversary would have been 
disconcerted to discover that their powerful attack in the first wave of the battle, as Khalid 
described it, was resisted for several hours with great courage and determination by a 
much less numerous army without reinforcements. 153 
The time the Arabs spent in al-Sham and their insistence on confronting the Byzantine 
army show that al-Yarmnk was well planned at the strategic level; and indeed the 
leadership were well aware of the strategic consequences of losing this battle since it was 
clearly to be decisive. And not only the leadership; the whole army as well as the 
reinforcements that arrived from Iraq knew that the goal had been chosen and were 
determined to aim for it. Here the goal required the principle of offence to be applied by 
the entire Muslim community. The situation demanded that battle be joined rather than 
that peace be spread'154 "especially when two incidents that happened prior to the 
conquest of al-Sham called for warlike action. "155 This principle of choosing the target and 
aiming for it was incorporated in the leadership's strategic planning for the expected 
isz See Turkumani, a/-Madhähib, p. 72. Also see the section "The Significant Qualities of the Muslim 
Leader: Säbiqüti' in the chapter 'The Impact of Islamic Military Leadership" (Ch. 5). 
153 Khalid expected a sweeping assault at the beginning of the battle. See the section "The Battle of al- 
Yarmiik" in the chapter "The Impact of Islamic Military Leadership" (Ch. 5). 
See the above discussion of the principle of offence. 
iss The two incidents were: the killing by the Ghassanians of a messenger sent by the Prophet, and the 
attempt to seal the border between al-Sham and the Arabian Peninsula. See Kamal, a/--7'ariq i/ä 
Dimashq, pp. 146 & 148. 
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confrontation, which was initiated and thought through at the highest level. Hence not 
even a change of the Caliph could have changed this strategy, which shows the closely- 
knit integration of this principle with that of unity of command. 156 Further, the offensive 
strike into al-Sham was in accordance with the element of divine assistance, since the 
Muslims had long prepared themselves for such a confrontation, their Prophet having told 
them at al-Khandaq that they would conquer the region. 157 This divine promise not only 
raised morale; it encouraged the Caliph and his commanders to gather most of the power 
they had. 
Since strategy must be formulated and carried out according to the strengths and 
weaknesses of each new adversary, 258 mass and force concentration were not only applied 
to ensure that most of the available men and equipment would be assembled in the right 
place and time in a key terrain, but also facilitated the important role the principle of 
economy in the use of force played in this decisive battle. The Muslims' assessment of the 
adversary's power, based on the intelligence gathered by their scouts, enabled the Caliph 
and his commanders to make the best use of their forces both materially and spiritually, 
especially as they had to move another force from one front to another. 159 It also made 
possible the redeployment of the whole army just before the battle. Although it can be 
argued that both armies had striven to accomplish mass and force concentration, the 
Muslims' application of the principle of manoeuvre was crucial in deciding the final 
outcome. 160 For the Muslims the strategic plan was clear; however, the details of the 
tactical plan took shape only as the two armies drew close to each other. The successful 
use of economy in the use of force, seen in the actions of Qays b. Habirah and Said b. 
Zayd, and especially in the cavalry charge led by Khalid himself, was decisive in turning 
the battle to their advantage. 161 There was no simplicity of plan but its conduct shows the 
readiness of the soldiers to accept and follow new orders. 
The principle of chasing the enemy was implemented at al-Yarmük since both leaderships 
had intended to utterly defeat their enemy and drive him from the region. Therefore, the 
156 See al cAsali, al-Madhähib a1-Asakariyyah, p. 182. 
157 See al-Sunan al-Kubrä (Bäh: al-Nahi can al-Tafarruq B al-Shi°ab wa al Awdiyah, No. 8858, v. 5, p. 
269), Ibn Kathir, al Bidäyah wa al Nihäyah, v. 4, pp. 97 & 99, and al I Talabi, al-Shah al 1Yalabiyyah, v. 2, 
p. 633. 
158 See Ahmad, Nahwa Qanün Muwahhad, p. 91. 
159 See the section "The Battle of al-Yarmiik" in the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" 
(Ch. 3). 
160 It is worth noting here that they did not follow the normal strategy of the Muslim army during the 
conquest, which was "move fast and attack fast". See al , Asali, a/-Madhähib al-Asakariyyah, pp. 183- 
184. 
1b1 See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 7, p. 8. 
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Muslim army's victory in the field enabled and encouraged them to engage in a long 
pursuit, during which many of the adversary's warriors were slain. "' 
VIII. 5.5: The Battle of al-Qädisiyyah 
Al-Qadisiyyah was the second of the battles in question to be concerned with the second 
`pillar' of the Islamic military strategy. It also saw the implementation of all the principles 
of war, some of which were more important than others, such as morale and unity of 
command, surprise, and mass and force concentration. However, the integration of some 
of these principles strengthened others, for example the combination of security and 
surprise with manoeuvre. 
Once again the principle of morale was crucial to the outcome of this battle, as the 
leadership's strategy relied on the quality of the Muslim troops rather than on their 
numbers, as can be seen when the tribe of Bujaylah stood firm against the first destructive 
assault even though about five hundred of them were killed. ' It is not recorded whether 
the Muslim leadership used the religious hatred and scorn the Muslims felt for the 
Säsänians in order to raise their morale; nevertheless, this principle is likely to have been 
strongly present in their minds. Evidence for this is provided by the first verses revealed in 
surah al-Rüm. 164 In addition, morale was raised due to the great interest and concern 
shown by the Caliph, as evidenced by his letters and gifts. ' In one of his letters to Sa`d 
he wrote that he was sure of their victory. ' Although it is not known whether Sacd 
passed this message on to the troops, it would certainly have encouraged them and raised 
their performance, coming as it did from cUmar b. al-Khattäb himself. 161 This leads us to 
consider another important principle of war, unity of command. 
It is clear that unity of command was well established and effective since the whole army 
was led by a single field commander, who at al-Qädisiyyah benefited from this unity, 
which facilitated communications down the chain of command. Nevertheless, this unity 
was placed at risk owing to the doubts and dissentions of some of the soldiers regarding 
'62 See the section "The Battle of al-Yarmük" in the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" 
(Ch. 3). 
' See ibid. 
164 See the Qur'än, 30: 1-6. Among these verses one refers clearly to the element of hatred, (ETMC): 
"On that day shall the Believers rejoice". 
165 See the section "The Battle of al-Qädisiyyah" in the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" 
(Ch. 3). 
166 See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 387. 
167 See the Virtue of 'Umar in Sahib al-Bukhäri (Bäh: Manägib Umar, v. 3, p. 1346) and Sunan al- 
Tirmidhi (Bib: Managib Umar, v. 5, p. 617). 
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the designated field-commander, Khälid b. cArfatah. 68Thus the risk in this battle was not 
due to the death of the Caliph as at al-Yarmük but to the dissatisfaction among some of 
the soldiers, which was assuaged by the leadership's constant exhortations reminding the 
warriors of the ultimate goal. Hence, it can be argued that this problem was solved by the 
application of another important principle, that of cooperation and coordination. The 
soldiers were asked to report any mutinous acts against the field-commander. It is also 
seen in the lifting of the ban on the Murtadün, who played an important part in the 
conduct of the battle. 169 
In fact, cUmar's letters connect the above three principles with Islamic military doctrine. 10 
These letters also explain that the doctrine had in effect chosen the goal and inspired the 
army to aim for it as one united body. Also the huge mass of the army and the 
leadership's strategic planning illustrate the great importance given to winning this 
battle. "' 
It might be thought that this planning demanded strong security measures, but these were 
not apparent in the earlier stages of the confrontation, especially prior to the battle, since 
the aim was to provoke the adversary to approach the Muslim army's position. Hence, the 
principle of security was cautiously applied in accordance with special criteria, as 
particular information needed to be provided to the adversary. There was, however, 
another aspect of the principle of security as applied by the Muslims at al-Qädisiyyah: the 
security of the army and its movements was essential, as was the protection of its flanks 
and rear during the battle. In addition, `Umar knew that in order to conquer the East and 
at the same time to secure the Arabian Peninsula, the Muslim army's penetration into the 
Säsänian lands had to be through al-Q5disiyyah. 12 This security effort was linked to 
another important principle of war, that of surprise; here it can be noted that the 
adversary was unable to make any sudden moves at the operational level since the timing 
and location of the battle was chosen by the Muslim leadership. 
168 See the section "The Battle of al-Qädisiyyah" in the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" 
(Ch. 3). 
169 See ibid. 
1'o See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, pp. 384-389. 
See al-Tabari, Tärikh al-Tabari, v. 2, p. 384. It is worth mentioning that Umar had demanded that 
everyone who was eligible should come to Medina to take part in the army's preparations to conquer 
the Säsänian Empire. Also see Kamäl, al-Qadisiyyah, pp. 10-11. 
172 See the section "The Battle of al-Qädisiyyah" in the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" 
(Ch. 3). 
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Since the Islamic military strategy implemented in this battle had as its goal the spreading 
of Islam, offensive action became necessary when the messages of peace were rejected. 
This fulfilled the principle of offence. 
To be successful, offence must be effectively combined with another principle of war, that 
of mass and force concentration. Despite being greatly outnumbered - by more than four 
to one - the Muslims realised that victory might yet be assured by gathering at a decisive 
time and place and making the strategically correct choice of battlefield. Their concern for 
this principle is also seen in the lifting of the ban on the Murtadün. Availing themselves of 
this concession, Tulayhah b. Khuwaylid and his tribesmen joined the Muslim forces in 
large numbers because of the great scale of the campaign to be undertaken. 13 Their 
location allowed both armies to apply mass and force concentration; yet the Persian 
leadership did not allow their army enough room to manoeuvre or to retreat. Further, the 
way the troops were deployed into ranks and small units later on allowed the Muslims to 
gain superiority in mass and force concentration. 14 
The principles of manoeuvre and simplicity lay behind the choice of a battlefield with 
limited access; this choice was made in the knowledge of strengths and weaknesses of the 
Persians, since every new adversary has to be fought using a different strategy. 1' 
Considered at the strategic level it was important that the battlefield lay between the 
Persian lands and the Arabian Peninsula. At the operational level its location was secured, 
and it was tactically crucial that the battle would take place on that particular spot. 
Moreover, dividing the army into small units, starting with groups of ten, facilitated the 
rapid redeployment of the army and its quick response, as can be seen in the reaction to 
the plight of the Bujaylah. Although the plan was not sophisticated, as at al-Yarmük, and 
the attack, it must be acknowledged, was sometimes premature since the tribes would not 
wait for the final signal of the leader, what was lacking in the orthodox application of 
mass and force concentration or even manoeuvre and simplicity was achieved by the 
reinforcements and especially by the cunning way the reinforcements were introduced 
into the field over the four days of the battle. This tactical stroke was an important 
instance of the principle of surprise; the adversary was tricked and remained unaware of 
173 Prior to the battle Umar made an oath that he would use the 'kings' of the Arabs to defeat the 
'kings' of the non-Arabs (al-Ajam). See Ibn Kathir, al-Bidäyah wa al-Nihäyah, v. 5, p. 36. 
14 See the section "The Battle of al-Qädisiyyah" in the chapter "The Battles and their Significance" 
(Ch. 3). 
171 See Ahmad, Nahwa Qänrin Muwahhad, p. 91. 
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the deception for a considerable time. 176 Also, the powers of endurance of the Muslim 
army, which fought tenaciously for many hours, must have astonished the adversary; and 
the focused assault on the leadership on the fourth day of the battle was another example 
- this time decisive - of surprise. 
177 
Thus we come to the final principle, that of chasing the enemy. Since al-Qädisiyyah was 
considered a decisive battle the aim was to eliminate the Persian army and pursue the 
fleeing troops in order to thoroughly accomplish the second `pillar' of the Islamic military 
strategy. It can be argued that in this the Muslims were entirely successful, since it was 
not long before the capital of the Säsänians fell to the forces of Islam. 
178 
VIII. 6: Comparison of the Battles 
As we have seen the two `pillars' of the Islamic military strategy - defending and spreading 
the faith - were served through the 
five battles under consideration. Badr, Uhud, and al- 
Khandaq accomplished the first while al-Yarmük and al-Qädisiyyah accomplished the 
second. Each of these battles saw the application of the Islamic military principles of war; 
however, some were fully applied, either alone or in combination, while others were either 
absent or not fully implemented. Generally speaking, the most important appear to have 
been unity of command, morale, surprise, and manoeuvre. 
Raising the morale of the army was accomplished in different ways according to the 
circumstances. It was particularly successful in the five battles, either through the wise 
approach of the leadership or through divine assistance as at Badr and al-Khandaq. 
Unity of command was evident in all five battles, where it proved very effective despite the 
minor difficulties that arose in the last two, and was crucial to their successful outcome. 
Security was barely successful at al-Khandaq, unlike the other battles. However, surprise 
was effectively - sometimes brilliantly - used in all the battles, strengthening the principle 
of security. 
Mass and force concentration were well applied, but not according to the general 
understanding of having superiority in the number of men and amount of equipment; in 
fact, as we have seen, the Muslims lacked this advantage in every one of the battles in 
question. However, they were able to gather the available men and equipment at the right 
time and place, using the element of terrain affectively. Success was achieved through the 
16 For the tactic of continuous reinforcements see the section "The Battle of al-Qädisiyyah" in the 
chapter "The Battles and their Significance" (Ch. 3). 
" See Ibid. 
18 See Kamdl, al-Tariq i1ä al-Madä'in, p. 105. 
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thorough, and usually simple, planning of the army's manoeuvres, and economy of force 
also played an important part in this respect, except at Badr. With regard to the principles 
discussed above, it is possible to say that strategy was clear from the beginning of every 
battle, but its operational and tactical application differed according to the surrounding 
circumstances. 
The principles of offence and chasing the enemy were not universally applied. At Badr, 
Uhud, and al-Khandaq offence was not a factor since the second `pillar' of the Islamic 
strategy was not yet possible, while chasing the enemy was not applied at Badr and al- 
Khandaq. 
VIII. 7: Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the Islamic military strategy applied in the five battles under 
study using a new approach. First of all, strategy, Islamic strategy, and - the subject of our 
interest - Islamic military strategy, were 
defined, differentiated, and discussed. The useful 
notion of the two `pillars' of the general Islamic strategy was introduced, and the concept 
of the ultimate goal was explained. Next, the relationships between religious and military 
decisions, and that between strategy, operations, and tactics, were examined. Following 
this, a number of principles of war were considered from an Islamic viewpoint. On the 
basis of this theoretical discussion the practical application of these principles was 
extensively investigated, and their relative importance in the battles was established. 
As the revelation continued it became evident that the Muslims' military activities were 
permissible only in so far as they were governed by Islamic principles of war. 
The power of the Muslim army depended not so much on material strength (numbers of 
men and amount of equipment) as on the army's spiritual force, which derived from the 
soldiers' zeal and devotion to Islam. 
Some of the principles of war such as morale, unity of command, and cooperation and 
coordination, were constant features of the Islamic military strategy in all five battles. 
The study has now discussed all the major factors under consideration. The final chapter 
will sum up and draw conclusions from the argument presented in the foregoing pages. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Conclusion of the Study 
The preceding chapters have shown that from a purely military perspective it is difficult to 
explain the Muslim armies' success in overcoming their adversaries; they should certainly 
not have won such decisive victories. The study's central concern has been to address this 
apparent anomaly of history and attempt to answer the question, how could a small 
persecuted minority living in an area marginal to the main centres of power and 
considered as barely civilized by their neighbours have come to dominate the region 
within a generation? Within two decades they managed to accomplish the unexpected. 
While it must be admitted that the battles under study provide no more than one means 
of measuring this transformation, the question remains, in precisely what ways did Islam 
make a decisive difference to each of the factors we have discussed and, to what extent 
were these factors, in combination, important to the outcomes of the battles? Hence, the 
object has been not merely to decide which specifically Islamic elements could shed light 
on a study of the battles; the main interest of the thesis can be said to lie in its method of 
explaining the Muslims' decisive victories, without having recourse to the notion of divine 
assistance, by analysing the causes of those victories through a detailed study of the 
chosen factors. 
The research methodology applied in this study has involved both theoretical and 
practical approaches; the theoretical approach produced a searching analysis and detailed 
comparison of the factors in question, while the practical approach focused on the conduct 
of the battles. It must be admitted, however, that as the study has been essentially an 
exploration of the possibility of constructing a synthesis which goes beyond the bounds of 
its constituent elements as they are analysed in each individual chapter, it is open to 
criticism. It has not attempted to furnish proof, rather it has suggested that strong 
arguments exist in favour of its conclusions. In a nutshell, the study has been concerned 
with the social transformation of a people through religion and with the effects of that 
transformation on the conduct of military affairs. 
No academic research seems to have been published on the interrelationship of these 
important factors and their influence on the five key battles. In the study this relationship 
has been subjected to thorough investigation using a modern approach, our intention 
being to reach a new and comprehensive understanding built upon a solid academic basis. 
The study has attempted to look at the past through the experiences of the people who 
actually lived it, and as we have admitted it is to a certain degree speculative. While 
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examining the past through the eyes of the present, using modern concepts and 
categories, the study has also attempted to look at the past through the eyes of the past; 
that is the Qur'an and the hadith, which for Muslims embody eternal verities, and, by 
using these sources, to discover the causes of the outcomes of the battles, which has been 
one of the key projects of the thesis. It should be noted, however, that while the study has 
relied on the commentaries of both classical and modern exegetes it has sometimes 
disagreed with their conclusions. 
The study has deliberately chosen to examine these important battles and to emphasise 
their significance by comparing and contrasting them and analysing their differences and 
similarities. There has, however, been no attempt to explore their many interesting aspects 
from the point of view of the military expert; of, for example, the specialist in strategy. 
The battles have been seen as important historical events, and the influence of a number 
of carefully selected factors on each battle has been considered. The connections between 
these have been made clear through an examination of the Qur'an and the hadith. 
As some of these aspects have been considered from various perspectives in previous 
works of scholarship while others have not, the decision to focus on these particular 
battles has been based chiefly on the following reasons. Badr was a decisive battle and the 
first to be fought against the Quraysh, and, for Muslims, was distinguished by divine 
intervention of a physical nature; Ubud revealed the consequences of disobeying orders; 
al-Khandaq took the form of a protracted siege and was primarily a psychological conflict 
involving the purification of faith; al-Yannük was a battle of conquest against an empire 
ruled by one of the peoples of the Book; and al-Qadisiyyah was fought against an empire 
whose people were regarded by the Muslims as adherents of an "unrevealed" religion. 
The study has attempted to discover a way to reconstruct from an Islamic standpoint the 
usual definitions of military doctrine, military leadership, military intelligence, and military 
strategy. It must be acknowledged that these usual definitions are largely modern 
formulations and as such have only been used as guidelines; the study has argued, 
however, with certain reservations, that they could be said to have been put into practice 
during the period under study. 
Thus the study's significance is enhanced by its use of a specifically Islamic analysis of the 
phenomena connected with the battles. For example, an Islamic interpretation of the 
modern concept of intelligence and of the leaders' relationship with his sources and agents 
can illuminate the past and provide food for thought in the present day. 
Two points should be emphasised here: the study has discussed and interrelated set of 
factors in great detail and these factors and their salient features have been analysed 
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through a meticulous examination of the two main sources: chiefly the Qur'an and to a 
lesser degree the hadrth. In other words, the study has been able to show that aspects of 
these factors are extensively mentioned in the Qur'an, and these Qur'anic references have 
been used to elucidate the various dimensions of the Islamic military practices of the 
period. 
The study's discussion of these factors is original in that it has connected and integrated 
their most important elements and shown that their relationship is intricate and dynamic. 
Although other factors could have been considered, it was felt that the chosen factors 
were arguably influential enough to determine the outcomes of the battles: doctrine 
provided motivation, leadership provided control and direction, intelligence provided an 
overview of the military situation, as well as a knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses 
of the adversary, which in turn provided the particular information necessary for effective 
action, and strategy was the final and decisive factor, designed and implemented on the 
bases of the other four. All five factors have been shown to be important and to be 
interconnected, and because they can be seen as forming a sequence, it is important to 
realise that each is essential to an understanding of the nature of each battle, although 
they and their interconnections vary in their degree of influence on each battle. In 
addition, these relationships have been examined in their various manifestations 
throughout the study, and this method has yielded significant findings, which form the 
basis of this concluding chapter. 
Islamic military doctrine was not only the cause and effective motivational factor, as a 
matter primarily of the heart and only secondarily of intellectual conviction, governing the 
other factors in question; it has been shown to be essential to the fruition of the other 
factors. The study has argued that it was the main cause of the huge changes that took 
place among the Arabs, which have been described in the comparisons made in the 
second and third chapters. The present study is the first to discuss the principles of 
Islamic military practice from a chiefly Qur'anic perspective, and has argued that because 
of its particular features, Islamic military doctrine succeeded in unifying the Arabs' loose 
collection of aims into the clear and constant goal of exalting the word of Allah above all, 
which was crucial as cohesion among the Muslims depended absolutely upon faith. It 
demanded obedience to the classical components of the Islamic military doctrine of what 
some modern scholars call the lesserJihäd (which Muslims believe are still binding upon 
them), such as providing the 'three offers' before any clash of arms. It managed to 
stimulate the fighting spirit of the Muslim soldiers, who knew in advance the divine 
promises of victory or martyrdom, which were made conditional upon the willingness to 
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sacrifice wealth and life. However, it must be admitted that not every soldier or lower 
ranking officer was devoted to the cause of Allah, as the Qur'an mentions. Thus the 
Muslims were obliged to observe certain rules and regulations derived from the shari`a 
such as the prohibition of dismembering the dead (one of what the study called the 
"twenty`don'ts"') and that the assistance of non-Muslims was bound by certain limits. The 
doctrine's exhortation to take all appropriate measures to reach its goal through victory or 
martyrdom was, however, limited by the type of strategy being implemented. 
Nevertheless, it encouraged the conviction that although the Muslim should understand 
that divine assistance is a conditional support, the help of Allah is not limited to any 
particular occasion; but even in the heat of battle Allah should not be 
forgotten, as in this 
situation it is recommended that the warriors remember and pray to Allah "in a 
murmuring voice". However, this remembrance and supplication did not permit them to 
neglect the element of al-tawakkul, nor were they permitted to despair of the assistance of 
Allah. It is also very significant that the absence of the excellent example and inspiring 
leadership of Muhammad did not lead the soldiers to abandon their commitment to 
Islamic doctrine, as they showed no sign of reverting to their former ways after his death. 
The study has shown that the Muslims' military leadership was an important factor in its 
effect upon the soldiers. In other words, Islam offered significant philosophical and 
religious tenets and principles whose exercise enabled the leaders to exert a positive 
influence on their soldiers' performance in the five battles under study. One significant 
example of these principles may be reiterated here: according to the Qur'anic concept of 
al-ragib we should understand that from an Islamic perspective all the Muslim leaders 
knew that every leader, even the Prophet himself, has One above hire Who observes his 
actions, which ensured accountability of action and behaviour. We have suggested that 
the unity of leadership, whose roots are found in the unity of doctrine, springs 
intellectually speaking from the theological principle of the unity of Allah, Who is the 
supreme Observer. 
The study has also shown that as Islam has ordained three gradual steps that the Muslim 
leader must consider when applying the quality of courage and al-tagrv in commanding 
the Muslim army, his belief in al-qadar increased his bravery and in turn his performance, 
and this applies equally to his soldiers on the battlefield. In addition, 
during the period 
under study, the leadership was bound by an obligation to continually remind the troops 
of the noble cause of the fighting. Another point to note is that in spite of the principle 
that the Muslim leader or field commander should ideally be among the snbiqün (those 
having precedence in Islam), experience of and competence in military leadership were of 
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greater importance. It should not be forgotten, however, that without exception the 
Muslim leadership at that time was characterised by a strong commitment to Islamic 
doctrinal concepts. This commitment not only created strong bonds of comradeship 
among individuals, groups and their leaders but also bore fruit in a mutual concern and 
just social relations between the leaders and their soldiers. On the one hand, the soldiers 
accepted new forms and varieties of affiliation and obedience, notably to fight under a 
single united leadership without insisting on being commanded by their own tribal 
leadership. On the other hand, the humility of the leadership was a direct result of their 
submission to Islamic military doctrine. 
Islamic military intelligence has also been shown to be crucial to the outcomes of the 
battles. Its role varied according to the missions it conducted. As with the other factors, 
however, it was found to have special features and boundaries, which were fixed by 
Islamic concepts. Important aspects of Islamic military intelligence are discussed in the 
Qur'än and the hadith, among which may be numbered divine assistance of various kinds 
which provided important information, and intelligence activities were also an essential 
element of al-ribätwhich the Qur'än also encourages. 
Further, it was found that although al-mundhir (warner) and al-tatvri}'ah 'dissmulation' 
were essential elements of intelligence gathering, reconnaissance was the method most 
commonly used to collect information. The leader's relationship with his intelligence 
gatherers and his degree of response to their information directly impacted on the 
soldiers' performance. Hence choosing the correct moment to reveal important 
information to the troops was essential, and the leaders' quality of response to their 
intelligence reports and withholding of any potentially disruptive news made the 
intelligence they received particularly effective. Moreover, reliable intelligence gave the 
leaders freedom to take risks, although always within the context of the relationship 
between religious and military decisions. 
Before each of the five battles, the advantage seemed to lie with the adversaries, but for a 
variety of reasons the outcomes were unexpected. As has been made clear, however, not 
all these reasons were equally evident in all the battles, but all have been relevant to the 
discussion. 
The adversaries were distinguished by many differences. The Quryash and their allies 
were not united by doctrinal affiliation. The adversaries were not able to extinguish the 
fighting spirit of the Muslim army. They were able to comprehend only the material 
power, not the moral power - derived from their faith - of the Muslims, and so made a 
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quantitative judgment when a qualitative one was essential. Their actions therefore failed 
to achieve their goals. 
In addition, the adversaries failed to take the initiative; even Abü Sufyän was not equal to 
these new circumstances and misread the unfamiliar aspects of the situations at Badr and 
al-Khandaq, due to the shortcomings of the Quraysh's intelligence activities. The 
adversaries' leaderships relied on their military superiority in men and material, and the 
two empires considered the Muslims to be no different from the Arabs whom they had 
dealt with successfully before. Therefore, strategy at various levels was generally 
insufficiently well considered and executed, especially in the first three battles, showing 
that their failure to appreciate or match the Muslim army's creativity was a weakness of 
the adversaries' plans and performance. The Muslims' setback at Uhud was not due to the 
Quraysh's strategy but to the indiscipline of the archers and the subsequent confusion 
among the Muslim ranks. The similarities and differences between the adversary's 
strengths and weaknesses and their own were discovered and well used by the Muslims. A 
common factor was the relative lack of comradeship binding the adversaries' artnies in 
comparison to that uniting the Muslim soldiers. 
Islamic military strategy during this period was clearly subordinated to the ultimate goal 
of the general Islamic strategy - to serve Allah - and was dedicated to the service of the 
two 'pillars' of that strategy - to defend and/or to spread the faith. In addition, since the 
military aspects of Islamic military strategy are always subservient to the doctrinal aspects, 
as we have seen in the foregoing discussion, the principles of war in this study have been 
constructed through a painstaking search of the Qur'an. As the revelation of Islam 
continued it became evident that the Muslims' military activities were permissible only in 
so far as they were governed by Islamic principles of war. Moreover, some of the 
principles such as morale, unity of command, and cooperation and coordination were 
constant features of the Islamic military strategy in all five battles. Further, all strategic 
decisions were subservient to the ultimate goal, and all military decisions were 
subordinate to religious decisions. Therefore every decision maker, from the supreme 
commander to the lowly soldier on a scouting mission, was duty bound to serve the 
ultimate goal before all others. 
Moreover, the Islamic military strategy emphasised that the power of the Muslim artily 
depended not so much on material strength (numbers of men and amount of equipment) 
as on the army's spiritual force, which derived from the soldiers' zeal and devotion to 
Islam. 
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As we have indicated, the study's claim to originality rests on its delineation of the 
dynamic interrelationship and interaction of the factors under study, and on its 
exploration of the Qur'an and the hadith to illuminate its subject matter and support its 
arguments. 
Since the Muslim leadership acted according to religious tenets and principles, its strategic 
decisions were made in accordance with doctrinal principles. It gathered and used 
intelligence within the limits laid down by Qur'an and the hadith in order to learn and 
understand the methods of the adversary and his weak and strong points. 
While doctrine was a stable factor in all the battles the other factors were subject to 
modification; however, these changes were made in the light of and according to the 
guidance of Islam, as the study has shown. Also the other factors differed in their degree 
of influence according to the exigencies of the battles. 
In addition, we have seen that each of these factors was necessary to victory. The 
performance of the Muslim soldiers was clearly enhanced by their commitment to Islamic 
military doctrine. In all five battles the main goals remained unchanged in spite of the 
changes of command. In addition, it is evident that Jihad was not fought merely for the 
sake of worldly gain nor were civilians attacked. 
Therefore, even though the Muslims' actions may seem superficially indistinguishable 
from those of other armies, the study has argued that they were transformed by the inner 
quality of belief in and commitment to Islam, and has attempted to show that Islam 
purified and transformed the particular virtues of the pre-Islamic Arabs into Muslim 
virtues, directing their energies into the proper channels and prohibiting the old 
undesirable behaviours. So it is not a matter of Islam adding a civilising gloss to barbaric 
traditions, but of a revolutionary change in the fundamental structure of the Arab culture, 
so that the mentality of the Muslim leaders and the soldiers alike was wholly altered. 
Therefore, to consider the battles as we have done from an Islamic point of view is to 
analyse the seeds of the process by which Islam was to flourish into a great power, by 
virtue not only of conquest but also of its civilising influence. 
The study has cast some light on a period of history which, though brief, witnessed 
momentous changes, and on a region which, though small, gave birth to a great 
civilisation. It has explained how a destitute community of refugees, who had been driven 
from their own land to take shelter among strangers came to control the whole peninsula, 
and were able to challenge and defeat the regions' two great powers. 
Indeed what began as apparently no more than an insignificant tribal feud over access to 
resources and forms of worship, of no interest to anyone outside this harsh land, had 
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within a generation become a struggle between a new religion and old order ripe for 
conquest, and the victors were to spread a great civilisation throughout not only the 
Middle East but also north Africa and parts of Asia and Europe. 
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Suggestions for Further Studies 
This study has explained the crucial importance of Islam to the process by which the faith 
was defended and spread, and has argued that these early victories could not have been so 
decisively accomplished (if accomplished at all) without the transformation of the Muslim 
soldiers and their commanders by Islam. 
At the close of this study, it may be useful to make a few suggestions regarding areas of 
further research related to the subject matter of the thesis. 
First: The `twenty `don'ts"' as a coherent body of prohibitions might be compared and 
contrasted with the articles of the Geneva Convention. 
Second: The effect of location on the progress of the battles could be further investigated. 
Third: The routes leading to the battlefields and their selection (as at the battle of Uhud) 
as effective "avenues of approach" could be further examined. 
Fourth: The availability of logistics provided by the surrounding natural resources might 
be investigated. 
Fifth: A study of the major factors between, and their influence, in different periods could 
be made. 
Sixth: the element of al-tawriyah might be more extensively studied. 
Seventh: The major factors considered in this study might be compared from different 
perspectives, for example from those of the sunna and sharf'a. 
Eight: The decision of the leadership to participate actively in the conflict, and the 
advantages and disadvantages of this decision, could be studied. 
Ninth: The authority of a leader to decide on the question of martyrdom might be 
examined. 
Tenth: Two important questions arising in connection with the battle of al-Khandaq could 
be investigated: why was there no coordination or effective communication between the 
allies, i. e. the Banii Qurayzah and the confederates, and why were they unable to derive 
any advantage from the long siege they imposed upon the Muslim army? 
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Verses in Use 
The Verses are listed in according with the numerical order of Qur'anic surahs 
" "On earth will be your dwelling place and your means of livelihood for a time. " 
See the Qur'an (ETMC), 2: 36. 
" "On earth will be your dwelling place and your means of livelihood for a time. 
Then learnt Adam from his Lord certain words and his Lord turned towards him; 
for He is Oft-Returning, Most Merciful. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 2: 37. 
" "Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress limits; for 
Allah loveth not transgressors. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 2: 190. 
" "And fight them on until there is no more Persecution and the religion becomes 
Allah's. But if they cease, let there be no hostility except to those who practice 
oppression". See the Qur'an (ETMC), 2: 193. 
" "Let there be no compulsion in religion. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 2: 256. 
" "Say: "0 Allah! Lord of Power (and Rule), Thou givest power to whom thou 
pleasest, and Thou strippest off power from whom thou pleasest: Thou enduest 
with honour whom Thou pleasest, and thou bringest low whom Thou pleasest: in 
Thy hand is all good. Verily, over all things Thou hast power. " See the Qur'an 
(ETMC), 3: 26. 
" "Let not the believers take for friends or helpers unbelievers rather than believers: 
if any do that, they shall have no relation left with Allah except by way of 
precaution, that ye may guard yourselves from them. But Allah cautions you (to 
fear) Himself; for the final goal is to Allah. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 28. 
" "As for those who sell the faith they owe to Allah and their own solemn plighted 
word for a small price, they shall have no portion in the Hereafter: Nor will AII5h 
(deign to) speak to them or look at them on the day of Judgment nor will He 
cleanse them (of sin): they shall have a grievous Chastisement. " See the Qur'an 
(ETMC), 3: 77. 
" "The first House (of worship) appointed for men was that at Bakkah (another 
name for Mecca): full blessing and guidance for all the worlds. " See the Qur'an 
(ETMC), 3: 96. 
" "In it are Signs Manifest; the station of Abraham; whoever enters it attains 
security; pilgrimage thereto is a duty men owe to Allah. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 
3: 97. 
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" "And remember with gratitude Allah's favour on you; For ye were enemies and He 
joined your hearts in love, so that by His Grace, ye became brethren. " See the 
Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 103. 
" "Allah had helped you at Badr, when ye were Helpless. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 
3: 123. 
" "And that He may take to himself from your ranks Martyr-witnesses (to truth). " 
See the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 140. 
" "If he died or were slain. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 144. 
" "And swiftly shall We reward those that (serve us with) gratitude. " See the Qur'an 
(ETMC), 3: 145. 
" "Allah did indeed fulfil His promise to you when we with His permission were 
about to annihilate your enemy, until ye flinched and fell to disputing about the 
order and disobeyed it after He brought you in sight (of the victory) which ye 
covet. Among you are some that hanker after this world and some that desire the 
Hereafter. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 152. 
" "Those of you who turned back on the day the two hosts met, - it was Satan who 
caused them to fail, because of some (evil) they had done. " See the Qur'an 
(ETMC), 3: 155. 
" "And if you are slain, or die, in the Way of Allah, forgiveness and mercy 
from Allah 
are far better than all they could amass. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 157. 
" "It is part of the Mercy of Allah that thou dost deal gently with them. Wert thou 
severe or harsh-hearted, they would have broken away from about thee: so pass 
over (their faults), and ask for (Allah's) forgiveness for them: and consult them in 
affairs (of moment). Then, when thou hast taken a decision, put thy trust in A11ah. 
For Allah loves those who put their trust (in Him). " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 
159. 
" "No Prophet could (ever) act dishonestly if any person acts dishonestly he shall, 
on the Day of Judgment, restore what he misappropriated; then shall every soul 
receive its due whatever it earned, and none shall be dealt with unjustly. " See the 
Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 161. 
" "And the Hypocrites also. These were told: "Come, fight in the way of Allah, or (at 
least) drive (the foe from your city). " They said: "Had we known there would be a 
fight, we should certainly have followed you. " They were that day nearer to 
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Unbelief than to Faith, saying with their lips what was not in their hearts. But 
Allah hath full knowledge of all they conceal. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 167. 
" "Think not of those who are slain in Allah's way as dead. Nay, they live, finding 
their sustenance from their Lord. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 169. 
" "They rejoiced in the Bounty provided by Allah. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 170. 
" "Those to whom men said: "A great army is gathering against you, so fear them": 
But it (only) increased their Faith: they said: "For us Allah Sufficient, and He is 
the best Guardians. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 3: 173. 
" "And there are, certainly, among the People of the Book, those who believe in 
Allah, in the revelation to you, and in the revelation to them, Bowing in humility 
to Allah: they will not sell the Signs of Allah for a miserable gain! " See the Qur'aii 
(ETMC), 3: 199. 
" "0 ye who believe! Persevere in patience and constancy; vie in such perseverance; 
strengthen each other; and fear Allah; that ye may prosper. " See the Qur'an 
(ETMC), 3: 200. 
" "0 ye who believe! If ye will help (the cause of) Allah, He will help you, and plant 
your feet firmly. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 47: 7. 
" "Then We put thee on the (right) Way of Religion. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 45: 
25. 
" "Allah doth wish to make clear to you and to guide you into the ways of those 
before you; and (He doth wish to) turn to you (in Mercy): and Allah is All- 
knowing, All-wise. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 26. 
" "Hast thou not turned thy thought to those who were given a portion of the Book? 
They believe in Sorcery and Tagut and say to the Unbelievers that they are better 
guided in the (right) way than the Believers! " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 51. 
" "And when ye judge between people that ye judge with justice. " See the Qur'an 
(ETMC), 4: 58. 
" "0 ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those charged with 
authority among you. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 59. 
" "0 ye who believe! Take your precautions and either go forth in parties or go forth 
all together. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 71. 
" "Let those fight in the cause of Allah who sell the life of this world for the 
Hereafter, to him who fighteth in the Cause of Allah whether he is slain or gets 
victory, We give him a reward of great (value). " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 74. 
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" "Let those fight in the cause of Allah who sell the life of this world for the 
Hereafter to him who fighteth in the cause of Allah, whether he is slain or gets 
victory soon shall We give him a reward of great (value). " 
" "Those who believe fight in the Cause of Allah, and those who reject faith fight in 
the cause of Evil (Tagut): so fight ye against the friends of Satan: feeble indeed is 
the cunning of Satan. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 76. 
" "And rouse the Believers. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 84. 
" "Go ye forth, (whether equipped) lightly or heavily, and strive and struggle, with 
your goods and your persons, in the Cause of Allah" See the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 
94. 
" "0 ye who believe! When ye go out in the cause of Allah, investigate carefully, and 
say not to any one who offers you a salutation: "Thou art none of a Believer! .... 
Therefore carefully investigate. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 94. 
" "Not equal are those Believers who sit (at home) except those who are disabled. 
And those who strive and fight in the Cause of Allah with their goods and their 
persons. Allah hath granted a grade higher to those who strive and fight. " See the 
Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 95. 
" "When ye travel through the earth, there is no blame on you if ye shorten your 
prayers, for fear the Unbelievers may attack you: For the Unbelievers are unto you 
open enemies. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 101. 
" "When thou (0 Messenger) art with them, and standest to lead them in prayer, let 
"one party of them stand up (in prayer) with thee, taking their arms with them; 
when they finish their prostrations, let them take their positions in the rear. And 
let the other party come up - which hath not yet prayed - and let them pray with 
thee, taking all precautions, and bearing arms. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 4: 102. 
" "Who can be better in religion than one who submits his whole self to Allah, does 
good, and follows the way of Abraham the truth in faith. " See the Qur'an 
(ETMC), 4: 125. 
" "Help ye one another in righteousness and piety, but help ye not one another in 
sin and rancour. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 5: 2. 
" "Do they then seek after a judgment of (the Days of) Ignorance? But who, for a 
people whose faith is assured, can give better judgment than Allah? " See the 
Qur'an (ETMC), 5: 50. 
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" "Your (real) friends are (no less than) Allah, His Messenger, and the believers, 
those who establish the regular prayers and pay al-Zakat and bow down humbly 
(in worship). " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 5: 55. 
" "0 ye who believe! Take not for friends and protectors those who take your 
religion for a mockery or sport whether among those who received the scripture 
before you, or among those who reject faith: but fear Allah, if ye have faith 
(indeed). " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 5: 57. 
" "0 Messenger! Proclaim (the Message) which hath been sent to thee from thy 
Lord. If thou didst not, thou wouldst not have fulfilled and proclaimed His 
Mission. And Allah will defend thee from men (who mean mischief). For Allah 
guideth not those who reject Faith. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 5: 67. 
" "When it is said to them: "Come to what Allah Hath revealed; come to the 
Messenger": They say: "Enough for us are the ways we found our fathers 
following. " What! Even though their fathers were void of knowledge and 
guidance? " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 5: 104. 
" "He knoweth the Unseen. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 6: 73. 
" "To whom We gave life" See the Qur'an (ETMC), 6: 122. 
" "Verily, this is My way leading straight: follow it: follow not (other) paths: they 
will scatter you about From His path. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 6: 153. 
" "He hath raised you in ranks, some above others that He may try you in the gifts 
He hath given you. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 6: 165. 
" "Behold! Allah promised you one of the two parties, that it should be yours: Ye 
wished that the one unarmed should be yours, but Allah willed to establish the 
Truth according to His words and to cut off the roots of the Unbelievers. " See the 
Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 7. 
" "Remember ye implored the assistance of your Lord. And He answered you: "1 will 
assist you with a thousand of the angels, ranks on ranks. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 
8: 9. 
" "Remember He covered you with drowsiness, to give you calm as from Himself, 
and He caused rain to descend on you from heaven, to clean you therewith, to 
remove from you the stain of Satan, to strengthen your hearts, and to plant your 
feet firmly therewith. " See the Qur'an, 8: 11. 
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" "Remember thy Lord inspired the Angels (with the message): "I am with you: give 
firmness to the Believers: I will instil tenor into the hearts of the Unbelievers. " 
See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 12. 
" "0 ye who believe! When ye meet the unbelievers in hostile array, never turn your 
backs to them. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 15. 
" "If any do turn his back to then on such a day - unless it be in a stratagem of war, 
or retreat to a troop (of his own)- he draws on himself the wrath of Allah, and his 
abode is hell, - an evil refuge (indeed)! " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 16. 
" "0 ye that believe! Betray not the trust Of Allah and the Messenger, nor 
misappropriate knowingly things entrusted to you. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 
27. 
" "On the Day of Furq n (Discrimination)- the day of the meeting of the two 
forces. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 41. 
" "And know that out of all the booty that ye may acquire (in war), a fifth share is 
assigned to Allah, and to the Messenger, and to near relatives, orphans, the needy, 
and the wayfarer. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 41. 
" "Remember ye were on the hither side of the valley, and they on the farther side, 
and the caravan on lower ground than ye. Even if ye had made a mutual 
appointment to meet, ye would certainly have failed in the appointment: But (thus 
ye met), that Allah might accomplish a matter already decided. " See the Qur'an 
(ETMC), 8: 42. 
" "Remember in thy dream Allah showed them to thee as few: if He had shown 
them to thee as many, ye would surely have been discouraged. " See the Qur'an, 8: 
43. 
" "That Allah might accomplish a matter already decided and unto Allah are all 
matters returned. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 44. 
" "0 ye who believe! When ye meet a force, be firm, and call A115h in remembrance 
much (and often); that ye may prosper. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 45. 
" "And obey Allah and His Messenger; and fall into no disputes. Lest ye lose heart 
and your power depart; and be patient and persevering: For Allah is with those 
who patiently persevere. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 46. 
" "And be not like those who started from their homes insolently and to be seen of 
men, and to hinder (men) from the path of Allah. For Allah compasseth all that 
they do. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 47. 
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" "Remember Satan made their (sinful) acts seem alluring to them, and said: "No 
one among men can overcome you this day, while I am near to you. " But when the 
two forces came in sight of each other, he turned on his heels, and said: "Lo! I am 
clear of you; Lo! I see what ye see not; Lo! I fear Allah; for Allah is strict in 
punishment. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 48. 
" "If ye gain the mastery over them in war, disperse, with them, those who follow 
them. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 57. 
" "Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including 
steeds of war, to strike terror into (the heart of) the enemies, of Allah and your 
enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know. 
Whatever ye shall spend in the Cause of Allah, shall be repaid into you, and ye 
shall not be treated unjustly. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 60. 
" "But if the enemy incline towards peace, do thou (also) incline towards peace. " 
See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 61. 
" "If there are twenty amongst you, patient and persevering, they will vanquish two 
hundred: if a hundred, they will vanquish a thousand of the Unbelievers. " See the 
Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 65. 
" "It is not fitting for a Prophet that he should have prisoners of war until he hath 
thoroughly subdued the land. Ye look for the temporal goods of this world; but 
Allah looketh to the Hereafter. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 67. 
" "Those who believed, and emigrated and fought for the faith, with their property 
and their person, in the Cause of Allah, as well as those who gave (them) asylum 
and aid; these are (all) friends and protectors, one of another. " See the Qur'an 
(ETMC), 8: 72. 
" "Those who believe, and emigrate, and fight for the faith, in the Cause of Allah, as 
well as those who give (them) asylum and aid, - these are (all) in very truth the 
Believers: for them is the forgiveness of sins and a provision most generous. " See 
the Qur'an (ETMC), 8: 74. 
" "Beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war). " See the 
Qur'an (ETMC), 9: 5. 
" "0 ye who believe! take not for protectors your fathers and your brothers if they 
love infidelity above Faith: if any of you do so, they do wrong. " See the Qur'an 
(ETMC), 9: 23. 
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" "On the day of Hunain: behold! your great numbers elated you, but they availed 
you naught: the land, for all that it is wide, did constrain you, and ye turned back 
in retreat. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 9: 25. 
" "Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day ... until they pay the Jizyd'. 
See the Qur'an (ETMC), 9: 29 
" "Say: can you expect for us (any fate) other than one of two glorious things- 
(Martyrdom or victory)? " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 9: 52. 
" "They will present their excuses to you when ye return to them. Say thou: 
"Present no excuses: we shall not believe you: Allah bath already informed us of 
the true state of matters concerning you. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 9: 94. 
" "Allah bath purchased of the Believers their persons and their goods; for theirs (in 
return) is the Garden (of Paradise): they fight in His Cause and slay and are slain: 
a promise binding on Him in truth, through The Torah, The Gospel, and the 
Qur'an: and who is more faithful to his covenant than Allah? Then rejoice in the 
bargain which ye have concluded: that is the achievement supreme. " See the 
Qur'an (ETMC), 9: 111. 
" "It is not for the Believers to go forth together: if a contingent from every 
expedition go forth to devote themselves to studies in religion, and admonish the 
people when they return to them, that thus they (may learn) to guard themselves 
(against evil). " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 9: 122. 
" "Now hath come unto you a Messenger from amongst yourselves: it grieves him 
that ye should suffer, ardently anxious is he over you: to the Believers is he most 
kind and merciful. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 9: 128. 
" "Those who fulfil the Covenant of Allah and fail not in their plighted word. " See 
the Qur'an (ETMC), 13: 20. 
" "Is then He Who standeth over every soul (and knoweth) all that it doth? " See the 
Qur'an (ETMC), 13: 33. 
" "We have sent down to thee the Book explaining all things, a Guide, a Mercy, and 
glad tidings to the Muslims. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 16: 89. 
" "Allah commands justice, the doing of good, and giving to kith and kin, and He 
forbids all indecent deeds, and evil and rebellion: He instructs you, that ye may 
receive admonition. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 16: 90. 
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" "Fulfil the Covenant of Allah when ye have entered into it, and break not your 
oaths after ye have confirmed them; Indeed ye have made Allah your surety; for 
Allah knoweth all that ye do. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 16: 91. 
" "Invite (all) to the Way of thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching; and 
argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious: for thy Lord knoweth 
best, who have strayed from His Path, and who receive guidance. " See the Qur'an 
(ETMC), 16: 125. 
" "And if ye punish, let your punishment be proportionate to the wrong that has 
been done to you: But if ye show patience, that is indeed the best (course) for 
those who are patient. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 16: 126. 
" "Make not thy hand tied (like a niggard's) to thy neck, nor stretch it forth to its 
utmost reach, so that thou become blameworthy and destitute. " See the Qur'an 
(ETMC), 17: 29. 
" "Not a messenger did we send before thee without this inspiration sent by us to 
him: that there is no God but I; therefore worship and serve Me. " See the Qur'an 
(ETMC), 21: 25. 
" "We sent thee not, but as a mercy for all creatures. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 21: 
107. 
" "And We have made from water every living thing. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 21: 
30. 
" "To those against whom war is made, permission is given (to fight), because they 
are wronged; - and verily, Allah is Most Powerful for their aid; - (they are) those 
who have been expelled from their homes in defiance of right, - (for no cause- 
except that they say: "Our Lord is Allah. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 22: 39 & 40. 
" "And strive hard in Allah's Cause as you ought to strive (with sincerity and with 
all your efforts that His Name should be superior). He has chosen you (to convey 
His Message of Islamic Monotheism to mankind by inviting them to His Religion 
of Islam). " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 22: 78. 
" "Only those are Believers, who believe in Allah and His Messenger: when they 
are with him on a matter requiring collective action, they do not depart until they 
have asked for his leave: those who ask for thy leave are those who believe in 
Allah and His Messenger. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 24: 62. 
" "But only he (will prosper) that brings to Allah a sound heart. " See the Qur'an 
(ETMC), 26: 89. 
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" "On that day shall the Believers rejoice. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 30: 4. 
" "Now no person knows what delights of the eye are kept hidden (in reserve) for 
them as a reward for their good deeds. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 32: 17. 
" "Allah has not made for any man two hearts. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 33: 4. 
" "But We sent against them a hurricane and forces that you saw not: But Allah sees 
clearly all that ye do. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 33: 9. 
" "Behold! They came on you from above you and from below you, and behold, the 
eyes swerved and the hearts gaped up to the throats, and ye imagined various 
(vain) thoughts about Allah! " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 33: 10. 
" "In that situation were the believers tried: they were shaken as by a tremendous 
shaking. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 33: 11. 
" "And behold! The Hypocrites and those in whose hearts is a disease say: "Allah 
and His Messenger promised us nothing but delusions! " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 
33: 12. 
" "Ye have indeed in the Messenger of Allah an excellent example for him who he 
hopes in Allah and the Final Day, and who remembers Allah much. " See the 
Qur'an (ETMC), 33: 21. 
" "And Allah turned back the non-believers for (all) their fury: no advantage did 
they gain; and enough is Allah for the believers in their fight. " See Qur'an 
(ETMC), 33: 25. 
" "From Whom is not hidden the least little atom in the heavens or in earth: nor is 
there anything less than that, or greater, but is in the record perspicuous. " See the 
Qur'an (ETMC), 34: 3. 
" "We have not sent thee but as a (Messenger) to all mankind, giving them Glad 
tidings, and warning them (against sin), but most men know not. " See the Qur'an 
(ETMC), 34: 28. 
" "Who (conduct) their affairs by mutual consultation. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 42: 
38. 
" "Therefore, when ye meet the Unbelievers (in fight) smite at their necks; at 
length, when ye have thoroughly subdued them, bind (the captives) firmly: 
therefore (is the time) either, generosity or ransom until the war lays down its 
burdens. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 47: 4. 
" "0 ye who believe! If ye will help (The Cause of) Allah, He will help you, and 
plant your feet firmly. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 47: 7. 
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" "While the Unbelievers got up in their hearts Heat and cant-the heat and cant of 
Ignorance. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 48: 26. 
" "0 ye who believe! If a sinner comes to you with any news ascertain the truth, lest 
ye harm people unwittingly, and afterwards become full of repentance for what ye 
have done. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 49: 6. 
" "But Allah has endeared Faith to you, and Has made it beautified in your hearts, 
and He Has made hateful to you Unbelief, wrongdoing, and Rebellion: such 
indeed are those who walk in righteousness. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 49: 7. 
" "0 ye who believe! Avoid suspicion as much (as possible): for suspicion in some 
cases is a sin: And spy not on each other, nor speak ill of each other behind their 
back,... Spy not on each other. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 49: 12. 
" "I have only created Jinns and men, that they may serve Me. " See the Qur'an 
(ETMC), 51: 56. 
" "Soon will their multitude be put to flight, and they will show their backs. " See the 
Qur'an (ETMC), 54: 45. 
" "Verily, all things have We created in proportion and measure. " See the Qur'an 
(ETMC), 54: 49. 
" "(Some part is due) to the indigent Muhajirs, those who were expelled from their 
homes and their property, while seeking Grace from Allah and (His) Good 
Pleasure, and aiding Allah and His Messenger: such are indeed the truthful". See 
the Qur'an (ETMC), 59: 8. 
" "And those who before them, had homes (in Medina) and had adopted the Faith, 
show their affection to such as came to them for refuge and entertain no desire in 
their hearts for things given to the (latter), but give them preference over 
themselves even though poverty was their (own lot). And those saved from the 
covetousness of their own souls, - they are the ones that achieve prosperity. " See 
the Qur'an (ETMC), 59: 9. 
" "Thou wouldst think they were united, but their hearts are divided. " See the 
Qur'an (ETMC), 59: 14. 
" "0 ye who believe! Take not My enemies and yours as friends (or protectors), 
offering them (your) love, even though they have rejected the Truth that has 
come to you, and have (on the contrary) driven out the Messenger and yourselves 
(from your homes), (simply) because ye believe in Allah your Lord! If ye have 
come out to strive in My Way and to Seek My Good Pleasure, showing friendship 
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unto them in secret: for I know full well all that ye conceal and all that ye reveal. 
And any of you that does this has strayed from the Straight Path. " See the Qur'an 
(ETMC), 60: 1. 
" "Allah forbids you not, with regard to those who fight you not for (your) faith nor 
drive you out of your homes, for dealing kindly and justly with them: For Allah 
loveth those who are just. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 60: 8. 
" "Truly Allah loves those who fight in His Cause in battle array, as if they were a 
solid cemented structure. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 61: 4. 
" "0 ye who believe! Shall I lead you to a bargain that will save you from a grievous 
Chastisement? " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 61: 10. 
" "That ye believe in Allah and his Messenger, and that ye strive (your utmost) in 
the Cause of Allah, with your wealth and your persons: That will be best for you, 
If ye but knew! " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 61: 11. 
" "He will forgive you your sins, and admit you to the Garden, beneath which rivers 
flow, and beautiful mansions in Gardens of Eternity: that is indeed the supreme 
Triumph. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 61: 12. 
" "0 Prophet! Strive hard against the Unbelievers and the Hypocrites, and be 
firm 
against them. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 66: 9. 
" "And have patience with what they say, and leave them with noble (dignity). " See 
the Qur'an (ETMC), 73: 10. 
" "May arrive at certainty. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 74: 31. 
" "We showed him the way: Whether he be grateful or ungrateful. " See the Qur'an 
(ETMC), 76: 3. 
" "For the familiarity of the Quraysh, their familiarity with the journeys by winter 
and summer. " See the Qur'an (ETMC), 106: 1&2. 
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The glossaries have been used are: 
o Ahlaf: (sing. Hilf) making alliances between tribes. 
o Allah: God; the name of the Creator of the universe. 
o Al-`Anvil: (pl. 'Umala') one who, although not a Muslim, helps the Muslims. 
o Al-Ansar: (sing. al-Ansari) the Helpers. This is the epithet given to the Medinians 
who helped Muhammad. 
o Agida: (pl. 'Agä'id) doctrine, dogma, faith, belief, creed. 
o 'Asabiyyah: Tribal loyalty, Group solidarity, kinship ethos. 
o Asbab al-Nuziil: (sing. Sabab al-Nusül) occasions of revelation. 
o Al `Asharah al-Mubashsharün bi al-Jannah: The Ten who were promised or glad 
tiding of Paradise by the Prophet. 
o Aswaq: (sing. Süq) the markets or fairs which used to be held annually in the 
Arabian Peninsula. 
o Al-Aws: Major Arab tribe of Medina which constituted an important section of the 
Ansar after the arrival of the Prophet in Medina. 
o 'Ayn: (pl. 'Uyün) a spy, scout. 
o Badiyat al-'Iraq or al-Simawah: The area comprising the eastern part of the 
Arabian Peninsula and the southern part of Iraq. 
o Badiyat al-Sham: The area comprising the northern part of the Arabian Peninsula 
and southern Syria. 
o Banü Qaynuga', Banü Qurayzah, and Banü al-Nadir: Major Jewish tribes in 
Medina. 
o Al-Dalil: (pl. Adila') guide; one that knows the area and its routes. 
o Al-Dirayah: Cognizance of the hadith. 
o Fatwa: (pl. Fatawa) a technical term used in Islamic law to indicate a formal legal 
judgement or view. 
o Fiqh: Islamic Jurisprudence. 
o Fitnah: (pl. Fitan) turmoil; also temptation, trial, enchantment, civil war, strife. 
o Ghazwa: (p1. Ghazawat) the battles the Prophet led himself. 
o Hadith: (pl. in English `Hadiths' - In Arabic `Ahadith') the tradition of the Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH). It is the second source of the shan`a. 
o Al-Hajj: Pilgrimage to Mecca. 
o Harb: (pl. Hurüb) war. 
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o Hijrah: The Migration of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina in 622, which 
became Year 1 of the Muslim lunar calendar. 
o Ijmac: Consensus. 
o Isnäd: chain of authorities at the beginning of aI ladith. 
o Al-Jähiliyyah: State of ignorance. The Arabic word is used to designate the pre- 
Islamic period. 
o A1-Jizyah: Poll tax imposed on non-Muslims in areas ruled by Muslims. 
o Al-Kacbah: The black cubic building in Mecca towards which Muslims face during 
their prayers. Muslims believe it to be the first house of A115h, built by Adam. 
Pilgrimage is said to have been made to it since the days of Abraham, who rebuilt 
it and began the practice of pilgrimage, calling on others to perform it. 
o Khalc: Annulment of an alliance between tribes. 
o Al-Khazraj: Major Arab tribe in Medina which constituted an important section of 
the Ansär. 
o Kutub al-Sihäh al-Sittah: The Six Authentic Books. The title given to the six most 
trustworthy collections of traditions received by Sunni Muslims, namely, those by: 
Sähih al-Bukhäri, Sahih Muslim, Sunan al-Tirmidhi, Sunan Ibn Mäjah, Sunan Abü 
Dä'üd, and Sunan al-Nasä'i. 
o Al-Lawb al-Mahfüz: (The Preserved Tablet) a book in which A11äh has recorded 
all things that will come to pass before bringing them into existence and according 
to predestined proportions and measures known only to Himself. 
o Al-Maghäzi: (sing. ghazawät) battles, military campaigns, expeditions, especially 
those undertaken by the Prophet Muhammad. 
o Matn: (pl. mutün) the main text of a hadith. 
o Mecca: The holy city of Islam where the faith was first revealed, towards which 
Muslims turn during prayer and to which they undertake pilgrimage (al-Ilajj). 
o Medina: the second holiest city in Islam after Mecca. It was the city to which the 
Prophet migrated to and the first headquarters of Islam. 
o Al-Mum'inün: (sing. mu'min) the Faithful. 
o Al-Munäfigün: (sing. munäfiq) hypocrites. 
o Al-Mundhir: (pl. mundhirün) warner; one who alerts others to an impending 
danger which he has seen and reported without being assigned to do so by his 
group. 
o Al-Murtadün: (sing. Murtad) those who abandon their faith or religion. 
o Al-Nasi': Postponing one of the sacred months. 
o PBUH: Peace Be Upon Him. 
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o PBUTA: Peace Be Upon Them All, the Prophets and Messengers. 
o Al-Qada': Perfect commanding, decreeing, ruling, accomplishing and perfect 
precision in execution. 
o Al-Qadar: Setting, commanding, executing, and encompassing in due and precise 
proportions. 
o Qur'an: Islam's holiest book, being the uncreated word of Allah revealed through 
Jibril (Gabriel) to the Prophet Muhammad. It is the primary source of the shariýa. 
o Quraysh: Major tribe in Mecca to which the Prophet Muhammad belonged. 
o Al-Ragib: (pl. rugaba') the watcher, observer; one of the ninety-nine names of 
or attributes of A11ah. 
o Al-Riwayah: (pl. al-Riwayat) narration, transmission of the hadith. 
o Sabigiin: (sing. sabiq) those having precedence in Islam. 
o Al-Shari°a: The right way of religion, the law, including both the reaching of the 
Qur'an and of the sunna. 
o Shaykh: (pl. shuyiikh) old man, chief, title of respect for Islamic religious leader, 
tribal head. 
o Al-Sirah: (pl. siyar) biography, particularly that of the Prophet Muhammad. 
o Al-Sunna: Often used as a synonym for the hadith, but more properly the mode of 
life of the Prophet. There is a slight difference between them, for a hadith may not 
contain any sunna or a single hadith may contain more than one sunna 
o Surah: (pl. suwar) chapter of the Qur'an. 
o Tafsir: (pl. tafasir) exegesis, interpretation, commentary, especially relating to the 
Qur'an. 
o Al-Tawakkul: Trust in Allah. 
o Al-Tawriyah: A pun or dissimulation. 
o AI-Zakah: (pl. Zakawat) obligatory alms tax which constitutes one of the five 
pillars of Islam. 
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